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Abstract 
In this thesis I explore the problem of the nature of modem technology by posing the 
question: 'What is the essence of Heidegger's critique of modern teehnology and 
what are its limitations as an account of our relationship to technology?' My 
response is that Heidegger's critique of technology rests upon an investigation of the 
understanding of the being of beings in modem philosophy and the manner in which 
this underpins the modem conception of human existence and scientific knowledge. 
I argue that Heidegger's work on the metaphysical foundations which underlie the 
union of modem science and techn,ology yielded two crucial findings. Firstly, the 
form of knowledge manifest in modem science is indistinguishable from the 
practical knowledge that Aristotle called techne. Secondly, throughout the history of 
Western metaphysics being itself has been understood through an analogy with 
artefacts. Heidegger reaches the first of these conclusions through a critique of the 
role of the subject in modem metaphysics. This critique consists in a demonstration 
of the fact that modem philosophy has produced a distorted account of human 
existence because it has unwittingly carried over an understanding of being and 
scientific knowledge from medieval philosophy. Heidegger correctly ~gues that 
throughout the history of Western philosophy priority has been given to 'substance' 
as a means of understanding being; this i~ coupled with the fact that being has been 
understood through an analogy with artefacts. I argue that Heidegger's critique of 
technology reveals the structure of natural science in the ancient, medieval and 
modem periods to be dependent upon the different senses in which beings were 
understood as artefacts in each period. Furthermore, I argue that despite deficiencies 
in his interpretation of Descartes and his elevation of a dogmatic reading of the 
history of metaphysics to a description of the nature of being itself, Heidegger's 
critique of the priority given to substance remains an insightful demonstration of the 
necil to rethink our account of being. 
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Introduction 
One of the dominant features of our society is its dependence upon, and pursuit of, 
technology. It is a commonplace to observe that modem technological advances 
have greatly expanded the scope of human action. Indeed, we are now capable of 
transforming and manipulating both ourselves and the natural world in ways that are 
unprecedented in their scale and radicality. This new found power of action is, 
however, by no means a pure good for humanity. Modem technology, despite its 
advances over its predecessors, remains a means to an end, and in this sense can be 
both good and bad depending upon the purpose to which it is put. Therefore, our 
reflection on modem technology is, by necessity, mostly concerned with establishing 
how new technologies should be employed and which new possibilities should be 
pursued. 
This ethical reflection on technology can be divided into two parts, namely into 
concerns over the nature of particular new technological devices or techniques, and 
concern over the large scale system that produces such new devices. The necessity 
of reflection on the implications of new technological devices is obvious as they 
simultaneously hold the potential for achieving great good and great harm. For 
example, such technologies as genetic engineering and nuclear technology open a 
great wealth of new possibilities for human action. Yet, from our mastery of nuclear 
technology we are able to produce both nuclear weapons and nuclear medicine. We 
can use nuclear technology to generate electricity without producing air pollution, 
yet this process generates highly dangerous nuclear waste. Similarly we derive 
genetic therapy from our growing mastery of genetic engineering, yet we are also 
confronted with the problematic expansion of property rights over the genetic 
structures of natural creatures. Thus, such advances call for constant vigilance in 
order that they be used for the good. 
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The second aspect of the ethical reflection on modem technology concerns not its 
individual products, but the system from which they are produced. This need not be 
restricted to mechanical and industrial processes, rather it can include the entire 
social structure that underpins them. Modem technological products are not 
generally produced by a single craftsman from materials that he has gathered 
himself, rather they are produced through the operation of a massive social 
apparatus. The importance of reflecting upon the means of production that are 
characteristic of modem technology stems from the fact that the character of other 
aspects of society are, in part, drawri from them. The political, cultural, educational, 
economic and medical aspects of a society are all closely linked to the means of 
production that are characteristic of that society. Thus, for example, the industrial 
revolution was not merely a change in manufacturing techniques, it was also a 
revolution in the organisation of society in general. 
These approaches are vitally important both for understanding the structure of 
modem society and for its effective practical administration. However, if we focus 
exclusively on the potential for good or ill of each new technological development, 
then we come to no insight into the foundations of modem technology as such. 
Given that technology is not anexclusively modem innovation, what is the 
distinctive character of modem technology which makes it such an effective tool? 
The consideration of particular technological developments gives us no 
understanding of what it is that is new and distinctive about modern technology, as 
opposed to ancient or medieval technologies. Furthermore, what is it about our 
relationship to technology that causes it to be pursued so vigorously by modem 
society? Certainly we pursue technology in order to improve the material conditions 
oflife, however, this was also true of previous ages and yet technology was not 
pursued with the same vigour as it is in modernity. These questions can only be 
answered by an investigation of the essence of modem technology, not through an 
examination of its ever changing products. 
In pursuit of an account of the essence of modem technology I intend to examine the 
works of Martin Heidegger. Whilst Heidegger is by no means the only philosopher 
to have devoted their attention to technology, he remains unique in his attempt to 
determine the metaphysical foundations which underpin modem technology. He 
does not conduct a close examination of the effect modem technology has had upon 
society and politics. Indeed, far more detailed examinations of that issue have been 
developed by thinkers associated with the Marxist tradition. I have in mind thinkers 
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from the 'Frankfurt School', such as Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter 
Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse and Jfugen Habermas. Furthermore, Heidegger does not 
closely examine specific instances in the history of technological development. His 
critique of modem technology is focused entirely upon the metaphysical framework 
within which modem technology has developed. 
Due to the unique manner in which Heidegger examines modem technology, he is 
able to demonstrate that the interdependence of science and technology in the 
modem age is not an accidental matter. Rather, he argues, modem science itself is 
essentially technological. The crucial point of this argument is the claim that the 
'nature' addressed by modem physics is not simply observed and grasped by the 
intellect, as was the case in Aristotelian and medieval science, but is conceived in 
advance and subsequently produced through experimentation. Thus, Heidegger 
explains the explosion of technology in the modem era, not in terms of specific 
scientific discoveries or technical innovations, nor as a function of economic and 
social change, but as a metaphysical problem of how we understand beings in 
general. By pursuing Heidegger's critique I am not suggesting that these other 
approaches do not have their own validity. Rather, it is simply that he addresses, at 
its most fundamental level, the relationship between science and technology in the 
modem age. 
I intend, therefore, to address this problem of the essence of modem technology by 
asking 'What is the substance of Heidegger's account of modern technology and 
what are its limits as an account of our relationship to technology?' In my response 
to these questions I will not immediately tum to Heidegger's most famous attempt to 
describe the essence of modem technology, namely his 1954 essay The Question 
Concerning Technology (Die Frage nach der Technik). Although this essay forms 
the central focus of many considerations of Heidegger's critique of technology, I 
believe that both this essay and his critique in general cannot be properly understood 
and evaluated unless they are read in the context of his previous analyses of the 
relationship between modem science and metaphysics. With this in mind, I will only 
address The Question Concerning Technology in the final chapter of this study. 
Indeed, before I examine any of Heidegger's work directly I will use the initial two 
chapters to provide a sketch of the conceptual foundations that underpin modem 
science. I will do this by establishing the points of dispute between empiricists, 
Southwest German neo-Kantians, and Dilthey. This discussion, apart from 
illuminating the nature of modem science, will also provide a background for chapter 
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three in which I will provide an interpretation of Heidegger's Being and Time (1927). 
In the final three chapters I will provide a direct account of Heidegger's critique of 
technology, which will culminate in a discussion of his 1954 essay. Thus, the 
following discussion of The Question Concerning Technology is merely intended as 
an introduction to themes that I will address in more detail in chapters three to six. 
1. 
In his 1954 essay Heidegger attempted to answer the question, 'what is modem 
technology?' The sense of this first question is provided by an initial reflection on 
the broader question 'what is technology as such?' He notes that we have a ready 
answer for this second question according to which technology is simply an 
instrument which man employs in order to attain the ends which he sees as desirable. 
He argues that: 
Everyone knows the two statements that answer our question. One says: 
Technology is a means to an end. The other says: Technology is a human activity. 
The two definitions of technology belong together. For to posit ends and procure 
and utilize the means to them is a human activity. The manufacture and utilization 
of equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured and used things themselves, 
and the needs and ends that they serve, all belong to what technology is. The whole 
complex of these contrivances is technology. Technology is itself a contrivance, or, 
in Latin, an instrumentum.1 
This 'instrumental and anthropological' definition of technology subsumes several 
distinct senses of 'technology'. We commonly use 'technology' to refer variously to 
the knowledge that is involved in a practical art, to the· artifacts that are produced 
through the employment of such a practical art, or even to the devices and tools that 
are used in any productive process. Heidegger argues that these senses all refer to 
some aspect of man's practical activities. It is due to their belonging within this 
instrumental context that they are all referred to as 'technology'. 
This definition of technology is accurate, and yet it is so broad that it is able to 
encompass all forms of technology, ancient, medieval, and modem. In the sense that 
they are all means to an end, there is no distinction between these categories. Thus, 
given that Heidegger is asking about the nature of modern technology, this 
instrumental definition is inadequate for his purpose. What is required is an 
understanding of what is 'new' about modern technology such that its character, 
1 Martin Heidegger, The QuestiOn Concerning Technology, trans. William Lovitt, (Harper & Row 
Publishers, NewYork, 1977). p4-5. 
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within this initial restriction to the realm of instrumentality, can be distinguished 
from previous forms of technology. 
Another common opinion has it that the specific difference of modem technology is 
its use of modem science. It is through the use of the knowledge of nature that has 
been gained by modem physics, chemistry, biology and so on, that modem 
--
technology acquires its distinctive characteristics. Once again, this ready answer is 
not wrong, for it cannot be denied that modem technology relies heavily upon 
modem scientific knowledge. Yet, this relationship is more complicated than it first 
appears for it is not only the case that technology employs science, but also that 
modem science employs technology. As Heidegger argues: 
It is said that modern technology is something incomparably different from all 
earlier technologies because it is based on modern physics as an exact science. 
Meanwhile we have come to understand inore clearly that the reverse holds true as 
well. Modern physics, as experimental, is dependent upon technical apparatus and 
upon progress in the building of apparatus.2 
Thus, following the clue that is contained in this conception of modem technology, 
we are led to a series of problems concerning the nature of both modem science and 
modem technology. If, as Heidegger contends, modem science is essentially 
involved with modem technology, then the question concerning technology is 
equally the question concerning science. Indeed, as will become clear, the heart of 
Heidegger's discussion of the essence of technology is the recognition that modem 
science is a form of productive knowledge, or 'techne' to use Aristotle's term, and 
that its object is an artefact. Heidegger, through his investigations of ancient Greek 
and Medieval philosophy, eventually sees that natural objects have predominantly 
been understood as artefacts in the Western philosophical tradition. However, the 
sense in which objects are 'created' changes throughout this period. Heidegger's 
important insight is the recognition that this ontological tradition remains present, 
albeit in a new form, in modem philosophy. 
2. 
Although this alliance of scientific knowledge and technological production seems 
commonplace, it is in fact a distinctively modem achi~vement. It unites two 
concerns that were held to be separate from the first moments of Western philosophy 
and science in ancient Greece until the dawn of the modem age. In order to display 
2 Heidegger, QCT, pl4. 
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the extent to which this unity of science and technology involves a transformation of 
some of the most fundamental concepts of Western philosophy, I will briefly outline 
Aristotle's conception of episteme and techne and contrast them with Francis 
Bacon's distinctively modem proclamation that 'human knowledge and human 
power come to the same thing'. Although they are separated by a period of roughly 
two millennia, it is instructive to compare these two thinkers because the proper 
nature of science is addressed as a question by both, rather than as something which 
is merely to be assumed. 
In his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguished between two parts of the soul, 
the rational and the irrational. He bases these distinctions within the soul on the 
argument that 'knowledge presupposes a certain kinship of subject and object' and 
that different kinds of objects will be known by different parts of the .soul. He further 
divides the rational part into two elements. With one part 'we apprehend the realities 
whose fundamental principles do not admit of being other than they are ... ', and with 
the other rational part of the soul 'we apprehend things which do admit of being 
other.'3 That is, one part is devoted to the apprehension of necessary and unchanging 
reality and the other part to contingent matters. He goes on to call the first element 
the 'scientific element' and the other the 'calculative element'. The calculative 
element is further divided in two on the basis that it contains both a faculty by which 
we act rationally, and a faculty by which we produce rationally. 
This series of distinctions provides the groundwork within which the relationship of 
'scientific knowledge' to 'productive knowledge', understood as translations of 
episteme and techne, was understood by Aristotle. Essentially they are distinguished 
by their respective aims, objects, and relative values. Episteme is defined very 
strictly as knowledge of that which is by necessity, of those things which must be as 
they are and cannot be otherwise. Aristotle argues that, as a consequence of the fact 
that science deals with what is by necessity, an object of scientific knowledge is also 
eternal. He argues that 'everything that exists of necessity in an unqualified sense is 
eternal, and what is eternal is ungenerated and imperishable (and hence cannot be 
otherwise). '4 In keeping with the necessity of its object, scientific knowledge itself . 
must be demonstrable. One cannot be said to have scientific knowledge in the fullest 
sense unless one has knowledge of the principles and causes from which it is derived. 
3 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald, (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1962), Book VI, 
1139a5-10. 
4 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, 1139b20-25. 
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However, as all demonstrations must assume the principles upon which they proceed, 
Aristotle notes that we must attain these first principles by induction, rather than by 
demonstration through the use of syllogisms. 
In contrast, the objects of the calculative rational element which includes both 
productive knowledge (techne) and practical wisdom (phronesis), are things which 
-
can be other than they are. This is because, in the case of practical wisdom, one does 
not deliberate about what cannot be otherwise, nor about what cannot possibly be 
done. In the case of productive knowledge or art, one only attempts to produce 
things that are not already present, or are not natural things which have the power to 
generate themselves. Although natural things may come into, and go out of, being, 
their form is eternal and therefore they are properly the subject of scientific 
knowledge rather than art. The relationship between the necessity of scientific 
objects and explanations and natural objects is a problematic one as many natural 
phenomena occur only infrequently. In fact Aristotle elsewhere offers another 
definition of the objects of natural science which includes 'what is for the most part'. 
However, I will reserve this problem for my subsequent discussion of Aristotelian 
natural science. 
Aside from this difference of objects, the goal of episteme is also distinct from that 
of either techne orphronesis. Aristotle argues that the aim of scientific knowing is 
knowledge itself. One does not pursue science for the sake of anything else, rather it 
is to be pursued for its own sake. He writes of scientific knowledge in the 
Metaphsyics, 'Evidently then we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage; 
but as the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another's so 
we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its o\vn sake. '5 The 
proper means of pursuing this scientific knowledge is theoria, or detached 
contemplation and inspection of things which aims neither at action nor production, 
but simply at knowing what a thing is. This is not the case for art and practical 
wisdom for they aim at, respectively, the production of an artefact or acting 
rationally concerning matters that are good and bad for man. 
Finally, Aristotle distinguishes between these three forms of knowledge in terms of 
the relative wisdom, or sophia, which should be attributed to their possessors. He 
places the possessor of scientific knowledge at the highest point of this ranking, with 
5 Aristotle, Metapf?)isics, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2, 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984), Book I, 982b25-30. 
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practical wisdom and art both standing below this peak. Thus, concerning the 
relative importance of scientific knowledge and art Aristotle argues that, 
all men suppose what is called Wisdom to deal with the first causes and the 
principles of things; so that, as has been said before, the man of experience is 
thought to be wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception whatever, the artist 
wiser than the men of experience, the master-worker than the mechanic, and the 
theoretical kinds,ofknowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom than the 
productive. Clearly then Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes.6 
With regard to practical wisdom, Aristotle writes in his Nicomachean Ethics that 
'practical wisdom has no authority over theoretical wisdom or the better part of the 
soul any more than the art of medicine has authority over health. (Just as medicine 
does not use health but makes the provisions to secure it, so) practical wisdom does 
not use theoretical wisdom but makes the provisions to secure·it.' 7 
This final series of distinctions essentially equates wisdom with theoretical 
knowledge of beings that are by necessity. Thus, wisdom or sophia, understood as 
the highest end of man's rational existence, is equivalent to the detached 
contemplation of eternal and unchanging beings. The possession of the other 
categories of knowledge is considered wise only in that they either contain a 
theoretical element, or aid in the development of theoretical knowledge. The 
boldness of this account of wisdom, of what should be considered the highest goal of 
man insofar as he is rational, was apparent to Aristotle. Indeed he considers the 
objection, raised by some thinkers, that the possession of such science 'might be 
justly regarded as beyond human power; for in many ways human nature is in 
bondage, so that according to Simonides "God alone can have this privilege", and it 
is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to 
him. ' 8 In response to this objection, Aristotle does not deny that the science he 
describes is divine, both in the sense that its objects are divine and that it is a science 
fit alone for God, or at least for him above all others. He merely argues that man 
need not fear the pursuit of it for the divine powers are not jealous, contrary to what 
the poets of ancient Greece sometimes claimed. 
For Aristotle there is a firm difference between science and technology, that is 
episteme and techne. In fact they are defined in opposition to one another, techne 
6 Aristotle, Metapl!Jsics, Book I, 981b25. 
7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, 1145a5-10. 
8 Aristotle, Metapl!Jsics, Book I, 982b30. 
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aims to produce a result, it is knowledge of how to bring into being that which does 
not come about of its own accord, whereas episteme aims to stand back from its 
objects to let them be as they are in order that they can be simply known as they are. 
As I noted, although Aristotle is confident that man can pursue such a purely 
theoretical science, he provides no argument as to how man, whose 'nature is in 
bondage', can attain a form of knowledge that is proper only to God. How can man, 
given his finite nature and his immersion in a world of constant change, come to 
know that which is necessary, eternal and unchanging? Despite any misgivings that 
Aristotle may have had regarding the divine nature· of his vision of science, it is 
precisely such knowledge that he counted as the most honorable and the most worthy 
of pursuit. Thus the various ways in which Aristotle distinguished between science 
and technology flow from his identification of science with theoretical knowledge of 
what is by necessity. 
3. 
Francis Bacon's account of science and technology stands in stark contrast to that of 
Aristotle. In his Novum Organum of 1620, Francis Bacon argued that knowledge 
and power come to the same thing. He writes there: 
Human knowledge and power come to the same thing, for ignorance of the cause 
puts the effect beyond reach. For nature is not conquered save by obeying it; and 
that which in thought is equivalent to a cause, is in operation equivalent to a rule.9 
To modem ears this statement is merely a truism. However, it was in fact a radical 
statement at the time. It was radical precisely because of the way it links 
'contemplation' or 'the representation of causes' with mastery over nature. That 
such a connection between science and power over nature was something quite new 
is reflected in the fact that Bacon makes this statement prior to the elaboration of his 
plan for the reformation of the sciences. Indeed, his promise of mastery over nature 
is inseparable from his rejection of what he takes to be Aristotelian and scholastic 
science. Thus, for Bacon, the successful combination of science and technology 
could only be achieved if scientific reasoning was drawn from natural things in the 
correct manner. The 'correct' method of natural science is induction, and if we 
follow this method we will arrive not at 'anticipations of nature' but at 
'interpretations'. I will not delve any further into Bacon's account of the correct 
methods of science at this stage. It is enough to note that his hopes for the advance 
9 Francis Bacon, The Instauratio magna Part II: Novum Organum and Associated Texts, ed. Graham Rees 
and Maria Wakely, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2004), p65. 
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of technology were tied to a different mode of deriving knowledge from nature. He 
writes of science: 
There are and can only be two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The one 
rushes up from the sense and particulars to axioms of the highest generality and, 
from these principles and their indubitable truth, goes on to infer and discover 
middle axioms; and this is the way in current use. The other way draws axioms from 
the sense and particulars by climbing steadily and by degrees so that ineaches the 
ones of highest generality last of all; and this is the true but still untrodden way.10 
Bacon is certainly right that Aristotelian science does not give us a form of 
knowledge by which we can master nature. We need only contrast the technology of 
ancient and medieval times with that of the present to see this. Yet, it would be 
unfair to Aristotle to say that his science was a failure on this count. For if we 
consider Aristotle's position it is clear that he never understood a successful 
'science' as providing help in man's practical endeavours. As I described above, he 
defines episteme, scientific knowledge, precisely in contrast to techne, knowledge 
aimed at production. Aristotle saw no essential connection between the 'scientific' 
and the 'calculative' branches of knowledge. No doubt knowledge of what is real, in 
the strict sense of being necessary, eternal, and unchanging, could be expected to aid 
man in his practical and productive pursuits. This is, however, vastly different from 
Bacon's vision, in which science and technology are simply mirror images of one 
another, such that 'what in contemplation represents the cause, in operation stands as 
the rule'. For Bacon scientific knowledge is, if correctly attained from experience, 
already technological knowledge. 
4. 
Although I have used the terms 'technology' and 'science' as equivalents of 'techne' 
and·' episteme', for this is how they are commonly translated, the contrast between 
Aristotle and Bacon demonstrates that these terms are by no means simply 
interchangeable. Indeed, the difference between them is precisely what is in question 
when we ask about the essence of modem technology. Thus, far from being an issue 
of only marginal philosophical interest,· the attempt to determine the essence of 
modem technology is necessarily bound up with a series of fundamental 
metaphysical problems. As I have shown, following Heidegger's preliminary 
suggestions about the metaphysical foundations of this problem, the question 
concerning the essence of modem technology leads to the question of the nature of 
10 Bacon, Novum Organum, p71. 
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modem science. Although modem and ancient science differ, they retain the 
fundamental aim of gaining knowledge of beings, of what is. Just as the attempt to 
differentiate modern technology from technology as such leads Heidegger to 
examine the nature of science, the attempt to differentiate modern science from 
science as such leads him to examine the ontological foundations of modem 
metaphysics. In particular, he wants to establish how the ontological foundations of 
modem science differ from those of ancient and medieval science, such that modem 
physical science became essentially dependent upon technology. This question 
returns us to Aristotle's thought that there is a kinship between the subject and object 
of knowledge. His conception of episteme was commensurate with his notion of 
reality as necessary, unchanging and eternal. Following the thought that modem 
science differs fundamentally from ancient science, the question is now whether 
there is a new conception of reality that is commensurate with this new mode of 
knowledge. 
This is the sense in which Heidegger thinks that the essence of modem technology 
can be arrived at through an examination of the ontological foundations of modem 
science and philosophy. If 'technology' denotes the various elements of our practical 
activities, then its character must alter depending on our understanding of how to 
bring about an effect. Our understanding ofcausality is, however, a metaphysical 
matter which determines the nature of particular sciences. Both' science and 
technology are grounded in this underlying metaphysics of causality. This 
connection provides a strong hint that the differences between Aristotle and Bacon 
extend beyond their accounts of science and technology into their metaphysical 
conceptions of causality. 
As I stated earlier, the purpose of this study is to examine the nature of Heidegger's 
account of the metaphysical foundations of modem technology and to evaluate the 
adequacy of his approach as a means of understanding our relationship.to 
technology. In brief, I will argue that Heidegger's critique of technology rests upon 
a claim concerning the being of beings in modem philosophy. Essentially he argues 
that modem philosophy, beginning with Descartes, understands the being of beings 
with increasing clarity as representedness, that is as objects of a representing subject. 
Heidegger argues that modem philosophy does not abandon the ontological concepts 
of scholastic and ancient philosophy. Rather it simply transposes them such that the 
being of man, that is self-consciousness, is understood as absolute substance. 
Previous philosophers had identified God as the absolute substance. Thus, although 
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modem philosophers thought of themselves as beginning philosophy anew upon the 
foundation of what reason could make certain for itself, Heidegger argues that their 
inquiries in fact presupposed the ontological categories that underpinned ancient and 
medieval philosophy. 
The force of tltjs argument, which is elaborated by Heidegger with increasing clarity 
from the mid-nineteen-thirties onwards, depends upon his earlier analysis of the 
ontology of human beings. In Being and Time, and lecture courses from that period, 
Heidegger criticised precisely this modem ontology in which self-consciousness is 
equated with absolute substance. He argues that the concept of supstance is defined 
through a reference to the present whereas the being of human beings is constituted 
as movement which unifies the past, present, and future. Thus, the concept which 
has guided the understanding of being throughout the course ofWestem metaphysics 
seems inadequate when it comes to understanding the being of human beings. 
Therefore, Heidegger's later critique of the foundations of modem metaphysics must 
be seen in the light of his earlier attempts to provide a new ontology of human being. 
He argues that we are confused about our own nature, the certainty of which is 
supposed to provide the foundations of modem philosophy and science. This 
confusion will remain for as long as we do not attempt to· reformulate our concept of 
being in order that it can do justice to the temporal structure of human existence. 
These critical aspects of Heidegger's analysis of modem metaphysics are, for the 
most part, valid., However, his own positive attempts to reformulate the concept of 
being in order to take into account this problem of temporality become increasingly 
difficult to justify. Indeed his elevation of a dogmatic reading of the history of 
metaphysics to a description of the nature of being itself, tends to obsc'ure his early 
insight into the nature of modem metaphysics. The problematic nature of this 
'history of being' points to an essential problem in Heidegger's attempt to 
distinguish between our scientific knowledge of the .past and the existence of man as 
itself essentially historical. Nevertheless, the negative moment of his work, that is, 
the critique of the tendency to view the human subject as substance, remains an 
insightful demonstration of the need to rethink the relationship between being and 
time. I will expand on this tension in my sixth chapter which deals with Heidegger's 
technology essay. 
5. 
As I have stated, my intention in this study is to argue that the heart of Heidegger's 
account of modem technology is to be found in his interpretation of 'subjectivity' as 
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a continuation of ancient and medieval ontological doctrines. Given this argument, it 
might seem obvious to begin with Heidegger's essay on technology, a work that is 
often taken as the centre of discussions of Heidegger and technology. However, as I 
mentioned earlier, I intend to first focus on his critique of subjectivity as it emerges 
both in Being and Time and in his later writings. Having established the nature of 
this argument, I will then return to the essay on technology in order to demonstrate 
how it fits within his broader critique of modem ontology. The advantage of this 
approach is that once I do come to examine The Question Concerning Technology, I 
will be in a position to establish which of its claims are founded on a sound analysis 
of the nature of modem metaphysics and which are not. 
The six chapters that comprise this study are divided into two groups of three. The 
first three are devoted to an interpretation of Heidegger's early criticisms of the 
modem understanding of the peculiar being of human beings. By 'early' I mean 
those criticisms contained in Being and Time itself, and in the lectures courses that 
immediately precede and follow its publication in 1927. As I will outline shortly, my 
interpretation of Heidegger's early period will proceed through an examination of his 
critique of three contemporary philosophical movements, namely positivism, neo-
Kantianism, and Dilthey's hermeneutic philosophy. The purpose of these initial 
three chapters is to understand how Heidegger's examination of the being of human 
beings serves to undermine two metaphysical doctrines that had survived from 
ancient Greece up to the present. These two doctrines are: the identification of being 
with substance; and the evaluation of theoretical knowledge as a paradigm of 
knowledge in general. 
Heidegger's argument is essentially that these fundamental determinations remain 
current in modem philosophy and prevent us from correctly understanding our own 
mode of being and the knowledge that is proper to such a being. In order to show 
this I will follow Heidegger's attempt to demonstrate that history is not simply the 
object of scientific study but rather a fundamental characteristic of human being. 
This seemingly obscure debate concerning the nature of history is in fact of central 
importance because it forms the foundation of Heidegger's claim that the human 
mode of being is not simply that of substance. I will also examine Heidegger's claim 
that the being of a human being is not separable from its world. This argument 
effectively attacks the ancient identification of theoria, or simple beholding and 
contemplation, as the proper means of attaining knowledge of beings. Such 
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knowledge is ultimately impossible for humanity given its historical and worldly 
character. 
I will compare Heidegger's position with contemporary accounts of the nature of 
history and science. Although Heidegger does not deal with these traditions in great 
detail in Being and Time, his criticisms of them in surrounding lecture CEurses are 
vital for a correct understanding of Being and Time itself. In my first chapter I will 
describe the position of positivism regarding science and history; in particular I will 
focus on the po~ition of J. S. Mill. I will then contrast the foundations of positivism 
with the position of two neo-Kantians, Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert. 
By this contrast I hope to demonstrate that despite their radically different 
approaches to the foundations of the sciences-the positivists are essentially 
empiricists whilst the neo-Kantians draw inspiration from Kant's 'Copernican 
revolution'-these two schools hold the same assumptions about the nature of 
science. They differ over what they consider to be the correct logic of the historical 
sciences, yet they both.attempt to understand science by examining the logical 
structure of its results. Heidegger differs from this tradition in that he is concerned 
not with the logical structure of historical science, but with. the ontology of its object. 
The sense in which human beings are themsdlves 'historical'. and the consequences 
of this for their accounts of science are not addressed by either the neo-Kantians or 
the positivists. 
My second chapter will examine Wilhelm Dilthey's distinctive approach to historical 
. . 
science. Despite the sometimes confused nature ofDilthey's investigations, he was 
able to see that understanding the foundations of historical science was not simply a 
matter of developing a different scientific logic which .could sit alongside that of the 
natural sciences. Rather, it depended upon a renewed investigation of the nature of 
human existence. In particular he saw that, in historical study, humanity is both the 
subject and the object of the investigation. Such a self-involving model of 
knowledge seemed to be precluded by contemporary understandings of the knowing 
subject, and so Dilthey set about investigating the nature of human subjectivity. 
Thus, Dilthey clearly saw that historical science posed far deeper problems than 
' 
either the neo-Kantians or the positivists had believed. I contend that Dilthey's 
recognition of the clash between historical existence and theoretical ideals of science 
deeply influenced Heidegger leading up to the publication of Being and Time. This 
heritage provides us with a clue by which we can understand Heidegger's attack 
upon the traditional distinction of 'theory' and 'practice'. 
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My third chapter is devoted to interpreting Heidegger's arguments in Being and Time 
in light of his attitude towards these competing accounts of science and history. 
Aside from demonstrating the manner in which Heidegger undermines our traditional 
concepts of knowledge and being through his interpretation of the being of man as 
Da-sein, I will employ Heidegger's open attempts to appropriate Dilthey's work as a 
means of arguing against recent pragmatist interpretations of his intentions in Being 
and Time. More precisely, I argue that pragmatists misconstrue Heidegger's 
attempts to develop an account of pre-theoretical knowledge. They take this as an 
argument about the presence or absence of concepts in our everyday practical 
activities, whereas it is in fact an attempt to demonstrate the inappropriateness of a 
detached and contemplative model of knowledge for existing human beings. 
This initial set of three chapters describe how Heidegger employs an account of 
man's historical and worldly existence as a means of questioning the adequacy and 
the origins of the ontological and epistemological.categories within which we 
understand ourselves and the world. The essential purpose of reconstructing these 
arguments is to·demonstrate that Heidegger was already addressing, in his early 
career, questions about the nature of scientific knowledge and human being. His 
examination of these questions underpins his attempt to re-open the question of the 
meaning of being. However, his later pursuit of this question of being does not lead 
him away from these initial considerations, rather he takes them up anew from the 
perspective he gained from their initial examination. 
It is due to the fact that Heidegger often returned to consider an issue from a new 
vantage point that divisions of his career into early and late, or pre-turn and post-
turn, phases are generally unhelpful. The issue of when Heidegger's thought 
underwent a 'turn' and what this 'turn' might consist of has been addressed 
innumerable times and is a perennial issue amongst Heidegger scholars. Those 
versed in the details of such discussions will recognise thatthe way I have organised 
my chapters mirrors the common, though controversial, division of Heidegger's 
works into early and late periods with his 'turn' being roughly identified with his 
1930 essay On The Essence ofTruth or Vom Wesen der Warheit. Although I believe 
Heidegger's work certainly did undergo a change during this period, the structure of 
this study is not intended to imply that this is the only change Heidegger underwent, 
or that it is the decisive moment of his career. Indeed it is my conviction, and the 
strategy of this discussion, that Heidegger's 'late' works are best understood as an 
extension of his 'early' works, and as a return to the themes that occupied him then. 
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I will have more to say on this in my discussion of Heidegger's account of truth in 
chapter three, however, I merely wish to avoid misunderstandings by bringing up this 
issue at this early stage. 
The second set of three chapters focus on the account of modem metaphysics that 
flows from this re-opening of the question of being, and a demonstration of how 
Heidegger's interpretation of modem technology fits within this framework. Thus, 
my fourth chapter is devoted to understanding Heidegger's account of the difference 
between ancient and modem science. As I have outlined above, the fundamental 
~ifference between the two forms of science is to be traced back to their 
metaphysical foundations. Heidegger's recognition of the interdependence of 
physics and metaphysics leads him to develop an account of ancient and modem 
science that has many similarities with those developed by other historians of science 
around the middle of last century. He argues that the transformation of science in the 
seventeenth century was not simply a matter of paying closer attention to the 'facts', 
rather it was based upon a reconception of what counted as a fact and how it could be 
known. Despite some deficiencies in his account of the beginnings of modem 
science, Heidegger correctly sees that although modem science seemingly operates 
independently of philosophy, it is nevertheless based on a definite set of 
metaphysical propositions. 
Heidegger's account of the metaphysical ground of modem science provides the 
focus of my fifth chapter. As I have stated above, Heidegger's contention is that 
modern metaphysics, beginning with Descartes, is founded upon an understanding· of 
the human subject as the absolute substance. I argue in this chapter thl:l.t Heidegger's 
account of Descartes as the beginning of this new ontological order is ultimately 
untenable for the reason that Descartes himself remains wedded to the ontological 
order that was characteristic of scholastic philosophy. That is, Descartes still takes -
God as the true substance and we cannot truly understand his attempts to secure the 
necessity of our scientific knowledge if we do not recognise this fact. It is John 
Locke who more fully expresses the conception of modem philosophy that 
Heidegger describes. It is also with Locke that the foundations for an essentially 
experimental science are laid. Thus, although Heidegger appears to misconstrue 
Descartes' position, I argue that he nevertheless captures an essential characteristic 
of post-Cartesian philosophy. 
My sixth chapter will attend to the content of Heidegger's essay The Question 
Concerning Technology. In this chapter I distinguish between the sound claim that 
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Heidegger makes concerning the common metaphysical foundation of modem 
science and modem technology, and his highly controversial claims concerning our 
relationship to the 'essence' of technology. This later element of Heidegger's 
account of modem technology is based upon a mistaken understanding of the 
relationship between the metaphysical determination of the nature of being and the 
character of our everyday interaction with beings. Heidegger's mistake is to attempt 
to see the modem world as a result of the determination of being as substance. It is 
this tendency to reduce the richness of human history to an ontological schema which 
plagues Heidegger's later philosophy and must be avoided if we are to recover the 
positive elements of his account of modem technology. 
In my concluding remarks I suggest that Heidegger's account of the essence of 
modem technology provides a penetrating critique of the ontological foundations of 
modem philosophy. In particular it demonstrates the great extent to which the 
modem philosophical tradition remains wedded to the ontological determinations of 
previous eras. Heidegger's interpretation of the history of philosophy is fragmentary 
and dogmatic. Nevertheless, he is correct in pointing out the central role the idea of 
production or creation has played in Western accounts of the nature of being. In 
doing so he provides a new means of understanding the significance of modem 
science and technology. 
Chapter 1 
The Philosophical Foundations of 
Modern Science 
In the introduction and first chapter of his lecture course of 1925, published in 
English as the History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger ponders whether the 
scienc~ of history exhaustively captures the :reality of history itself.·. He argues: 
We.tend to understand history, and nature by way.of the sciences. which investigate 
them. But then history and nature would be accessible only insofar as they are 
objects thematized in these scientes. But ids nofoertain whether a'domain of 
objects necessarily .also gives us the actual area of subject matter out of which the. 
thematic of the sciences is first carved. To say that the science of history .deals with 
history does not necessarily mean that history as this science understands it is as/ 
such also the authentic reality of history. 11 
Heidegger thinks that historical science does not capture the reality of history itself 
and he devotes the rest of this lecture course, which can be considered a draft of 
Being and Time, to demonstrating that this is the case.12 As I stated in _my 
introduction, this question of the nature of history is central to Heidegger's attempt to 
loosen the hold of the ancient conceptions of knowledge and being which, he 
believes, have prevented us from attaining an adequate understanding of our own 
existence. Although this is the ultimate end of Heidegger's phenomenological 
investigation of the being of human beings, his concrete arguments in Being and 
Time and its surrounding lecture courses can only be properly understood in the 
context of contemporary discussions of science and history. Heidegger eventually 
11 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept ofTime, trans. Theodore Kisiel, (Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington, 1985), pl. 
12 For a very thorough account of the origins and transformations of the themes that eventually appear 
in Being and Time, see Theodore Kisiel The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993). Kisiel discusses Heidegger's History of the 
Concept of Time in chapter 8. 
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comes to see the character of the entire Western metaphysical tradition as based upon 
the manner in which tbe ancient Greeks conceived of being, however, he only comes 
to this.position once he has.re-opened the question of the meaning of being from 
within his own philosophical context. This is the explicit task of Being and Time. 
The fact that Heidegger later considered Being and Time to have failed in its own 
project of understanding the temporality of being itself, certainly does not mean that 
this work achieved nothing.13 In fact the concept of 'unconcealment' that he 
developed in that period is indispensable for his later investigations, as is ~ account 
of the historicity of human being. Thus, if we are to grasp the broad historical sweep 
of this later work, including The Question Concerning Technology, we must attend to 
the philosophical context from which Heidegger originally,tried to break free in 
Being and Time. 
In order to carry .out this task I will follow a brief sketch that Heidegger himself 
provides in History of the Concept of Time, under the heading "The situation of 
philosophy inthe second half of the 19th century. Philosophy and thesciences."14 
This sketch is intended as an introduction to the various achievements of 
phenomenology, as Heidegger understands them. It involves a brief discussion of 
positivism, theneo-Kantian critique of positivism, the difference. between the neo-
Kantianism of Dilthey and that of Windelband and Rickert, and finally the 
development of 'psychology' as the fundamental philosophical discipline. 
In:this chapter and the next, I ~tend to investigate the details of this sketch more 
closely. In particular I will focus on its less well known elements, in the English 
' ' } ' 
speaking world at least, namely the neo-Kantianism of Wilhelm \:Vindelband, 
Heinrich Rickert, and Wilhelm Dilthey. Given Heideg$er's own neo-Kantian 
beginnings, his reaction against this tradition is particularly interesting. Although I 
take my direction.from Heidegger's own scheme, I intend to bring.it within a broader 
discussion of the nature of modern philosophy'. Thus, rather than beginning with the 
13 He comments in his Letter on Humanism that 'The adequate execution and completion of this other 
thinking that abandons subjectivity is surely made more ·difficult by the fact that in the 
publication of Being and Time the third division of the first part, "Time and Being'', was held 
back. Here everything is reversed. The division in question was held back because thinking 
failed in the adequate saying of this turning [Kehre] and did not succeed with the help of the 
language of metaphysics.' He goes on in this passage to state that the lecture of 1930, On the 
Essence of Truth, provides some insight into the 'turning' that he is attempting. This is an 
oft-quoted passage as it contains one of Heidegger's rare evaluations of Being and Time. See 
Martin Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell, 
(HarperCollins Publishers, San Francisco, 1993 ), p23 l. 
14 Heidegger, HCT, pp13-23. 
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positivism of Mill, I will begin with John Locke and his separation of real and 
nominal essences. Having described Locke's position it will be possible to see not 
only the origin of positivism's understanding of experience, but also the common 
ground which underlies both positivism and neo-Kantianism. Aside from tracing the 
conceptions of history, science, and philosophy that are to be found in these different 
traditions, I also hope to demonstrate the sense in which they are all reactions to the . 
fundamental change in the understanding of essence that was announced by Locke in 
his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
Demonstrating the relationship between British empiricism, positivism, and neo-
Kantianism, may appear to be a very roundabout approach to understanding the 
decisive elements of Being and Time, especially since in that work Heidegger directs 
his attention towards a critique of Cartesian conceptions of human existence. 
However, it is my contention that Heidegger, both in his early and late thinking, 
mistakenly attributes the decisive ontological shift that underlies modem 
philosophical thinking to Descartes, rather than to Locke. This may appear to· be a 
minor problem, for Heidegger correctly describes the central ontological difficulty of 
modern philosophy, but attributes its first expression to the wrong· philosopher. In 
fact, the matter is significant because, although he does not state this explicitly, 
Heidegger's account of truth as aletheia or unconcealment directly addresses 
Locke's separation of real and nominal essences. By this I mean that the ontological 
schism, which was first described by Locke, and which so profoundly influenced the 
character of subsequent philosophy, is brought into question by Heidegger's account 
of truth. Thus, Heidegger's critique ofneo-Kantianism and positivism is 
simultaneously a critique of the foundations of modem philosophy established by 
Descartes and Locke. Although Heidegger had not yet developed his account of 
modernity as the 'age of the world-picture', or as the 'age of technology', I will 
argue in these opening three chapters that he had already grasped the nature· and 
importance of the ontological transformations that he focused upon in those later 
accounts. 
Given this tension between Heidegger's identification of Descartes as the beginning 
of modem philosophy and my claim that it is in fact Locke who should be given this 
role according to Heidegger's own criteria, a discussion of his decisive account of 
our knowledge of essences is not out of place here. I provide a detailed discussion of 
Heidegger's reading of Descartes in my fifth chapter and the full consequences of 
this confusion will become apparent there. With these considerations in mind, the 
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aim of this chapter will be to demonstrate the mutual dependence of positivism and 
neo-Kantianism, and their respective accounts of historical science, on Locke's 
separation of real and nominal essences. I will only discuss the positions of 
Windelband and Rickert in this chapter and reserve a discussion of Dilthey for 
chapter two. I do this because I intend to focus on Dilthey's conception of history 
and human existence, a matter which separates him from Windelband and Rickert. 
1. 
In a discussion of Kant's understanding of being and the phenomenological principle 
of categorical intuition, Heidegger writes: 
We said that color can be seen, but being-colored cannot. Color is something 
sensory and real. Being, however, is nothing of the sort, for it is not sensory or real. 
While the real is regarded as the objective, as a structure and moment of the object, 
the non-sensory is equated with the mental in the subject, the immanent. The real is 
given from the side of the object, the rest is thought into it by the subject. But the 
subject is given in inner perception. Will I find 'being', 'unity', 'plurality', 'and', 
'or' in inner perception? The origin of these non-sensory moments lies in immanent 
perception, in the reflection upon consciousness. This is the argument of British 
empiricism since Locke. This argument has its roots in Descartes, and it is in 
principle still present in Kant and German idealism, though with essential 
modification. Today we are in a position to move against idealism precisely on this 
front only because phenomenology has demonstrated that the non-sensory and ideal 
cannot without further ado be identified with the immanent, conscious, subjective.15 
This passage provides an early hint of Heidegger's objections to the primacy of 
human subjectivity in modem philosophy. More precisely it addresses the issue of 
how phenomenology can overcome the Kantian understanding of being. However, it 
is relevant to the theme of this chapter because it contains one of.Heidegger's rare 
mentions of Locke's place in the development of modem philosophy. He argues that 
Locke and Descartes developed a distinctive understanding of reality that remains 
influential even for Kant and his followers. This is certainly true; however, as I 
mentioned above, I believe that Heidegger did not pay sufficient attention to the 
differences between Descartes and Locke regarding ontology. As a result of this he 
misrepresents Descartes' position. This section is devoted to describing several 
features of Locke's philosophy which are decisive in the development of modem 
philosophy, and which Heidegger does not himself directly address. The full import 
of Locke's arguments will not become clear until I have discussed Descartes 
15 Heidegger, HCT, p58. 
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ontology, however, I consider that a knowledge of them is vital for understanding 
Heidegger's attacks upon 'subjectivity' in Being and Time. 
Locke's stated intention in writing An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the 
first edition of which appeared in 1690, was much the same as that of Descartes in 
writing his Meditations on First Philosophy. Locke writes that he intep._9.s.'to enquire 
into the Original, Certainty, and Extent, of human Knowledge; together, with the 
Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent ... ' .16 He goes on to argue in a 
manner that was to be repeated throughout the Enlightenment; 'It is therefore worth 
while, to search out the Bounds between Opinion and Knowledge; and examine by 
what Measures, in things, whereof we have no certain Knowledge, we ought to 
regulate our Assent and moderate· our Perswasions.' 17 Whilst the intention of 
examining the limits and foundations of human knowledge are common to Locke 
and Descartes, their respective conclusions are quite different. 
There are three elements of Locke's empiricism that are important for my immediate 
project of identifying the common foundation of positivism and neo-Kantianism. 
These elements are his rejection of innate ideas as a source of knowledge, his 
atomistic account of experience, and his separation of real and nominal essences. 
Perhaps the most well known of these differences is Locke's argument that we do not 
.. 
possess any innate ideas. Descartes' attempt to provide a solid foundation for 
scientia, or knowledge of necessary truths, had partly depended upon demonstrating 
that we possess innate ideas and that these innate ideas, because they are stamped 
upon us by God, could be taken to be true, that is to give us knowledge of the 
essential nature of God, ourselves, and the physical world. This argument is quite 
complex and I provide a discussion of it in chapter five. The interesting point to note 
at this stage is that although Locke is famous for his argument concerning our lack of 
innate knowledge, he does not contest the claim that innate ideas, if we were to 
possess them, must be true ideas. To have objected to the use of innateness as a 
criterion of truth would have been a much more fundamental objection to Descartes 
arguments, yet Locke does not take this path. 
Locke accepts that if we possessed any innate principles, then they would be true. 
His reasons for accepting this are the same as those of Descartes, namely that such 
16 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1975), Book I, Chapter i, §2. 
17 Locke, Essay, I. i. 3. 
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ideas could only be explained by the fact that God had produced them within us. 
Locke writes: 
23 
I grant, That if there were any Ideas to be found imprinted on the Minds of Men, we 
have reason to expect, it should be the Notion of his Maker, as a mark GOD set on 
his own Workmanship, to mind Man of his dependence and Duty; and that herein 
should appear the first instances of humane Knowledge.18 
Once the divine origin of innate ideas has been established, it must be assumed that 
they are true, for it is clear that God would not deceive us. Indeed Locke is less 
questioning in this regard than Descartes himself, for Descartes went on to apply his 
metaphysical doubt to all of his ideas, even to those which appear to us as utterly 
necessary. 19 
Locke's argument is, rather, concerned with establishing that innateness is a poor 
means of explaining the origin of our ideas. He makes this strategy plain at the very 
beginning of his argument where he writes: 
IT is an established Opinion amongst some Men, That there are in the Understanding 
certain innate Principles; some primary Notions, ... Characters, as it were stamped 
upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being; and brings 
into the World with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced Readers of 
the falseness of this Supposition, if I should only shew ... how Men, barely by the 
Use of their natural Faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the 
help of any innate Impressions; and may arrive at Certainty, without any such 
Original Notions or Principles.20 
Rather than deny the possibility of innate ideas, or that they would be true if we 
possessed them, Locke is content to argue that we need not resort to such notions in 
order to account for all the knowledge that we do in fact have. He continues on, after 
the above passage, to provide his well known arguments that universal assent need 
not be explained by innateness, and furthermore that there are no principles that are 
assented to universally. 
18 Locke, Essay, I. iv. 13. 
19 For a discussion of Locke's curious arguments about innate ideas see both Grenville Wall, 'Locke's 
Attack on Innate Knowledge' in Locke on Human Understanding, ed. I. C. Tipton, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1977), pp19-24, and Richard Campbell, Truth and Historicity, 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) pp203-216. 
20 Locke, Essay, I. ii. 1. 
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2. 
Whatever the details of Locke's arguments against our possession of innate ideas, his 
rejection of them as a source of knowledge leaves him with the difficult task of 
establishing a new source of scientific knowledge. He attempts to do this by arguing 
that all of our knowledge is derived from sense experience. This is the foundation of 
British empiricism which Heidegger referred to in the quote given above. However, 
Locke's account of how a mind that is initially devoid of all knowledge could come 
into the possession of it through the senses is. beset by difficulties. These problems 
stem partly from the radical new ontology which he employs with very little 
discussion, and partly from the confused epistemology which arises from his 
separation of real and nominal essences. 
In line with his rejection of innate ideas, Locke argues that there are only two sources 
of knowledge. These two sources are sensory experience and our reflection upon the 
materials provided by such experience. Locke puts the matter this way: 
Let us the suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void ofall Characters, 
without any Ideas; How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast 
store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost 
endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this 
I answer in one word Experience: In that all our Knowledge is founded; andfrom 
that it ultimately derives it self. Our Observation employ' d either about external, 
sensible Objects; or about the internal Operations of our Minds, perceivedand 
reflected on by our selves, is that, which supplies our Understand~ngs with all the 
materials of thinking. These two are the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all 
the1deas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.21 
Locke's elaborations on the operation of the first of these fountains of knowledge, 
sense perception, exposes his radically particular ontology. He argues that the senses 
are 'conversant with particular sensible Objects' and it is through the various ways 
such particular objects affect us that we come to our ideas of' Yellow, White, Heat, 
Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities ... ' .22 
The point here is that Locke, in assuming that the objects which affect the senses are 
particular objects, is breaking decisively with the notion that what truly exists are 
universal principles the possession of which gives individual objects their reality. 
Given the significance of this move it is extraordinary that Locke does not provide 
any substantial argument for it; he simply asserts that it is so. Having taken this 
21 Locke, Essay, II. i. 2. 
22 Locke, Essay, IL i. 3. 
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view, Locke's problem was not that of accounting for how an individual object can 
exist, given that he thinks that the principle of individuation is 'Existence it self, 
which determines a Being of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable 
to two Beings of the same kind. ' 23 His difficulty is, rather, to account for the 
general, or universal, terms and ideas which we employ. These he takes to be the 
product of the mind's reflection on its own ideas. As Richard Campbell has argued, 
Locke is a nominalist in the sense that 'Not only does he hold that everything which 
exists is a particular; the only universals he admits are those general ideas and terms 
(names) which have been made by abstraction.'24 
Thus, the mind is furnished, through the senses, with distinct ideas generated by 
particular objects. Locke maintains that of all the knowledge that we possess it is the 
immediate impression of these simple ideas that is most certain. He argues that in 
the case of this immediate intuitive knowledge, 
the Mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth, as the Eye 
doth light, only by being directed toward it. Thus the Mind perceives, that White is 
not Black, That a Circle is not a Triangle, That Three are more than Two, and equal 
to One and Two. Such kind of truths the Mind perceives at the first sight of the 
Ideas together, by bare Intuition, without the intervention of any other Idea; and this 
kind of Knowledge is the clearest, and most certain, that humane Frailty is capable 
of.'25 
The clarity and distinctness with which the mind is presented withthese simple ideas 
is such that the mind cannot be confused about the nature of its own ideas. This 
forms the foundation upon which Locke bases 'the Certainty and Evidence of all our 
Knowledge' .26 Locke's epistemology rests upon these atoms of sense experience 
and he is concerned to establish that they cannot be confused, either one with 
another, nor in the nature of each individual experience. This concern echoes 
Descartes' attempt to establish which of his ideas are both 'clear and distinct' and as 
a consequence can be taken to be true. In Locke's case, however, this foundation of 
knowledge in clear distinct ideas is ambiguous because the knowledge that Locke 
secures is not knowledge of the real essence of objects. Locke, due to his rejection 
of innate ideas, is unable to follow Descartes argument that we can take our clear and 
distinct ideas as giving us knowledge of real essences because they are imprinted 
23 Locke, Essay, II. xxvii. 3. 
24 Campbell, Truth and Historicity, p207. 
25 Locke, Essay, IV. ii. 1. 
26 Locke, Essay, IV. ii. 1. 
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upon: us by God and God is not a deceiver. As I will demonstrate shortly, the 
rejection of this recourse to the nature of God, by way of our innate ideas, leads to a 
dramatic restriction of the scope of human knowledge and ultimately to the 
distinction of real and nominal essences. 
Locke defines knowledge as 'the perception of the connexion and agreement, or 
disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas. ' 27 However, he is quick to 
qualify this definition as it appears to base. knowledge upon each man's perception of 
his own ideas. As an objection to his own definition of knowledge, Locke writes, 
'Knowledge, you say, is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our 
own Ideas: but who knows what those Ideas may be? Is there anything so 
extravagant, as the Imaginations of Men's Brains?' If knowledge is based upon each 
man's own ideas then 'ifthere be a sober and a wise Man, what difference will there 
be ... between his Knowledge, and that of the most extravagant Fancy in the 
World?'28 In order to counter this objection Locke introduces a distinction between 
real and verbal truth. He states that ' ... Truth, as well as Knowledge, may well come 
under the distinction of Verbal and Real; that being only verbal Truth, wherein 
Terms.are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas they stand 
for, without regarding whether our Ideas are such, as really have, or are capable of 
having an Existence in Nature.' 29 Thus, although we are able to truly assert that 
'centaurs are animals', this statement attains only verbal truth. The idea of a centaur 
has no analogue in reality and as such our statement that 'centaurs are animals' is 
true only in the sense that it has correctly described the idea of a centaur. Thus, it is 
the relationship between ideas and reality that is fundamental to real truth in Locke's 
account. We can attain real truth only when we correctly combine ideas which 
themselves refer con;ectly to reality.30 
27 Locke; Essay, IV. i. 2. 
28 Locke, Essay, IV. iv. 1. 
29 Locke, Essay, IV. v. 8. 
30 This situation is further complicated by the case of mathematical knowledge. Here Locke argues 
that we can gain real knowledge from an examination of our ideas of 'circle' and 'square' 
even if such objects have never been found in reality. He argues that this is unproblematic 
because in a mathematical investigation we examine the idea itself without reference to any 
existing circles or squares. According to Locke, we gain knowledge of the properties of 
actual squares from an examination of our idea of a square, not because our idea corresponds 
to reality but because reality corresponds with our idea. Essay, N. iv. 6. This last sounds 
like a very Platonic thesis except that Locke has relocated the ideas (or forms) within the 
human mind. 
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Our simple ideas are of such importance to Locke as they form our only link, indirect 
as it is, with things as they actually exist. The accuracy of our assertions thereby 
depends entirely upon the fidelity with which our simple ideas present the external 
world to us. The problem with this scheme is that there can be no way of going 
beyond our simple ideas in order to establish how they do in fact relate to reality. 
Due to the manner in which Locke interposes simple ideas between ourselves and 
reality, we could only ever strike upon the truth by chance and without knowing that 
we had done so. Locke argues that we can assume ' ... simple Ideas are notfictions of 
our Fancies, but the natural and regular productions of Things without us, really 
operating upon us ... ' .31 Although it may seem a reasonable assumption that objects 
produce sensations within us in a regular fashion, this claim must always remain an 
assumption as it can never be tested. Locke's separation of reality and our ideas 
leaves us with the possibility of achieving truth, but no way of knowing whether we 
have done so. 
3. 
For my argument, the decisive element of Locke's philosophy is this restriction of 
knowledge to our ideas and the various abstractions we can derive from this 
foundation. He states his novel position on essences in the following passage: 
Concerning the real Essences of corporeal Substances, (to mention those only,) there 
are, if I mistake not, two Opinions. The one is of those, who using the Word 
Essence, for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those Essences, 
according to which, all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every 
one of them partake, and so become of this or that Species. The other, and more 
rational Opinion, is of those, who look on all natural Things to have a real, but 
unknown Constitution oftheir'insensible Parts, from which flow those sensible 
Qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we 
have Occasion to rank them into sorts, under common Denominations.32 
Locke thinks immediate experience serves as our guarantee of epistemological 
certainty, however, it also has the function of separating us from objects as they 
actually exist. Locke argues that we know only nominal essences and can have no 
access to real essences. Indeed, our position is likened to that of the Countryman 
who views 'that famous clock at Strasburg, whereof he only sees the outward Figure 
and Motions' and knows nothing of its 'inward contrivance' .33 Despite this 
restriction of knowledge, Locke continues to assume that there exists a real external 
31 Locke, Essay, IV. iv. 4. 
32 Locke, Essay, III. iii. 17. 
33 Locke, Essay, III. vi. 9. 
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world which produces those qualities that we know through our external sense. 
Indeed he is clearly of a mind that the peculiar nature of a body might be explained 
by means of the arrangement of insensible particles within it. Yet, no matter how 
plausible or useful such a theory may be, it remains impossible for us to know the 
real essence of objects. 
Locke's claim that we cannot know the real essences of objects leaves him in an 
ambiguous position. He maintains that bodies have real essences, although he has 
come to identify this with the material constitution of a body rather than its rational 
form, and that real truth would consist in our correct combination of ideas which 
themselves correctly refer to reality. Yet he thinks we are unable to know real 
essences themselves and are therefore unable to know whether we ever attain such 
real truth. This restriction of human knowledge, .if accepted, is a telling blow to the 
Aristotelian and medieval ideal of scientific knowledge which aimed above all to 
understand the necessity of natural events. Thus, Locke takes a sceptical view of the 
reaches of human knowledge: 
I deny not, but a Man accustomed to rational and regular Experiments shall be able 
to see farther into the Nature of Bodies, and guess righter at their yet unknown 
Properties, than one, that is a.Stranger to them: But yet, as I have said, this is but 
Judgement and Opinion, not Knowledge and Certainty. This way of getting, and 
improving our Knowledge in Substances only by S~perience and History, which is 
all that the weakness of our Faculties in this State of Mediocrity, which we are in this 
World, makes me suspect, that natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a 
Science.34 
Yet this sceptical tone is generated by measuring the knowledge that we are capable 
of against an ideal that Locke himself has argued is impossible. Gerd Buchdahl has 
argued that: 
1be reason for Locke's vacillating attitude[reg~ding the status of oµr knowledge} 
must hence be sought in his failure to make a complete break with the Cartesian 
approach, and in his remaining in a position approximately half-way between the 
earlier period and that of Hume. Locke ascribes the fun9amental cause of our 
ignorance to our inability to perceive the 'necessary connections' between each 
group of qualities of physical substances which the evidence of our senses shows us 
regularly to 'coexist' .'35 
Of course only in retrospect does it make sense to say that Locke became 'stuck 
halfway' between Descartes and Hume, for Hume only went the 'whole way' on the 
34 Locke, Essay, N. xii. 10. 
35 Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysics and ihe Philosophy of Science, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969), p187. 
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basis of Locke's prior efforts. Nevertheless, this image nicely illustrates the sense in 
which ancient and modem conceptions of knowledge are tenuously held together in 
Locke's thinking. 
David Hume, in contrast to Locke, was far less ambiguous about the possibility of 
attaining scientific knowledge. Beginning with Locke's account of experience he 
drew the much more radical conclusion that we should redefine our most 
fundamental scientific terms if we are to retain them at all. He argued that we cannot 
have gained the idea of any 'necessary connexion' between natural events from our 
experience as it was impossible to find any experience of this connexion itself. Thus, 
'when we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of 
causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary 
· connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one the 
infallible consequence of the other.'36 As we are unable to gain any knowledge of 
real causes and connexions, Hume argues that ifthe term 'cause' is to remain 
meaningful we should take it to designate either the experience that certain objects 
are always succeeded by certain other objects, or the experience that the appearance 
of certain objects induces the mind to think of another object. The necessity of the 
habitual movement of the mind from one object to another need not be mirrored in. 
reality. The mind may expect one object to appear after another yet this may not in 
fact occur. This reduction of 'cause' to either a habit of mind or. the constant 
conjunction of experiences, rather than a feature of reality itself, was adopted by the 
positivist tradition. 
4. 
This is, in broad terms, the context within which John Stuart Mill's positivism was 
developed. Mill is often discussed together with the French positivist Auguste 
Comte, however, for reasons of space I will only address Mill's position.37 
Heidegger describes positivism in the following way: 
36 David Hume, Eniuiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, 3' Edition, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975), p63. 
37 I do not intend to imply by using this strategy that there are not significant differences between the 
'positivism' of Mill and Comte. Rather I am using Mill as an illustration of the fundamental 
character of a broader philosophical development, namely British empiricism. The 
relationship between the Mill and Comte is quite complex and its interpretation has been 
coloured by Mill's own accounts of Comte. Robert C. Scharff has argued that Comte's 
'positivism' differs from that of Mill in that he addresses the problem of the historical 
development of philosophy. On this see Robert C. Scharff, Comte after Positivism, 
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All the scientific disciplines are dominated by positivism, the tendency toward the 
positive, where "positive" is understood in terms of facts, and facts are understood in 
terms of a particular interpretation of reality. Facts are facts only if they can be 
enumerated, weighed, measured, and experimentally determined. In history, facts 
are those movements and events which are in the first instance accessible in the 
sources. 
Positivism is to be understood not only as a maxim of concrete researeh but in 
general as a theory of knowledge and culture.38 
In running together both the actual practice of scientific research and positivism as a 
philosophical school, Heidegger is attempting to point out that the philosophical 
theory of positivism shares the same attitude towards its foundations as scientific 
practice. The sciences, in the normal course of research, assume a certain realm of 
objects within which they conduct their research. Unless the science in question 
undergoes a radical transformation, these initial premises remain unquestioned. 
Thus, the founding conceptions of the various realms of scientific study-the 
physical, the biological, the chemical, and so on-are not the subject of, but rather 
the presupposition of, scientific research. These presuppositions are not a problem 
for the practice of particular sciences; however, these presuppositions do become a 
problem when the founding assumptions of a general theory of knowledge are 
quarantined from reflection. 
The difficulties that are generated by such a refusal to reflect on founding 
assumptions are clearly expressed by Mill's attempt to develop a system oflogic that 
could determine how knowledge may be derived from immediate sense experience: 
The problem with Mill's approach is that he must assume a great deal before he is 
able to take derivation from distinct sensations as a criterion of legitimate 
knowledge. Mill inherits his ontological scheme from Locke's philosophy in which 
our clear and distinct impressions are produced by the operations of bodies upon our 
senses. This ontology is rendered unjustifiable by an epistemology that regards all 
legitimate knowledge as stemming from these very sensory impressions. These two 
elements of empiricism, namely the restriction of knowledge to sensations and the 
claim that these sensations are the result of operations of material bodies acting upon 
us, undermine one another. Whereas Locke was concerned to explicitly argue for 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995). For Mill's criticisms of Comte see John 
Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism, (N. Trilbner & Co., London, 1866). 
38 Heidegger, HCT, p15. 
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this account of experience in opposition to the rationalism of Descartes and his 
followers, Mill never questions its validity. 
31 
The epistemic architecture of Mill'sA System of Logic, first published in 1843, is 
broadly that of Locke. Thus, he argues in familiar style that there are only two 
sources of knowledge. The first source consists of our direct intuitions or sensations. 
Such things as our 'bodily sensations and mental feelings' are 'examples of truths 
known to us by our immediate consciousness' .39 Knowledge that has been gained 
from this source is understood by Mill to be unquestionable, in the sense that it is not 
possible for us to increase the certainty with which we know such intuitions. On the 
understanding that 'What one sees or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one cannot 
but be sure that one sees or feels', there cannot be any doubt which would require the 
application of scientific methods.40 
In contrast to this first source of knowledge stands the practice of inference. In this 
case we make judgments that go beyond the scope of our immediate experience. 
Mill takes general laws of nature and historical truths as examples of knowledge 
derived from inference. Given that we cannot gain direct intuitions of events that 
occurred in our absence, or are yet to occur, we must deduce their character from 
knowledge that we already possess. As Mill takes the substance of immediate 
experience to be the 'original premises from which all others are inferred', it is vital 
that this experience is itself beyond doubt. If these premises, on which all 
knowledge is based, could not be absolutely relied upon then all subsequent 
inferences would remain questionable. However, as our experience is understood to 
have always showed itself as it is, only in the leap from the imme_diate and certain 
data of intuition to knowledge gained from inference is the possibility of error 
introduced. 
A System of Logic addresses the problem of how we can move from immediate to 
inferred knowledge. The book deals with various areas in which this takes place and 
details the characteristic methods of inference in each case. Thus, the methods of 
ratiocination and the syllogism are discussed at length with respect to their logical 
structure and legitimate use. However, it is Books III and VI that are of particular 
interest here as they deal respectively with the methods of induction in the natural 
39 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, (Longmans, Green, and Co, London, 1900), p3. 
40 Mill, A System of Logic, p4. 
32 Chapter One 
sciences and the methods of the moral sciences. I will deal with Mill's thoughts on 
induction in the natural sciences first. 
Mill argues that whether we are attempting to discover general propositions or 
merely particular ones, our method remains inductive. He states that 'whenever the 
evidence which we derive from observation of known cases justifies usm drawing an 
inference respecting even one unknown case, we should on the same evidence be 
justified in drawing a similar inference with respect to a whole class of cases. ' 41 Mill 
employs this notion, that every induction concerning one unknown case must also be 
capable of being rendered as a general proposition, to support his view that natural 
science is essentially only an extension of the reasoning of common life. The 
manner in which children know to avoid a flame when they have once been burned is 
taken by Mill as an illustration that common life is maintained through the induction 
of individual unknown cases. Whilst the child does not explicitly formulate a 
general law it will nevertheless avoid fire each time it is encountered. 42 In natural 
science the attempt is made to transform these limited and particular inductions into 
universal laws. 
For Mill induction consists of 'inferring from some individual instances in which a 
phenomenon is observed to occur, that it occurs in all instances of a certain class; 
namely in all which resemble the former, in what are regarded to be the material 
circumstances. '43 This procedure is understood to underpin not only our scientific 
endeavours but also our everyday survival. There is, however, a grave difficulty 
with respect to how this procedure is to be justified. Mill himself discusses this 
problem at length. The issue in question is that if we draw conclusions regarding the 
nature of as yet unknown events upon the evidence of similar events we have 
observed, then we must assume that the course of nature is regular. This is not to say 
that the events of nature are constantly repeating themselves; rather, I mean that 
every phenomenon is preceded by a certain combination of objects and events. Thus, 
whenever such a combination arises we can be sure that the phenomenon in question 
will also arise. 
This relationship can be described as the 'Law of Causation' provided that we 
recognize that Mill follows Hume in his conception of causation. If so, then it 
41 Mill, A System of Logic, pl86. 
42 Mill, A System of Logic, ppl22-123. 
43 Mill, A System of Logic, p200. 
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becomes clear that Mill's difficulty concerning the legitimacy of induction is in fact a 
modification of the problem of the separation of real and nominal essences. Mill's A 
System of Logic is motivated by essentially the same aim as that of Locke's Essay, 
namely, the delimitation of what we can legitimately know and the operations by 
which we may come to this knowledge. With respect to our knowledge of external 
objects, Mill subscribes to the doctrine that we can know only nominal essences or 
qualities, just as Locke and Hume had done.44 
However, these tenets of British empiricism clash with the status that Mill ascribes to 
scientific knowledge. The assumption that nature is in fact regular, despite the fact 
that all we have experience of is the regular conjunction of our simple ideas, amounts 
to the assumption of a universal and necessary connection or 'causality' amongst 
natural objects. Thus, the metaphysics that is concealed in Mill's understanding of a 
'fact' rules out the possibility that scientific knowledge could have as its object the 
necessary connections in nature. As Hume had already observed, such necessity is 
not to be found in our 'experience' of natural change. 
Mill is reduced to the argument that the method of induction should be accepted 
because our experience justifies us in making the assumption that nature is in fact 
regular. Thus, Mill accepts that upon his own view of experience, the method of 
induction can only be justified through an inductive judgement. That the entirety of 
nature is in fact regular, and that it exhibits natural laws, is a judgment that we make 
only after having examined our more limited experiences.45 As this overarching 
inductive judgment comes at the end of our more limited inquiries concerning 
particular regions of nature, Mill poses the question 'In what sen~e, then, can a 
principle, which is so far from being our earliest induction, be regarded as our 
warrant for all the others?'46 We are left in a position whereby a conclusion must be 
assumed throughout every investigation by which we are supposed to convince 
ourselves of its truth. Mill provides an historical account in which one begins with 
the observation of various simple regularities. Through the gradual expansion of 
these observations of regularities, we will eventually become convinced of the 
regularity of nature in general. 
44 Mill, A System of Logic, pp35-42. 
45 Mill, A System of Logic, pp201-242. 
46 Mill, A System of Logic, p201. 
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That it is impossible tojustify the method of induction through an appeal to the 
regularity of experience was pointed out by Karl Popper in The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery (1935). With regard to the principle of induction he argues that, 
if we try to regard its truth as known from experience, then the very same problems 
which occasioned its introduction will arise all over again. To justify it, we should 
have to employ inductive inferences; and to justify these we should have to assume 
an inductive principle of a higher order; and so on. Thus the attempt to base the 
principle of induction on experience breaks down, smce it must lead to an infinite 
regress. ' 47 
This situation.is further complicated in the case of the British empiricists due to their 
account of experience. 
5. 
. I have so far treated Mill's comments on induction as an attempt to justify the 
assumption that the events in nature are necessarily connected. However, it has been 
suggested that Mill's discussion of the justification of induction is not intended as a 
response to Hume's difficulties concerning necessary connections in nature.48 As 
Geoffrey Scarre has argued: 
To the modem reader, the phrase 'the justification of induction' immediately brings 
to mind Hume's famous attack on the soundness ofinduetive reasoning .. ;Yet the 
refutation of Hume was not an objective of Mill, though he did regard himself in 
Book III as justifying inductive inference. Indeed, Mill seems not to have grasped 
what Hume's problem was, and his chief concern was to explain how inference from 
particulars to particulars - that standard· pattern of valid reasoning '-•despite its 
appearance of slightness was really the only form of inference which science either 
needed to, or could, admit.49 
On this account, Mill is merely interested in detailing which inductive inferences are 
valid and establishing that we are justified in applying the inductive method in fields 
of which we have no direct experience, and therefore no knowledge of whether they 
exhibit regularities. 
Such a reading of Mill certainly explains the weakness of his justification of 
induction when read as a response to Hume's scepticism about necessary 
connections. Yet, if we accept that Mill not only did not attempt to refute Hume, but 
47 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (Routledge, London, 2002), p5. 
48 For this reading of Mill on the justification of induction see both John Skorupski 'Mill on language 
and logic', and Geoffrey Scarre 'Mill on induction and scientific method', in The Cambridge 
Companion to Mill, ed. John Skorupski, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998). 
49 Scarre, 'Mill on induction and scientific method', p 116. 
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that he did not even seem 'to have grasped what Hume's problem was', then we are 
left with an even starker picture of the extent to which Locke's separation of real and 
nominal essences undermined the ancient Greek and medieval understanding of 
scientific knowledge. 
As I briefly outlined above, Descartes thought that by establishing that our innate 
ideas are the imprint of God upon us he would be able to provide a sound foundation 
for scientific knowledge which, following the Aristotelian tradition, he conceived of 
as knowledge of what is true, evident and necessary. This argument ultimately turns 
upon God's constancy, for ifthe objects of our knowledge are to exist by necessity 
and yet be the creations of the free activity of God, then it must be that He could alter 
this reality but that He would not. Locke's denial of innate knowledge left him 
unsure as to the possibility of attaining scientific knowledge at all. If this 
interpretation of his comments on induction are correct, then Mill, who stands firmly 
in the tradition of British empiricism begun by Locke, appears no longer to even see 
the connection between necessity and scientific knowledge. 
I will not push this investigation further and ask whether Mill nevertheless assumes 
that scientific knowledge, arrived at by his inductive methods, is necessary. He 
certainly thinks that the putative knowledge arrived at by this method is always 
falsifiable by further experience, yet he does not seem to lack faith in the constancy 
of our experience. Whatever the answer to this problem, if it is true that Mill is no 
longer sensitive to the problem of necessity, a problem which was so troubling to 
Locke and Hume, then his intention that A System of Logic be 'a textbook of the 
'school of experience' in opposition to apriorism or neo-Kantianism', must be 
considered unfulfilled.50 It is precisely this problem, of providing a justification of 
our necessary knowledge, that Kant addressed by resorting to 'apriorism'. Mill fails 
to properly confront this in his treatise on induction. 
6. 
Several important features of Mill's notion of 'reality' are now clear. For Mill, as for 
his predecessors in the empiricist tradition, we cannot come to know reality as it 
exists in itself. Thus, the investigation of nature amounts to our investigation of our 
own sensations which we treat as though they were the product of a causally 
structured reality, although this can never be directly established by us. The 
50 Scarre, 'Mill on induction and scientific method', pl 16. 
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expressed aim of Locke, Hume and Mill was to establish the limits of what could be 
legitimately inferred.from our sensations. Thus, they establish rules concerning the 
nature and scope of legitimate inferences from our experience. These investigations 
are aimed at establishing the unity and coherence of the operations we perform upon 
the ideas we gain from our inner and outer senses, not at establishing the agreement 
of our thoughts with reality. 
Although I have argued that Mill shares in the fundamental doctrines of Locke and 
Hume, it appears, on occasion, that he took issue with this tradition on some 
significant points. In particular Mill disagreed with Locke's interpretation of truth as 
a matter of propositions agreeing with our simple ideas which in tum agree with 
reality. In a discussion of Hobbes' position on names, Mill argues that 'It seems 
proper to consider a word as the name of that which we intend to be understood by it 
when we use it ... ' and that for this reason he will speak of names 'as the names of 
things themselves, and not merely of our ideas ofthings.' 51 This appears to be a 
rejection of Locke's account of words as the signs of ideas and it is difficult to see 
how Mill could claim that names refer to things themselves at the same time as he 
argues that 'our conception of a body is that of an unknown exciting cause of 
sensations ... ' and that it may·'safely be laid down as a truth ... that, of the outward 
world, we know nothing, except the sensations we experience from it.' 52 This 
problem is only apparent, however, and it can be resolved once it is noted that Mill in 
fact refers to our sensations as 'things themselves'. He argues: 
When I say, "the sun is the cause of day," I do not mean that my idea of the sun 
causes or excites in me the idea of day: or in other words that thinking of the sun 
makes me think of day. I mean that a certain physical fact, which is called the sun's 
presence (and which, in the ultimate analysis, resolves itself into sensations, not 
ideas) causes another physical fact, which is called day.53 
The difficulty arises because Mill has taken Locke's reduction of the scope of 
knowledge to our ideas so much to heart that he thinks a physical fact can be 
'resolved into sensations'. As for the causes of these sensations, Mill maintains that 
it is of no importance to logic whether such noumena exist or what their character 
may be. 54 Thus, Mill upholds the idea that we only have access to our sensations, 
whilst maintaining that the nature of what lies beyond our sensations is of no 
51 Mill, A System of Logic, pl5. 
52 Mill, A System of Logic, pp39-40. 
53 Mill, A System of Logic, p 15. 
54 Mill, A System of Logic, p39-40n. 
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importance to the conduct of logic.55 Initially this appears to be true given that logic, 
as Mill conceived of it, addresses only inferences based upon experience, not the 
origin of this experience. However, as I have just demonstrated, the problem of 
induction hinges upon the issue of the regularity of nature and as such, contrary to 
Mill's assertions, the nature and existence of these 'unknown exciting causes of 
sensation' becomes a central problem for logic. 
7. 
I turn now to Mill's program for the reformation of the 'moral' sciences. He 
employs this term, 'moral sciences', to refer to those investigations which deal with 
the 'laws of Mind' and 'those of society'. 56 He also uses the term 'science of human 
nature' interchangeably with 'moral sciences' and describes the object of these 
sciences as the' ... thoughts, feelings, and actions of human beings ... ' 57 'Moral 
science' is therefore a rather broad term for which we have no modem equivalent as 
it includes the studies of the laws of the mind, human nature, society, political 
economy, and history. 
Given his identification of knowledge that has been derived from experience by 
means of the inductive method with knowledge as such, it is no surprise to find that 
in his System of Logic Mill calls for a reformation of the moral sciences in order that 
they can incorporate this inductive methodology. He states that only the sciences of 
man remain 'abandoned to the uncertainties of vague and popular discussion.' 58 For 
Mill, the sciences of natural phenomena provide the paradigm of scientific 
knowledge as they have reached a mature stage in which their method has become 
secure. By comparison, the sciences of man and society are char~cterized by mere 
speculation. 
The new moral sciences that are proposed by Mill are to be modelled upon the 
successful natural sciences. However, he argues that this modelling can only be 
achieved up to a point as the moral sciences do not lend themselves to the exactness 
that can be attained in other fields. He argues that 'even if our science of human 
nature were theoretically perfect, that is, if we could calculate any character as we 
55 Mill discusses various doctrines concerning the nature of noumena, their existence, and our 
knowledge of them in his Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, (Longmans, 
Green and Co., London, 1865). 
56 Mill, A System of Logic, p546. 
57 Mill, A System of Logic, p554. 
58 Mill, A System of Logic, p545. 
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calculate the orbit of any planet, from given data; still, as the data are never all given, 
nor ever precisely alike in different cases, we could neither make positive 
predictions, nor lay down universal propositions. ' 59 In the study of social and 
political phenomena it is enough that we are able to arrive at approximate truths, 
provided that these approximate truths can be deduced from the laws of nature. 
Thus, 'in order to give a genuinely scientific character to the study, it is-
indispensable that these approximate generalizations, which in themselves would 
amount only to the lowest kind of empirical laws, should be connected deductively 
with the laws of nature from which they result-should be resolved into the 
properties of the causes on which the phenomena depend. ' 60 
Mill sees the difficulties presented by the study of psychological, social, and political 
phenomena. Exact prediction within the sciences of human nature is an impossibility 
because of the complexity of the phenomena that are under examination. As every 
person possesses an individual character and no social situation is ever quite alike, it 
is impossible to precisely determine what the consequences of a given situation 
might be. Thus, even in the work of this positivist thinker, there is a recognition that 
the individuality of both characters and situations presents great difficulties to 
science. If individuality of people and social situations is not to be overlooked, it 
seems impossible that such phenomena may give rise to general laws. 
In the case of the natural sciences we understand that only certain aspects of an 
object are relevant to a scientific inquiry. We must separate those aspects of a 
situation that are relevant to the determination of subsequent phenomena from those 
that are not. Different aspects of the same object become relevantin different 
sciences. Thus, such matters as location and velocity are of interest in physical 
studies but not in chemical studies. In every case, the individuality of phenomena is 
disregarded except as it shows itself in the relevant aspect. If objects are to become 
evidence of a general law, or are to be deduced from a general law in the reverse 
case, then they must be considered as members of the same order of objects. No two 
objects are precisely the same, however, through abstracting from their particularities 
and viewing them under one of their aspects, we can consider them as subject to the 
same laws. Although no two objects are the same we can consider them in so far as 
they are physical, chemical, or biological objects. It is thereby possible both to 
59 Mill, A System of Logic, p554. 
60 Mill, A System of Logic, pp554-555. 
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discover the laws that the objects of each realm follow and to employ each object as 
evidence for such general laws. 
The difficulty in trying to apply this approach to the science of man is that it cannot 
provide a method of investigating individuality. The logic of the 'moral sciences' as 
Mill proposed them, follows that of the natural sciences. They can thereby only 
investigate a man, a society, or an historical event, in terms of the general laws that 
govern humanity, societies, and historical development. Due to the complexity of 
these phenomena, these sciences can never be exact. However, the fact that general 
laws can be discovered, and that these laws provide us with relatively accurate 
predictions, remains the mark of scientific validity for Mill. Indeed, the sciences that 
he proposed have been largely established. We are familiar with forms of 
psychological and sociological inquiry which rely heavily upon statistics in order to 
deal with the complexities of mental and social phenomena. Mill in fact cites 
statistics as the method whereby the regularities of history are revealed. The fact that 
the murder rate is found to change little from year to year, and that 'the same thing is 
found true of suicides, accidents, and all other social phenomena of which the 
registration is sufficiently perfect', is taken as proof that the course of history is 
governed by general laws.61 
It is true that, through the use of statistics, we can reveal general trends such as these. 
In Mill's scheme, the seemingly chance events of history are revealed to follow 
general laws provided we examine a large enough sample. The complexities of 
mental and social phenomena preclude us from understanding individual events. We 
can only see the trends that groups of events manifest. Just as the number of times a 
coin lands on heads will be roughly equal to the times it lands on tails if it is tossed 
enough times, the 'increasing preponderance of the collective agency of the species 
over all minor causes is constantly bringing the general evolution of the race into 
something which deviates less·from a certain and preappointed track. Historical 
science, therefore, is always becoming more possible' .62 History conceived in this 
way can only be studied in general as trends cannot be revealed by a single instance. 
The problem with this approach, to anticipate the objections made against Mill by the 
Southwest German neo-Kantians and Dilthey, is that it simply reduces history to 
nature. Yet they are distinct fields with different characteristics. Nature, as it is 
61 Mill, A System of Logic, p608. 
62 Mill, A System of Logic, p615. 
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understood in the modem tradition, is simply the realm of physical objects whose 
motions and interactions follow rules which can be calculated mathematically. There 
is no purpose or intention in the movements of this vast mechanical system, at least 
none which is discemable to our finite intellect. History is, in contrast to nature, 
constituted precisely by purposive human activities. The statistical sciences that Mill 
hoped would come into being through the reformation of the moral sciences seem 
inadequate to this realm of history. It is certainly true that human beings are partly 
natural beings, and that in physiological and even some psychological matters they 
can be studied using natural scientific methods. However, in so far as human beings 
are capable of acting, with varying degrees of self-awareness, they must be 
understood by different means. 
This difficulty regarding the fitness of general laws as a means of understanding 
historical events points to the limitations of Mill's understanding of scientific 
knowledge. He essentially admits only one legitimate method by which it is possible 
to derive scientific knowledge from experience, which he in tum views simply as an 
accumulation of sensations. Thus, there is no basis for a distinction between the 
'moral' sciences and the natural sciences, either in terms of the method of these 
sciences or in terms of the nature of their objects. Mill certainly sees that the study 
of human objects presents particular difficulties, yet he does not think that these 
difficulties are grave enough to warrant reconsidering his account of a unified 
inductive logic as the foundation of all scientific knowledge. The thought that 
historical science in particular relied upon a different logical structure to that of the 
natural sciences was developed by the philosophical tradition that Mill most 
vehemently opposed, namely neo-Kantianism. 
8. 
Having examined Mill's positivist approach to the moral sciences and its foundation 
in the empiricism of Locke, I tum now to a tradition that more directly influenced the 
development of Heidegger's thought, namely the neo-Kantianism of Wilhelm 
Windelband and Heinrich Rickert. These two philosophers were the leading figures 
in the 'Southwest German' school ofneo-Kantianism, also referred to as the 'Baden' 
or 'Heidelberg' school. It has been suggested by R. Lanier Anderson that this 
Southwest school, along with the 'Marburg' school which included such thinkers as 
Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer, 'have a claim to be counted as 
orthodox adherents ofneo-Kantianism because of their common commitments to 
anti-psychologistic readings of both the normative force and the a priori status of 
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philosophical principles for Kant. ' 63 Whether this is a legitimate means of 
determining orthodox from non-orthodox neo-Kantianism is beyond the scope this 
discussion. Indeed the history of neo-Kantianism is notoriously complex due partly 
to the vagueness of the term itself, and partly to the intricacies of German academic . 
politics. Lewis White Beck provides an outline of these difficulties in the opening 
passages of his article on neo-Kantianism in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. He 
writes there: 
Neo-Kantianism is a term used to designate a group of somewhat similar movements 
that prevailed in Germany between 1870 and 1920 but had little in common beyond 
a strong reaction against irrationalism and speculative naturalism and a conviction 
that philosophy could be a "science" only if it returned to the method and spirit of 
Kant. 
Of the politics of this movement he writes: 
Neo-Kantianism grew out of the peculiar social- cultural situation of German 
science and philosophy, and in turn it constituted a new academic situation with 
many characteristics of a long intellectual fad ... Doctrines were known by the names 
of the universities where they originated; men entered and left the movement as if it 
were a church or political party; members of one school blocked the appointments 
and promotions of members of the others ... 64 
With this vexed history in mind, I will abstain from any attempt to adjudicate on the 
matter of orthodoxy amongst the various neo-Kantian schools. However, I do intend 
to take up Anderson's suggestion that Windelband and Rickert, along with the 
Marburg neo-Kantians (whom I will not discuss here), were concerned with 
defending an 'anti-psychologistic' foundation for philosophical principles. 
This 'anti-psychologism' stems from the nature of Kant's attempt to provide a new 
foundation for necessary scientific knowledge. It is of particular interest here 
because it brings to a head the issue of whether the ancient ideal of theoretical 
knowledge can survive once we have surrendered the idea that the order of being is 
directly intelligible to us. Whereas Mill seemed either not to have realised, or not to 
have been troubled by, the fact that he was unable to provide a foundation for this 
63 R. Lanier Anderson, 'Neo-Kantianism and the Roots of Anti-Psychologism', British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy, 13, (2005), p291. 
64 Lewis White Beck, 'Neo-Kantianism', The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards, 
(Macmillan & The Free Press, New York, 1972), Vol. 5, pp468-473. For a more detailed 
examination of the politics of the neo-Kantian movement see Klaus Christian Kohnke, The 
Rise of Neo-Kantianism, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1991). 
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ideal of natural scientific knowledge, Kant resolutely tried to achieve just that. The 
Kantian solution to this problem is, however, burdened with its own difficulties. 
Kant must establish that the categories by which the subject synthesises the raw 
matter of experience can be considered the categories that should be employed, 
rather than the categories that it simply happens to employ. Should this initial 
difficulty be overcome, there is the further matter that Kant secures ourKn.owledge of 
appearances rather than of being itself, a problem which he shares with the 
empiricists. 
The aim of this section is to trace these characteristics of Kantian philosophy and to 
examine how they influence the attempts by Windelband and Rickert to provide an a 
priori logic of the human sciences. The difficulties that this project faces are 
symptomatic of the contradiction between the essentially un-historical conception of 
knowledge that survived in the neo-Kantian tradition, and the historical existence of 
humanity. 
9. 
Kant writes in his Prolegomena that, since the inception of metaphysics, 'no event 
has occurred which could have been more decisive in respect of the fate of this 
science than the attack which David Hume made on it.' 65 He refers here to Hume's 
argument that we have no grounds upon which to base our idea of a necessary 
connection between cause and effect. Kant sees that this argument is relevant not 
only to our idea of causality, but to all metaphysical knowledge. He describes 
Hume's argument as a challenge to reason, 
who pretends to have conceived this concept [necessary connection] "in her womb, to 
give an account of herself and say with what right she thinks: that anything can be of 
such a nature, that if it is posited, something else must thereby also be posited 
necessarily; for that is what the concept of cause says. He [Hume] proved 
irrefutably: that it is wholly impossible for reason to think such a conjunction a 
priori and out of concepts. For this conjunction contains necessity; but it is quite 
impossible to see how, because something is, something else must also necessarily 
be, and how therefore the concept of such an a priori connection can be introduced. 
From this he inferred that Reason completely deceives herself with this concept, in 
falsely taking it for her own child, whereas it is nothing but the bastard of the 
imagination fathered by experience.66 
65 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. Peter G. Lucas, (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 1953), p5. 
66 Kant, Prolegomena, p6. 
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Kant accepts Hume's arguments that it is neither possible to deduce necessary 
connections in nature simply from concepts, nor possible to find any evidence of 
such necessity in experience. Indeed, he thinks this argument places the entirety of 
our metaphysical knowledge in need of justification due to the fact that it is a priori, 
universal, and necessary. 
Yet Kant does not follow Hume in asserting that the necessity of our metaphysical 
knowledge is merely a subjective necessity, founded in the regularity of experience, 
to which we unthinkingly and without justification give objective status. Rather he 
thinks this conclusion is 'hasty and incorrect'. Apart from the ambiguities of 
Hume's actual account, which seems to include two different definitions of causality, 
the entire thrust of his psychological account is aimed at explaining away the notion 
of necessary connection. Thus, as I said above, he argues that what we naively take 
to be necessities of nature itself, are merely a product of the habitual and involuntary 
movement of the human mind. This strategy would not be so objectionable were it 
not for the fact that it relies, in its mechanistic account of human psychology, upon 
the very necessary causal connections it argues cannot be found in nature. 
Rather than follow Hume's sceptical conclusions, Kant was sufficiently impressed by 
the successes of the new mathematical sciences of nature that he did not question the 
legitimacy, or possibility, of the model of science as necessary knowledge, rather he 
took it as an established fact that only needed to be provided with a philosophical 
foundation. 67 Thus, he took it that the recently developed physics in fact contained 
knowledge that was both universal and necessary, and which was therefore a priori, 
or not produced by experience. Beginning from this position, he states that, 'The real 
problem of pure reason is now contained in the question:. How are synthetic 
judgements a priori possible?'68 Kant distinguishes between 'analytic' and 
67 It is important to note the extent to which the successful development of 'modem' physical sciences 
changed the nature of philosophical reflection. M. B. Foster puts this point well, ' ... the 
relation of philosophy to science varied according to the degree of development which the 
latter had achieved at the time. By the later centuries of the modem era the sciences of 
nature had become so firmly established that they formed a datum from which philosophical 
speculation could start. This does not of course mean that the philosopher dogmatically 
accepted the truth of any scientific hypothesis. He assumed only that a science of nature was 
possible (because it was actual), enquired into the presuppositions of its possibility, and 
tested his conclusions by their compatibility with it. This procedure is what Kant first named 
. the Critical Method ... '. See M. B. Foster, 'The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise 
of Modem Natural Science', Mind, 43, (1934), p447. 
68 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1998), B19. 
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'synthetic' judgements. Analytic judgments are those in which 'the predicate B 
belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A;' 
whilst in synthetic judgements 'B lies entirely outside the concept A, though to be 
sure it stands in connection with it.' He goes on to argue that analytic and synthetic 
judgements can be called 'clarifying' and 'amplifying' respectively. This is because 
the predicate in the analytic judgement merely brings out what was inexplicit in the 
subject, whilst in a synthetic judgement we 'add to the concept of the subject a 
predicate that was not thought in it at all, and could not have been extracted from it 
through analysis. ' 69 
This division allows Kant to clarify whichjudgements he considers are in need of 
philosophical justification. Analytic judgments are all a priori, however, this is not a 
problem because 'I do not need to go beyond my concept at all in order to formulate 
the judgement, and therefore need no testimony from experience for that.' The case 
of synthetic judgements is more complex. Some synthetic judgements have their 
foundation in experience and are therefore only contingent, rather than necessary. 
Kant provides the judgement 'All bodies are heavy' as an example of such an a 
posteriori synthetic judgement. The concept of 'weight' is not analytically contained 
in that of 'body', yet they 'nevertheless belong together, though only contingently, as 
parts of a whole, namely experience, which is itself a synthetic combination of 
intuitions.' 7° Kant's difficulty is with judgments that are both synthetic and a priori, 
for they seem to extend our knowledge beyond mere concepts, yet they have no 
warrant from experience, and can have none because they are supposed to be 
universally and necessarily valid. He thinks that mathematics and natural science do 
contain such judgements as their principles, the classic example of such knowledge 
being the principle of causality discussed above. 
Kant's critical project is then to reflect on the foundations of the synthetic a priori 
knowledge that is contained in the mathematical and natural sciences, and from this 
to clarify the limits to which metaphysics can be extended as a science rather than as 
an exercise in ungrounded speculation. This project is 'critical' because it involves 
the self-examination of reason itself. Kant writes of the science he hopes to establish 
through a critique of reason, 
69 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 7/B11. 
7° Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A8/B12. 
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... this science cannot be terribly extensive, for it does not deal with objects of 
reason, whose multiplicity is infinite, but merely with itself, with problems that 
spring entirely from its own womb, and that are not set before it by the nature of 
things that are distinct from it but through its own nature; so that, once it has become 
completely familiar with its own capacity in regard to the objects that may come 
before it in experience, then it must become easy to determine, completely and 
securely, the domain and the bounds of its attempted use beyond all bounds of 
experience.71 
Kant's solution to the question 'How are synthetic a priori judgements possible?' is 
inseparable from the problem of delimiting the sphere of objects to which reason can 
rightly apply itself. His answer to the first question is that the mass of sensory 
experience we receive, which in itself seems to be merely contingent as Hume had 
claimed, is provided with an order and structure by the operations of the judging 
subject. This takes place in two stages, firstly the 'matter' of appearances is 
provided with the 'forms' of space and time. Secondly, these objects which are 
ordered by space and time are further determined through the 'categories' of the 
understanding, which includes such concepts as possibility, necessity, existence, 
cause and effect, substance and accident, and so on. Thus, by ordering the 'manifold 
of sensations' with these various categories we are able to produce a unified 
expenence. 
The details of how Kant arrives at these categories is far too complex to consider 
here, although it is worth noting that they are designed to be comprehensive enough 
to account for the mathematical and natural scientific knowledge that he took to 
contain incontestable examples of synthetic a priori knowledge. The more relevant 
issue is that Kant introduces two sources of knowledge. He write"s that: 
Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is 
the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the 
faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of 
concepts); through the former an object is given to us, through the latter it is thought 
in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and 
concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither 
concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without 
concepts can yield a cognition.72 
71 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B23. 
72 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A50/B74. 
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Thus, our knowledge of objects depends upon our receptivity to phenomena and our 
ability to structure this experience according to the forms of intuition and the 
concepts of the understanding. Working backwards from what he took to be the 
necessary and universal knowledge contained in the natural and mathematical 
sciences, Kant comes to the conclusion thatthese necessary elements are derived 
from the structuring activity of the mind. In this way he provides a necessary 
structure within which appearances can be known. 
However, Kant only provides this necessary framework by restricting our knowledge 
to appearances. What is known in Kant's account of knowledge, the object of 
knowledge, is appearances. As he states: 
Appearances are the only objects that can be given to us immediately, and that in 
them which is immediately related to the object is called intuition. However, these 
appearances are not things in themselves, but themselves only representations, which 
in turn have their object, which therefore cannot be further intuited by us, and that 
may therefore be called the non-empirical, i.e., transcendental object = X 73 
This is the point at which Kant's attempt to justify our claim to universal and 
necessary knowledge coincides with his 'transcendental idealism,' that is his 
insistence that we cannot go beyond the conditions of our own experience and attain 
knowledge of things in themselves. Anderson summarises this point well when he 
writes of Kant's strategy: 
Kant returns to his insistence on idealism at the close of many of the arguments of 
the Transcendental Analytic. His claim in these passages is that the valid 
applicability he has shown for the category in question, and therefore genuine 
knowledge using that category, is possible only because the objects of knowledge are 
appearances. That is, the objects are just the 'fillings in' by empirical details of a 
priori valid schemata for synthesis. Therefore, the conditions placed on the proper 
representation of objects by the normative rules of synthesis are at the same time 
conditions on the things to be known.74 
This is the crux of Kant's position. He claims that we have necessary and universal 
knowledge of nature and that this is to be found in the principles of physics and 
mathematics. As this necessary knowledge cannot arise from experience, it must 
73 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A109. 
74 R. Lanier Anderson, 'Synthesis, Cognitive Normativity, and the Meaning of Kant's Question, 'How 
are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?'', European Journal of Philosophy, 9, (2001), 
p294. In this article Anderson provides a detailed discussion of the nature in which Kant 
envisioned the synthesis of a priori knowledge with appearances, a matter which I have not 
addressed here due to its complexity. 
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arise from the necessary structures of cognition. However, if this knowledge is to be 
considered objectively valid, it must be assumed that the objects in question are only 
objects insofar as they appear to us. The resulting division of appearances and things 
in themselves, however formal this division may be, appears to renounce the 
possibility of us coming to know being itself. Yet it was the vision of being itself as 
necessary and therefore unchanging which initially brought abouUhe idea that 
scientific knowledge should itself have these characteristics. Kant's argument, 
putting aside questions about its plausibility, secures the necessity of scientific 
knowledge whilst it renounces any knowledge of being itself. 
11. 
Having seen something of the strategy Kant employs in order to provide a foundation 
for necessary scientific knowledge, it is possible to understand why the problem of 
'psychologism' was so central to neo-Kantian philosophy in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. This is of particular interest because it provides the framework 
in which Windelband and Rickert approach the problem of developing a logic for the 
human sciences and the source of their concept of 'validity'. 
The problem of 'psychologism', which essentially consists of the claim that logical 
laws are founded on laws of psychology, stems from the ambiguity of Kant's account 
of mental synthesis. On the one hand Kant clearly intends his logical categories, by 
which we bring unity to the manifold of sensory experience, to be free of any 
foundation in psychology. He writes of this logic, 'As pure logic it has no empirical 
principles, thus it draws nothing from psychology (as one has occasionally been 
persuaded), which therefore has no influence at all on the canon of the 
understanding. It is a proven doctrine, and everything in it must be completely a 
priori.' 75 Yet Kant also thinks that the process by which we come to know objects 
involves mental acts of synthesis. Thus there is some basis for thinking that the 
logical laws by which this synthesis is carried out are in fact psychological laws. 
These two different ways of reading Kant mark a deep division amongst neo-Kantian 
philosophers. The Marburg and Southwest schools ofneo-Kantianism both held to 
an anti-psychologistic reading of Kant in opposition to such thinkers as F. A. Lange. 
There have been two basic lines of argument by which the validity of psychologism 
has been denied. These strands of argument have different emphases yet they are 
75 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A54/B78. 
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closely related. The first is concerned to uphold the objectivity of logical laws and 
proceeds by asserting that logical laws have their own reality which is not dependent 
upon on the contingent psychological structures of knowing subjects. Thus, logic is 
not a matter of how reasoning minds actually conduct themselves, but is rather 
concerned with a realm of abstract objects which possesses its own reality. This 
response to psychologism, was developed by Frege and Husserl. The second 
response is that logical laws are normative laws. This means that they are binding on 
any thought which aims to achieve knowledge, regardless of whether they are 
actually followed. Hermann Cohen's interpretation of Kant, outlined in his Kants 
Theorie der Erfahrung of 1871, developed this second line of attack upon 
psychological readings of Kant's transcendental philosophy. His critique is focused 
upon how we should understand the 'a priori' in Kant, and is well summarised by 
Anderson in the following passage: 
Kant claims that various structures (space, time, the categories) are a priori 
preconditions of the possibility of experience, and he locates these in the 
transcendental mind. For the psychological reader, this may look like a claim about 
the innateness of these structures, and such an interpretation invites a Lange-style 
extension of Kant's thought by means of attempts to discover the innate mental 
structures through empirical psychology. But according to Cohtm, treating the 
Kantian forms of experience as mental 'organs' that cause transformations of the 
incoming data of sense fundamentally misreads Kant's notion of apriority. Close to 
· the heart of Kant's complaint against empiricism was a charge that it offered only a 
theory of the natural laws of cognition - what Kant calls a 'physiology of the 
understanding'. Whatever such accounts might show about the way our concepts 
emerge in fact, they leave untouched Kant's main question viz., with what right we 
can use them to produce justified, objective cognitions ... For Cohen'sKant, the 
transcendental forms that structure our experience are 'not psychological categories, 
but rather epistemological conditions of the possibility of experience' .76 
Cohen's argument forms the foundation for an anti-psychological reading of Kant 
which focused upon this question of the justification or validity of knowledge. 
Windelband and Rickert also pursued this line of argument. These two lines of 
attack on psychologism are often brought together. Thus, the independent reality of 
the logical realm is often taken as an explanation of the normativity oflogical rules, 
and logical normativity is sometimes thought to imply such an independent logical 
realm. However, my aim in discussing Kant's critical philosophy was to provide a 
framework within which to discuss the attempts made by the Southwest neo-
76 Anderson, 'Neo-Kantianism and the Roots of Anti-Psychologism', pp299-300. 
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Kantians to extend Kant's account of the transcendental foundations of natural 
scientific knowledge into the realm of the human sciences. I turn now to this issue. 
12. 
The discussion of history and the other 'human' sciences amongst German 
philosophers towards the close of the nineteenth century was conducted in light of 
the fact that such learning was already well established in German academia. Thus, 
more so than Mill, German philosophers were confronted with the achievements of 
established humanistic disciplines. Thus, it was not possible for them simply to 
dismiss such scholarship as 'unscientific'. The fact of such human 'sciences' 
brought the question of how science should be defined into prominence. Anderson 
summarises the difficulty for German philosophers of the period in this way: 
On the one hand, humanistic learning was prominent in the German intellectual 
landscape, both because ofnineteenth-century scholarly achievements, and because 
of the central place of classical languages and literatures in gymnasium education. 
Work in the Geisteswissenschaften thus served as an example of intellectual rigour 
for students and scholars alike, and it was standard to see humanistic learning as 
exemplary science. On the other hand, the older and more established natural 
sciences were still paradigms of mature science, and the progress of the natural and 
human sciences had carried them far apart, both in their methods and in the nature of 
their results. Natural sciences subjected phenomena to relatively simple quantitative 
laws, which permitted improvements in precision and confirmation of theory by 
controlled experiment. .. By contrast, the Geisteswissenschaften in Germany were 
dominated by the 'Historical School', whose highest accomplishments rested on 
sensitive historical interpretations of unique and valuable cultural achievements.77 
The difficulty was that the methods of the natural sciences were considered 
paradigmatic for well established sciences, yet these methods were not followed in 
the humanistic disciplines. Thus the question was, what were the methods of the 
humanistic sciences, and insofar as they differed from those of the natural sciences, 
could they be considered legitimate? 
Much of the debate concerning the humanistic disciplines centred upon the role of 
psychology. Both Wilhelm Dilthey and Wilhelm Wundt considered the development 
of psychology as fundamental to the Geisteswissenschaften although they differed 
greatly in their conception of psychology. I will address Dilthey's concept of 
psychology in the next chapter and devote the remainder of this chapter to a review 
of the Southwest neo-Kantian contribution to this debate. In opposition to the 
77 R. Lanier Anderson, 'The Debate Over the Geisteswissenschaften', in The Cambridge History of 
Philosophy, ed. Thomas Baldwin, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), p221. 
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positivism of Mill and his German followers, and to the emphasis on psychology in 
the work of Dilthey and Wundt, these neo-Kantians sought to provide a 
transcendental logic for the human sciences. In doing this they attempted to maintain 
a rigorously anti-psychologistic account of this logic. 
Wilhelm Windelband is perhaps best known now for his works. on the history of 
philosophy. However, he also developed several ideas regarding knowledge and the 
division of the human and natural sciences which were very influential amongst the 
Southwest neo-Kantians. With regard to knowledge, he argued that the most 
fundamental problems of epistemology are in fact problems of'validity'. His other 
well known idea was that the customary division of the sciences in to the 
Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften was ambiguous because it did 
not take into account the distinct logical 'aims' of each discipline. I will begin by 
outlining Windelband's 'logical' division of the sciences. 
The understanding that the sciences could be divided into two realms on the basis of 
the ontological difference of their respective objects was one ofWindelbanCl's targets 
in hisRectorial Address of 1894.78 He argues there that we &re in.need ofa new 
means of classifying the sciences. The inadequacy of this substantive division is 
illustrated by the case of psychology .. Using such a divisfon _i;neaJ.lS that 'psychology 
cannot be classified unambiguously· either as a natural scienc.e or as a science of the 
mind.' 79 · The reason for this lack of clarity lies in the fact that whilst psychology is a 
science of the mind, insofar as its object is the human mind, it proceeds in a manner 
that is, in terms of methodology, indistinguishable from the natural sciences. He 
states that it is for this reason that psychology has been referred to as the 'natural 
science of the mind'. Thus, Windelband's complaint concerning a suhstantive 
definition of the sciences is that such a definition tells us nothing about the method of 
the science itself. 
Windelband goes on to argue that, 'At present, a certain classification of the 
disciplines which attempt to establish knowledge of reality is regularly employed. 
They are distinguished into natural sciences [Naturwissenschaften] and sciences of 
the mind [Geisteswissenschaften]. Stated in this particular form I regard the 
78 Wilhelm Windelband, 'History and Natural Science', trans Guy Oakes, History and Theory, 19, 
(1980). 
'19 Windelband, 'History and Natural Science', p174. 
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dichotomy as unfortunate. Nature and mind is a substantive dichotomy.' 80 He 
claims that this means of separating the sciences has dominated recent philosophy as 
it has been maintained from 'Descartes and Spinoza to Schelling and Hegel'. Hans-
Georg Gadamer has pointed out that the term Geisteswissenschaften was made 
popular in Germany by the translator of J. S. Mill's Logic.81 Here the term is 
employed as a translation of Mill's term 'The Moral Sciences'. Having already 
examined what Mill meant by the term we can understand what its German rendering 
denoted. Mill understood the 'moral sciences' as the sciences of the thoughts, 
feelings, and actions of human beings. This included the study of the laws of mind, 
human nature, society, political economy, and history.82 It should be clear from this 
list that both the terms 'moral sciences' and 'Geisteswissenschaften' have no obvious 
equivalent in modem English. The slightly ungainly character of substitute terms 
such as 'human sciences' or 'historical sciences' should be understood in this light. 
It should also be noted that the notion of' Wissenschaft' is a broader term than 
'science'. Whilst the English term 'science' is often used simply to mean the 
physical sciences, or investigations that employ their exact methods, 'Wissenschaft' 
retains a broader meaning. It is true that the English term is sometimes used in a 
broader sense, for instance in 'Political Science'. Nevertheless, the narrower sense 
of 'science' appears to be more common. In German, any branch of systematic 
scholarship or learning can be described as 'wissenschaftlich'. In this discussion of 
the concept of an 'historical science' or a 'human science', I employ 'science' in its 
broader meaning of 'scholarship' or 'branch ofleaming', which it shares with the 
German notion of' Wissenschaft'. 
Windelband is dissatisfied with a substantive division of the sciences, as it is based 
upon a belief that there can be only one scientific method. His conviction that the 
sciences must be divided on the basis of their logical structure is also based upon his 
Kantian understanding of scientific knowledge. If, as Windelband believes, 'these 
objects are not given simply as such, but are shaped by the scientific work of the 
concepts themselves', then we cannot speak of the object independently of the 
science.83 In contrast to the substantive division, Windelband proposes that the 
80 Windelband, 'History and Natural Science', pl73. 
81 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall, (Continuum, 
New York, 2000), p3. 
82 Mill, A System of Logic, p554. 
83 Wilhelm Windelband, An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. Joseph McCabe, (T. Fisher Unwin, 
London, 1921), p207. 
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sciences can be distinguished upon the basis of their aim:s. In developing this theory 
he introduces the terms 'nomological' and 'idiographic' and uses them to distinguish 
between those sciences that aim at the production of general laws, the 'nomological' 
sciences, and those that aim at the description of a single reality, the 'idiographic' 
sciences. 
The reason we are led to describe psychology as the 'natural science of the mind' is 
that it shares its method with the natural sciences. Thus, Windelband states that 
' ... both psychology and the natural sciences establish, collect, and analyze facts only 
from the viewpoint and for the purpose of understanding the general nomological 
relationship to which these facts are subject. ' 84 This is the scientific method that Mill 
identified as the only scientific method. It is that method which examines individual 
phenomena only in order to bring them under a general law. The objects of a 
nomological science are seen as instances or examples rather than as unique 
phenomena. 
Windelband describes the idiographic sciences, which largely coincide with what 
were previously known as the Geisteswissenschaften, as seeking to provide 'a 
complete and exhaustive description of a single more or less extensive process which 
is located within a unique, temporally defined domain of reality.'85 Rather than 
seeking to understand an event insofar as it is the same as other events and thereby 
bring it under a general rule, the idiographic sciences attempt to understand events in 
their individuality. It is the fully historical event which the idiographic science 
attempts to capture and as such it cannot aim at the development of general laws. It 
must rather describe the event itself. It is for this reason that the idiographic sciences 
aim at the 'singular, assertoric proposition' whilst the nomological sciences aim at 
the 'general, apodictic judgment' .86 
Just as the natural sciences are characterized by nomological aims, the human 
sciences are taken up with idiographic aims. However, Windelband does not 
propose that the division of nomological and idiographic sciences necessarily follows 
the old division of human and natural sciences. Rather, it is precisely because this 
mode of defining the sciences does not follow the lines of the old division that it is 
able to unambiguously characterise the nature of psychology. The earlier division 
84 Windelband, 'History and Natural Science', pl74. 
85 Windelband, 'History and Natural Science', pl 74. 
86 Windelband, 'History and Natural Science', pl 74. 
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was unable to indicate that whilst psychology was a study of mind, it nevertheless 
employed the methods of the natural sciences. Employing Windelband's schema it is 
obvious that psychology is a nomological science. Thus, if we wish to assimilate the 
terms natural and human, or historical, sciences to Windelband' s new division of the 
nomological and idiographic sciences, then we must say that psychology is a natural 
science. 
The important feature of this new mode of definition is that, although it lends 
legitimacy to the methods of the Geisteswissenschaften by arguing that they possess 
an independent method of investigating reality, it does not rely upon the accurate 
description of any existing investigations. Rather, it is a purely logical distinction. 
We must not understand the terms 'nomological' and 'idiographic' as replacements 
for the previous categories of Geisteswissenschaft and Naturwissenschaft. As we 
have noted, these terms are applied to the sciences based upon the object of their 
investigation. In the case of Windelband's terms, 'nomological' and 'idiographic', 
these descriptions do not apply to any science in particular. They describe the 
logical aim of scientific conceptualization, rather than an actual investigation. 
Indeed, Windelband explicitly states that his 'methodological dichotomy classifies 
only modes of investigation, not the contents of knowledge itself.' 87 
As a consequence of this it is possible that a single phenomenon may become the 
object of both nomological and idiographic inquiries. Windelband argues that the 
fact that the same object can become subject to both modes of inquiry is partly a 
matter of the scale in which it is viewed. Thus, we can investigate an historical 
phenomenon that has remained constant for a period of time in a nomothetic fashion. 
However, if we view the same phenomenon within a broader historical framework, 
that is we see that it is an individual event that has come into being and passed away, 
then we can investigate it in an idiographic manner. This leads us to the further point 
that the two methods must be thoroughly intertwined in many investigations with 
only the final aim of the investigation determining its character as nomological or 
idiographic. We can see, for example, that the natural sciences will require 
idiographic methods in order to precisely determine individual facts in order that 
they may then be made available as instances of general rules, whilst the 
Geisteswissenschaften will inevitably make use of general laws in their inquiries of 
historical processes and events. 
87 Windelband, 'History and Natural Science', pl 75. 
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13. 
Windelband presents his account of the sciences as a development of Kant's position. 
As Charles Bambach has argued, we can see Windelband as having 'applied Kant's 
epistemological critique of mathematics to the new science of history and developed 
a logic of both the Naturwissenschaften and theGeisteswissenschaften.'88 In his 
Introduction to Philosophy, Windelband provides a very basic account of the Kantian 
critique of 'narve realism'. Essentially this position involves the conception of 
reality as a 'reality which needs no sort of consciousness for its reality.'89 
Windelband argues that it was the great innovation of the Critique of Pure Reason to 
have recognized that we can not know reality, or the 'thing-in-itself, as it exists 
outside of consciousness. Thus, the central problem for Windelband, given that 'the 
object is not real as such outside the mind, but merely in virtue of the form in which 
the mind brings together the various parts of its content in a unity',· is 'under what 
conditions this synthetic unity of the manifold has the value ofknowledge.'90 The 
answer is that we have knowledge only when we think about objects in a manner that 
belongs to them. Thus, although it is through the Unifying action of the subject that 
reality is produced, this should not be seen as undermining the requirement of 
thought to direct itself towards its objects. 
Windelband supplements Kant's conception that empirical science is only the study 
of 'nature'. He argues: 'Opposed to this study ofnature ... are those scientific 
activities which have to establish and thoroughly study particular realities. ' 91 Given 
that these studies cannot aim at generalisation, they must be guided by another 
logical end or value. In the case of these idiographic sciences, the guiding values of 
the inquiry are 'the structures of civilized life, which, engendered and perfected in 
the course of human history, we regard as the historical cosmos as distinguished 
from the natural.'92 Windelband is arguing here that just as the nomological sciences 
form their objects on the basis of a view of the cosmos as regular and governed by 
law, the idiographic sciences must form their objects in line with a ruling conception 
of the cosmos as related to values. Both idiographic and nomological sciences must 
select their objects from the fullness of reality and in the case of idiographic sciences 
88 Charles R. Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism, (Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1995), p70. 
89 Windelband, Introduction to Philosophy, p198. 
90 Windelbartd, Introduction to Philosophy, p199. 
91 Windelband, Introduction to Philosophy, p204. 
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this must take place on the basis of the relevance of the object to the guiding values 
of human life, whatever they may be. Thus, although all events are historical in the 
sense that they are in time, only some of them will be seen as significant with regard 
to these guiding values. 
Windelband makes a distinction between unscientific and scientif!c production of a 
world of objects. In our unscientific dealings with the world, he states that 'not only 
in perception, but also in the opinions that are based thereon, the objects seem to take 
shape so much ofthemselves ... that they seem to be something foreign, introduced, 
seen, reproduced and pictured in the soul.' However, in the production of scientific 
knowledge 'the objects are consciously engendered, and therefore deliberately 
shaped.' 93 In the case of the objects of the rational sciences, logic and mathematics, 
Windelband argues that it is clear that they are not derived from experience, even 
though experience may be the occasion for thinking about such objects. Our 
knowledge depends upon the pre-structuring of the object as a mathematical or 
logical object. The knowledge that is derived from these rational sciences is 
independent from any 'correspondence' to an object in reality (in the naive realist 
sense). Rather the basis of knowledge in these sciences is the manner in which the 
objects are conceived. Thus, it is not through empirical examples that we learn about 
the mathematical properties of triangles, but rather by attending to the original 
concept of a triangle. 
Although they are not derived from experience, the rational sciences provide us with 
an understanding of the nature of reality. Both mathematics and logic, according to 
Windelband, give us an account of the forms of reality. By this it is meant that 
reality always agrees with the laws of mathematics and logic. However, in saying 
this we must recognize that our conclusions are restricted to the form of reality and 
that we are unable to derive the content of reality from these formal laws. This is 
simply a point concerning the difference between logical possibility and actuality. 
Although we may know the necessary structure of reality, this does not tell us 
anything about the state of reality itself. ·These logical forms are hypothetical in that 
they only tell us that if there is a real object, then it must agree with the laws oflogic 
and mathematics. Whether there is in fact a real object or not cannot be determined 
from this formal knowledge. Windelband argues that, 'A description of the present 
state of the universe follows from the general laws of nature only if the immediately 
93 Windelband, Introduction to Philosophy, p202. 
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preceding state is presupposed. ' 94 This is ·simply a restatement of Kant's thought that 
it is the conceptual form of knowledge that is necessary, not its empirical content. 
Windelband emphasizes the finitude of human knowledge. He understands science 
as based upon a process of selecting from 'the immeasurable richness of reality. ' 95 
This is true in the sense that given our limited existence and powers of perception, it 
is simply impossible to comprehend all aspects of reality .. Thus, there must be a 
process of deliberate selection through which the sciences obtain their objects. 
Windelband contends that this is done in the sciences of reality with a logical 
purpose in mind. First, there are the nomological sciences in which objects are 
placed under general laws. These nomological investigations coincide with what 
Kant understood as the investigation of nature. Kant states: 'By nature (in the 
empirical sense) we understand the combination ofappearances. as regards their 
existence, in accordance with necessary rules, i.e., according to laws. ' 9~ Thus the 
logical aim or value that rules in the study of 'nature' in this Kantian sense is 
generalisation; Second, there are the idiographic sciences which aim at the 
production of a complete picture of an individual reality: Windelband takes history 
as an example of this sort of science as it seeks to .understand individual realities 
within a cosmos which is governed not by .univetsaHaws, but by the progression of 
values. 
14. 
Windelband understands his acceunt as a logical exercise and one which does. not 
seek to alter the actual sciences in any way. Thus, 'The task of the logician is simply 
to define the general form of specific methods which have proven to be successful 
and, following this, to determine the significance, the cognitive value, and the limits 
of these methods. '97 Philosophy thereby concerns itself only with the forms of 
knowledge which are manifested by the sciences. Thus, altheugh we can saythat 
Windelband understands the project of philosophy to be the development of an 
understanding of the methodology of the sciences, once again we must emphasise 
that this is true only if we understand methodology in. a formal logical sense. 
Methodology is for him the manner in which the sciences approach their objects with 
a guiding understanding of the cosmos· already in mind. The particular 
94 Windelband, 'History and Natural Science', p184. 
95 Windelband, Introduction to Philosophy, p204. 
96 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A216/B263. 
97 Windelband, 'History and Natural Science', pp 170-171. 
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manipulations and operations of any actual scientific investigation are of no 
importance in such an understanding of methodology. It is rather the forms of 
knowledge and their validity that is of interest to Windelband in his transcendental 
mqmry. 
This returns us to Windelband's contention that epistemological P!Oblems are 
essentially problems of validity. This point is founded upon Kant's understanding of 
knowledge as a product of the synthetic activity of the mind. Windelband takes this 
to mean that knowledge is essentially an activity, that is, it is the result of our 
unifying the infinite manifold of experience under categories that we take to be valid 
for such production. Indeed, Kant likens his rethinking of the nature of knowledge in 
general to that Copernican revolution in natural science in which it was 
'comprehended that reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to 
its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its judgements according 
to constant laws and compel nature to answer its questions, rather than letting nature 
guide its movements by keeping reason, as it were in leading strings ... ' .98 
As I have already shown, the central difficulty of this revision of our understanding 
of knowledge lies in providing a justification for the validity of the principles that are 
employed in this process of unification. Windelband maintained an anti-
psychological interpretation of logical laws, both for idiographic and nomological 
sciences. He writes: 
... this philosophical idea of validity always points beyond the process of knowledge 
in empirical subjects. The validity of truth is independent of all behaviour of fallible 
and evolving subjects. A mathematical truth was valid long before anybody 
conceived it, and it is valid even if an individual erroneously refuses his assent to it. 
For this reason the meaning of validity-in-itself has become one of the main 
problems of modern logic.99 
On this point, Windelband made little headway. Indeed, he seems to have confused 
the matter by trying to maintain the distinction between normative rules of 
judgements and simple psychological laws, whilst arguing that Kant was wrong to 
have so strictly separated the realms of freedom and nature. The details of 
Windelband' s defence of an anti-psychological account of logical validity are not of 
98 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxiii. 
99 Windelband, Introduction to Philosophy, pl83. 
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great interest here.100 However, what is of interest is his account of historical reality 
as a progression of values. By this he means that the categories which are taken to 
be valid by a society, and in terms of which an historical age understands itself, 
change over time. This presents an obvious difficulty for Windelband's claim that 
historical science differs from the natural science only in that it has a different logical 
'aim'. If historical science is to attain the necessity and universality of the natural 
sciences, the categories by which it produces objective knowledge must themselves 
be necessary and universal. That is to say, the categories by which the historian 
constitutes the historical 'cosmos' must be valid for all of human history. Unlike the 
realm of nature, the laws of which are said to be unchanging, the objects of history 
are unique developments of human culture. What these generally valid categories of 
historical judgement might be, or how we might come to know them given our own 
historical position, are difficulties that Windelband never resolved. 
15. 
Heinrich Rickert goes much further than Windelband in attempting to develop a 
rigorous transcendental logic of the human sciences. There are two elements of his 
work that are of particular interest here: his determination of reality as the limit of 
concept formation; and his account of 'value'. 
The notion that reality forms the limit of concept formation is based upon the idea 
that reality is itself irrational. Rickert argues that reality is irrational because it is 
both extensively and intensively infinite. By this he means that reality cannot be fully 
comprehended through the formation of concepts. Thus, 'Every empirical science 
proceeds from immediately experienced reality in its concrete actuality and 
individuality, and every empirical science must single out what is essential from 
reality. In other words, it must destroy the immediacy of reality.' 101 By 'extensively 
infinite' Rickert means that there is no sense in which we can come to know the 
totality of reality. From our perspective as human beings reality is without spatial 
and temporal limits and as such we cannot find its end. 
The notion of 'intensive infinity' indicates the fact that each segment of reality, no 
matter how well it is sealed off from its relationships with the rest of reality, remains 
'
0° For more thorough discussions of this see Anderson, 'Neo Kantianism and the Roots of Anti-
Psychologism', pp3 l 4-316, and Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey and the Crisis of Historicism, 
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infinitely complex. There is no sense in which one can arrive at a basic element of 
reality which cannot be further analysed in its various constitutive aspects. Rickert 
argues that this is true not merely of physical objects but also of mental phenomena. 
Although we may content ourselves with knowledge of only certain important or 
relevant aspects of reality, this does not mean that reality itself is restricted to these 
particular determinations. 
Thus, for Rickert, reality is understood as an infinitely extended series of infinitely 
complex events. Furthermore, as he understands knowledge to arise only in the form 
of the judgement, the correspondence theory of truth becomes an impossibility for 
Rickert. As all concepts address reality only in its relevant aspect, they are unable to 
produce a true copy of reality. The fact that knowledge is possible only in the form 
of a judgement means that knowledge can never consist in a complete representation 
ofreality. As Rickert states the problem: 'Knowledge of nature can only undertake 
an analysis and transformation of empirical reality. That is because the totality of 
this reality simply cannot be pictured: The attempt to provide an exact reproduction 
of what has no limits is an absurd enterprise. ' 102 The essential point here is that the 
content of a judgement can never be a complete reproduction of reality. Given that 
this is the case, the issue for Rickert is what governs the selection of relevant aspects 
in the sciences. 
Rickert agrees with Windelband that the natural sciences are ruled by the value of 
generalisation. The procedure of the generalising sciences is to eliminate as much 
specific information as possible from its concepts. In order to move from a 
collection of observations concerning particular historical events, the information 
that is specific to these observations must be eliminated. Once this has been 
achieved, then we will arrive at a judgement that is valid in general but which can tell 
us nothing about the nature of any real cases. It is the essence of nomological 
concept formation that everything that anchors the general judgement to particular 
existing instances must be removed. This process leaves us with a hypothetical 
judgement which is valid in general but which can tell us nothing about reality as it 
exists. 
It seems problematic to claim that the general concepts of natural science tell us 
nothing about reality given that we are able to predict the course of reality by 
102 Rickert, Limits of Concept Formation, p43. 
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employing them. This claim is meant only in a certain sense. We have seen that 
Rickert believes that 'What.fixes the limits of natural scientific concept formation, 
and which the natural sciences can never surmount, is nothing but unique empirical 
reality itself, just as we directly experience it in sense perception, in its concrete 
actuality and individuality.' 103 It is this individuality of empirical reality as we 
experience it which sets the limit of nomological, and as we shall see idiographic, 
concept formation. Thus, a general concept cannot tell us about reality itself because 
reality can never be fully captured in concepts. General concepts can certainly tell us 
about reality conceived as nature, that is as governed by general laws, but Rickert 
contends that this is not reality as we find it in experience. Our ability to calculate 
the course of nature in advance is dependent upon the fact that nature is composed of 
instances that can be brought within the scope of general laws. It is not the complete 
and unique reality that we calculate in advance, rather it is the object seen only with 
reference to its subsumption under a general law. 
This is a slightly different point from that made by Windelband with respect to our 
ability to predict the future course of events. Windelband made the point that we 
cannot simply de.rive reality .from general laws due to their hypothetical nature. We 
must presuppose a state of reality in order to predict what will occur after it. It is a 
great mistake to confuse these laws with reality itself for there remains an 
insurmountable leap between hypothetical laws and the brute fact of reality. 
Rickert's point is different in that it concentrates upon the inability of concepts to 
capture the full~ess of reality. Although he would probably agree with Windelband's 
point, the issue here is that nomological science does not in fact deal with complete 
reality but only with an aspect of it. Taking these two points together we can say that 
science.does not deal with reality in its fulhiess andthat its predictions therefore do 
not tell us how events truly unfold. Rather we see only that aspects of reality 
conform to general laws in their development. 
16. 
We have seen that, according to Rickert, 'The empirical perception of reality cannot 
be represented by any science, because it remains infinitely diverse under all 
conditions.' 104 The issue now is Rickert's understanding of the relation of the 
historical or idiographic sciences to this empirical reality. As he states, 'The problem 
103 Rickert, Limits of Concept Formation, p40. 
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of concept formation in history, therefore, is whether a scientific analysis and 
reduction of perceptual reality is possible that does not at the same time-as in the 
concepts of natural science-forfeit individuality'. 105 Is it possible that we are able 
to form scientific concepts that present objects not in their similarity with other 
objects but in their uniqueness? As discussed earlier, to achieve this by a simple 
description of reality is impossible. Rather, the simplification of reality must be 
guided by an ideal of individuality rather than that of generality. 
Rickert spends some time outlining the ideal of individuality that is dominant in the 
idiographic sciences. His famous example involves a contrast between a lump of 
coal and the Koh-i-noor diamond. He argues that both the lump of coal and the 
diamond are individuals, however, they are individuals of a different order. Both the 
diamond and the lump of coal are individuals in the sense that they are simply one 
diamond, or one lump of coal, and that they are each different from every other 
diamond and piece of coal. Thus, if we take individual to mean unique then both the 
coal and the diamond are unique. However, in terms of their indivisibility, it is clear 
that the diamond and the coal are of a different order. Whilst it is certainly possible 
that both can be divided, in the case of the diamond we recognise that this should not 
occur. One piece of coal can always be replaced with another and as such there is no 
significance or value attached to the individual piece of coal. Were we to split one 
piece of coal nothing would be lost as pieces of coal are not significant in their 
individuality. In the case of the diamond the opposite is true. If we were to split the 
diamond something would be lost as the significance of the diamond is attached to its 
irreplacability. We are interested in coal only.in a general sense, whilst we are 
interested in the Koh-i-noor diamond as an individual. Or, as Rickert puts this point, 
'The meaning possessed by the diamond rests on the value attached to its 
irreplaceable uniqueness. The diamond should not be split because it is valuable.' 106 
In this example Rickert is attempting to formulate a notion of the historical 
individual that would allow him to distinguish between events that are 'historical' in 
the sense that they have simply occurred, and events that are 'historical' in the sense 
that they are significant for us. Although every individual part of reality gains a 
place in time, it is only certain individualities that we are willing to call historical. 
He argues that this differentiation can be maintained if we recognise that there are 
105 Rickert, Limits of Concept Formation, p78. 
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two orders of individuals: those that are related to values and those that are not. It is 
this relationship to values that renders the unity of the individual important. Thus, 
'We take note of uniqueness and have occasion to become explicitly aware of it only 
when they are related to a value and thereby become indivisibly unified in their 
uniqueness' .107 Although all realities are individuals in a broad sense, only certain 
objects qualify as historical individuals through their relationship to values. Thus, 
for Rickert, when we compare the personalities of the average person with that of 
Goethe, it is clear that 'Goethe is related to such a person as the Koh-i-noor diamond 
is related to a lump of coal.' 108 With reference to general values the ordinary person 
could be replaced by any other person, whilst the significance of Goethe lies in his 
irreplaceability. 
17. 
The question is then, what does Rickert mean by a 'relationship to values' and 
'general values'? He recognises a prescientific relationship with reality in which we 
are constantly valuing and reacting to values. Thus, at the centre of Rickert's 
account is a valuing person which provides the 'primm:dial conception of reality, 
which is prior to every science'. In the course of acting and achieving our ends, 
various aspects.of reality will stand out as·essential for us.· In some cases we are 
interested in objects only in so far as they are instances of general.concepts. In other 
cases it is precisely the uniqueness of an object that is essential. Thus, 'for the real 
person, therefore - who is always a person who wills, values, and takes positions -
reality conceived ... as in part generalizing and in part individualizing, actually 
becomes reality simpliciter.' 109 For Rickert, reality as it is experienced by the living 
person is itself constituted by valuations and selections. 
This leads us to the same problem that developed in Windelband's account of 
historical science, namely how the necessity of historical values is to be secured. 
How can a science of history be based upon the peculiar valuations of individuals? 
Will not this science become an account of the various inclinations of the historian 
and his subjects? In response to this problem Rickert makes two important points 
regarding the manner in which historical science must avoid becoming arbitrary in its 
selection of objects. His first concern lies in demonstrating how historical science 
avoids becoming meaningless through the obscurity of its objects. If the origin of 
107 Rickert, Limits of Concept Formation, p86. 
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valuations is the real person then how are we to overcome the fact that the 
significance of objects differs wildly from person to person? What is of great 
significance to one person may be of no interest to another. Rickert's solution to this 
problem lies in distinguishing what can be recognised as valid for everyone, from 
that which is of only personal significance. He contends that 'the value with 
reference to which objects become historical individuals must be a general value: in 
other words, a value that is valid for everyone.' 110 
Having said this, Rickert does not want historical science to be understood as taking 
part in the process of valuing and willing that occurs in practical existence. He 
argues that the historian in so far as he is a scientist does not participate in this 
process of valuing. He must consider reality from the perspective of values, 
however, he does not himself participate in the act of valuing or willing. Rickert's 
point depends upon his distinction between positive and negative valuations and the 
relationship of an object to values. The point here is that it can be generally agreed 
that an event is significant without there being a decision regarding what this 
significance consists in. Thus, in the case of Martin Luther, 'it can never occur to a 
historian to claim that Luther's personality is historically unimportant'. However, 
there is certainly great scope for disagreement as to the nature of this significance. 
Whether Luther's actions were a good or a bad influence upon German history 
remains a matter of great controversy. 
One of the abiding ambiguities of the philosophy of Rickert and Windelband is their 
confusing use of the term 'value'. They both distinguish between what we can call 
'evaluation', or the process of determining the positive or negative worth of 
something, and values themselves. The first notion, that of 'evaluation', is restricted 
to determining the worthiness or importance of an object, whilst the second notion 
includes those concepts that are held to be significant or important. Thus, ideas of 
truth and beauty and freedom are encompassed under this second notion. This 
distinction is vital if we are not to be confused by the notions 'a value' and 'to 
value', or in German 'ein Wert' and 'werten'. Although Rickert insists on this 
separation, it is far from clear that these two senses of 'value' can be distinguished in 
historical studies. 
110 Rickert, Limits of Concept Formation, p89. 
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This separation of valuation and significance implies a common conception of 
reality. The contours of this historical reality are defined by the generally valid 
values. This underlying historical reality in fact allows, according to Rickert, 
controversy over the positive or negative value of historical events. Indeed, it is 
upon the basis of an agreement over what constitutes a significant event that such a 
controversy can first arise. Rickert is arguing here that 'the claim that e-very object 
that falls within the domain of history must be related to a value only articulates in 
logically useful terms the quite trivial truth that everything history represents is 
interesting, characteristic, important, or significant.' 111 In so far as it is essentially 
reliant upon these generally valid values, historical science is in fact involved with 
generalities. However, these generalities are not its logical aim, as is the case with 
natural science; rather they provide the framework within which the selection of 
significant individualities can take place. 
18. 
I come finally to Rickert's account of how values in general stand in relation to 
science. In the preceding discussion I focused upon the issue of how values govern 
the concept formation of the historical sciences. Thus, historical science must be 
guided in its selection of historical individuals by general values. However, this does 
not include an account of how the natural sciences are also bound up with values. 
Indeed it is Rickert's position, following Windelband, that all science is founded 
upon these 'meta-empirical' values. 
In the case of natural science this seems incongruous given that, as we have seen 
above, it is part of the procedure of natural science to ignore the value relevance of 
its objects. Indeed, as Rickert states, 'The essence of natural science ... requires 
abstraction, even abstraction from the theoretical relation of objects to values.' 112 
Thus, the positive and negative valuations that are made in everyday existence are 
purposefully overlooked in natural scientific considerations. Although this is true, it 
is also the case that natural science cannot do entirely without values. The very 
ideals of nomological science through which this expunging of values is carried out, 
can themselves only be understood as values. The forms of every science must 
themselves be valued by the existing subject. The forms of science, both natural and 
historical, must be pursued and thereby considered worthwhile. There is no case in 
111 Rickert, Limits of Concept Formation, p97. 
112 Rickert, Limits of Concept Formation, p218. 
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which science can become completely free of values. The most fundamental of these 
commitments is to 'truth' itself. Rickert writes: 
A "fact" is relevant for science only insofar as it is known, that is, insofar as the 
judgement, which as a fact it states, can be considered true. Consider, however, the 
idea that what is called "true" is what has theoretical value for the cognitive subject. 
On no account is this idea to be detached from the concept of a true judgement. So 
the statement of every fact in a judgement that makes a claim tO truth already implies 
as a necessary presupposition the commitment to the value of truth and its 
recognition by the cognitive subject.113 
Although their objects differ, both the historical and natural sciences are dependent 
upon a meta-empirical or an a priori element. Both sciences are reliant upon an 
original conception of their field of objects in order that these objects may be 
constituted from the infinity of reality. Given this, Rickert argues that natural 
science is in fact a more restricted version of the historical a priori. He states that 
'The most general presupposition on which an objective conception of the world in· 
historical science is based includes even fewer metaempirical elements than the 
presuppositions of natural science.' Indeed the only presupposition that is required 
by the historical scientist is that there are 'some absolutely valid values, which may 
be completely unknown to him.' This presupposition is necessary for a science of 
history as it must be assumed that the attitudes of actual people more or less 
approximate these assumed absolutely valid values. Although we are not in a 
position to know what absolutely valid values there are, it must be assumed that the 
course of history is significant in that it is related to these absolute values. Given that 
science relies upon these absolute values, it is dependant upon this conception of 
historical reality. The more specific values involved in the pursuit of nomological 
science cannot be conceived unless we have previously recognised the relation of 
reality to these absolute values. Thus, ' ... history can be pursued without making the 
metaempirical assumptions of natural science; but without the metaempirical 
assumptions of history, natural science loses its meaning. This is because every 
natural scientist has implicitly set the unique historical development of natural 
science in relation to a value that is absolutely valid.' 114 
113 Rickert, Limits of Concept Formation, p219. 
114 Rickert, Limits of Concept Formation, p225. 
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19. 
Anderson provides an excellent summary of the difficulties that are raised by the 
value theories of the Southwest school ofneo-Kantianism. He argues, rightly I 
believe, that: 
In the end, then, the value theories at the centre of the system of philosophy for the 
Southwest neo-Kantians fail to resolve the basic philosophical problems about the 
transcendental status of a priori norms. In Rickert as in Windelband, it is very 
tempting to conclude that, metaphysically speaking, transcendental norms would 
simply have to be Platonic ideal objects, of just the sort that the Kantian critique of 
transcend~mt metaphysics rendered problematic, Moreover none of the attempts by 
Southwest neo-Kantians to a~count for our access to such norms succeed to offer a 
plausible epistemology, capable of explaining how we grasp the a priori 
transcendental norms in such a way as to render rational our rich, fully articulated 
normative judgements. 115 
The fundamental problem for Rickert and Windelband was that they began with the 
same atomistic understanding of experience as the British empiricists, and indeed 
Kant himself. The empiricists were unable to resort to the concept of a priori 
knowledge in order to generate necessary and universal· scientific knowledge from 
our merely contingent sensory experiences. Kant resorted to apriori knowledge as a 
means of overcoming this problem and he was followed by Rickert and Windelband, 
although they disagreed with Kant's account of the details of our d priori knowledge. 
By restricting the range of <?ur knowledge to appearances, rather than being itself, 
Kant and his followers managed to circumscribe a realm in which we could achieve 
necessary and universal knowledge of nature. This has been an unhappy 
compromise to many philosophers, perhaps most famously to Hegel, as it seems to 
sacrifice the very essence of scientific and philosophical knowledge as_this had been 
pursued since the time of Plato and Aristotle. Nevertheless it did appear to provide a 
means by which philosophy could account for the fact of science. 
Thus, the Southwest neo-Kantians conceived of philosophy as a 'science of 
knowledge' whose function was not metaphysical speculation, nor interference in the 
actual course of scientific research, but a critical reflection on the fact of scientific 
knowledge. They proceeded from an anti-psychological reading of Kant and 
attempted to determine what a priori logical apparatus was required in order to 
produce not merely natural scientific knowledge, but also knowledge of humanity, in 
particular psychology and history. However, the extension of Kant's critique of 
115 Anderson, 'Neo-Kantianism and the Roots of Anti-Psychologism', p318 .. 
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natural scientific knowledge to include historical and psychological science only 
serves to emphasise an inherent.problem in Kant's account of knowledge. This 
difficulty arises from the fact that Kant simultaneously describes knowledge as a 
product of the synthesising activity of the judging subject, and holds that the 
principles of this synthesis are necessarily valid. 
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Windelband and Rickert, in their attempts to provide a transcendental logic for 
historical science, bring this problem to a head. There are three elements to this 
problem. First, Windelband and Rickert adopt Kant's view that all scientific 
knowledge is a product of the cognitive activity of existing subjects. The subject 
must select objects from the infinite manifold of sensory experience and bring order 
to them by the application of objectively valid categories of judgement. Second, they 
recognise that the everyday, practical existence of the human subject consists of the 
same process of judging, evaluating, and selecting from sensory experience, although 
this is not done with the same explicit attention as in scientific research. Third, they 
think that the changes and developments of the categories, in which the existing 
subject understands its own activities, form the materialof historical science. 
The question is then, what status do the categories of historical science have? If 
Rickert and Windelband are to maintain that our knowledge of history is 'scientific' 
in the sense that it is necessary, universal and true, then they must establish that the 
categories or 'values' by which the historical cosmos is constituted are themselves 
necessary and universal. The difficulty is that they have acknowledged that science 
is merely a careful and self-aware form ofproducing knowledge from contingent 
experience, and that the categories by which this takes place, have developed through 
time. Thus, there is a contradiction between the ahistorical status that is claimed for 
historical science, and the historical development of its objects, namely the self-
understanding of human beings. Yet the scientist is himself a human being and 
therefore subject to the same historical conditions as the objects of his study. How 
can the historically situated scientist assure himself that the categories by which he 
produces historical knowledge are not themselves contingent? He must be able 
somehow to immediately recognise them as valid for judging not only his own 
actions, but those of humanity in all of its ages and cultures. Rickert and 
Windelband's appeal to 'generally valid values', and indeed their strongly anti-
psychological reading of what Kant means by a priori knowledge, is designed to 
address this problem. Yet they were never able to successfully progress much past 
this simple appeal to provide an account of what these values might actually be, or 
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describe how we might come to know them. Rickert and Windelband maintained 
that the proper categories by which an age should be judged are not those of the age 
itself, nor those of the historian, but categories which are universally valid. 
However, leaving aside the question of how these universal categories could be 
recognised, there is a further difficulty, namely in what sense can these categories be 
considered objectively valid if they are not those in which people understood their 
own activities. If we are to truly understand an historical achievement, it seems 
important that we understand the values according to which it was carried out. 
Thus, following Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' the Southwest neo-Kantians 
attempted to ground the necessity of science in the human mind. However, their 
attempt to expand 'science' to include history undermines this initial strategy 
because it recognises the contingency of human self understanding. History, by 
virtue of the fact that it involves a reflexive examination by humanity of its own 
development, unsettles the ancient conception of science as the·attainment of a 
'divine' perspective on being. Windelband and Rickert sought to restrict history to a 
theoretical object, yet this view ultimately proved untenable because both the subject 
and object of historical knowledge are historical. What it means to say that human 
being is itself 'historical', and the effect such a claim has on our understanding of 
science, are matters that were more self-consciously addressed by Wilhelm Dilthey. 
His attempts to clarify the historical nature of man are the subject of the next chapter. 
Although these controversies over the foundations and status of scientific knowledge 
initially appear far removed from Heidegger's critique of technology, they are in fact 
of central importance to my project for two reasons. Firstly because this critique of 
technology is essentially concerned with the manner in which modem philosophers 
secured scientific·knowledge within the human mind. As I argued at the beginning 
of this chapter, it is possible to see the spur for this distinctively modem project in 
Locke's separation of real and nominal essences. Although there was certainly 
widespread scepticism about the extent of human knowledge prior to Locke's Essay, 
it is only in that work that a decisive ontological break is made with the medieval 
period. By distinguishing between real and nominal essences and arguing that we 
only have access to the latter, Locke was forced to find a new foundation for 
scientific knowledge. Heidegger argues in his critique of technology that Descartes 
marks the beginning of the modem period. However, I believe this is not correct 
because Descartes remains committed to the idea that we can know the real form of 
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natural objects and that the being of objects consists in their being the creatures of 
God. I will return to this issue in my fifth chapter. 
The second reason I pursued this sketch in such detail is that it demonstrates the 
profound effect Locke's particularist ontology had on subsequent philosophy. As I 
have already demonstrated with regard to Mill, Kant, and the Southwest neo-
Kantians, this particularism produced a distorted understanding of experience which 
made it extremely difficult to account not only for the validity of scientific 
knowledge, but also for everyday human interaction with the world. Both Dilthey 
and Heidegger saw that this concept of experience produced an impossibly 
'theoretical' vision of human existence. Their attempts to overcome this doctrine 
form the subject matter of the next two chapters. Thus, the preceding discussion 
provides a background for my interpretation of both Heidegger's Being and Time, 
and his later critique of technology. 
Chapter 2 
Dilthey's Critique of Positivism and Neo-
Kantianism 
In this chapter I will address both Wilhelm Dilthey's critique of Kantian philosophy 
and Heidegger's appropriation of his insights. This is the final element of my 
exposition of modem attempts to provide a foundation for scientific knowledge 
within the human subject. This sketch serves the purpose of illustrating the 
understanding of subjectivity that Heidegger criticises both in Being and Time and in 
his later critique of technology. Of course his focus changes between these two 
periods. In Being and Time he is concerned to undermine the 'theoreticist' 
assumptions that had blocked the way to an accurate account of human existence, 
whilst in his later work he is more concerned with the ontological foundations of 
modem science. As I will argue in this chapter and the next, the work of Dilthey and 
Heidegger makes clear that human subjectivity cannot serve as a foundation for 
universal and necessary scientific knowledge due to the fact that it is essentially 
historical and worldly. These early arguments are the means by which-Heidegger 
distances himself from the tradition he criticises in his later works on technology. 
Dilthey is best known for his attempts to develop a philosophical foundation of, and 
a hermeneutic method for, the human sciences. In particular he was focused upon 
the science of history. However, the manner in which he went about this task 
involved him in a radical critique of the two philosophical traditions that I discussed 
in the previous chapter, namely positivism and neo-Kantianism. I demonstrated that 
these two traditions shared a common ground in Locke's empiricism. Although 
Windelband and Rickert differ from Mill over both the possibility of a priori 
knowledge and the logic of the human sciences, all three philosophers were 
concerned with establishing how scientific knowledge can be legitimately produced 
from simple sensory experience. Yet none of these thinkers set about questioning the 
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most fundamental element of their Lockian inheritance; they all retained the idea that 
sensory experience, prior to its combination and organisation by the mind, is 
originally atomistic and particular. Dilthey, on the other hand, questions whether this 
abstract opposition of a pure subject and pure sensory experience can provide a 
legitimate foundation for the sciences. Thus, although Dilthey retains this 
epistemological orientation and is vitally concerned with the foundations of the 
sciences, he differs from both positivists and neo-Kantians in that he questions the 
assumptions upon which the modem philosophical tradition had, for the most part, 
proceeded. 
Heidegger is right, therefore, when he comments in The History of the Concept of 
Time that Dilthey, 
... saw that the task of understanding the historical disciplines philosophically can 
succeed only if we reflect upon the object, the reality which is the actual theme in 
these sciences, and manage to lay open the basic structure of this reality, which he 
called life. It was in this way, from this positively novel and independently 
formulated task, that he came to the necessity of a psychology, a science of 
consciousness. But this was not to be a psychology fashioned after a natural science 
nor one invested with an epistemological task. Its task is rather to regard 'life' itself 
in its structures, as the basic reality of history. The decisive element in Dilthey's 
inquiry is not the theory of the sciences of history but the tendency to bring the 
reality of the historical into view and to make clear from this the manner and 
possibility of its interpretation.116 
Dilthey's interest in providing a foundation and method for historical science is 
inseparable from his attempt to describe the structure of 'life'. This is because he 
recognised that the presuppositions that are made about the objects of historical 
science, the past actions of human beings, must also be valid for the historian, for the 
historian is also an existing human being. In the sense that both the knower and the 
known are human beings, historical understanding is reflexive. Thus, any reflection 
upon the methods of historical science must draw upon the historian's understanding 
of their own being. As Bambach put it: 'Dilthey's study of Schleiermacher made it 
apparent to him that the practical problems of historical research are always tied to 
the theoretical problems of philosophical critique; both are mutually 
determinative.' 117 This is why Dilthey's attempts to develop a hermeneutic method 
for historical science are inseparable from his reflections on the structure of 'life'. 
116 Heidegger, HCT, p 17. 
117 Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism, p133. 
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Dilthey provides the third element in·my examination of the fraught issue of 'history' 
in the philosophical context from which Heidegger developed the arguments of 
Being and Time. Heidegger's reaction to the tension between Dilthey and the 
Southwest neo-Kantians concerning the nature ofhistory,.understood both as a 
science and as a feature of human existence, provides the framework for my 
interpretation of his account of theory and practice in Being and Time . . This in turn 
will serve as a context for my interpretation of his critique of technology. With this 
end in mind, I will divide this chapter in two and devote the first section to a brief 
outline of Dilthey's position and its difference from the transcendental philosophy of 
the Southwest neo-Kantians. The second section will be dedicated to a discussion of 
Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey's work and the significance this relationship 
holds for interpreting Being and Time. 
The task of describing Dilthey's philosophy is not an easy one for his career was 
long, his interests were many and diverse, and his thought underwent constant 
revisions and restatements. As such, my account of his work will provide only a 
very limited sketch. Nevertheless, his thought is unified by its aim, namely the hope 
of finding a middle path between positivism and idealism in order to expose the 
relationship between theory and practice, thought and life. Dilthey hoped to achieve 
these two tasks through an examination of 'life' as it is lived rather than how it is 
abstractly conceived of in empiricist and idealist theories of judgment. As both 
Michael Ermath and Charles Bambach have argued, this project is best seen as a 
response to the sense of crisis that was pervasive among German intellectuals from 
the second half of the nineteenth century onwards.118 Ermath writes that: 
Dilthey's thought cannot be understood apart from this context of prolonged, even 
endemic, crisis. The period through which he lived was marked by controversy and 
upheaval in almost all levels and sectors of existence. In none was the agitation 
more radical and far-reaching than in the realm of ideas. He lived through the 
Hegelstreit, Religionsstreit, Materialismusstreit, Darwinismusstreit, 
Pessimismusstreit, and the Methodenstreit; it was, as one observer noted in 
retrospect, "an endlessly strife-racked age." The sense of crisis was all the more 
acute for the fact that it reached down to the very foundations of thinking and 
knowledge. Although the symptoms of crisis were often lodged in abstruse terms 
and intricate arguments, it was far from being a merely academic matter. The very 
us See chapters one and four of Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism, and 
chapter one of Michael Ermath, Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason, (The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978). 
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nature of reason and knowledge were at stake and, with them, the prospects of a 
civilization increasingly shaped by their imperatives.119 
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Thus, Dilthey felt that although humanity had achieved an unprecedented dominance 
over nature through the development of the modem natural sciences, the nature and 
purpose of human existence itself remained unclear. He argued that the development 
of both the natural and human sciences had contributed in different ways to this 
impasse. He writes of this difficulty: 
But when, today, we ask what is the final goal of action for the individual or for 
mankind, the deep contradiction which pervades our time emerges. We face the 
enigma of the origins of things, the value of our existence, the ultimate value of our 
actions, no wiser than a Greek in the Ionian or Italian colonies or an Arab at the time 
of Averroes. Today we are even more at a loss for an answer to this question than 
any earlier period. For (1) the sciences have progressively dissolved the 
presuppositions which lay at the foundations of the religious faith and philosophic 
convictions of former centuries. The reality experienced by our senses has proved to 
be merely the appearance of something unknown. (2) The greatest achievement of 
philosophy irt the last century, the analysis of consciousness and knowledge, has 
itself contributed most effectively to this destruction; ... (3) Historical comparison 
reveals the relativity of all historical convictions. They are conditioned by climate, 
race and circumstance .... From this dissonance between the sovereignty of 
scientific thought and the inability of the spirit to understand itself and its 
significance in the universe springs the final and most characteristic feature in the 
spirit of the present age and its philosophy.120 
Dilthey's thought is directed towards healing this rift in modem society by 
developing a fundamental science of 'life'. He came to call this science 
'beschreibende Psychologie' or 'descriptive psychology' in order to distinguish it 
from established sciences of the human mind. In doing this he believed he could 
provide a secure foundation for the human sciences, such as history, theology, 
economics, political science, and philology, and thereby provide a means by which 
'spirit' could come to understand itself. As Heidegger stated in the quote above, 
Dilthey did not conceive of descriptive psychology along natural scientific lines. 
Nevertheless, he was criticized for his alleged 'psychologism' by Husserl and the 
Southwest neo-Kantians. As I have already outlined the neo-Kantian objection to 
psychologism, I will distinguish Dilthey's position from that of Windelband and 
Rickert by determining the justice of this charge. In order to do this I will focus 
119 Ennath, Wilhelm Dilthey, pl6. 
120 Wilhelm Dilthey, 'Present Day Culture and Philosophy', Gesammelte Schriften Vol. VIII, pp190-
205, reproduced in W. Dilthey Selected Writings, ed. & trans. H.P. Rickman, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1976), pl 12. 
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upon four points: Dilthey's appropriation of Kant; the demarcation of the realms of 
the human and natural sciences; his account of Verstehen or understanding as a 
distinct scientific method; and his account of the structure of consciousness. 
1. 
Dilthey summarises his attitude towards 'epistemological philosophy', both 
empiricist and Kantian, in a famous passage from the preface to his Introduction to 
the Human Sciences (Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften) of 1883: 
Although I found myself frequently in agreement with the epistemological school of 
Locke, Hume, and Kant, I nevertheless found it necessary to conceive differently the 
nexus of facts of consciousness which we together recognise as the basis of 
philosophy. Apart from a few beginnings, such as those of Herder and Wilhelm von 
Rumbolt, which were not scientifically developed, previous epistemology-Kant's 
as well as that of the empiricists-has explained experience and cognition in terms 
of facts that are merely representational. No real blood flows in the veins of the 
knowing subject constructed by Locke, Hume, and Kant, but rather the diluted 
extract of reason as a mere activity of thought. A historical.as well as psychological 
approach to whole human beings led me to explain even knowledge and its concepts 
(such as the external world, time, substance, and cause) in terms of the manifold 
powers of a being that wills, feels, and thinks ... 121 
This passage illustrates the complexity ofDilthey's relationship with the 
epistemological tradition stretching back to Locke. On the one hand he remains 
committed to the spirit of this epistemological standpoint in general and to Kant's 
reduction of knowledge to appearances in particular. Yet on the other hand he sets 
about undermining the very understanding of experience and knowledge which this 
tradition both developed and relied upon. 
According to Dilthey, the achievement of this epistemological tradition lies in its 
recognition of the fact that all knowledge is subject to the conditions of 
consciousness. This is because all science is dependent upon experience and all 
experience occurs 'within' consciousness. Thus: 'Only in inner experience, in the 
facts of consciousness, have I found a firm anchor for my thinking' .122 Dilthey often 
employs the term 'inner experience', despite the fact that it is highly misleading. He 
does not mean by this that somehow all knowledge arises from the examination of 
the self. As I will demonstrate shortly, he thinks that distinctions between self and 
world, or between history and nature, must occur within the original context of 
121 Wilhelm Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences, ed. RudolfMakkreel & FrithjofRodi, 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989), p50. 
122 Dilthey, Introduction, p50. 
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consc10usness. Dilthey is simply saying that we must consistently recognise the 
'impossibility of going behind these conditions. To attempt this would be like seeing 
without eyes or directing the gaze of knowledge behind one's own eye.' 123 
However, this acknowledgement that experience is limited by the conditions of 
consciousness is stripped of many of the doctrines that had accompanied its 
development. As I have already mentioned, Dilthey attempts to overcome the 
atomistic account of experience that Locke, Hume, Mill, and Kant, had all employed. 
He also denies the possibility of arriving at any a priori knowledge, a matter I will 
turn to ·shortly. Perhaps the only significant element of this tradition that Dilthey 
maintains is its claim that we cannot directly experience the essences of natural 
beings. This argument is crucial to his distinction of the 'human' and 'natural' 
realms. Thus, from the 'epistemological' standpoint 'our conception of the whole of 
nature proves to be a mere shadow cast by a hidden reality; by contrast, only in the 
facts of consciousness given in inner experience do we possess reality as it is.' 124 
This account of nature harks back to Locke's crucial argument that we cannot discern 
the real essences of natural objects, merely the impressions they leave upon our 
senses. 
2. 
As I described in the previous chapter, Kant's attempt to turn reason upon itself in 
order to determine with what right it could claim to have necessary knowledge of 
nature led to controversy among his interpreters over the nature of his a priori logic. 
Windelband and Rickert, along with the Baden neo-Kantians, argued that Kant's a 
priori logic should not be taken as a psychological, that is a natural scientific, 
account of the innate. structures of the mind. This is because Kant was not concerned 
with establishing a 'physiology of the understanding', meaning a natural science of 
the mind. Rather, he intended to determine how, in general, such natural scientific 
investigations could lay claim to necessary knowledge. Thus, the a priori logic that 
he develops is not intended to be an empirical description of the categories which the 
understanding happens to employ in the natural sciences. It is rather an account of 
the right or validity with which these categories are used to judge nature. 
This is, I believe, a more accurate interpretation of Kant's intentions, as opposed to 
those who thought his a priori logic was meant as a psychological account of the 
123 Dilthey, Introduction, p50. 
124 Dilthey, Introduction, p50. 
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innate structures of the mind. Dilthey understood this point well, however, he 
thought that it was simply not possible to completely separate a theory ofknowledge 
from all psychological foundations. He writes that the Kantian school, 
claims absolute independence of epistemology from psychology. It alleges that 
Kant's critique of reason has in principle emancipated the theory of knowledge from 
psychology by giving it a particular method. It is this method which this school 
wants to develop. The future of epistemology appears to depend on it. 
But it is evidently impossible to connect the spiritual data which form the matter of 
epistemology without relying on some idea or other of the psychic nexus. 
Absolutely no magical trick of a transcendental method can make possible what is in 
itself impossible. Utterly no legerdemain of the Kantian school can be of any help 
here.125 
Kant believed that in order to provide an apodictic foundation for scientific 
knowledge the inquiry into the validity of knowledge must proceed independently of 
all experience. However, Dilthey points out that even such 'transcendental' 
reflection upon knowledge itself, despite its greater level of abstraction, is an 
empirical matter. Kant's great failing, according to Dilthey, was that he did not 
proceed from an examination of the nature of consciousness, but rather began with a 
series of abstractions and from this basis derived the transcendental forms that were 
necessary to account for mathematics and natural scientific knowledge. As Ermath 
explains: 
Dilthey, in contrast [to Kant],insisted that "knowledge of knowledge," for all its 
second-order claims of superior jurisdiction, is itself an empirical inquiry and that it 
too must rely upon an extended concept of experience for its "proof'. Kant was 
correct in positing the primacy of consciousness, but wrong to take an abstract and 
formal approach to his own discovery. The knowledge which we have (including 
the knowledge of mind itself) is not the result of a deduction of transcendental 
forms, but the distilled product of man's cumulative experience. The proper critical 
approach to consciousness is not only empirical but historical, for knowledge is 
developmental in character.126 
In this way Dilthey attacks the validity of one of Kant's most important distinctions, 
namely that between the 'matter' and 'form' of experience. He believes that this 
absolute distinction is founded upon the faculty psychology which Kant uncritically 
adopts. Thus, 'The classification theory of the faculties during the time of Kant 
resulted in the drastic separations ... of his critique ofreason. This can clearly be seen 
125 Wilhelm Dilthey, Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding, trans. Richard M. Zaner 
and Kenneth L. Heiges, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1977), p32. 
126 Ermath, Wilhelm Dilthey, p 151. 
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as regards the separation between intuition and logical thought, as well as between 
the matter and form of knowledge.' 127 Such separations arise not from an 
observation of experience itself, but from the empiricist psychological theories. 
Dilthey argues that, if we examine the nature of experience itself, we find that form 
and matter are inseparable. Even if we conceive of a Kantian 'manifold of 
sensations', it is impossible to remove all 'form', all distinctions and relationships, 
from this 'manifold'. Indeed, even 'distinct' sense impressions presuppose a 
unifying consciousness in which they can be set apart and known as distinct. 
3. 
Thus, although Dilthey often aligned himself with the 'critical spirit' of Kant's 
philosophy, his approach constitutes a fundamental breach with his transcendental 
strategy. He argued that Kant's investigation of the transcendental a priori was an 
attempt to recombine what should not have been considered separate in the first 
place. This is the case not simply with his separation of the form and content of 
knowledge, but also in the entire methodology of transcendental reflection. Because 
Kant seeks an absolute foundation for necessary scientific knowledge, he attempts to 
judge the validity of our knowledge from a position beyond, or outside, experience 
itself. The difficulty with this approach is that it illegitimately and artificially 
separates the transcendental level of reflection from the experience that is being 
reflected on. Rational self-reflection can only attain a relative distance from its 
object, precisely because this object is itself. Although Kant claims that we can hold 
the categories in one hand and the matter of sensory experience in the other for the 
purposes of reflecting upon the validity of applying the one to the other, he 
necessarily assumes the validity of this secondary, transcendental. knowledge in the 
process. 
Kant's attempt to separate the forms of consciousness as· such from all empirical 
contents is, of course, central to his attempt to salvage the necessity of scientific 
knowledge. Indeed his project repeats, in a modified form, the ancient Greek 
ambition of attaining a completely theoretical view of beings. Although Kant 
renounces the possibility of attaining such a vision of the natural objects through his 
distinction of 'appearances' and 'things in themselves', he nevertheless attempts to 
find an absolutely detached point from which to observe the realm of experience. If 
such an enterprise were possible, then Kant could discover the necessary structures 
127 Dilthey, Descriptive Psychology, p32. 
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of this realm, thereby replacing the ancient goal of attaining necessary knowledge of 
being itself, with necessary knowledge of the forms of appearances. Yet, as Dilthey 
saw, consciousness can never entirely detach itself from itself. As Ermath explains: 
For Dilthey, the theory and practice of knowledge, as well as its form and content, 
cannot be separated, for they are linked in the real source of our knowledge-
experience in the broadest sense. We cannot hope to get fully outside_ the actual 
experience of the mind in order to test the formal validity of its operations. In 
contrast to the Kantian postulate of a rational ego or transcendental consciousness, 
we must recognise that there is no higher consciousness which validates our thought. 
We can never arrive at a Kantian Bewusstsein uberhaupt, for consciousness is 
always immersed in the actual experience of the world. 128 
Dilthey's rejection of Kant's transcendental philosophy leaves him no stable point on 
which he might ground any necessary scientific knowledge. Accordingly he thinks 
that all knowledge arises from, and is relative to, the consciousness from which it 
develops. Given his extensive background in historical research, he is aware of the 
manner in which consciousness develops through the course of history. Yet he does 
not see this as a 'loss', or as a problem to be overcome. Rather, he takes it as a 
liberation of humanity from a misunderstanding of its own character. He writes: 
We must first become fully conscious of what the relativity of all historical reality 
implies. The study of all the conditions of man on this earth, the contacts between 
nations, religions and concepts, inevitably increased the chaos of historical facts. 
Only when we have grasped all the forms of human life, from primitive peoples to 
the present day, does it become possible to see the generally valid in the relative ... A 
historical consciousness which is no longer abstract or conceptual and, therefore, 
does not dissolve into unlimited ideality, forms a basis for the unity of mankind in 
universally valid thought.129 
Both the neo-Kantians and Husserl charged Dilthey with 'psychologisin' and 
'historical relativism' due to his rejection of the transcendental method. Indeed, from 
a Kantian perspective, this charge has some merit. Yet the 'psychology' that Dilthey 
proposed to develop was by no means a natural science of the mind-a 'physiology 
of the understanding' as Kant put it. In fact it was far closer to Husserl's own 
phenomenological project as it sought to study how the 'form' and 'matter' of 
knowledge were both imminent in experience. As I have argued above, Dilthey 
objected to the very foundations of Kantian philosophy and he was certainly aware 
that his arguments undercut any claims for the absolute validity of human 
128 Ennath, Wilhelm Dilthey, p153. 
129 Dilthey, 'Present Day Culture and Philosophy', Selected Writings, p121. 
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knowledge. Yet this does not mean that the historical and natural sciences are not 
'objective'. It simply means that this objectivity is an historical achievement rather 
than the result of a transcendental deduction. Dilthey argued that scientific 
objectivity was the result of an initial conceptual limitation of a region of objects and 
that these limitations developed over time. In this way he sought to maintain the 
objectivity of scientific knowledge whilst denying its absolute validity.130 This 
strategy was closely followed by Heidegger, and I will examine his position on the 
objectivity of science in chapter four. 
4. 
Charles Bambach argues that the tension between scientific demands for universal 
knowledge and the recognition of the historical nature of man, remained unresolved 
in Dilthey's work. He writes: 
Dilthey never really resolved the tension between the finitude of historical 
consciousness and the scientific demand for universality. He could admit that "the 
development of historical consciousness destroys faith in the universal validity of 
any philosophy" at the same time as he charged historical reflection with the task of 
finding validity within the realm of the relative. But the tensions within Dilthey's 
thought are not unique; they reflect the contradictions within German philosophy 
itself. The concurrent demands for a historical and a scientific approach to the 
human world of the late nineteenth century were part of both the historicist and 
Kantian traditions.131 
Thus, Dilthey occupies an uneasy middle position in which he denies that any 
elements of knowledge escape the contingency of their historical development, 
whilst maintaining that we can work towards knowledge which is 'universally valid'. 
He writes that, 
... history does indeed know of various assertions of something unconditional as 
value, norm, or good. Such assertions appear everywhere in history-now as given 
in the divine will, now in a rational concept of perfection, in a teleological order of 
13° For an account of the difficulty Dilthey's interpreters have had in establishing his position on the 
objectivity and relativity of knowledge, with particular emphasis upon Husserl's assessments, 
see Michael Ermath, 'Objectivity and Relativity in Dilthey's Theory of Understanding' in 
Dilthey and Phenomenology, ed. Rudolf A. Makreel and John Scanlon, (Center for Advanced 
Research in Phenomoneology & University Press of America, Washington, D. C., 1987), 
pp73-91. He writes: 'Dilthey insisted that "Every science concerns a delimited objectivity" 
(GS, VII, 41). It is conceptual limitation which constitutes the very conditions of objectivity 
in the first place, yet this delimited objectivity is not static and a-temporal: there is a larger 
and longer-term objectivity which is a function of expanding horizons and processes of 
reciprocal correction and critical probation ... It is not eternity but history which discloses 
both the grounds and growth of knowledge ... '. 
131 Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey and the Crisis of Historicism, pp 176-177. 
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the world, in a universally valid norm of our conduct which is transcendentally 
based. But historical experience knows only the process, so important for it, of 
making these assertions: on its own grounds it knows nothing of their universal 
validity .132 
Michael Ermath has suggested that Dilthey's position on the 'relative certainty' of 
scientific knowledge is quite close to that of J. S. Mill.133 This seems correct in that 
Dilthey thinks that there are no absolute starting points for knowledge, but rather a 
constant interaction between experience and reflection which gradually provides us 
with knowledge of greater universality and validity. This is essentially the same as 
Mill's understanding of the progress of his inductive method. However, Dilthey, 
unlike Mill, was acutely aware that this procedure involved both circular reasoning 
and an abandonment of the central ancient and medieval scientific ideals. Dilthey 
addressed the circularity that is involved in attaining this relatively certain 
knowledge in his account of hermeneutics, a matter I will address shortly. 
Despite this unresolved tension, Dilthey managed to develop a critique of modem 
philosophy that is remarkably similar to Heidegger's. Dilthey argues that humans 
are in 'life', the original realm of experience, not as observers but as actors. Thus, 
reality, as it is originally given, is &haped by the fact that we are practically engaged 
in life. It is constituted by the vital interests and evaluations of each person. Or as 
Ermath puts it: 'The connotative and affective sides of mental life are constitutive of 
our experience along with the more strictly cognitive functions' .134 Dilthey argues 
that the distorted account of experience which is found in the epistemological school, 
is ultimately the result of the ancient Greek conception of reality and knowledge. He 
argues that: 
All reality is given in experience. Thought is an analysis of reality. These 
propositions cannot be disputed. And yet the metaphysical school claimed to be able 
to show that there is within thought itself, a source of knowledge independent of and 
outside of experience. 
This epistemological foundation of the metaphysical school can be shown to be 
untenable. But a tendency that has been dominant in European thought for many 
centuries, from Plato to the victory of the nominalists in the fourteenth century, can 
lose its power over men only when its colossal error is understood historically. 
132 Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VII, p 173, reproduced in H.A. Hodges, Wilhelm 
Dilthey: An Introduction, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1944), pp146-147, 
133 Ennath, Wilhelm Dilthey, p155. 
134 Ennath, Wilhelm Dilthey, pl 18. 
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The scientific outlook was preceded by a conceptual world that held that reality 
proceeds from divine knowledge. I will show how this conceptual world is the 
product of the totality of our mental powers and how crucial features of it can only 
be < ... > with our mental powers themselves.135 
This passage from the drafts for volume two ofDilthey's Introduction to the Human 
Sciences, anticipates the most important elements of Heidegger's critique of the 
modem philosophical tradition, a critique that was developed several decades later. 
The central point of Dilthey's, and Heidegger's, arguments is that if we are to take 
human existence as the foundation of philosophical and scientific knowledge, then 
the ancient Greek and medieval ideal of disinterested and necessary scientific 
knowledge must be revised. 
5. 
Dilthey's account of the relationship between 'life' and the sciences is of great 
importance because it is here that he develops the idea that history, and the subjects 
of the human studies in general, are not simply the objects of scientific research, they 
also characterise the nature of the historian. Given this reciprocal relationship 
between the subject and object of human science, I will demonstrate the important 
elements, for my study at least, of Dilthey' s concept of 'life' by examining his 
account of the difference between the human and the natural sciences. 
In the opening passages of his Introduction to the Human Sciences, Dilthey argues 
that 'What is contained in the concept of science is generally divided into two 
subdivisions. One is designated by the name "natural science," while for the other 
there is, curiously enough, no generally accepted designation. I shall follow those 
thinkers who refer to this second half of the globus intellectual is by the term 
Geisteswissenschaften.' 136 However, he employs this term with some caution as it is 
burdened by its associations with various philosophical traditions. First, Dilthey 
explains, the term 'Geisteswissenschaften' became widely known in Germany as a 
translation of Mill's term 'Moral Sciences', as was already mentioned in chapter one. 
Second, the term 'Geist', translated variously as 'spirit' or 'mind', played a very 
prominent role in Hegelian philosophy. Third, 'Geist', carries connotations of the 
Cartesian separation of extended and mental substances, and thus it may be thought 
that the Geisteswissenschaften consist of those sciences which deal with the non-
135 Dilthey, Introduction, p281. 
136 Dilthey, Introduction, p57. 
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physical elements of human existence, in opposition to the Naturwissenschaften 
which deal with the physical realm. 
Dilthey argues that the separation of the human sciences, that is the 
Geisteswissenschaften, from the natural sciences, is difficult because humanity 
possesses both mental and physical aspects. Thus, although he does distinguish 
between these two scientific realms, he does not think that the human sciences can be 
conducted in isolation from the natural sciences. Dilthey argues that: 
To be sure, the reference to the spirit (Geist) ll;t the term Geisteswissenschaften can 
give only an imperfect indication of the subjectmatter of these sciences, for it does 
not really separate facts of the human spirit from the psychophysical unity of human 
nature. Any theory intended to describe and analyse socio-historical reality cannot 
restrict itself to the human spirit and disregard the totality of human nature.137 
Although there is a difference betWeen nature and 'socio-historical reality', this does 
not mean that we can gain an adequate understanding of the latter in isolation from 
knowledge of the former. Human being consists not simply of a spiritual component, 
but also of a physical element. Importantly, Dilthey maintains thatthese two 
elements ofhinnan existence are not 'externally' related, but that the natural aspect· 
of humanity determines, to some eXtent, the social and historical aspects: He argues 
that 'In reality ... an individual comes into being, surVives, ail.d develops on the basis 
of the functions of an animal qrg&nism and its connections to his natural 
' ' ' ' ./ 
environment. His feeling oflife is, atleast partly, based on these n~turaJ 
functions ... ' .138 Thus, human beings are not simply mental b.ut also natural, and the 
·'' • c •• ·,· ' ' 
structure of mental life is partly determined by this physical composition. 
Thus, having adopted the terni 'Geisteswissenschaften' and argued that it forms one 
half of the 'globus intellectualis', Dilthey is concerned that we notjump to any hasty 
. . 
conclusions concerning the grounds of this distinction. In particular, that we not 
think that this division of the sciences implies.any separation of humanity's mental 
and physical aspects. Dilthey's actual demarcation of the two forms of science is far 
more complex than this and he differs from both the positivists and the neo-Kantians 
in this respect. Mill thought that there was only one legitimate :method by which 
scientific knowledge could be derived from raw sensory experiences. He considered 
social and historical reality as the subject of scientific knowledge only to the extent 
137 Dilthey, Introduction, p58. 
138 Dilthey, Introduction, p66. 
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that this inductive methodology could be applied to them. The neo-Kantians argued 
that there were in fact two legitimate scientific methodologies, the nomothetic and 
the idiographic. By this they meant that there were two legitimate modes in which 
the subject could judge the infinite and irrational manifold of sense experience. 
Therefore, although they recognised two distinct scientific methods, it was the 
methods themselves that produced either a 'historical' or a 'natural' scientific object 
from the same field of experience. Dilthey's distinction of the natural and human 
sciences is more complex than both of these approaches because he recognises two 
distinct scientific methods and two distinct orders of objects to which they apply. 
Thus, Dilthey distinguished two modes in which reality could be experienced and 
thought that there was a different method appropriate for knowing each of them. The 
two different modes of experiencing reality are described as 'inner lived experience' 
and 'outer sensory experience'. Ermath explains that: 
Lived experience is the "originruy" way in which we perceive reality. As living 
persons we have an awareness of things and ourselves which is immediate, direct, 
and nonabstractive. We "live through" ( erleben) life with an intimate sense of its 
concrete, qualitative features and myriad patterns, meanings, values, and relations. 
It could be said that we "know" these features and relations more by tacit 
acquaintance than by explicit inference or discursive thought-but they are 
nonetheless real or empirical for being often below the threshold of conscious 
objectified attention.139 
It is from this original level of experience, in which we conduct our everyday lives, 
that both the human and natural sciences develop. According to Dilthey, there exists 
a unified realm of experience prior to all distinctions of the mental and physical. 
This idea is based upon the argument that nothing exists for us unless it is given in 
consciousness. Dilthey names this tenet the 'principle of phenomenality'. This is 
not a denial of the existence of external reality or any related sceptical claims. It is 
merely a statement that 'Whatever is there forus-because and insofar as it is there 
for us-is subject to the condition of being given in consciousness.' 140 This implies 
no scepticism of the existence of the external world. Rather it makes the point that 
the categories of inner and outer experience, and the related categories of physical 
and mental worlds, must be distinguished within.consciousness, not the other way 
around. 
139 Ermath, Wilhelm Dilthey, p97. 
140 Wilhelm Dilthey, 'Drafts for Volume Two of the Introduction to the Human Sciences', in 
Introduction to the Human Studies, pp246-247. 
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6. 
Dilthey' s references to inner and outer experience are meant to indicate that the 
original context of lived experience can be regarded from two points of view. These 
two points of view form the most basic conceptual limitation of the natural and 
human sciences. Dilthey argues that the defining aspect of nature is its 'alien' 
quality. In contrast to the world of human affairs we only have knowledge of the 
outer aspect of nature. Indeed a successful natural science was only possible based 
upon the strict separation of man and nature. Thus, the overcoming of 
anthropomorphism is the prerequisite of natural science. As nature is only presented 
to us through appearances, we can have no understanding of its inner order. Dilthey 
states that 'Nature is alien to us. It is a mere exterior for us without any inner life. 
Society is our world.' 141 The fact of our estrangement from the inner workings of 
nature expresses itself in the procedures of the modem natural sciences. Despite his 
fundamental disagreements with the epistemological school Dilthey adopts their 
definition of nature. As.Locke, Hume, and Kant had argued, we have no immediate 
sensory experience of the causal connections between the various occurrences we 
witness in nature. 
Dilthey argues that the opposite is true in the case of the human world. Here we 
have an immediate experience of the inner nature of society. We have this 
immediate experience because, in contrast to the world of nature, the human world is 
the world that we live in. In order to understand why this is so we must take heed of 
Dilthey's argument that we are never originally enclosed subjects that are separate 
from the world. Rather, it is impossible to separate the subject from the world in 
which it lives. Dilthey argues that: 'Man as a fact prior to history and society is a 
fiction of genetic explanation ; the man whom sound analytical science has for its 
object is the individual as an element of society.' 142 We never live as isolated 
knowing subjects, rather we always experience ourselves as within a world of 
meaningful and significant relationships. We have no immediate knowledge of the 
relationships between the elements of nature. However, our knowledge of the human 
world is such that we have an immediate awareness of the relationship between its 
elements. Indeed we are aware, originally, of the elements of the human world as 
part of an encompassing nexus or coherence (Zusammenhang). Dilthey argues that: 
141 Dilthey Introduction, p88. 
142 Dilthey Introduction, p83. 
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Human sciences have indeed the advantage over the natural sciences in that their 
object is not sensory appearance as such, no mere reflection of reality within 
consciousness, but is rather first and foremost an inner reality, a nexus experienced 
from within. Yet the very way in which this reality is given in inner experience 
raises great difficulties for its objective apprehension.143 
We are unavoidably aware of the relationships of value that are at play in the human 
world and it is for this reason that our knowledge of this world is an 'inner' 
knowledge. In the case of the human world 'we sympathetically experience the 
interplay of social conditions with the power of our total being. From within we are 
aware of the states and forces in all their restlessness that constitute the social 
system.' 144 
Thus, the difference between 'inner' and 'outer' experience lies in their respective 
distances from our lived experience. Simply put, nature is 'alien' to us because it is 
understood as a realm that is free of human values and interests. As I argued above, 
this realm is nevertheless derived from the original context of experience and 
produced through a careful process of abstraction. We see only the outer side of 
nature because we have no experience of what animates it. We must provide 
hypotheses to fill this gap. In our study of the human world, we are equipped with 
knowledge of its animating forces, for these forces are also to be found within 
ourselves. Just as we must avoid anthropomorphism in natural science, we must also 
avoid attributing too much weight to our personal experience in the human sciences. 
Thus, abstraction from the original context of experience is required in both forms of 
science; however, insofar as the human sciences do not seek to overcome the 
interests of man, they remain closer to this original experience. 
7. 
This is the basis ofDilthey's distinction between the processes of understanding 
(verstehen) and explanation (erklaren). Explanation, that is the method employed by 
the natural sciences, is unable to rely upon any 'inner' knowledge of its objects. It is 
unable to provide anything beyond an explanation of the appearances. of nature 
because it is based upon hypotheses. The Geisteswissenschaften on the other hand 
are able to call upon an inner knowledge of their object. The categories which are 
employed in the Geisteswissenschaften are found immediately in the human world 
143 Wilhelm Dilthey, 'The Rise of Hermeneutics', in Hermeneutics and the Study of History, ed 
Rudolf A. Makkreel and FrithjofRodi, (Princeton University Press, Princeton: New Jersey, 
1996), pp235-236. 
144 Dilthey, Introduction, p88. 
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itself. Our consciousness is fundamentally bound.up with the social and historical 
world insofar as our existence cannot be separated from this context. As I noted 
above, for Dilthey there is no original isolated subject. This notion is only an 
abstraction from the original context of consciousness in which we are always bound 
up in relationships with the historical world. It is not possible to completely separate 
the human world from the individual consciousness because they arise as a unity. 
The human world can never be something completely alien to us. As we already live 
within this world and are familiar with it, what is required here is not a hypothetical 
construction of a world, but a deepening and refining of what is already understood. 
The distinction between verstehen and erklaren is one that has a long history in 
German thought. Herbert Schnadelbach has pointed out in his discussion of the 
history of 'verstehen' that the notion that 'only what is made by human beings can be 
understood' can already be found in Kant's philosophy.145 This is true, however, this 
claim can ultimately be traced back to the work of Giambattista Vico and his 
'maker's knowledge principle'. This principle is well summarised by Stephen 
Gaukroger in the following passage: 
Vi co argued that we have a special kind of access to the civil world, which we do 
not have to the natural world .and which is due to our having created the former but 
not the latter. The kind of understanding which we can achieve of the former is 
consequently deeper than, and more secure than, that which we can have of the 
latter.146 
Vico employs this principle as a replacement for Descartes' criteria of truth, which 
were that ideas which are both clear and distinct are also true. This may seem a 
strange criterion of truth, and Gaukroger has argued that it is ultimatel)' mistaken. 
He argues that, even if it is true that we must understand the intentions of the maker 
if we are to understand an artefact, and that makers have direct access to their own 
intentions which others lack, the privileged knowledge of a maker does not appear to 
depend upon them actually making anything. Gaukroger argues that, 
all the point amounts to is that people know their own intentions in a way others do 
not. It would follow from this that we may not be able to know their artefacts in the 
145 Herbert Schnadelbach, Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933, trans. Eric Matthews, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1984), pl 10. 
146 Stephen Gaukroger, 'Vico and the Maker's Knowledge Principle', History and Philosophy 
Quarterly, vol. 3 (1986), pp29-44. 
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way that they do, but what they know is not dependent upon their making 
anything.147 
87 
In contrast to this, Campbell argues that we must take note ofVico's Aristotelian 
understanding of causality if we are to see his point. 148 Thus, he is not employing 
Hume's understanding of cause as the orderly sequence of events, but Aristotle's 
notion of cause as denoting all those elements which are brought together and 
ordered by the maker to produce the artefact. Thus, it is the act of synthesising these 
original elements which gives rise to the artefact. Only the maker, or one that can 
retrace the maker's act of synthesis, can know the object in this sense. 
This principle remains at the foundation ofDilthey's separation of the human and 
natural worlds, and his subsequent division of understanding and explanation. He 
thinks that because the human world consists of the products of conscious and 
intentional human activities, it is possible for us to retrace these actions and to 
'understand' them in a way that we cannot with the natural world. As Locke first 
argued, and Dilthey maintained, we cannot know the real essences of natural beings. 
Therefore, we cannot know the elements from which natural objects are formed and 
can have only an outer knowledge of them. Although our knowledge of the human 
world does not attain the precision of our natural knowledge, it is superior in the 
sense that it is direct knowledge of the elements by which this world is constructed. 
8. 
Understanding, taken in Dilthey's specific sense as a manner of comprehending the 
human as opposed to the natural world, has two aspects. As Bambach observes: 
Understanding, in Dilthey's interpretation, signified not only the specific procedure 
of the human sciences but the fundamental movement of human historical life as 
well, a movement whose beginning is impossible to isolate epistemologically.149 
In accordance with his rejection of faculty psychological approaches to 
understanding life, Dilthey argues that life is originally a purposive whole and that it 
is inherently 'structured'. Thus, rather than beginning with atoms of sense 
experience on the one hand, and empty conceptual structures on the other, Dilthey 
conceives of life as a unified process of understanding. Dilthey describes the 
147 Gaukroger, 'Vico and the Maker's Knowledge Principle', p40. 
148 For this discussion of the plausibility ofVico's principle and its importance for the concept of 
historicity, see Campbell, Truth and Historicity, pp251-268. 
149 Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey and the Crisis of Historicism, pp 160-161. 
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different premises of his descriptive psychology and explanatory psychology in this 
way: 
Explanatory psychology arose from the analysis of perception and memory. The 
core of it was constituted from the beginning by elements - such as sensations, 
representations, agreeable and disagreeable affects - as well as by the processes 
among them, notably that of association, which were subsequently added, as other 
explanatory operations, apperception and fusion. It therefore did not have for its 
object the totality of human nature and the full content of the psychic nexus. In view 
of this, I would oppose to explanatory psychology ... the conception of a realistic 
psychology whose descriptions would permit us to comprehend the totality of 
psychic life, its prevailing contexts, content, and forms. 150 
Furthermore, the whole 'nexus' of life is temporally structured such that the flow of 
time is also, originally, the flow oflife. For Dilthey, time is in fact grounded in our 
original consciousness of a past, present, and future. In the drafts for the unpublished 
second section of the Introduction to the Human Sciences, Dilthey formulates his 
account of time in opposition to that of Kant. Kant sees time as the form of inner 
intuition which cannot be derived from experience due to its apodictic certainty. In 
response to this Dilthey argues that in fact time certainly is a concept that can, and in 
fact must, be derived from our experience for our consciousness is always 
determined by a before and an after. 
Dilthey also objects to the conception of time as a line consisting of homogeneous 
elements. Thus, 'if one attempts to understand the time-line as composed of 
homogeneous elements-so that after abstraction from their specific content the 
elements as time elements are uniform like those of space-then this is a mistake that 
is rooted in abstraction being carried too far.' 151 His point here is that there is no 
more basic conception of time than that of our everyday experience of the past, 
present, and future. It is our experience and recognition of past elements of 
consciousness as always memories and reproductions, along with our recognition of 
the future as populated by possibilities and potentialities, that forms the basis of time. 
It is not possible to go behind this original ordering of our experiences in order to 
find an 'empty' flow of uniform time which we 'fill up' in the course of our life. 
Dilthey states that 'From the present we run through a series of memories back to the 
point where our small, malleable, and unformed self is lost in the twilight and we 
press forward from the present to possibilities, which are grounded in it, but, at the 
150 Dilthey, Descriptive Psychology, p39. 
151 Dilthey, 'Drafts for Volume Two of the Introduction to the Human Sciences', in Introduction, 
p386. 
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same time, assume vague and vast dimensions.' 152 The ordering of experiences in 
this structure of past, present, and future, forms the basis of all our later theorising 
about the nature of time. Although our experience is fundamentally structured by 
this order, we are not necessarily aware of this. Dilthey argues that it requires a 
certain level of abstraction and the development of self-consciousness to see our 
consciousness as sequential. We are mostly not concerned with our experiences as 
experiences, rather, they find their place in the context of our present situation. Their 
significance is determined by their position with regard to future projects and past 
experiences. Life itself is already meaningfully structured and understood. As 
Dilthey states: 
We are first of all historical beings before we are inquirers into history, and it is only 
because we are the former that we become the latter ... The first important factor for 
the solution of the problem of historical knowledge is revealed: the primary 
condition for the possibility of historical knowledge lies in the fact that I am a 
historical being, that one who studies history is the same one who makes history.153 
Here lies the basis for Dilthey's claim that knowledge in the human sciences is 
ultimately circular and without any absolute foundations. Dilthey describes the 
hermeneutic circle in which any interpretation becomes involved in the following 
passage: 
Description, which is based on observation, demands the construction of concepts; 
the concept and its definition presupposes a classification of the phenomena; if this 
classification is to be an orderly totality, ifthe concepts are to express the essence of 
the facts which they represent-then they presuppose a knowledge of the whole. 
There arises a circle here. At base, it is an artistic process in which the power, the 
universality, and the objective character of the intuitions determine the value of the 
results.154 
Dilthey's point is that all interpretation must proceed by anticipating the nature of 
the object in question in order to then subject it to more detailed empirical 
examination. There is a constant tension between this initial determination of a field 
of objects, and the results that are gained from examining those objects. It may be 
that our initial conception may have to be revised based upon results that were 
gained by assuming that it was in fact adequate. This interplay between parts and 
152 Dilthey, 'The Construction of the Historical World in the Human Studies', in Selected Writings, 
p185. 
153 Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VII, p278, quoted in Ermath, Wilhelm Dilthey, p250. 
154 Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XI, p258, quoted in Ermath, Wilhelm Dilthey, p252. 
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wholes is the essential element of the hermeneutic method that Dilthey advocates for 
the human sciences. 
In our practical engagement with the wor~d we already possess an understanding of 
ourselves and reality. This understanding is, for the most part, tacit, yet it 
nevertheless forms the intelligible framework in which we act. Furthermore, we do 
not construct this framework ourselves but inherit it from our society and its 
traditions. It is certainly possible to reflect upon the categories and structures of 
meaning which we have inherited and even come to understand them differently 
through this process. Indeed, the very point of scientific investigations of the human 
world is to bring these inherited categories into view and to test their adequacy. 
Dilthey's point is that we can never go behind life, or stand outside it, in order to 
know it 'scientifically'. Rather we mustworkfromwithin an historical context and 
attempt to gradually develop a greater awareness of its character. 
9. 
Although I have only provided a sketch ofDilthey's thinking, it is sufficientto 
understand the significance of Heidegger's claim that his analysis of the problem of 
history in Being and Time 'grew out of an appropriation ofDilthey's work.' 155 As I 
stated above, the aim of examining the issues of history and science in the work of 
Mill, the neo-Kantians, and Dilthey, was to provide a context for Heidegger's 
account of theory and.practice in Being and Time. In particular, I aimed to 
demonstrate .that the probletn with .the scientific ideal of theoretical knowledge, as 
Dilthey saw, was that it was impossible for an existing human to attain. It is not 
possible for humans to attain a divine view of beings because they are historically 
situated. Our knowledge does not begin from absolute principles but from categories 
and concepts thathave developed through the course of history. As human existence 
cannot be separated from its historical era, except as a convenient abstraction, it can 
never attain a purely contemplative view of the world. Yet this is the ideal which lay 
at the heart of ancient Greek, Medieval, and even modem accounts of scientific 
knowledge. As I noted in the introduction, Aristotle recognised that his account of 
science seemed to render it fit only for the gods. Dilthey's account of the thoroughly 
historical character of human existence demonstrates why this is so. Humans cannot 
stand outside the world and view it as a pure spectacle, as could a god. Rather their 
155 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, (State University ofNew York Press, 
Albany, 1996), p363. 
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very nature is dependent upon this world and although they can understand their 
situation more thoroughly, they cannot stand beyond it. 
91 
I will conclude this chapter with a brief account of the significance of Dilthey and the 
neo-Kantians in Heidegger's philosophical development. This is by no means 
intended as a definitive account of Heidegger's early philosophical development.156 
The influences on, and directions of, Heidegger's early thinking constitutes a large 
field of study in its own right. I merely intend to establish that Heidegger recognised 
the essential difficulty with which Dilthey struggled; and that his comments in Being 
and Time on theory and practice should be read as an extension ofDilthey's 
objections to theoreticist ideals of knowledge. 
Initially, it is worth noting that Heidegger had himself approached the problem of 
understanding the relationship between philosophy and the sciences from within the 
neo-Kantian schema. Ifwe examine a trial lecture he delivered in 1915 to the 
philosophy department at Freiburg entitled "The Concept of Time in the Science of 
History", then his identification with the neo-Kantian position is clear. This is 
perhaps not surprising given that leading up to this lecture Heidegger had studied 
with Heinrich Rickert, who directed his dissertation. This 1915 lecture aims at the 
description of the peculiar nature of the understanding of time that is employed in 
historical science. Heidegger initially provides an account of the concept of time in 
the natural sciences, physics in particular, in order that the concept of time assumed 
in historical science could then be displayed by way of contrast. 
Importantly, the target of this lecture is the logical structure of both the natural and 
historical sciences. In fact Heidegger goes so far as to state that, 'Bringing into relief 
the logical foundations of methods of research in the particular sciences is thus the 
concern of logic as theory of science.' 157 Furthermore, he sets out to determine what 
the concept of time in historical science is, based upon the nature of existing 
historical science. The problem this lecture addresses is thus posed as ' What 
structure must the concept of time in the science of history have in order for it to be 
able to function as a concept of time in a manner corresponding to the goal of this 
156 Some idea of the scope of this field is given by the collection of essays in Reading Heidegger From 
the Start, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, (State University of New York Press, 
Albany, 1994). 
157 Martin Heidegger, 'The Concept of Time in the Science of History', trans. H. S Taylor, H. W. 
Uffelmann and J. Van Buren, in Supplements, ed. John Van Buren, (SUNY Press, Albany 
NY, 2002), p51. 
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science?' 158 The goal is thus to proceed in a purely descriptive manner with the hope 
of unveiling the logical structure of the concrete investigation of history. 
It is clear thatthis early lecture is framed in a classically neo-Kantian manner. 
Heidegger even displays the concern that was shared by Rickert, Windelband, and 
Dilthey to identify the distance between the natural and historical or human sciences. 
The conclusions of this lecture, namely that the concepts of time in the historical and 
natural sciences are distinct and that this distinction revolves around the homogeneity 
of time points, are thoughts that will be taken up again by Heidegger in different 
modes of questioning throughout his career. He argues in this 1915 lecture that the 
time of physical science, or indeed the clock time of our everyday understanding, is 
merely one view of time, in particular a view of time as a homogeneous parameter of 
measurement of the physical world. Rather than being merely a matter of quantity or 
a parameter of the physical world, the time of historical science is determined by its 
quality. Although it is bound up here with the neo-Kantian philosophy of science 
that Heidegger would·later come to reject, his attempt to demonstrate the limitations 
of the natural scientific understanding of time already pointed to a concern for the 
reality that lay behind the obfuscations of psychological and scientific theory. 
This early lecture is worth considering as it allows us to see the movement of 
Heidegger's thought in the decade leading up to the publication of Being and Time. 
We can now see that he traveled from a neo-Kantian approach to the theory of the 
sciences, through Dilthey's conception of a grounding of the sciences in a descriptive 
psychology, into the radical questioning of the being of Da-sein and temporality that 
characterised Being and Time. I am not suggesting here that Heidegger ever adopted 
Dilthey's position as his own. Rather, Heidegger came to see neo-Kantian 
philosophy as ungrounded in that it was unable to account for the reality of values 
and valuation in our everyday existence. He came to view science as an issue for 
philosophy, not as a matter of determining its logical structures and transcendental 
conditions, but as a problem of determining how the scientific practice grew out of 
everyday existence. It should be clear that this was also the tendency that was active 
in Dilthey's thought. He sought to gain a clear view, through descriptive 
psychology, of the character of 'life' understood as the foundation of understanding. 
158 Heidegger, 'The Concept of Time in the Science of History', Supplements p51. 
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Therefore, the importance of Dilthey for Heidegger is that he provided a critique of 
the philosophical position in which he himself had worked as a student of Heinrich 
Rickert. Although he was able to state later that Dilthey' s work had been inadequate 
in that it did not manage to pose the problem of life in a sufficiently radical manner, 
it should be recognised that Heidegger did not say this as an onlooker, but as one that 
also had to overcome the outlook of Windelband and Rickert. Thus, Heidegger 
states in the lecture course History of the Concept of Time, delivered at the 
University ofMarburg in 1925, that Dilthey 'did not come to a more rigorous 
formulation of the phenomenon, but, and this is what is most important, he already 
saw quite early that reality is experienced not only in knowledge and awareness but 
in the whole "living subject", as he puts it, in this "thinking, willing, feeling 
being."' 159 Dilthey certainly saw the unity in which experience took place but was 
unable to recognise the manner in which this undermined the isolated psychological 
categories of thinking, willing, feeling, and so on. 
Dilthey provided an important element in the overcoming of the presuppositions of 
the neo-Kantians. Although he understood himself to be providing a foundation for 
the conduct of the Geisteswissenschafien, the central problem that he constantly 
addressed was the standpoint from which we address the issue of the sciences. The 
fundamental insight in Dilthey's work was that we must understand the sciences as 
developing out of the context of lived experience. This is certainly how Heidegger 
saw the matter. Returning to the quote with which I began this chapter, he states, 
again in the History of the Concept of Time, that: 
The decisive element in Dilthey's inquiry is not the theory of the sciences of history 
but the tendency to bring the reality of the historical into view and to make clear 
from this the manner and possibility of its interpretation. To be sure he did not 
formulate the question so radically. He continued to operate in the interrogative 
b. f h" . 160 am 1ence o is contemporanes. 
Heidegger understood the vital issue in Dilthey's thought to be the attempt to work 
out the implications of a recognition that thinking must take place from within the 
context of life. Once we recognize that all questioning and research must take place 
from out of our concrete existence, then the vital task, as Dilthey recognized, is to 
understand the nature of this concrete existence from which questioning and research 
first arise. 
159 Heidegger, HCT, p220. 
160 Heidegger, HCT, pl 7. 
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10. 
It is Dilthey's abiding sense of the historical situation of human existence that was 
vital for the development of Heidegger's thought leading up to Being and Time. His 
analysis of the structure of life, the original temporality that can be found in this 
structure, and his later advocacy of hermeneutics as the proper method of 
approaching the objects of the Geisteswissenschaften, all contain hints in the 
direction of what was to come in Heidegger's thought. However, none ofDilthey's 
concrete findings are wholly adopted by Heidegger. It is only the exhortation that in 
our attempt to arrive at an understanding of ourselves we must begin with life as it is 
given, not with psychological constructions, that we can say was truly taken up. 
Thus, Dilthey's thought was crucial for Heidegger in his project in Being and Time, 
and the drafts and lectures that led up to this work throughout the 1920's. Indeed, 
the two works that Theodore Kisiel describes as drafts of Being and Time, the lecture 
entitled The Concept of Time delivered to the Marburg Theological Society in 1924, 
and the lecture course The History of the Concept of Time delivered at the University 
of Marburg in the summer semester of 1925, are dominated by the aim of providing a 
description of the character ofhuman life as it shows itself.161 We.can trace 
Heidegger's involvement with the problem ofthe 'self-interpretation offacticity', as 
he then called it, to the last lecture course of his early Freiburg period, delivered in 
the summer semester of 1923. Here we find Heidegger already stating what he 
repeated several times in the later works already mentioned. Namely, that although 
Dilthey remained trapped within the project of providing a foundation for the 
Geisteswissenschaften, as Kant had earlier done for the Naturwissenschaften, his 
approachwas superior due to the depth of problem with which it grappled. Thus, for 
Heidegger, 'Rickert and Windelband are only scions of what Dilthey tackled in 
concrete research and indeed with far scantier resources.' 162 Even before he gained 
access to the correspondence between Dilthey and Count Yorck von W artenburg, 
Heidegger took Dilthey's work as having touched upon something essential.163 
In attributing such importance to the encounter with Dilthey, I am not suggesting that 
there are not other highly significant influences that express themselves in the make 
161 See part three of Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time. 
162 Martin Heidegger, Ontology- The Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans John van Buren, (Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1999), p54. 
163 Kisiel writes that Heidegger obtained a review copy of the Dilthey - Yorck correspondence after 
requesting it in late 1923 whereas the lecture course The Hermeneutics ofFacticitytook 
place earlier that year. Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, pp321-322. 
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up of Being and Time. Indeed there can be no doubt that in methodological terms, 
the influence of Husserl's phenomenology upon Heidegger was of much greater 
significance than that of Dilthey. Husserl's analysis of intentionality indicates, in 
much more concrete manner than Dilthey ever achieved, how it is that we can 
overcome the presuppositions that plagued not only the neo-Kantians but also all 
theorists that subscribed to a representationalist psychology ... Indeed, Heidegger 
argues that it was Dilthey that first saw the significance of Husserl's Logical 
Investigations (1900-01) because it achieved the first concrete breakthrough towards 
a founding science of life that he had been seeking. Heidegger attributes to Dilthey 
the comment that the Logical Investigations were 'the firstgreat scientific advance in 
philosophy since Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.' 164 Thus, in terms of how 
Heidegger drew upon these two philosophers in the course of his early career, it 
appears that Dilthey provided the direction and Husserl the partial means for the 
rethinking of the nature of man, world, and temporality, that occurred in Being and 
Time. 165 
11. 
At this point it is worth spelling out precisely why Heidegger found Dilthey' s 
approach to the understanding of life and history inadequate. This dissatisfaction is 
an important element in coming to understand Heidegger's account of life in Being 
and Time and his later critique of the effect of technology on our understanding of 
life. Both Dilthey and Husserl responded to the neo-Kantians through a return to the 
concreteness of life. As Hans-Georg Gadamer has pointed out, the concept of life 
plays the same role in Husserl's thought as the concept of the coherence of 
experience in Dilthey's.166 What is meant here is that in both cases, the concept of 
life as it exists prior to its development into scientific practice is employed as the 
founding basis of these philosophies. Both Husserl and Dilthey exhort us to 
recognise that the conduct of the natural and human sciences is possible only upon 
the basis of this originary experience of life. 
164 Heidegger, HCT, p24. 
165 For more detailed discussions of the various stages of Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey' s work 
see Robert C. Scharff, 'Heidegger's "Appropriation" of Dilthey before Being and Time', 
Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 35 (1997), pp105-128; Charles R. Bambach, 
'Phenomenological Research as Destruktion: The early Heidegger's reading of Dilthey', 
Philosophy Today, Vol. 37 (1993), ppl 15-132; Istvan M. Feher, 'Phenomenology, 
Hermeneutics, Lebensphilosophie: Heidegger's Confrontation with Husserl, Dilthey, and 
Jaspers.', in Reading Heidegger From the Start, pp73-89. 
166 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 
(Continuum, New York, 2000), pp242-254. 
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Heidegger's dissatisfaction with Husserl's phenomenology stems from the fact that 
although Husserl sees the field of everyday experience, and indeed even understands · 
its foundational role, he is unable to focus adequately upon it. Heidegger argues that 
Husserl, having glimpsed the importance of the 'life-world', immediately sets about 
. describing our interaction with this world in terms of a subject bringing itself into 
relationship with this world through acts such as perceiving, willing, comparing, 
distinguishing, and so on. Thus, although Husserl characterizes his account of the 
'natural standpoint' as 'a piece of pure description prior to all "theory" ', he in fact 
introduces the essential aspects ofa Cartesian account of subjectivity.167 Rather than 
turning his phenomenological inquiry to the issue of what in fact shows ·itself in the 
natural standpoint, Husserl adopts the idea that in its being, this standpoint involves 
the 'subject' and it correlation with 'objects' through 'acts'. 
The being of the natural standpoint thereby never becomes fully :thematic for 
Husserl. Heidegger argues, both in Being and Time and in preceding works, that it is 
precisely these categories of act, subject, and object, that never show themselves in 
life as it is lived. He states in History of the Concept of Time that: 
This primary kind of experience, which provides the basis for every further · 
characterization of consciousness, turns out to be a theoretical kind of experience 
and not a genuinely natural one, in which what is experien9ed could give itself in its 
original sense.168 
Heidegger's critique of the fundamental inadequacy of the notion of subjectivitY, as 
it is conceived from Descartes onwards, must also apply to the work of Husserl. He 
too is unable to see behind the account of consciousness as the explicit correlation of 
a subject and its object. 
Dilthey is also seen by Heidegger as suffering from the, same fundamental inability to 
overcome the traditional definition of man. The traditional Cartesian epistemological 
orientation, taken up by Kant, and later by the neo-Kantians and Dilthey himself, 
involved itself with the question of how the subject is to reach outside of itself and 
achieve secure knowledge of its objects. The very name of the science ofllved 
experience which Dilthey hoped to establish speaks of his place within this tradition. 
His formulation of a 'descriptive psychology' immediately introduces the subjective 
schema. Although the aim of this psychology is the description of the 'nexus of facts 
167 Edmund Husserl, Ideas, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson, (Allen & Unwin, London, 1931), p105. 
168 Heidegger, HCT, pll7. , . 
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of consciousness', this description presupposes that the elements of this nexus are 
comportments of a subject towards objects of perception, whether inner or outer. 
There remains in Dilthey' s work the same inability to let the reality of life show itself 
as it is. 
12. 
Given that Dilthey was unable to overcome this Cartesian inheritance in just the 
same manner as Husserl, we must look further in order to pin down precisely why it 
was Dilthey that came in for such praise in Being and Time. In section 77 of Being 
and Time Heidegger states that his 'analysis of the problem of history grew out of an 
appropriation ofDilthey's work. It was corroborated, and at the same time 
strengthened, by Count Yorck' s theses that are scattered throughout his letters to 
Dilthey.' 169 He continues on in this section to. give a brief account of Dilthey' s work 
"- and to quote extensively from Count Yorck's various letters to Dilthey. Heidegger 
argues that the thoughts of Count Yorck express the true and fundamental direction 
ofDilthey's thought more clearly than Dilthey himself was able to, due to his 
entanglement in the neo-Kantian problematic of philosophy of science. 
Heidegger believed that the constantly provisional and fragmentary nature of 
Dilthey's work was a result of the fact that he was never able to grasp his project 
with sufficient clarity. This was achieved, according to Heidegger, by Count Yorck 
when he refers to the 'common interest in understanding historicity' shared by 
himself and Dilthey .170 The fundamental contribution of Dilthey and Yorck is 
thereby the manner in which they.opened up the question of the nature of historicity 
for further exploration. Furthermore, they provided the guideline for how to 
approach this problem in that they saw a re-examination of the being of man as the 
key to understanding historicity itself. Thus, Heidegger attributes to Count Yorck 
the opening up of a more primordial approach to historicity. He states that 'Yorck 
gets his clear insight into the fundamental character of history as "virtuality" from his 
knowledge of the characteristics of being of human existence itself, thus precisely 
not in a theoretical and scientific way oriented to the object of historical 
observation.' 171 
169 Heidegger, BT, p363/397. 
170 Dilthey - Yorck Correspondence quoted in Heidegger, BT, p363/398. 
171 Heidegger, BT, p366/401. 
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13. 
It appears that we must take seriously Heidegger's claim towards the end of Being 
and Time that this work had been an extension of the thoughts of Dilthey and Count 
Yorck. Thus, this work is in fact best understood as a critique which employs the 
phenomenological techniques developed by Husserl towards the fundamental aims of 
Dilthey's philosophy. Thus, whilst Husserl, through his work on the problem of 
intentionality, provides much of the phenomenological methodology of Being and 
Time, we must recognize that the aim of this work involves a questioning of the 
being of human existence in order to further clarify the question of being itself. The 
guideline for this investigation was provided by Dilthey and Count Yorck. 
The importance of Dilthey, and Count Yorck's correspondence with him, for our 
reading of Heidegger's thought leading up to Being and Time is now clear. Being 
and Time is dedicated 'in friendship and admiration' to Edmund Husserl. Further 
into the text we find Heidegger stating that 'The following investigations would not 
have been possible without the foundation laid by Edmund Husserl; with his Logical 
Investigations phenomenology achieved a breakthrough.' 172 Given Heidegger's high 
appraisal of the work of Dilthey and Count Yorck we must be somewhat wary about 
how we understand Heidegger's acknowledgement of his debt to Husserl. I suggest 
,, 
that it is not tenable to understand Being and Time as an extension of Husserl's work. 
This work in fact'contains a fundarllental critique of Husserl's position, standing as it 
does firmly within the Cartesian tradition. In the lectUre courses that lead up to the 
publication of Being and Time, Heidegger always portrays Husserl's work in the 
Logical Investigations as of great importance in the development of phenomenology. 
However, he is also quick to point out the limitations of Husserl's position in these 
works. Already in the summer semester lecture course of 1923 Heidegger argues 
that although Husserl provided great insight into the phenomenological 'question of 
access' to the subject matter, the subject matter itself did not undergo a fundamental 
analysis. 173 Husserl is not directly criticized in Being and Time, however, it is clear 
that Heidegger's critique of the tradition holds also for his position. 
The implications of Heidegger's identification of Dilthey as the originator of the line 
of questioning that was pursued in Being and Time are quite serious. Initially this 
should provide us with a guide to understanding problematic aspects of Being and 
172 Heidegger, BT, p34/38. 
173 Heidegger, Ontology, p56.' 
Chapter Two 99 
Time. In particular the problem of how we are to understand the relationship 
between Heidegger's analysis of our everyday existence and scientific practice. The 
relationship between the practical and the theoretical in Being and Time is of 
profound importance if we are to achieve an understanding of Heidegger's account 
of technology. This is because it is there that Heidegger establishes the fundamental 
determinations of human understanding, truth and the world, that remain the 
foundation of his later discussions of technology. It is impossible to assess 
Heidegger's later work without some understanding of these fundamental 
determinations. Thus, it is to this problem of how a recognition of Heidegger's 
appropriation ofDilthey's problematic can aid us in understanding Being and Time 
that I will tum in the next chapter. 
Chapter3 
'Theory' and 'Practice' in Being and 
Time 
In my preceding discussion of Dilthey, I noted that he had, in a brief passage from 
the drafts for the second volume of his Introduction to the Human Sciences, managed 
to point to the central difficulty of the 'epistemological school' of Locke, Hume, and 
Kant. He argued that this school was correct in its restriction of knowledge to the 
realm of human experience, although it was certainly wrong in its account of the 
nature of this experience. Thus, he agreed that humanity can have no direct insight 
into the real essences of natural beings. The problem with this modem tradition was 
that it had not altered its ideals of scientific knowledge in accordance with this 
restriction. However, as Dilthey argues: 'The scientific outlook was preceded by a 
conceptual world that held that reality proceeds from divine knowledge.' 174 This 
model of knowledge implied the ability to view the world from a position that is 
entirely independent of it. According to Dilthey, the continuing power of this model 
of knowledge is demonstrated by such notions as the transcendental subject and the 
pure, inductive logical methods of J. S. Mill. Such attempts to re-establish this 
'divine' knowledge on a subjective foundation simply misconstrue the essentially 
finite, historical, and worldly nature of human existence. Thus, what was required 
was an explicit investigation of human existence in order that philosophy and science 
may be securely founded, even if this meant the abandonment of any absolutely valid 
knowledge. 
This contradiction between human existence and scientific knowledge is the point 
that Heidegger takes up in Being and Time. In so doing he laid the foundations of his 
later meditations on the nature of modem technology. He describes Being and Time 
174 Dilthey, Introduction, p281. 
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as an attempt to re-open the question of the meaning of being, which has, he 
contends, been forgotten. He continues: 
But the question touched upon here is hardly an arbitrary one. It sustained the avid 
research of Plato and Aristotle but from then on ceased to be heard as a thematic 
question of actual investigation. What these two thinkers achieved has been 
preserved in various distorted and "camouflaged" forms down to Hegel's Logic. 
And what then was wrested from phenomena by the highest exertion of thought, 
albeit in fragments and first beginnings, has long since been trivialized. 
Not only that. On the foundation of the Greek point of departure for the 
interpretation of being a dogma has taken shape which not only declares that the 
question of the meaning of being is superfluous but sanctions its neglect.175 
Heidegger's point is not that philosophers have, since the time of Plato and Aristotle, 
neglected to think about being. Indeed, he thinks that the tradition of metaphysics is 
characterised by.a certain understanding of being, namely that which was developed 
by the ancient Greeks. His point is, rather, that philosophers have simply assumed 
these initial ontological determinations and have not turned to an inquiry into their 
adequacy. They have not investigated whether the concept of substance is adequate 
to describe the mode of being of all beings. 
Heidegger correctly saw that within the modern philosophical tradition the question 
of being is inextricably linked to the question of human nature. As I demonstrated in 
the preceding discussion of Dilthey, the southwest neo-Kantians and Mill, the.central 
difficulty for modern metaphysics was attempting to secure a foundation for 
necessary and universal scientific knowledge.176 The philosophers of the 
'epistemological school', to borrow Dilthey's phrase, began their reflections on the 
basis of a separation of real and nominal essences. Without any direct access to the 
real essences of natural beings, which had been the foundation of all previous 
metaphysical and scientific knowledge, they were left in the difficult position of 
trying to secure scientific knowledge within the subject itself. This project relied 
upon the assumption that human existence possessed a stable essence upon which the 
edifice of scientific knowledge could rest. 
This assumption is the point at which Heidegger attacks, both in Being and Time and 
in his subsequent writings, the modern philosophical tradition as it has progressed 
175 Heidegger, BT, pl. 
176 It is true that this is also Descartes project, however, as I will demonstrate in chapter five, he differs 
from later philosophers in that he believed we could attain knowledge ofreal essences. 
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since Descartes. His argument in Being and Time is that human existence does not 
possess the same mode of being as other entities. He argues, with regard to human 
existence or 'Da-sein', that: 
The "essence" of this being lies in its to be. The whatness (essentia) of this being 
must be und~rstood in terms of its being ( existentia) insofar as one can speak of it at 
all. Here the ontological task is precisely to show that when we choose the word 
existence for the being of this being, this term does not and cannot have the 
ontological meaning of the traditional expression of existentia. Ontologically, 
existentia means objective presence [Vorhandenheit], a kind of being which is 
essentially inappropriate to characterize the being which has the character of Da-
sein.177 
He continues: 
The "essence" of Da-sein lies in its existence. The characteristics to be found in this 
being are thus not objectively present "attributes" of an objectively present being 
which has such and such an "outward appearance," but rather possible ways for it to 
be, and only this.178 
Thus, human existence is not a static 'substance' but consists of the projection of 
possible ways to be. This process by which human existence projects itself into the 
future forms, according to Heidegger, the foundation of both time and history. Thus, 
he argues that humans are not simply involved in history, but that their very way of 
being is characterised by its historicity ( Geschichtlichkeit). By this he means that 
there is no unchanging human essence which can be examined in isolation from its 
historical context, rather, human existence is the very matter of historical 
development. The effect of this claim, if it is accepted, is to make questionable the 
means by which the ancient Greek conceptions of science and being had been carried 
over into the modern philosophical tradition. Thus, because of the special role the 
human subject plays in modern philosophy, Heidegger's claim that human existence 
has no timeless essence is not simply a thesis about human beings, but about the 
nature of being itself. For if, as Heidegger argues, human beings do not have the 
same mode of being as other objects, but consist instead of a necessarily incomplete 
unification of past, present, and future, then the traditional conception of being must 
be revisited. 
I will address Heidegger's arguments concerning the historicity of human existence, 
and the subsidiary issues of authenticity and death, in the second half of this chapter. 
177 Heidegger, BT, p39. 
178 Heidegger, BT, p40. 
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However, before I address those matters, I intend to deal with a difficulty in the 
interpretation of the distinction between theory and practice in Being and Time. I 
will argue against an interpretation that has been developed by several pragmatist 
philosophers, although for reasons of space I will only focus upon Hubert Dreyfus' 
interpretation here. In Dreyfus' work Heidegger's account of our everyday, 
'practical', interaction with objects is taken to be 'non-mental'. Far from putting 
forth such an account of non-mental 'coping', I suggest that Heidegger's description 
of our everyday life is an attempt to overcome the detached and contemplative ideals 
of knowledge that cover over the worldly and involved nature of human existence. 
Although this may seem to be a merely technical matter, it is in fact vital to correctly 
understanding Heidegger's objections to the 'subjectivism' of modem philosophy. 
Having established the inadequacies of pragmatist interpretations of Being and Time, 
I will briefly discuss the implications of this misreading for understanding 
Heidegger's account of science. It has been argued by Don Ihde that in Being and 
Time Heidegger characterises science as a purely theoretical pursuit and that this is 
an inadequate account of the reality of modem science. He is seen as defending an 
outmoded conception of science as a contemplative activity whilst modem 
experimental science is inextricably bound up in its instruments and apparatus. This 
characterisation is, at its heart, another example of the misconstrual of the role of 
practice in Heidegger's analysis. Although I will address Heidegger's account of 
modem physical science in more detail in chapter four, it is convenient to deal with 
this issue here. 
1. 
I will address the first issue of how Heidegger characterised the nature of Da-sein 
through a critical discussion of the work of Hubert Dreyfus.179 This exemplifies the 
nature of much of the recent commentary on Heidegger that has emerged from 
American philosophers. Mark Okrent, in his work Heidegger's Pragmatism (1988) 
has identified Hubert Dreyfus, John Haugeland, Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom, and 
presumably himself, as part of this revived interest in Heidegger amongst analytic 
philosophers. 180 This group of philosophers do not agree about what is important in 
179 This critical discussion of pragmatist interpretations of Being and Time followi;; the broad outlines 
of arguments developed by Carleton B. Christensen in the following series of articles: 
'Heidegger's Representationalism', The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 51 (1997), pp77-104; 
'Getting Heidegger Off the West Coast', Inquiry, vol. 41 (1997), pp65-87; 'What Does (the 
Young) Heidegger Mean by the Seinsfrage?', Inquiry, vol. 42 (1998), pp411-38. 
180 Mark Okrent, Heidegger's Pragmatism, (Cornell University Press, Ithica, 1988), p3. 
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Heidegger's philosophy, and each appears to see a different aspect of his thought as 
illuminating or correct. For this reason Okrent states that 'what is missing in such 
debates is a clear, acceptable statement of just what Heidegger did say concerning 
metaphysics, intentionality, and being a person, together with a statement of his 
reasons for saying it.' Furthermore, 'what is needed is an interpretation 
comprehensible to all philosophers-including those trained in an analytic way-
which shows in a straightforward though not uncontroversial manner the impact of 
Heidegger's work on central questions in contemporary analytic philosophy.' 181 It 
seems somewhat optimistic to think that Heidegger's philosophy could be made 
straightforward and acceptable to all philosophers, both analytic and continental. 
The fact that Heidegger's thought has not been taken up in the analytic tradition is 
not due merely to perceived lack of clarity, rather it has its roots in fundamental 
differences of approach. The difficulties of Dreyfus', Okrent' s, and others', 
interpretations serve to demonstrate this. 
The issue of how we are to understand the relationship between Heidegger's 
categories of the ready-to-hand (zuhanden) and the present-at-hand (vorhanden) is 
crucial to understanding the direction of Being and Time. The matter is often seen as 
a fairly simple one. Our interaction with the zuhanden is understood as correlated 
with our practical everyday interactions, whilst the emergence of the vorhanden is 
associated with theoretical reflection which can be further refined into scientific 
investigation. Heidegger's writings are often confusing on this matter but I believe it 
can be shown that this comon interpretation is only adequate if we keep in mind the 
transcendental nature of Heidegger's ontological investigation. 
As I have argued in the previous chapter, the direction of Heidegger's work in this 
period is aligned more with Dilthey than Husserl. This is true in so far as he took up 
Dilthey's insights that life as it is lived must be the primary focus of philosophy and 
that we must not confuse the structure of life with its theoretical reconstructions. 
Both Dilthey and Heidegger focused upon this phenomenon of pre-theoretical life. 
Husserl had identified this notion as the 'life-world', however, he did not accord it 
the same priority it received in Dilthey and Heidegger's work. Although Dilthey 
does not characterise his own work in this way, both he and Heidegger employ a 
phenomenological approach in their investigation of life. They both argue that the 
phenomenon of life is overlooked in,standard accounts of consciousness and its 
181 Okrent, Heidegger's Pragmatism, p4. 
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worldly correlates, and that it is important to recover this underlying phenomenon 
from its various self interpretations. Heidegger's analysis of Da-sein is part of this 
effort to develop an account of the being of human existence as it shows itself, rather 
than how it commonly understands itself. 
Despite his alignment with Dilthey' s attempt to escape the psychological abstractions 
that characterised both neo-Kantian and empiricist philosophy, it is important to 
recognise that Heidegger's investigation proceeds along transcendental lines, 
although not in Kant's sense of the term. By this I mean that in his ontological 
investigations he seeks to determine the form in which objects must appear to us if 
we are to deal with them in everyday life. Thus, in his investigation of beings that 
are ready-to-hand, the details of which I will come to shortly, Heidegger attempts to 
determine the conditions of their possibility. Provided the analogy is not taken too 
far, this procedure can be helpfully compared with that of Kant in the Critique of 
Pure Reason. Whereas Kant was attempting to determine the necessary form of 
objects if they are to be scientifically known, in Being and Time Heidegger attempts 
to spell out the form of objects as we know them in our everyday existence. Kant 
argues that the objects of scientific knowledge must appear within a unified system 
of space and time, whilst Heidegger proposes that the world in which the objects of 
our pre-theoretical experience must appear is constituted by a web of practical 
significance. These two different senses of 'world' are the background within which 
objects, whether those of explicit scientific interest or everyday practical concern, 
must appear. 
Frank Schalow describes the relationship between the thought of Kant and Heidegger 
in the following passage: 
Heidegger seeks an alliance with transcendental philosophy due to a common 
concern for transplanting metaphysics onto the soil of human finitude. He thereby 
characterizes Kant's task as one of"layingthe ground of metaphysics" (GA3 1/1). 
Insofar as Kant implements a "critique of pure reason" in order to place metaphysics 
on the right footing, Heidegger suggests that the germ of his own inquiry into being 
must in some way be prefigured through this critical enterprise. 182 
182 Frank Schalow, 'The Kantian Schema of Heidegger's Late Marburg Period', in Reading Heidegger 
From the Start,p3 IO. Heidegger's reading of Kant in the period surrounding the publication 
of Being and Time is a complex and controversial subject which I cannot enter into here. An 
interesting summary of the tension between Heidegger's reading of Kant and what he took to 
be 'the' neo-Kantian interpretation can be found in the notes ofa disputation between 
Heidegger and Cassirer at Davos in 1929. This discussion is included as Appendix four in 
Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft, (Indiana 
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Despite this 'alliance', there are great differences between Kant and Heidegger. 
Although Heidegger adopts this notion of a Kantian 'schematism', it takes on an 
entirely new significance in his work due to the different manner in which he 
conceives of this 'soil of human finitude'. Indeed, as I mentioned above, 
Heidegger's account of human existence undermines the necessity and universality 
of scientific knowledge, which is the very thing Kant was attempting to secure by his 
transcendental approach. 
2. 
It is with the aim of clearing the ground for the inquiry into the meaning of being, 
that Heidegger addresses the problem of our understanding of the being of beings 
that we encounter in the world. He spends considerable time undermining the 
interpretation of innerworldly beings as objectively present things that exist within a 
world space. He points to Descartes as the most extreme example of this 
interpretation.183 Descartes ontologically distinguishes spirit and world into the 
categories of thinking thing (res cogitans) and extended thing (res extensa). It is this 
fundamental ontological division that largely determines our understanding of 
ourselves and our world. Perhaps most importantly, this distinction has led us to the 
understanding that man and world are separate phenomena that can be considered in 
isolation. The thinking thing is not a part of the extended world as it is not itself 
extended. The attempt to understand how these two modes of being interact has 
given rise to the modem problems of epistemology and intentionality. This division 
even gives rise to the question of how the world can have value for us. The neo-
Kantian philosophy of Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert is an example of 
how even the act of valuing becomes problematic if we assume such an original gulf 
between man and world. 
With this interpretation in mind we can follow Heidegger's arguments concerning the 
'handiness' of beings. He argues that the Cartesian account overlooks the 
preliminary step that must be taken if an adequate account of human being is to be 
gained. This step consists of not being content with ready answers, but looking at 
University Press, Bloomington, 1997), pp193-207. Heidegger argues in the opening 
passages that: 'I understand by neo-Kantianism that conception of the Critique of Pure 
Reason which explains, with reference to natural science, the part of pure reason that leads 
up to the Transcendental Dialectic as theory of knowledge. For me, what matters is to show 
that what came to be extracted here as theory of science was nonessential for Kant. Kant did 
not want to give any sort of theory of natural science, but rather wanted to point out the 
problematic of metaphysics, which is to say, the problematic of ontology.' 
183 Heidegger, BT, pp83-94. 
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the everyday existence of man. If this is done, Heidegger contends, we will discover 
that the interaction between man and world is not that between a thinking thing and 
physical objects. Rather, it is the mode of "taking care" that dominates everyday 
human existence. It is through being involved with them in order to achieve our ends 
that beings gain their character. We do not initially encounter beings as pure 
physical existences and then proceed to determine what they would be best employed 
as or what their significance may be. Rather, the structure of everyday existence is 
such that the encountering of beings takes place within a framework of taking care. 
Thus, Heidegger states that there "always belongs to the being of a useful thing a 
totality of useful things in which this useful thing can be what it is."184 In a sense a 
useful thing cannot exist in isolation, it must arise in the context of every other useful 
thing and as such it must refer to these other things. A hammer reveals itself as a 
thing that is useful for driving nails. Nails are revealed in the context of being useful 
for house building and houses are useful for living in and so on. It is within such a 
context of taking care of things that beings are revealed to human existence. 
This everyday context that is constituted by taking care of things, is the context in 
which beings reveal themselves in their handiness. It is in terms of our projects or 
involvements that beings reveal themselves in their specific modes of handiness. We 
are always already involved in the world through the various modifications of taking 
care, such as using, observing, undertaking, omitting, neglecting, and resting; 185 
Importantly, privative modifications, such as omitting and neglecting, are also taken 
by Heidegger to be possibilities of taking care. This is only possible because taking 
care is an ontological determination of human existence, in the transcendental sense 
of ontological outlined above. Thus, these factical possibilities, both positive and 
privative, are only possible upon the basis of an involvement in the world. Our 
overlooking or neglecting can only be such a neglect on the basis of this original 
involvement in the world. 
Beings are revealed within this context of taking care in various modes of handiness. 
It can certainly be the case that we encounter things that are not useful for our 
projects and such items reveal themselves as "irrelevant'' or "not what we were 
looking for". The situation can even arise where the useful item we are searching for 
is stubbornly unhandy. When we come across something that actually· impedes our 
184 Heidegger, BT, p64. 
185 Heidegger, BT, p53. 
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taking care, it has the character of a broken or missing tool. Heidegger argues that in 
such instances the fact that beings are initially encountered in terms of their 
handiness is more starkly revealed. It is when an item becomes prominent due to its 
stubborn uselessness, that one of the reasons for the constant overlooking of the 
phenomenon of handiness becomes clear. The truly handy item is something that 
withdraws from prominence in the face of the project for which this item is handy. 
3. 
On the basis of this initial characterisation of handiness, Heidegger divides objects 
into the zuhanden, translated as the ready-to-hand, and the vorhanden, the present-at-
hand or the objectively present. We can understand this distinction as based upon a 
difference in the mode of relating to things in the world. The ready-to-hand refers to 
objects as they exist for us in our everyday dealings. As such, it points to things 
which, in so far as they are equipment, withdraw from our thematic attention. The 
everyday involved.mode of existence does not look at useful items, but past them 
towards what they are useful for. The present-at-hand is a category which arises 
from the ready-to-hand. It arises when an item makes itself obtrusive by either not 
being useful, or by not being present at all. It is on these occasions, when we are 
confronted with something that halts our achievement of ends, that we look at 
objects. We areJorced to make objects thematic in order that we may establish what 
halted our taking care of the world and how we may overcome it. 
Heidegger characterises the second category, the present-at-hand, as the ground of 
our 'theoretical' relationship with the world. We must approach this term warily as it 
can all too easily become interpreted simply as a refrainment from physical 
manipulation. We cannot understand the term 'theoretical' to be making any claim 
regarding the presence, or lack, of physical activities. Rather, just as was the case 
with objects that are ready-to-hand, Heidegger is describing the form of objects that 
are the subject of theoretical attention. Thus, although he regularly characterises the 
difference between these two categories as that between objects as they withdraw 
during our practical involvements and as they appear in our theoretical contemplation 
of them, this is not a matter of the presence of activity or its absence. It is instead 
simply a matter of seeing that objects of our everyday experience appear in their 
relevance for our projects, and that these structures ofrelevance are proper to ready-
to-hand beings themselves. When we tum our explicit theoretical attention upon a 
being, then we are no longer immediately concerned with its relevance, but with its 
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objective constitution. It is in this mode that we attend to the physical characteristics 
of objects. 
It is vital to recognise that in the movement from circumspection to the theoretical 
attitude, and the correlated transformation of the zuhanden into the vorhanden, a 
layer of interpretation is not lost. The encounter with 'mere' physical objects 
mentioned above is dependent, in the same manner as the 'equipment' of everyday 
concern, upon an interpretive 'projection'. The theoretical encounter with objects 
depends upon a prior understanding of their being. For Heidegger there is no 'fact' 
that stands free of all interpretation. As he comments in a later section of Being and 
Time in relation to the projection that underlies our encounter with physical objects: 
This project discovers in advance something constantly present (matter) and opens 
the horizon for the guiding perspective on its quantitatively definable constitutive 
moments (motion, force, location, and time). Only "in the light of' a nature thus 
projected can something like a "fact" be found and be taken in as a point of 
departure for an experiment defined and regulated in terms of this project. The 
"founding" of "factual science" was possible only because the researchers 
understood that there are in principle no "bare facts."186 
This concept of a projection of nature will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter. I have addressed it here to prevent the misunderstanding that the 
vorhanden emerges when it is freed from all interpretations. 
The final point that must be made with regard to this division of the zuhanden and 
the vorhanden has to do with the apparently dramatic reversal that Heidegger has 
carried through here. It appears that he has reversed the standard order of priority of 
the practical and theoretical, and the order of the everyday and the scientific. It now 
appears that the object of our everyday involvements has priority over the 
theoretically observed object in the sense that it is more real. The theoretical account 
becomes merely an abstraction from this practical basis. This is, however, another 
misunderstanding of the point of Heidegger's analysis of everyday human existence. 
As Joseph Fell has argued, the analysis of Da-sein in Being and Time does not seek 
to establish the priority of the 'practical' over the 'theoretical' .187 Rather it is 
pursued as a means of characterising the phenomenon of world. Although the 
vorhanden is said to emerge from the zuhanden in Being and Time this is merely a 
186 Heidegger, BT, p331. 
187 Joseph P. Fell, 'The Familiar and the Strange: On the Limits of Praxis in the Early Heidegger', in 
Heidegger: A Critical Reader, (B. Blackwell, Oxford, 1992) pp65-80. 
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function of the focus of the inquiry. It would presumably be possible to begin the 
analysis with our involvement in scientific research and demonstrate the dependence 
of such an existence upon being-in-the-world. 
In fact, although his terms are not exactly the same, something like this occurs in 
Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. 
Here the dependence of science upon the life-world is emphasised. For Heidegger, 
both our interaction with the zuhanden and the vorhanden are dependent upon being-
in-the-world and the phenomenon of world should not be reduced to either category. 
It would be a mistake to think that he is setting up an absolute hierarchy of 
foundations. Depending upon whether we look at the order in which objects come to 
thought, or the order of relationships in nature, different elements will gain priority. 
Thus, such orders of priority are never absolute but always with respect to some 
particular outlook. 
4. 
On the basis of this background I will now address Dreyfus' argument that, 
according to Heidegger, in our everyday dealings with the world we are not reliant 
upon mental representations and in fact such representations are not present until we 
are forced to explicitly deliberate upon an obstacle to our progress in the world. I do 
not think that this interpretation is tenable for several reasons. Firstly, it does not 
seem to take into account the transcendental nature of Heidegger's ontological 
analysis. More specifically Dreyfus fails to take into account the separation of actual 
practical activities from the ontological determination of transcendence that makes 
such acting possible. Secondly, Dreyfus does not come to terms with the various 
attributions ofprimordiality that occur in Being and Time. 
Dreyfus' book, Being-In-The-World, A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time 
Division 1 (1990) is of particular importance because it forms the basis of the 
increased interest in Heidegger amongst American philosophers that was discussed 
above. 188 Dreyfus writes in the preface that the notes upon which the book is based 
had been circulating amongst his students for over 20 years. Indeed Frederick 
Olafson credits him with shifting the focus of American philosophers from 
Heidegger's association with the Nazi movement towards a serious examination of 
188 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991). 
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his philosophical works. 189 Furthermore, Dreyfus has sought to relate his version of 
Heidegger to new fields of inquiry, most prominently in the field of Artificial 
Intelligence.190 It is because of the wide ranging influence of this interpretation that 
it is particularly important to understand its weaknesses. 
Dreyfus sees Heidegger as giving an account of everyday human existence which 
does not fundamentally rest upon any notions of mental representations. Thus, he 
argues that 'Heidegger, like the cognitivists and structuralists, seeks to minimise the 
role of the conscious subject in his analysis of human being.' 191 In support of this 
claim Dreyfus refers to Heidegger's characterisation of the present-at-hand and the 
ready-to-hand, and the two different modes in which these objects are approached. 
In particular, he argues that Heidegger's description of our relationship with ready-
to-hand items demonstrates that in our everyday mode of dealing with objects, we 
have no mental representations of these objects. Dreyfus argues that 'in dealing, 
with the available, Da-sein is transparently absorbed in equipment without 
experiencing its activity as caused by a "mental state."' 192 
Just as Dreyfus correlates the mode of circumspection in Heidegger with a state of 
non-mental coping, the mode of theoretical looking is correlated with the appearance 
of mental states. The theoretical mode, which we described above as arising.from 
the mode of circumspection when objects themselves are made thematic, is for 
Dreyfus the occasion for the arrival of mental representation. He states that 
'temporary breakdown calls forth deliberate action and thus introduces "mental 
content," but only on the background of non-mental coping.' 193 Thus, Heidegger is 
characterised as developing an account which, contrary to the tra~ition, understands 
theoretical knowledge to arise out of some form of non-mental practical activity. 
5. 
Reading the first division of Being and Time as an account of such 'non-mental 
coping' is at the very least problematic. Aside from the issue of how this account is 
adequate to Heidegger's writings, there is the issue of the coherence of such a 
189 Frederick A. Olafson, 'Heidegger a la Wittgenstein of 'Coping' with Professor Dreyfus', Inquiry, 
vol. 37 (1994), pp45-64. 
19° For a critique of Dreyfus' use of Heidegger in the Artificial Intelligence debate see Carleton B. 
Christensen, 'Heidegger's Representationalism', The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 51 (1997), 
pp77-103. 
191 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, p3. 
192 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, p76. 
193 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, p76. 
112 Chapter Three 
proposal. The notion that we are completely unaware of ourselves or the objects 
with which we interact is one that is puzzling. If this were the case, how could it be 
that we are capable of overcoming even the slightest difficulties that we encounter 
without reverting to a mode in which we are explicitly aware of objects? Dreyfus' 
argument that 'Dasein could simply be absorbed in the world' implies that were we 
able to arrange things so that we never encountered any difficulties or obstacles in 
our activities, we would never be aware of either the world or ourselves. Thus he 
envisages the possibility of '[a] simplified culture in an earthly paradise ... in which 
the members' skills mesh with the world so well that one need never do anything 
deliberately or entertain explicit plans and goals.' 194 Such a possibility appears to 
run counter not only to our common understanding of ourselves, which in itself 
would be no argument, but also to any phenomenological description of our 
activities. It seems absurd to argue that we are not aware of objects or ourselves in 
our practice of taking care. Even our simplest dealings with objects require us to be 
aware of them. The process of making a cup of coffee is broadly the same each time, 
and yet it is also subtly different each time. Perhaps my cup has been placed in a 
different spot or the kettle is not plugged in. These are not major difficulties and yet 
every minor aberration would seem to require, on Dreyfus' account, that I resort to 
explicit theoretical deliberation. This separation of action and consciousness 
provides an account in which action becomes blind and. sight becomes impotent. 
Apart from the difficulties of his own account, which appear to be great, it seems that 
Dreyfus misses several important aspects of Heidegger's thought. The first of these 
is that he does not see that Heidegger uses the term 'practice' in an extremely broad 
manner. In fact he employs it in such a manner that it includes what we would 
normally call 'mental' operations. Dreyfus' contention that mental content arises 
only at the point of a breakdown in our plans and operations is evidence of the fact 
that he has not conceived of the category of our 'practical' involvement in the world 
broadly enough. Heidegger's true focus in distinguishing between the practical and 
the theoretical is the mode of seeing that is involved in each category. Furthermore, 
the notion that Heidegger somehow wishes to retain the notions of subjectivity and 
representation ignores his extended criticisms of such notions throughout Being and 
Time and other works from that period. In the two lecture courses History of the 
Concept of Time (1925) and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927) 
Heidegger provides an extended critique of representationalist misunderstandings of 
194 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, p85. 
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intentionality. This critique continues in Being and Time and extends to the analyses 
of being-in-the-world and truth as discoveredness. In all these works Heidegger is 
critical of the neo-Kantians, Dilthey, and Husserl, for their conception of man as an 
isolated subject that relates to the world through acts of knowing and valuing. He 
sees this subjectivist schema as a persistent misunderstanding of human existence. 
For Heidegger, no matter how man understands himself, he can never in fact become 
a subject that is closed off from the world. 
6. 
I will illustrate the inadequacies of Dreyfus' approach by analysing the relationship 
between Heidegger's conception of science and the zuhanden and vorhanden. 
Heidegger describes his account of science in Being and Time as an 'existential 
concept of science.' 195 He distinguishes this existential concept from the '"logical" 
concept that understands science with regard to its results and defines it as a "context 
of causal relations of true, that is, valid propositions."' 196 This definition 
encompasses the attitudes of a broad range of philosophers toward science. 
However, it appears that Heidegger is particularly at pains to oppose the neo-Kantian 
approach to science exemplified by Windelband and Rickert. Their interest lay in 
demonstrating the a priori validity of both the natural and human sciences. An 
existential concept of science, on the other hand, would consist of an account of the 
modifications of human existence that must occur in order to make science possible. 
Such an inquiry must aim at uncovering what it is that changes in our interaction 
with objects in order that this interaction becomes scientific. It must be noted here 
that Heidegger is not attempting to determine the manner in which various scientific 
disciplines were founded, nor is he attempting to understand the problems that 
occupy contemporary scientists. This is rather an ontological inquiry and thereby 
concerns a mode of being ofDa-sein. To emphasise this he states that 'we are asking 
which of these conditions of possibility in the constitution of being of Da-sein are 
existentially necessary for Da-sein to be able to exist in the mode of scientific 
investigation?' 197 
Heidegger is not very forthcoming in Being and Time on the matter of precisely what 
this existential concept of science is. However, it appears that his basic insight is that 
the scientific attitude involves focusing upon beings in a certain aspect. Thus, the 
195 Heidegger, BT, p327. 
196 Heidegger, BT, p327. 
197 Heidegger, BT, p327. 
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founding of a science involves defining the aspect in which beings are to be 
examined. Sciences are established through the thematization of a region of beings 
such that the being of these beings is understood, and the means of investigating such 
beings is established. The case of mathematical physics is cited as an example of the 
manner in which the establishment of a science is made possible by the opening up 
of a region of beings. Heidegger argues, controversially, that mathematical physics 
was made possible not by a closer examination of 'facts' but by the development of 
an understanding of being as something that can be quantified mathematically. The 
sighting of a region of beings which are 'constantly objectively present' and 
quantitatively definable as 'motion, force, location, and time', is the condition of the 
possibility of mathematical physics. 
Don Ihde has argued in his work Technics and Praxis (1979) that the account of 
science in Being and Time is misleading as it tends to obscure the manner in which 
modem science is embodied in its apparatuses and instrumentation. lhde's point 
seems to be that Heidegger's claim that the scientific attitude arises out of our 
interaction with present-at-hand or vorhanden objects, leaves us with the impression 
that science is a purely contemplative activity. In a comparison of Being and Time 
with Heidegger's later writing, Ihde writes that: 
[t]he 'science' of Being and Time is essentially a metaphysical and even 
contemplative science. It is a science derived from what may now be seen to be the 
ancient Greek ideal of speculation and deduction. It is not yet the science which is 
necessarily embodied in instrumentation; nor is it the science which is in the service 
of technology as calculative standing-reserve of the lecture.198 
Ihde argues that modem science is in fact essentially involved in praxis and is thus 
inseparable from the instruments and l.aboratories whichit employs. 
This argument, leaving aside for the moment the comparison with Heidegger's later 
writings, rests upon the same confusion regarding the terms practice and theory that 
can be found in Dreyfus' interpretation. Heidegger in fact appears to recognise the 
difficulty of these terms. In section 69 (b) of Being and Time Heidegger argues that 
although it would be easy to characterize the change from "'practically" circumspect 
handling and using and so on, to "theoretical" investigation' in terms of taking care 
abstaining from any kind of use, this cannot be the case. 199 The wary manner in 
198 Don Ihde, Technics and Praxis, (D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1979), p125. 
199 Heidegger, BT, p326. 
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which he employs the terms 'practically' and 'theoretical' here tells us that he is 
certainly aware of the misconception that may arise from their use. Heidegger 
argues that if we were to accept such a position then the 'ontological possibility of 
"theory" would be due to the absence of praxis, that is, to a privation. •200 
He does not, however, understand abstinence from practical use and manipulation as 
necessarily separate from our interaction with the ready-to-hand. He argues that 'the 
staying that stops which comes about when use stops can acquire the quality of a 
more precise kind of circumspection, such as "inspecting," checking what has been 
attained' .201 There is no correlation between the quantity of our manipulations and 
the sight by which they are guided. Thus, it is possible to be utterly immobile and 
yet remain concerned with objects as tools for the achievement of ends. As 
Heidegger states, '[t]o·refrain from the use of tools is so far from "theory" that 
staying, "reflecting" circumspection remains completely stuck in the tools at hand 
taken care of. ' 202 
We find that the same argument holds in the case of the present-at-hand. Far from 
being blind to the practical aspect of modern science, as Ihde contends, Heidegger 
argues that 'just as praxis has its own specific sight ("theory"), theoretical 
investigation is not without its own praxis.'203 Thus, he notes that 'Reading off the 
measurements that result from an experiment often requires a complicated 
"technological" set-up'. The practice of 'Observing with the microscope is 
dependent upon the production of "prepared slides"' and 'Archaeological excavation 
that precedes any interpretation of the "findings" demands the most massive manual 
labour. ' 204 We can see thereby that Heidegger was certainly aware that science is not 
an entirely speculative and non-practical activity. 
Ihde' s characterization of science in Being and Time is further undermined by 
another argument from section 69 (b ). Here Heidegger proposes that it cannot be the 
case that our change from interaction with ready-to-hand entities to interaction with 
present-at-hand entities is the essence of science. This simply cannot be the case 
because there are instances in which science concerns objects which have the 
character of ready-to-handness. Heidegger provides economics as an example of a 
200 Heidegger, BT, p327. 
201 Heidegger, BT, p327. On this topic see discussion above at pl09. 
202 Heidegger, BT, p327. 
203 Heidegger, BT, p328. 
204 Heidegger, BT, p328. 
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science that is concerned with ready-to-hand objects. He states that the 'everyday 
context of useful things at hand, their historical origination and utilization, their 
factical role in Da-sein-all these are the objects of the science of economics. ' 205 The 
fact that a present-at-hand object is in view is not synonymous with placing ourselves 
in a scientific attitude as we can just as well make the ready-to-hand an object of 
scientific investigation. It is rather the manner in which the object is brought into 
view that is important. 
Thus, many of the difficulties surrounding the notions of practice and theory derive 
from a failure to treat them as ontological categories. It is the conflict between the 
usual connotations of these terms and the use to which they have been put in 
Heidegger's fundamental ontology that causes confusion. Thus, we usually 
understand these terms as exclusive of one another. We say such things as 'putting 
theory into practice' as though 'theory' and 'practice' were two different realms, one. 
essentially mental and one essentially physical. However Heidegger's opposition to 
the Cartesian duality of mental and physical realms carries over to the conception of 
practice and theory which is based upon it. 
7. 
The weakness of these accounts of Heidegger as an anti-mentalist lie in the fact that 
his ontological approach actually serves to undermine these very categories of theory 
and practice. Through his attempt to determine the being of human existence, he 
arrives at ontological determinations that are, in a certain sense, empty. By this I 
mean that they do not refer to any factical aspects of human life but to their 
conditions of possibility. Heidegger's aim is to determine the most fun_damental 
aspect of human existence and this turns out to be transcendence. The term being-in-
the-world, coined by Heidegger, expresses this fundamental determination of 
existence as openness. 
The result of the analyses contained in the first half of Being and Time is that human 
existence is in its essence inseparable from its world. Heidegger argues that human 
existence is always outside itself in the world such that there is no question of how 
the relationship between man and world can occur. Da-sein is always involved in a 
world and the world, conceived in this particular sense, is always disclosed through 
Da-sein 's involvement. This reconception of human existence gives rise to a radical 
205 Heidegger, BT, p330. 
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interpretation of various basic philosophical concepts. Such ideas as truth and 
language are recast. Heidegger argues that we must see propositional truth as merely 
one mode in which man discloses beings. The conception of human existence as 
fundamentally disclosive and uncovering, undermines the interpretation of truth as 
something that is restricted to propositions. This is a matter that I will address in 
more detail in chapter six. The same occurs with the concept oflanguage as 
Heidegger argues that in its existential sense, language is the manner in which the 
intelligibility of Da-sein is expressed. All specific languages are based upon this 
feature of human existence.206 
Although Heidegger is less explicit about the issue of practice and theory, it is clear 
that our common understanding of these categories is also undermined. The fact that 
theory and practice are commonly defined with reference to the division of mental 
and physical realms means that they cannot survive Heidegger's examination 
unchanged. Indeed, it is clear that these terms are being used in a new sense when 
Heidegger takes 'practice' so broadly as to include 'doing nothing', and 'theory' as 
having its own form of practice. 207 Our interaction with the zuhanden and the 
vorhanden is guided by its own way of disclosing objects. In our everyday 
interaction we see objects only in terms of their relevance for our projects and 
dealings, but we are also capable of attending to beings themselves. Despite the 
difficult language of Being and Titne sometimes suggesting otherwise, this is not a 
question of the presence or absence of physical manipulations, rather it is a shifting 
of views. 
The accounts given by Dreyfus and Ihde arise from the fact that they do not see this 
feature of Heidegger's thought. Although there is not space here to discuss in detail 
Okrent' s reading of Heidegger as a pragmatist, it is possible to see that this 
interpretation is also flawed. Okrent' s claim that for Heidegger 'the primary type of 
understanding is practical and agent-oriented ('understanding how') rather than 
theoretical or mental ('understanding that')' clearly echoes the problems found in 
Dreyfus and Ihde. Okrent takes this misunderstanding further and argues that 
Heidegger is a verificationist in that he supposedly understands, following Quine that 
206 For language see Heidegger, BT, ppl50-151. For truth as aletheia see BT, ppl96-21 l. 
207 Heidegger, BT, p327. 
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'the meaning of a sentence turns purely on what would count as evidence for its 
truth' .208 
This is certainly a misreading of Heidegger's comments on the nature of the 
statement. The origin of this problem lies once again in misunderstanding the role of 
practice. Okrent states that Heidegger understands that 'propositional truth is 
dependent on practical truth'. 209 This is true if we take 'practical' in the sense of an 
ontological determination of the involvement of Da-sein with its world. However, 
the direction of the analysis of truth is entirely missed if it is seen as trying to show 
that the meaning of statements consists in the possible evidence of their truth. 
Heidegger's analysis rather aims at showing that the statement is only one mode of 
disclosure and is dependent upon the originally disclosive nature of Da-sein. To say 
that this amounted to support of verificationism would require that we ignore 
Heidegger's repeated claims that truth is in fact aletheia or unconcealment. The 
manner in which we go about confirming that a statement discloses something as it 
is, is different in each case and should not be confused with the nature of truth itself. 
Okrent' s optimistic attempt to render Heidegger's insights into plain language 
acceptable to all philosophers is undermined by the fact that Heidegger is trying to 
escape the characterisation of humanity that is implicit in such plain language. It is 
not possible to straightforwardly describe the structure of theory and practice in 
Being and Time because the usual understanding of these terms is undermined in this 
very work. It is certainly true that Heidegger's terminology is not always clear, but 
this should not be put down merely to a lack of care. It rather lies, at least partially, 
in the nature of his project. 
8. 
I tum now to the second part of this chapter and an examination of Heidegger's 
claims that human existence is essentially temporal and historical. This notion of 
historicity provides the foundation for his attempt to characterise the possible unity 
of human existence in a manner that is distinct from the unity characteristic of 
substantial objects. Heidegger deals with this possible unity or 'wholeness' of Da-
sein in his discussion of authentic ( eigentlich) existence. He concludes that the unity 
208 Okrent, Heidegger's Pragmatism, p102 quoting from W.V.O Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," 
in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969) 
p80. 
209 Okrent, Heidegger's Pragmatism, plOl. 
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of human existence does not consist in the static possession of the same 
characteristics through time, but in the mode in which it takes up its possibilities for 
acting. As I will demonstrate, this concept of human identity undermines the modem 
project of founding necessary and universal knowledge in the human subject. 
In the fifth chapter of the second division of Being and Time, Heidegger makes a 
distinction between the science of history and the nature of historical existence itself. 
He reserves the terms 'historiography' (Historie) for the science of history and 
'historicity' (Geschichtlichkeit) for the more fundamental structure of human 
existence. He criticizes those philosophers, including Rickert, who address history 
only in the sense of historiography in the following passage: 
Even if the scientific and theoretical kind of treatment of the problem of"history" 
does not just aim at an "epistemological" (Simmel) clarification of historiographical 
comprehension, or at the logic of the concept formation of historiographical 
presentation (Rickert), but is rather oriented towards the "objective side," history is 
accessible in this line of questioning only as the object of a science. The basic 
phenomenon of history, which is prior to the possibility of making something 
thematic by historiography and underlies it, is thus irrevocably set aside. How 
history can become a possible object for historiography can be gathered only from 
the kind of being of what is historical, from historicity and its rootedness in 
temporality .210 
As I discussed at the close of the preceding chapter, Heidegger argued that the 
tendency to raise the question of history, not simply as an object of scientific 
knowledge but as a feature ofhuman existence itself, was alive in Dilthey's thinking. 
210 Heidegger, BT, p344. In his study of Heidegger's concept of history, Michael Murray writes that 
'A source of confusion permeating most discussions of history comes from the academic 
conflation of history with historiography, a conflation which ranges from mere carelessness 
to an explicit philosophical program. This confusion, implicit or explicit, we shall call 
historicism.' See Michael Murray, Modern Philosophy of History, (Martinus Nijhoff, The 
. Hague, 1970), p24. However, the introduction of this term, often used as a translation of the 
German Historismus, is perhaps more confusing than clarifying. This is due to the many 
different senses in which it is employed. As Murray notes, Karl Popper famously, and 
idiosyncratically, employed the term to describe a science of historical prediction in The 
Poverty of Historicism, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1984). Aside from this 
somewhat unorthodox use, historicism is also more commonly used to describe various 
aspects of the recognition of a 'human world' consisting of the purposeful actions of 
humanity alongside the realm of nature. From this stems the sense of 'historicism' as a 
specific method of understanding past events, or as the claim that all knowledge is relative 
due to the fact that it is contingent upon its historical development. Calvin G. Rand provides 
an account of the relationship between these senses in the German tradition in 'Two 
Meanings of Historicism in the Writings of Dilthey, Troeltsch, and Meinecke', Journal of the 
History of Ideas, vol. 25 (1964), pp503-518. Given these confusions I will not follow 
Murray's lead here. 
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Yet, he claims that this tendency was only given 'unambiguous expression' in his 
Correspondence with Count Yorck. Heidegger writes: 
At bottom Yorck is demanding a logic preceding the sciences and guiding them as 
did Platonic and Aristotelian logic, and this demand includes the task of developing, 
positively and radically, the various categorial structures of the being that is nature 
and the being that is history (Da-sein). Yorck finds that Dilthey's investigations 
"too little emphasize the generic difference between the ontic and the historicaf'.211 
This is the project that Heidegger takes upon himself in his investigation of the 
temporality and historicity of human existence. The analyses of both the temporality 
(Zeitlichkeit) and historicity of human existence in Being and Time are far too 
complex to be fully addressed here.212 Thus, I will only focus upon his claim that: 
Historicity means the constitution of being of the "occurrence" of Da-sein as-such; it 
is the ground for the fact that something like the discipline of ''world-history" is at 
all possible and historically belongs to world history. In its facticalbeing Da-sein 
always is as and "what" it already was. Whether explicitly or not, it is its past. It is 
its own past not only in such a way that its past, as it were, pushes itself along 
"behind" it, and that it possesses what is past as a property that is still objectively 
present and at times has an effect on it. Da-sein "is" its past in the manner of its 
being which, roughly expressed, on each occasion "occurs" out of its future. In its 
manner of existing at any given time, and accordingly also with the understanding of 
being that belongs to it, Da-sein grows into a customary interpretation of itself and 
grows up in that interpretation. It understands itself in terms of this interpretation at 
first, and within a certain range constantly.213 
The point Heidegger is trying to make regarding the role of the past in human 
existence can be clarified by returning to the separation of the human and natural 
worlds. As I noted in the previous chapter, the human or historical world, as it was 
formulated from Vico onwards, consisted of the intentional and purposeful actions of 
human beings. This realm was defined in opposition to the natural realm, of which 
we know only appearances. Heidegger's account of historicity is essentially an 
account of how the past must be experienced by the existing human beings that 
create the human world through their actions. 
His answer to this question is that the past is only historical if it is appropriated in the 
present. Existing humans must act within a finite historical situation which is not of 
211 Heidegger, BT, p364. 
212 The concepts in question have been explored at length in various works. Of particular interest here 
is Han Ruin, Enigmatic Origins: Tracing the Theme of Historicity through Heidegger's 
Works, (Almqvist & Wiksell lntemational, Stockholm, 1994), and Michael Murray, Modern 
Philosophy of History. 
213 Heidegger, BT, pp17-18. 
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its own making. The possibility of acting freely in this given situation rests upon our 
ability to project possibilities into the future and to see the past as not merely a bald 
fact, but as meaningful in light of these possibilities. Calvin Schrag summarises this 
well in his article on the concept of repetition (Wiederholung): 
... repetition is a matter of reclamation rather than recurrence, and what is reclaimed 
are possibilities rather than factual historical incidents. "Repetition is the handing 
over and appropriation (Oberlieferung)-that is to say, a going back to the 
possibilities of the Dase in that has-been-there." Repetition is the handing-over and 
appropriation of possibilities. It is an appropriation through which the past is 
reclaimed as possibility. Repetition thus occasions a reopening of the past by 
translating that which has been into possibilities to be chosen time and 
again ... Repetition hands over the past as a past with a meaning or sense. Without 
repetition the past would simply be a collection of isolated facts and would remain 
without meaning or sense.214 
This final sentence is crucial for it summarises Heidegger's objections against those 
philosophers that were concerned with history only as an epistemological problem. 
Both Dilthey and the Southwest neo-Kantians sought to secure the objectivity of 
historical knowledge, the first through an appeal to a priori and absolutely valid 
values, and the second to a method of hermeneutic understanding. To be sure, 
Dilthey sacrificed the claim to the absolute validity of historical knowledge, yet was 
still greatly concerned to establish that this knowledge need not collapse into 
relativism. By taking seriously the claim that history examines the past actions of 
humans and examining what this implies about human existence itself, Heidegger 
undermines any claims to objective historical knowledge. As Bambach puts it, 
' ... for Heidegger, we are never in a position to judge objectively about the meaning 
of the past because our relations to ourselves and other beings are always mediated 
by our existential cares and concerns.'215 I will take up the implications of this 
position for Heidegger's own reading of the history of being, which is extremely 
controversial , at the end of chapter six. 
9. 
I come finally to Heidegger's alternative account of human selfhood. The topic of 
authenticity is dealt with in greatest detail in the second half of Being and Time. 
214 Calvin 0. Schrag, 'Heidegger on Repetition and Historical Understanding', Philosophy East and 
West, vol. 20 (1970), p289. The quotation in this passage is Schrag's translation from p385 
of Sein und Zeit. This is p352 in the Stambaugh translation and reads there 'Retrieve is 
explicit handing down, that is, going back to the possibilities of the Da-sein that has been 
there.' 
215 Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism, p246. 
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Brief discussions can also be found in the lecture courses History of the Concept of 
Time (1925) and Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927). The lecture entitled The 
Concept of Time (1924) also contains a lengthy discussion of this issue. The point of 
departure of these discussions is the issue of death. Heidegger argues, in concert 
with his discussion of everydayness and the they-self (Man-selbst), that in our 
everyday understanding we approach death in a manner that covers over its true 
nature. 'Everyday being-toward-death', as he puts it, involves an avoidance of the 
true significance of death. Death is understood as a certainty but. only in the sense 
that 'one also dies sometime'. In fact, 'Everydayness gets stuck in this ambiguous 
acknowledgement of the "certainty" of death ... ' .216 The point here is that although 
we often deal with death in our everyday lives, we do not look directly at the nature 
of death. So long as we persist in this attitude, the individuating aspect of death is 
missed. 
If death is truly confronted, then there are several points that become clear. Firstly 
death is certain in that it must occur eventually, but also indefinite in that it could 
occur at any time. Secondly, death is utterly individualising in that it cannot be taken 
on by another. Although I mostly live in a common understanding of death in which 
it appears as something that happens to everyone, it is truly only my death that awaits 
me, never death in general. Although we Witness the death of others, the 
fundamental significance of death is the possibility, for each person, of no longer 
existing. Death, seen in this way, forces a recognition of the finitude and 'mineness' 
or 'ownness' of our existence. 
These reflections upon death lead Heidegger to the formulation of authentic 
existence asDa-sein grasping the possibility of being itself. Death as the mark of the 
finitude .and individuality of Da-sein provides the basis upon which authentic 
anticipation is possible. That is, it becomes possible upon the basis of this correct 
conception of death to grasp in advance Da-sein as a possible whole. As a being that 
is still becoming, Da-sein can never be a completed whole, for this completion 
amounts to the end of human existence. 
For Heidegger, the issues of wholeness, death, and authenticity are all closely 
related. The wholeness of each Da-sein can never become actual for that Da-sein. 
However, it is possible to anticipate, that is prepare in advance, for this wholeness. 
216 Heidegger, BT, p236. 
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This can only be done in an authentic manner if what is anticipated is correctly 
understood. Death is in each case the death of a particular person and as such is the 
guarantee of the individuality of the existence to which it brings an end. Existing 
authentically amounts to bringing Da-sein from lostness in the they-self, back to the 
self through anticipation of death as my own death. It is possible, upon this 
recognition of selfhood, to make the self the basis of our projects and resolutions. 
As Richard Schacht has pointed out, Heidegger's formulation of authenticity 
involves an alienation, or entfremdung, of the self from itself.217 Given this 
characterisation of everydayness in terms of lostness and distraction, it would be easy 
to see Heidegger as taking authentic existence as the essence of Da-sein from which 
it falls away. Although these terms seem to express a marked preference for 
authenticity over inauthenticity, we must keep in mind that Heidegger also explicitly 
rejects the idea that these ontological categories carry any moral or normative 
weight. Authenticity and inauthenticity are simply two possible modes in which Da-
se in can exist. 
10. 
Authenticity becomes central to the issue of practice in Being and Time because it is 
through practice, understood ontologically, that Da-sein can take up the possibility of 
living authentically. Heidegger persistently characterises the possibility of authentic 
life as something that must be grasped or wrested from the tendency of Da-sein 
towards everydayness· and inauthenticity. The self-grounded and self..;directed nature 
of authentic life is something that must be won. We are not simply a self, in 
Heidegger's sense, without working to making it so. The projection of possibilities 
and the making of choices in the awareness of the ownership and finitude of one's 
existence, is the medium of authenticity. By this I mean that, in Heidegger's early 
works, authenticity relies upon our choosing and carrying out, even though his 
ontological approach prevents the recommendation of particular courses of action. 
The later Heidegger becomes increasingly uncomfortable with this formulation. By 
the time of writing the Letter on Humanism (1947) he has begun describing man as 
the 'shepherd of Being' in a clear attempt to break away from the earlier 
formulations in which human existence wins its authenticity through an ordering and 
calculation of itself and beings. At the very beginning of this Letter on Humanism 
217 Richard Schacht, Alienation, (Allen and Unwin, London, 1971), pp200-206. 
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Heidegger states that 'We are still far from pondering the essence of action 
decisively enough. ' 218 This appears to refer as much to other philosophers as to his 
own formulation of existence in Being and Time. For throughout this letter, 
Heidegger is concerned that we overcome the conception of thinking as merely a 
process of calculating. His intent seems to be to again reopen the problem of our 
worldliness and to assert the difference between calculation, seen as an order of 
means and ends, and the more primordial thinking, understood as letting being come 
to presence. 
The issue of precisely what prompted this reversal of metaphors cannot be fully dealt 
with here. However, it is perhaps the sort of erroneous readings of Being and Time 
that I have outlined, that drove Heidegger to this reversal of metaphors. Although it 
seems that a: careful reading of Being and Time shows that it does not describe man. 
as essentially practical, in the usual sense of the term, it has been and still is read in 
that way. As there seems to be no radical alteration in the description of human 
transcendence in Heidegger's later work, it is possible that he was attempting to rid 
his thinking of these misleading connotations by changing the emphasis of his 
discussion in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of restricting thought and being to 
one determination. 
11. 
In this discussion of Being and Time I have only touched the surface of Heidegger's 
analysis of human existence. The issues I have discussed, namely the distinction of 
theory and practice, his account of science, the concept of historicity, and the 
possibility of authentic existence, each have a vast field of scholarship devoted to 
them which I cannot possibly address here. However, my aim was not to provide a 
full account of the structure and plausibility of Heidegger's arguments. Rather, I 
have tried to establish a quite specific point, that Heidegger's early critique of the 
philosophical concept of human subjectivity addresses the tension between the finite 
and historical nature of human existence and the concept of scientific knowledge as 
universal and necessary. He came down decisively against the notion that humanity 
can attain the divine outlook upon being implied by the ideals of theoretical 
knowledge. This is because human existence is essentially involved in the world and 
essentially self-interested. Thus, the foundation of human knowledge is not an 
218 Martin Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in Basic Writings, ed. D. F. 
Krell (Harper Collins, San Francisco, 1993), p217. 
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absolutely detached 'I' which observes the world from without, but a self which only 
is through its involvement with the world, and a world which is revealed only in this 
concerned engagement. For Heidegger, the unity ofhuman existence stems from an 
active unification of past, present, and future, rather than from an underlying 
substance which remains the same throughout the continuous transformation of our 
accidental characteristics. 
Thus, the central innovation ofBeing and Time, is not to be found in its myriad 
neologisms and ontological categories, but in the standpoint from which Heidegger 
writes. He explicitly attempts to unite the subjective and objective elements of 
historical knowledge that had previously been held apart in both philosophical and 
historical research. By this I mean that historiographic research had conceived of the 
historical realm as the realm of human action and had increasingly shown the 
historical relativity of this action. Yet these determinations had not been taken 
personally by philosophers and historians themselves. Although Dilthey and Yorck 
came close, Heidegger contends that the modem philosophical tradition did not 
confront the consequences of these determinations for its own claims to objective, 
necessary, and universal knowledge. In his discussion of the historicity of human 
existence Heidegger attempted to do just this. From within this new, historical, 
standpoint Heidegger develops an account of the difference between ancient and 
modem science and it is to that matter that I turn in the next chapter. 
Chapter4 
The Difference Between Ancient and 
Modern Science 
Now that I have provided an interpretation of Being and Time and the philosophical 
context from which it developed, I will carry out in the next three chapters a closer 
examination of Heidegger's account of the essence of modern technology. This 
account rests upon the claim that the being of beings is conceived of in a distinctly 
new way in the modern era. Heidegger argues that what counts as a being in the 
modern age is what can be securely represented by the human subject. However, I 
will defer a direct discussion of this argument until chapters five and six. For the 
moment I intend to continue my discussion of the foundations of scientific 
knowledge by addressing Heidegger's characterisation of the difference between 
ancient and modern science. Due to Heidegger's claim that physics and metaphysics 
are dependent on one another, this discussion of the nature of science will provide an 
introduction to his more direct discussions of the essence of modern technology. 
The extent to which Heidegger's thinking was occupied by the nature and 
significance of science is often not fully recognised by interpreters of his work. It is 
certainly true that he did not delve into analyses of complex and technical 
experiments, nor concern himself greatly with models of inductive and deductive 
logic. Yet, as I have tried to demonstrate in the preceding three chapters, 
consideration of the concept of science and its relationship to human existence and 
philosophy played a central role in the formulation of Being and Time. Furthermore, 
as I outlined in the introduction, his account of the distinctive nature of modern 
science plays a central role in his critique of the essence of modern technology. 
Thus, although Heidegger does not fit our modern picture of a 'philosopher of 
science', Trish Glazebrook is right to claim that: 
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... what are taken to be Heidegger's many and significant contributions to 
philosophy-that is, his overcoming of metaphysics, his rereading of the ancients, 
his critique of technology and representational thinking, his vision and revision of 
language, truth and thinking-have at their core an inquiry into science that drove 
his thinking for sixty years.219 
The various approaches Heidegger takes towards science are unified by his claim 
that science relies upon an initial 'projection' of its domain of objects. This analysis 
of science is, as I will demonstrate shortly, an extension of Heidegger's general 
reflections on the nature of understanding in Being and Time. This is not to say that 
Heidegger's attitude towards science and metaphysics did not change over the course 
of his career. Indeed, there is a clear contrast between his early characterisation of 
his own endeavours as both scientific and metaphysical, and his later writings in 
which he characterises metaphysics as a mode of thinking which 'forgets' or 'covers' 
the question of being. Thus, there are two senses in which Heidegger employs the 
term 'metaphysics'. The first, and earlier sense, is simply as a name for 
philosophical thinking regarding being itself, rather than scientific inquiries into 
particular regions of being. The second, and later sense, is as a particular mode of 
thinking about being, or more precisely, an assumed doctrine about the nature of 
being. Whilst his analysis of the nature and significance of science changes along 
with the hardening of his critique of metaphysics, he remains committed to this 
fundamental schema of projection. 
Heidegger's discussions of the nature and significance of science are scattered 
throughout his work, from his very early neo-Kantian considerations of the concept 
of time in the study of history, through Being and Time, and throughout his later 
219 Trish Glazebrook, Heidegger's Philosophy of Science, (Fordham University Press, New York, 
2000), p 13. Both in this book and in several other articles Glazebrook has detailed how the 
theme of science runs through Heidegger's career and the various phases of this critique. See 
Glazebrook, 'Heidegger and Scientific Realism', Continental Philosophy Review, vol. 34 
(2001 ), pp361-401; 'The role of the Beitrage in Heidegger's critique of science', Philosophy 
Today, vol. 45 (2001), pp24-32; 'Heidegger on the experiment', Philosophy Today, vol. 42 
(1998), pp250-261. Glazebrook argues against the view put forward by William J. 
Richardson that 'On the longest day he lived, Heidegger could never be called a philosopher 
of science.' Richardson thinks that Heidegger's ontological approach is of no use to 
scientists because of the 'poverty of Heidegger's analyses of ontic truth as such.' 
Furthermore, he writes that 'A conception of ontic truth that would be of genuine service to 
this type of science [contemporary physical science] would have to go much further than 
Heidegger has gone in explaining the minutiae of the research technique.' For these quotes 
see p511 and p535 of William J. Richardson, 'Heidegger's Critique of Science', New 
Scholasticism, vol. 42 (1968), pp51 l-536. Whilst Richardson provides an otherwise quite 
useful account of the connection between Heidegger's account of science and the essence of 
technology, he assumes a very narrow definition of 'philosophy of science'. 
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efforts to understand the relationship between philosophy, science and technology. It 
is thereby possible to draw upon almost any period of Heidegger's work in. order to 
illuminate the nature of his interest in science. However, I will largely restrict my 
discussion to the 1935-36 lecture published under the name Die Frage Nach dem 
Ding, and translated as What is a Thing?220 In this lecture. Heidegger provides a 
detailed account of the difference .between ancient and modem science and the 
importance of metaphysics in this change. I will therefore focus closely upon this 
lecture in this discussion and draw upon other writings where necessary. 
1. 
At the beginning of Die Frage Nach dem Ding Heidegger establishes the difference 
between philosophical questioning and scientific questioning. He states that science 
always gains its starting points from 'a direct transition and entrance to them starting 
out from everyday representations, beliefs, and thinking.' We should not take this to 
mean that the basic concepts of scientific thought are immediately apparent to us in 
our everyday lives, for clearly it takes some education and training to come to see 
matters as a scientist does. Rather, the issue is that science is able to assume its 
starting point and proceed with its investigations from these assumptions. Once the 
fundamental concepts of a scien~e have been de:fined, then 'the plane of questioning 
will not be abandoned again when the questions become more difficult and 
complex. ' 221 
Science, in contrast to philosophy, is able to continue its investigations without 
returning to these basic assumptions that define the domain of the science in 
question. Heidegger constantly reiterated the idea that each science, in~ofar as it is 
involves the disclosure of a particular region of being, is founded when the nature of 
this region of being is established and the manner of investigation is also settled. 
The nature of the region of being determines the limits of how it can be investigated. 
We can turn to Being and Time for an example of this idea. Heidegger states there 
that: 
The scientific project of the beings somehow always already encountered lets their 
kind of being be explicitly understood in such a way that the possible ways of purely 
discovering innerworldly beings thus become evident. The articulation of the 
220 Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing?, trans. W.B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch, (Henry Regnery 
Company: Chicago: 1967). The section of this lecture that is of particular interest here has 
also been reprinted under the title 'Modem Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics' in 
Heidegger, Basic Writings, pp267-306. 
221 Heidegger, What is a Thing?, ppl-2. 
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understanding of being, the definition of the subject-matter defined by that 
understanding, and the prefiguration of the concepts suitable to these beings, all 
belong to the totality of this projecting that we call thematization. 222 
The founding of a science is understood here as a process of explicitly defining a 
region of beings and the appropriate methods and concepts for investigating this 
region. Heidegger's interest in science is in fact centered upon this idea that it 
constitutes a distinctive manner of revealing, and relating to, being. 
2. 
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Heidegger's attention in Die Frage nach dem Ding is focused upon Kant's account 
of the nature of a thing and with the role that his critical philosophy plays in this 
understanding. Within this broader problem Heidegger addresses the issue of how 
we should understand the difference between ancient and modem science.223 His 
strategy in this discussion is to focus on the fundamental assumptions upon which 
each mode of science is founded. He employs a familiar etymological strategy to 
bring these founding assumptions to the fore. An exposition of the meaning of 
mathematics and the mathematical for the ancient Greeks serves to set up the 
problem of how science springs from these founding conceptions of nature. I will 
follow Heidegger's etymology here in order to demonstrate the scope of his 
investigation. 
Initially Heidegger recounts some of the common explanations of the difference 
between ancient and modem science. It is said that 'modern science starts from the 
facts while the medieval started from general speculative propositions and 
concepts. '224 However, this seems inadequate as it is undeniable that facts and 
observation played no less a role in ancient and medieval science than concepts do in 
modem science. As will be seen later, both ancient and modem science employed 
facts and concepts. The more fundamental issue is the manner in which they were 
employed. The statement above takes no account of the subtlety of the division 
between these two modes of science. 
Heidegger makes the same point regarding the notions that modem science is 
distinctive due to its use of the experiment, and that its use of measurement and 
calculation is unique. In both cases it is possible to point out that ancient and 
222 Heidegger, BT, p332. 
223 Heidegger, What is a Thing?, pp66-107. 
224 Heidegger, What is a Thing?, p66. 
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medieval sciences employed observation and reckoning of nature. It is merely that 
they did not do so with the same intent as modem scientists. Heidegger is certainly 
correct in seeking a more subtle account that takes in the metaphysical framework 
within which science is pursued. In all three cases, it is not possible to distinguish 
ancient and modem science solely on the basis of the presence or absence of these 
features. Rather we must look at the ends which motivate these practices, and 
thereby the different emphases they receive. 
Such crude accounts are obviously inadequate, however, they do capture a feature 
common to more sophisticated examinations of the history of science. This feature is 
the assumption that ancient and modem science form a unified tradition in which the 
modem variation has been vastly more successful than the ancient. The greater 
success of modem science is a product of its greater emphasis upon 'facts'. The 
modem experimental method is seen as an expression of this greater attention to 
'facts'. 
Yet, Heidegger contends, on closer inspection it appears that such an account is 
unsatisfactory for the reason that it ignores the fact that ancient science was no less 
oriented towards the facts than modem science, and that modem science is no less 
involved with the use of concepts. Such a superficial account is attractive because it 
allows us to maintain the notion of a unified history of science in which ancient 
inquiry is represented as the fumbling and naive beginnings of modem science. In 
fact the matter appears to be much more complicated than this. For although it is 
possible to examine the history of science and identify 'early' traces of modem 
scientific practice, such enterprises tend towards anachronism and must overlook the 
possibility that the aims of science have fundamentally changed. The methods of 
science are not a sure guide to the difference or unity of science due to the fact that 
we must know to what ends these methods are employed. 
Heidegger's aim in this discussion is to demonstrate that a fundamental 
understanding of nature provides the unifying principle for experimentation, 
measurement, observation of facts and use of concepts. The issue of how this 
understanding is related to experience and philosophy will become important later. 
At this stage it is sufficient to establish its existence and its forms in ancient and 
modem experience. 
The issue of mathematics now becomes interesting as Heidegger proposes that the 
fundamental feature of modem science, understood as what 'rules and determines the 
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basic movement of science itself, is its mathematical character. But this is not to be 
understood in the sense that modem science employs the science of mathematics in 
its experiments and measurements. In reflecting upon what the mathematical is, 
Heidegger turns to the ancient Greek origins of the word and announces that 
'Mathesis means learning: mathemata, what is learnable. ' 225 The learning in 
question is of a very particular type. It is the learning of what a thing is, a learning 
that must occur in advance of the encounter with the thing if we are to see it as the 
thing it is. Heidegger uses the example of our encounter with a rifle. Whilst it is 
possible to learn many things about the correct operation of a rifle, we must first 
come to know what a rifle is. Thus the most original learning is taking cognizance of 
things 'as what we already know them to be in advance, the body as the bodily, the 
plant-like of the plant, the animal-like of the animal, the thingness of the thing' .226 
The mathemata are thereby things considered in the light of what we already know 
them to be, and numbers are only a special, although very prominent, case of this. 
For example, we gain no knowledge of 'three' from various collections of three 
things, rather we must know what three is in advance in order to identify such groups 
of three. 
It is now possible to see the direction of Heidegger's inquiry into the mathematical 
nature of modem science. It is certainly true that modem science employs 
mathematics, understood as the science of quantities and figures, much more 
comprehensively than was the case in ancient and medieval science. However, 
Heidegger is now asking about the mathematical character of modem science in the 
sense of this term that was developed by his etymological excursion. Thus, he poses 
the problem of understanding what modem science knows about things in advance, 
such that the science of mathematics is able to play such a prominent role in its 
investigations. 
3. 
Heidegger repeatedly employs the term 'project' (Entwurj) in his discussions of 
science. His use of this term is best understood in the light of his comments on 
understanding (verstehen) in Being and Time. Heidegger argues in Being and Time, 
as well as in several other works from that period, that understanding is essentially 
grounded in its 'fore-structure'. This 'fore-structure' is also referred to as the 
225 Heidegger, Whatis a Thing?, p71. 
226 Heidegger, What is a Thing?, p73. 
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'project of understanding'. Initially we must note that Heidegger uses the term 
'understanding' in a technical manner. Whilst we would ordinarily reserve the term 
to describe someone that has grasped a particular problem or knows how to do 
something, Heidegger employs it in a peculiar way. Understanding is used in Being 
and Time to denote the way in which we disclose the world. As will be clear from 
the discussion in the previous chapter, the term 'world' here refers not to a physical 
expanse but to a totality of significant references. Thus, it is never the case that we 
encounter something objectively present which we later come to interpret as this or 
that. Our world is always already invested with relevance and value. It is our stance 
towards these always already relevantobjectsthatis characterized as understanding. 
We can see that Heidegger uses 'understanding' to denote our disclosing stance 
towards the world rather than any mental faculty or the result of any inquiry. It is for 
this reason that 'interpretation', taken as the 'development of possibilities projected 
in understanding,' is 'existentially based in understanding, and not the other way 
around.'227 'Interpretation' is the name Heidegger gives to the 'as' structure of. 
understanding. In so far as we always see the objects.of our world as relevant, we 
always see something as something. Thus, our world is always interpreted and this 
interpretation is the condition of its possibility.228 
We see thereby that the role given.to understanding necessarily involves.a 
preempting or anticipation of the objects which it founds. If our disclosing of 
objects is an understanding disclosing then there can be no 'original' or 
uninterpreted object which can form the basis ofsubsequent investigations. The 
appearance of the object occurs only within a context and gains its character from 
this context. It is this anticipatory character of the understanding that Heidegger 
describes as its 'fore-structure'. This points us to the three structural moments of 
interpretation. Heidegger names these three moments the Vorhabe, Vorsicht, and 
Vorgriff These terms have been rendered respectively as fore-having, fore-sight, 
and fore-conception, by Macquarrie and Robinson and by Joan Stambaugh in her 
more recent translation.229 Theodore Kisiel, in his translation of the lecture course 
History of The Concept of Time, renders these same terms in more standard English 
227 Heidegger, BT, p139. 
228 Heidegger is not alone in emphasising the relationship between experience and interpretation. On 
this point see Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussion of 'seeing as' in his Philosophical 
Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2nd edition 
1958). 
229 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Maquarrie and E. Robinson, (Harper& Row, 
NewYork, 1962), p190. Heidegger, BT, trans. Joan Stambaugh, pp140-141. 
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as prepossession, pre-view, and preconception.230 Heidegger takes these three 
moments as constitutive for interpretation and thereby understanding. I will attempt 
to characterize them in turn. 
Heidegger states that 'Things at hand are always already understood in terms of a 
totality of relevance.' These things at hand are not always the explicit theme of an 
interpretation, however, as we saw above, they are nevertheless always interpreted in 
the sense that they always appear in a certain relevance. Heidegger argues that even 
ifthe thing at hand 'has undergone such an interpretation, it recedes again into an 
undifferentiated understanding. This is the very mode in which it is the essential 
foundation of everyday, circumspect interpretation. ' 231 We can understand fore-
having as referring to the manner in which objects are always already present in our 
'undifferentiated understanding'. We must already have the objects in a certain 
manner if we are to interpret them further. They must already be present in a world 
constituted by significance if their nature is to be brought out more precisely. 
Heidegger states in the History of the Concept of Time that 'That about which the 
discourse is from the start is always already discovered in some sense, anticipated as 
this or that for a primary understanding. ' 232 Before interpretation, understood as 'the 
way of enacting the understanding', takes a further step, it must already have as its 
basis an understanding of that which it is about. 
Heidegger goes on to argue that the 'interpretation is grounded in a foresight 
(Vorsicht) that "approaches" what has been taken in fore-having with a definite 
interpretation in view. ' 233 This seems to point to the fact that the interpretation must 
be guided by a prior sighting of the object. As we saw above, interpretation always 
finds its basis in an understanding of what it is about. If this is to be the case, then 
this basis is always already seen as something. Thus, we find that the interpretive 
structure, taking something as something, is to be found prior to each interpretation 
as its basis. Heidegger describes this foresight or pre-view as 'That toward which 
what is placed in prepossession is thus sighted, that toward which it is regarded, with 
respect to which it comes into sight' .234 The thing at hand taken up in prepossession 
230 Heidegger, HCT. 
231 Heidegger, BT, p140. 
232 Heidegger, HCT, p299. 
233 Heidegger, BT, pl41. 
234 Heidegger, HCT, p299. 
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or fore-having is not simply a thing. It is already interpretedand taken in a certain 
view in so far as it forms part of the structure of references of the ready-to-hand. 
Finally, I come to the notion of a fore-conception or preconception (Vorgriff). 
Heidegger directs us here to the conceptual scheme that we bring to the interpretation 
based upon our fore-having and fore-sight. He argues that we take the object that is 
to be interpreted up into a conceptual framework which can either be drawn from 
that object or be forced upon it. As the pre-view and the prepossession 'indicate in 
advance which of the possible correlations of meaning (should and can) be brought 
out in the thematic field', the 'conceptuality which corresponds to this particular 
interpretation and this particular theme isthus prefigured.'235 The important point 
that Heidegger is trying to make is that even our most inexplicit and undeveloped 
understandings are characterized by this fore-structure. In our everyday handling 
and using, things at hand are always already understood in terms of their relevance 
and usefulness. Thus, we always already have objects in our inexplicit everyday 
understanding. We can furtherinterpret these objects and this is undertaken in 
accordance with a pre-view of the object. Finally, we can produce an interpretation 
of the object, the conceptuality of which is determined in advance and can be either 
appropriate or inappropriate. 
The use of 'project' in various phrases, such as the 'mathematical project' or the 
'project of thingness', can be interpreted in light of this analysis of the fore-structure 
of understanding. In both his early analysis of understanding in Being and Time and 
the later problem of the mathematical project that underpins nature, Heidegger is 
attempting to emphasise the fact that we must go beyond experience if it is to appear 
in a meaningful light for us. The details of the existential analysis of understanding 
can be translated to the broader problem of how nature appears in a certain light for 
scientific investigation. By investigating the mathematical project, Heidegger is 
investigating that groundplan (grundriss), or domain (spielraum), within which our 
experience of nature takes place. 
4. 
Heidegger illustrates this modem mathematical understanding of things by 
demonstrating the contrast between the Aristotelian account of nature and that of 
modern science. This approach is particularly effective as it allows us to consider the 
235 Heidegger, HCT, pp299-300. 
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recent emergence of what appears to us now to be unquestionably the case. As 
Alexandre Koyre has put the matter: 
135 
We are so well acquainted with, or rather so well accustomed to, the concepts and 
principles which form the basis of modem science, that it is nearly impossible for us 
to appreciate rightly either the obstacles that had to be overcome for their 
establishment, or the difficulties they imply and encompass. '236 
The radical nature of modem mathematical science becomes clear to us through an 
historical examination of how fundamentally it departs from the assumptions of 
Aristotelian natural science. Such a study is not without its difficulties. In particular 
it is vital that the writings of the ancient Greeks and the medieval philosophers be 
interpreted in terms of their own concepts. The anachronistic imposition of concepts 
from modem quantitative physics upon Aristotle's essentially qualitative physics not 
only makes his work seem utterly misguided, but also makes it impossible to 
correctly understand the provenance of our own scientific assumptions.237 
I mention this problem of anachronism before I approach the matter of how ancient 
and modem science differ, in order to establish that this is not a question of 
evaluating the correctness of either approach. Neither myself, nor Heidegger in his 
essay, approach this issue with the idea of establishing which science is superior, or 
whether approximations and glimpses of modem science can be found in Aristotle's 
writings. The issue of the internal coherence of a science with regard to its founding 
conception of nature is not something that will be dealt with here. This is not to 
suggest that Aristotle had developed a completely satisfactory and coherent physics. 
There were certainly difficulties and points of tension in his system. A prime 
example of which is Aristotle's explanation of thrown objects.238 . Furthermore, there 
236 Alexandre Koyre, 'Galileo and the Scientific Revolution of the Seventeenth Century', in 
Metaphysics and Measurement, (Chapman & Hall, London, 1968), p3. 
237 For an attempt at reading Aristotle's Physics in his own terms see Helen S. Lang, The Order of 
Nature in Aristotle's Physics, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998). In particular 
see her discussion of the problem of Aristotle's explanation of the manner in which objects 
move through mediums of different density. 
238 This was a particular problem for Aristotle for he had asserted that everything that is moved must 
be moved by a mover. The difficulty here is that there are many examples in which a body 
continues to move long after it was in contact with its original motor. Aristotle's answer that 
the medium through which the body moves pushes that body along is obviously 
unsatisfactory as the medium must then be both a motor and provide resistance to that same 
movement. Furthermore we must ask what is it that moves the medium. This difficulty with 
Aristotle's account led to the development of impetus physics. See Alexandre Koyre, 
'Galileo and Plato', in Metaphysics and Measurement. Also see Aristotle, Physics, trans. 
Hippocrates G. Apostle, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London, 1969), books 
Hand0. 
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is no doubt that such difficulties can lead to the questioning of the adequacy of a 
founding projection of nature. 
The existence of such problems does not, however, render the entire physics absurd. 
Koyre expresses much the same sentiment. He states that: 
Aristotelian physics is false, of course; and utterly obsolete. Nevertheless, it is a 
"physics'', that is, a highly though non-mathematically elaborated science. It is not a 
childish phantasy, nor a brute and verbal restatement of common sense, but a theory, 
that is, a doctrine which, starting of course with the data of common sense, subjects 
them to an extremely coherent and systematic treatment.239 
It is senseless to criticise the scientific concepts of one age because they do not 
embody the concepts of another age. That ancient and modem science have utterly 
different aims will become clear in the course of this discussion. The notion that 
recent science represents an improvement of ancient efforts is seriously misleading. 
Although both ages seek knowledge of nature, the structure of nature and thereby the 
appropriate methods of investigation, as well as what counts as a scientific 
explanation, are understood differently in both. Indeed, the term 'nature' is at the 
very centre of.this debate. Ifwe take note of the fact that our understanding of 
'nature' is distinctively modem, then the incommensurability of ancient and modem 
science becomes clear. Modem natural science is not an improvement upon Greek 
natural science because the modem understanding of nature is utterly foreign to that 
which underpins the investigations of the ancients. That Aristotle was simply wrong 
in some matters does not preclude us from seriously examining the assumptions that 
underpinned his scientific writings. 
5. 
In attempting to demonstrate the contrast between ancient and modem science, 
Heidegger chooses several aspects of Aristotle's physics and contrasts them with 
Newton's work. In particular he focuses upon the doctrines of motion that stand at 
the foundations of these two physics. I shall follow his account and supplement it 
where it appears to skip over other relevant points. In following Heidegger's account 
I will adopt his use of the terms 'ancient' and 'modem' science. No claim to 
completeness should be understood by the use of these terms. Aristotle's natural 
science is not the sole 'ancient' science and this discussion of the birth of modem 
science must of necessity avoid many of the developments that made the break with 
239 Koyre, 'Galileo and Plato', pp22-23. 
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a predominantly Aristotelian medieval worldview possible. This analysis should be 
taken merely as an examination of the metaphysical doctrines that founded two 
extensive traditions of Western thought. It can obviously make no claim to historical 
completeness given the wealth of intellectual developments that can be included 
under two such broad headings. 
Beginning with Aristotle, we see that he conceives of motion, or metabole, in a very 
broad sense, such that it includes all alterations of a thing. Indeed, he divides motion 
into the alteration of substance, quantity, quality, and place. 240 Heidegger addresses 
only the issue of change in place as this is the object of most of Aristotle's 
discussions in the Physics. It also corresponds most closely with the focus of 
Newtonian physics. For modem readers, the most striking aspect of the local motion 
of bodies in Aristotelian physics is the relationship between the place of a body and 
its nature. The motion of a body is determined both by its place and its nature. 
Different elements, by virtue of their different natures, will behave differently in 
accordance with their place. Aristotle employs four elements in his physics, earth, 
water, air, and fire. (A fifth element, aether, is discussed in his account of the 
heavens in De Caelo, however this will not be dealt with here.) Heidegger states 
that, according to Aristotle: 'The purely earthly body moves downward, the purely 
fiery body-as every blazing flame demonstrates-moves upward. Why? Because 
the earthly has its place below, the fiery, above. Each body has its place according 
to its kind, and it strives toward that place.'241 For Aristotle, the nature of an element 
dictated its natural movement and its natural place. 
Two related ideas are implicit in this account of the nature of the _elements. Firstly, 
the idea of natural motion leads us to the idea of unnatural or violent motion. If we 
take the example of earth naturally moving downwards, it is clear that this does not 
always occur as earth may be suspended in the air or even thrown upwards. Thus, it 
is certainly possible for motions that are against nature to occur. We must 
understand however, that Aristotle's aim in his discussion of physics is to study 
things as they exist according to nature. Thus it is only natural things such as plants, 
animals, and the elements, that are under consideration. These things are natural 
because they contain a source of motion within themselves. In the case of things that 
are produced by art and not nature, the source of motion must come from outside the 
240 Aristotle, Physics, r, 1, 200b30-35. 
241 Heidegger, What is a Thing?, p83. 
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artefact. The craftsman imposes form onto matter. In natural things, the matter 
yearns after its proper form and moves towards this if it is not hindered.242 As Lang 
argues, 
No imposition of form is ever required for natural generation and growth because 
natural things possess an intrinsic principle of being moved and being at rest. This 
principle is matter aimed at and presupposing form, i.e., nature in the primary sense: 
in natural things, form and matter go together "by nature."243 
Lang's mention of rest as well as motion refers to Aristotle's notion that the 
fulfilment of an object's nature results in it coming to rest. Thus, with regard to the 
elements, once they have moved to their proper place they rest there unless disturbed 
by violent motion. The natural local motion of the elements is a product of the 
striving of matter to attain its appropriate form. 
6. 
A further point, mentioned by Heidegger, is that Aristotle understands the spaces in 
which bodies move to be both limited and heterogeneous. This must be so if the 
movements of the elements are to be understood. If the elements are always to move 
to their place, these places and the directions of movement must be absolute. The 
directions, up, down, left, right, forward, and backward, are absolute for Aristotle. 
The earth forms the centre, the point at which the element earth collects. Thus, down 
is always towards this centre, and up is away from it. Each element moves according 
to this absolute orientation of space, the heavy down and the light up, and so on. It is 
because of this that places are not interchangeable in Aristotelian physics. The 
behaviour of an element depends upon the relationship between the nature of the 
element and its position in this absolute framework. An object rests in its natural 
place and moves towards this place if it is somewhere else. . This explanation of 
motion in terms of place and nature, leads Aristotle to define place as the 'primary 
motionless boundary of that which contains' .244 This odd definition is reached 
because he must be able to account for the absolute places that his understanding of 
motion demands. Thus, the cosmos was seen by Aristotle as a finite sphere. Its 
motionless boundary provided the absolute orientation of place against which all 
motion could be measured. 
242 see Aristotle, Physics, books A, B, r. 
243 Lang, The Order of Nature in Aristotle's Physics, p54. 
244 Aristotle, Physics, A, I, 4, 212a20-21. 
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Aristotle's account of such fundamental concepts as motion, place, and nature is 
entirely different from that outlined in Newtonian physics. For Aristotle, place, 
motion and the elements are addressed in terms of qualities and essences .. The 
movement of a body is never simply a matter of distance covered, it is more 
importantly a matter of alteration in the quality ofthe body. The natural.movement 
of a body is a change in its essence from potential to actual. 
Before I go on to the second part ofthis contrast by examining Newton's basic 
position, I will discuss the implications Aristotle's conception of nature has on the 
procedure of scientific inquiry. This is an issue that Heidegger does not himself 
address in the lecture that I have been following, however, it is important in that it 
further clarifies the nature of ancient science. 
7. 
The character of explanation in Aristotelian and scholastic science is determined by 
the conception of natural things as a combination of matter and form. In particular, it 
is the idea that form wholly determines what a thing is, that enables Aristotle and his 
medieval followers to define the objects of nature, as if natural science was akin to 
geometry. As M. B. Foster put the matter in his discussion of ancient and modern 
science: 'All the peculiarities of Greek natural science are derived from the 
assumption that the essence of a natural object is definable, as the essence of a 
geometrical object is. ' 245 In the study of geometry, the evidence of the senses may 
play only a propaedeutic role. Although it is possible to use illustrations and 
physical objects in the development of a definition, geometrical objects are not to be 
found in the sensible realm, rather only within the intelligible realm. The same holds 
in the case of Greek natural science. Although Aristotle asserts that 'it should be the 
concern of physics ... to know both natures', that is the matter and form of an object, 
it must be understood that matter is subordinate to form.246 Thus he also argues that: 
'Indeed, the form is a nature to a higher degree than the matter: for each thing 
receives a name when it exists in actuality rather than when it exists potentially. ' 247 
It is the form, whether actualised or merely potential that determines the thing. 
Although matter is required for the instantiation of the form, it provides no basis for 
scientific knowledge as it is only the form that determines what the thing is. 
245 M.B. Foster, 'The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modem Natural Science', in 
Mind, vol. 43 (1934), pp.446-468. 
246 Aristotle, Physics, B, 2, 194b10-15. 
247 Aristotle, Physics, B, I, 193b5-10. 
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As the form of an object is intelligible whilst the matter is sensible, the empirical 
aspect of Aristotelian and scholastic science is minimal. Indeed, the analogy 
between geometry and Aristotelian natural science can be pressed further for in both 
cases empirical evidence can serve only as an illustration. It can serve merely to 
illustrate something that is in fact only intelligible. Thus, the course of explanation 
in such a science is not focused upon observation. Rather it is focused upon 
determining the form of the objects involved in a particular case of motion. Once 
this has been achieved we can separate forced and natural action, explain natural 
action in terms of the nature of the body (as explained earlier in the case of the 
elements moving towards their natural place as the actualisation of their forms), and 
state the definition of the forms involved. The observed motion of the thing serves 
only as an illustration of the essences involved.248 Although I will return to this issue 
shortly, it is important to recognise at this stage that the analogy between the 
methods of geometry and Aristotelian physics, does not carry over to the objects of 
these two sciences. For Aristotle, the objects of these two sciences are of distinct 
orders. 
8. 
I turn now to Heidegger's reading of Aristotle on physis or nature. Heidegger argues 
that the distinctive character of natural objects is concealed if they are conceived as 
objects which produce themselves, that is, through an analogy with artificial objects, 
or objects that are by techne. In the modem age, according to Heidegger, this results 
in a situation where our knowledge of nature has become indistinguishable from 
what Aristotle would have called techne, that is productive knowledge which has its 
end in the thing produced. By this Heidegger means that modem nature is 
represented in advance 'as a calculable coherence offorces.'249 Heidegger discusses 
the nature of physis at various times throughout his career for he saw it as integral to 
his account of metaphysics. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, a lecture course from 
1935, Heidegger argues thatphysis as it was originally understood by the ancient 
Greeks named 'the process of a-rising, of emerging from the hidden, whereby the 
hidden is first made to stand. ' 250 This, he claims, amounts to an experience of the 
coming to presence of beings, an experience that was later covered over through the 
development of metaphysical thought. 
248 For a discussion of this mode of explanation see chapter 8 of Campbell, Truth and Historicity. 
249 Heidegger, QCT, p2 l. 
250 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Mannheim, (Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1959), pp14-15. 
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Heidegger's most sustained attempt to articulate how phys is was thought of by the 
ancient Greeks, can be found in his work from 1939 entitled On the Essence and 
Concept of<l>um~ in Aristotle's Physics B, 1.251 As Trish Glazebrook has argued, this 
reading of Aristotle is focused on demonstrating that an echo of the pre-Socratic 
experience of physis survives in Aristotle, even as his account leads to the later view 
that physis and techne can be understood by analogy with one another.252 
The essential difference between these two categories of beings lies, according to 
Aristotle, in the different relationship that they have with their arche. The term 
'arche' is difficult to render simply in English. Hardie and Gaye translate arche as 
'principle of motion' whilst Heidegger explains this more fully as both the 
'originating ordering' and the 'ordering origin'.253 Going further, Aristotle says that 
those things that are by nature are distinguished by the fact that they possess their 
principle of motion within themselves. Those beings that are by techne or 'art', do 
not possess their principle of motion within themselves. Rather, they depend upon 
the prior envisaging of their form by the craftsman. Thus, Aristotle contrasts natural 
things such as plants, animals, and the basic elements with artefacts such as beds and 
coats. Natural items hold within themselves the principle of their own genesis so that 
they come into being of their own accord. Artefacts, by contrast, do not come about 
of their own accord but are reliant upon techne. 
Aristotle rejects the notion that we can separate the moments of potentiality and 
actuality when we examine natural objects, as the very beingness or ousia of a 
natural or physei being consists in its movement or kinesis. This idea is expressed in 
the very name physis which, as Heidegger recognised, refers to the 'genesis of 
growing things' .254 The very beingness of a natural being involves motion and this 
motion is not simply change of place, but rather change towards the achievement of 
an end. It is not the case that there is a process of movement, and then a natural 
being appears at the end of this process. Thus, in the case of natural beings, the 
being that holds the potentiality (dynamis) or the potency to change is also that which 
is actualised in this change. The being of natural beings is the very process of 
actualisation. This is well described by Leclerc when he writes that 'a physical being 
251 Martin Heidegger, 'On The Essence And Concept Of <I>Ucni;; In Aristotle's Physics, B, 1 ', trans. 
Thomas Sheehan, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1998), pp183-231. 
252 Glazebrook, Heidegger's Philosophy of Science, pp163-207. 
253 Heidegger, 'On The Essence And Concept Of<I>ucni;; In Aristotle's Physics, B, l ', p189. 
254 Ivor Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence, (G. Allen & Unwin, London, 1972), p108. 
142 Chapter Four 
does not exist as simply actual, but as in-actualisation - as is clear from the many 
passages in Aristotle in which the noun energeia retains the force of the verb 
energeo, to be in action or activity' .255 
Following from this, Aristotle claims that in its primary sense 'nature is the shape or 
form which is specified in the definition of the thing.' 256 That is to say, he identifies 
the beingness of natural things with their morphe or form rather than their hyle or 
matter. For Aristotle the concept of hyle is entirely relative to the form in question, 
and is devoid of any determinations in its own right. 257 Thus, hyle is simply that 
which is formed as opposed to the form itself and as such it is always relative to 
whatever a particular thing is. The fact that hyle is considered to be unknowable in 
itself, as its determinateness comes entirely from whichever form is in question, 
holds interesting consequences for the nature of Aristotelian and scholastic science. 
In particular it means that the objects of physical·science are rational and that the 
explanation of motion stems from a correct identification of the form involved, rather 
than the precise measurement of the motion itself. It is the morphe which is the 
source of motion in natural beings. Thus we come to Aristotle's definition of nature 
in the Metaphysics: 
From what has been said, then, it is plain that nature in the primary and strict sense is 
the substance (ousia) of things which have in themselves, as such, a source of 
movement: for the matter is called the nature because it is qualified to receive this, 
and processes of becoming and growing are called nature because they are 
movements proceeding from this. And nature in this sense is the source of the 
movement of natural objects, being present in them somehow, either potentially or 
actually. 258 
Thus, although Aristotle conceives of both natural and artificial beings in terms of 
morphe and hyle, his conception of nature is very different from that of artefacts. 
Heidegger brings out in his reading of Aristotle the thought that physis names a 
process in which beings come into being and maintain themselves in being. Both 
techne and physis are generative causes (although this word should not be taken in 
the modem sense of cause) in that they bring into being and determine the nature of 
255 Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence, pl 11. 
256 Aristotle, Physics, 193a25-30. 
257 Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence, pl 15. Leclerc gives a description of the origin of this 
term. Hyle meant 'wood' or 'forest' and derivatively 'timber' used in making something. 
Aristotle took this later meaning and generalised it to mean simply 'that out of which' any 
particular thing is made. 
258 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1015b10-20. 
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beings. However, they are different because in the case of physis, the arche and telos 
are physis itself. The arche of natural beings, as Heidegger puts it, 'is not like the 
starting point of a push, which pushes the thing away and leaves it to itself. Rather, 
something determined by physis, not only stays with itself in its movedness but 
precisely goes back into itself even as it unfolds in accordance with the 
movedness.'259 This is not so with something that is by techne, as the arche of this 
being is the conception of its form by the craftsman, not the form itself. 
Furthermore, the end of productive knowledge is the object and not the knowledge 
itself. 
However, Heidegger also argues that Aristotle's restriction of nature to one realm of 
beings alongside that of artificial beings encourages the analogy between them. 
Thus, he claims that what was distinctive about nature for Aristotle, namely its 
ability to bring itself forth, is quickly lost such that nature eventually comes to be 
either what produces itself or what is produced by a divine creator. The very merit 
of Aristotle's account, however, was that nature was something entirely different 
from production. Thus, the questioning of nature changed, according to Heidegger, 
from a question about being itself, in the sense that it was an attempt to understand 
the manner in which natural beings emerge, into a question about the relationship of 
a certain realm of beings to their ground. 
Thus, although Aristotle distinguishes between natural and artificial objects in 
various ways, when it comes to the most fundamental determination of the being of 
natural beings, he falls back upon an analogy with production. Indeed, as I discussed 
earlier, Aristotelian science differs from modem science because _it assumes that it is 
possible to define the form of natural objects. Yet, as Foster insightfully argued, 
For an object to be definable, two conditions must be satisfied: (i) its form must be 
intelligible, and (ii) its form must be its real essence. Both conditions are satisfied 
by the products of a Techne, and the possibility of an Aristotelian science of nature 
depends upon the assumption that both conditions are fulfilled by natural objects.260 
Thus, the conception of beings as artefacts can be traced to the beginnings of 
We stem philosophy. The sense of this creative act changes in different eras yet the 
underlying analogy remains. Thus, the work of the ancient Greek 'Demiurge' was 
simply to bring together forms and matter which were themselves thought to exist 
259 Heidegger, 'On The Essence And Concept Of<l>ucm; In Aristotle's Physics, B, 1 ', p195. 
26° Foster, 'The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modem Natural Science', pp461-462. 
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eternally. By contrast, the creatures of the Christian God were considered to exist 
only through this act of creation. Heidegger's critique of technology demonstrates 
that this way of thinking about beings carried on unnoticed in modem philosophy. I 
will hold off discussing the details of this account until the next chapter. 
Heidegger's later account of metaphysics as comprised of a theological and an 
ontological element stems from his examination of Aristotle's conception of nature. 
The ontological element focuses upon identifying the kind of being which is 
common to all specific kinds of beings and of which they are thereby composed. 
The theological element focuses on the specific being that is the highest and which 
provides the ground for all other beings.261 This twofold approach to giving the 
ground of beings is expressed in two of the most fundamental terms of metaphysical 
inquiry, 'essence' and 'existence'. The essence of beings names the 'whatness' of 
beings whilst the existence of beings names their 'thatness'. Heidegger claims that 
this distinction, which was already implicit in Plato's doctrine of the ideas, was first 
fully developed in the writings of Aristotle. Thus, the emergence of metaphysics in 
this form coincides with the fall into an understanding of nature as an artefact. This 
tendency was greatly exacerbated by the synthesis of Greek metaphysics and 
Christian doctrines in which the distinction between the.creator(God) and his 
creatures becomes the most fundamental ontological determination. 
9. 
The brief account of Aristotle's position given above, provides the first element of 
our contrast between ancient and modem science. The second will be Newton's laws 
of motion as they are described in his Principia: The Mathematical Principles of 
Natural Philosophy. These laws are the foundation of Newtonian physics and 
embody the fully developed 'modem' conception of nature.262 As such they are 
261 This analysis of metaphysics first appears in Heidegger's 1936 lecture course on Schelling. See 
Martin Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Joan 
Stambaugh, (Athens, Ohio, Ohio University Press, 1985), pp48-57. A more extended 
discussion, which was first published in German in 1957 under the title Jdentitat und 
Differenz, can be found in Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh, 
(New York, Harper & Row, 1969), pp42-74. For a late mention of this idea see Martin 
Heidegger, 'Kant's Thesis about Being', trans. Ted E. Klein Jr. and William E. Pohl, in 
Pathmarks, ed. William Mcneill, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp337-
363. 
262 The term 'modem science' is used here in contrast to 'ancient and medieval science'. It refers to 
the new science that developed around the seventeenth century. This of course leaves out of 
consideration the twentieth century revolution in physics and its development of relativity 
and quantum field theory. In terms of these developments the science of the seventeenth 
century is itself now 'classical'. 
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useful for attempting to demonstrate how fundamentally different the assumptions of 
modem physical science are from their ancient Greek counterparts. Heidegger 
focuses on Newton's first law of motion as this is all that is required to demonstrate 
the distinct elements of the modem conception of nature.263 
This first law of motion states that: 'Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest 
or of moving uniformly straight forward, except insofar as it is compelled to change 
its state by forces impressed. '264 From this law we can see that underlying Newton's 
axiom is a radically different conception of nature in which distinctions of place, 
direction and body are conceived anew. Firstly, Newton's law applies to all bodies. 
This already assumes the possibility of applying a single law of motion to all bodies. 
The distinction between the four elements that existed in Aristotle's account is 
effaced by the universal application of this law. Furthermore, following the work of 
Galileo, the distinction between terrestrial and celestial bodies has been abandoned. 
The notion of distinctive places is also groundless, as the law of motion holds 
regardless of the location of the object. It is true that Newton refers to both relative 
and absolute space in the Scholium that follows his definition of terms in the 
Principia. However, absolute space itself is assumed to be characterised by the laws 
of Euclidean geometry and is thereby homogenous and infinite. Relative motion 
refers to the movement of objects in respect to some other object. Newton provides 
the example of a sailor moving upon a ship. It is possible to measure the motion of 
the sailor relative to the ship. However, the ship is also moving relative to the 
surface of the Earth and the Earth itself is rotating and moving relative to other 
planets. Some part of a system of objects must be assumed to be _stationary for the 
purposes of determining the motion of the other objects. It is impossible to 
determine whether the entire system is also moving without reference to a larger 
system, at which point the problem recurs. Newton states that 'containing bodies are 
to those inside them as the outer part of the whole to the inner part or as the shell to 
the kernel. And when the shell moves, the kernel also, without being changed in 
position from the vicinity of the shell, moves as a part of the whole. ' 265 The situation 
263 Heidegger's brief discussion of Newton can be found in What is a Thing?, pp85-88. 
264 Isaac Newton, Principia, trans. I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, (University of California 
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California), p416. 
265 Newton, Principia, p411. 
146 Chapter Four 
is such that although Newton assumes absolute space as the basis of absolute motion, 
all our measurements of motion can only be relative.266 
The exception to this situation is circular motion in which the quantity of such 
motion can be measured by the centrifugal force that is exerted. This allows 
measurement of motion without reference to other bodies, which may themselves be 
moving. However, the absolute direction of such motion remains indeterminate, as 
Newton's conception of space allows no qualitative distinctions. Circular motion 
allows the possibility of determining that a body is in fact moving absolutely, but not 
any determination of absolute location or direction as the concept of space itself rules 
out such determinations. The confusing use of the terms absolute and relative 
motion should not lead us to confuse Newton's position with that ofAristotle.267 
Although Newton retains the notion of absolute space, it cannot be equated with 
Aristotle's account of place for the following reasons. First, Newton's space is 
infinite as opposed to Aristotle's cosmos which is bounded by the heavens. Second, 
although Newton describes this space as immovable, it does not provide any basis for 
the absolute orientation that is found in Aristotle's notion of place. Absolute space is 
an immovable framework within which bodies move. However, it is homogenous 
and cannot of itself provide any basis for direction. Up and down are only ever 
relative for Newton and they do not imply any difference in the quality of space. 
These differences can be elaborated further. The first law of motion contains no 
limit regarding the body's continuous motion or rest. This infinite continuance of 
motion stands in direct contradiction to Aristotle's conception of a bounded universe. 
Ifwe exclude the circular motion of the heavens, in Aristotelian science a body could 
never continue in motion indefinitely. Should its movement be unhindered, it will 
naturally find its place in the cosmos. For earth this is down, for fire it is up, and for 
air and water it is in between. Once a body has achieved this movement its form has 
become fully actual and it rests in its proper place. Such a relationship is impossible 
in Newton's scheme as the body's movement bears no relationship to its place, rather 
it is a function of force. Impressed force is defined by Newton as 'the action exerted 
on a body to change its state either of resting or of moving uniformly straight 
266 For a far more involved discussion of the notion of absolute space see parts one and two of 
Stephen Toulmin, 'Criticism in the History of Science: Newton on Absolute Space, Time, 
and Motion', The Philosophical Review, vol. 68 (1959), ppl-29, and pp203-227. 
267 see Koyre' s discussion of absolute space in From the Closed W arid to the Infinite Universe, (The 
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore and London, 1968), pp155-189. 
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forward. ' 268 The motions of natural bodies are no longer the result of an inner 
principle of development, rather they are imposed by outside forces which must 
overcome the inertia of bodies, that is their tendency to preserve their current state of 
motion or rest. 
In these manifold respects, the assumptions upon which Newton builds his physics 
differ profoundly from those of Aristotle. A dramatic transformation in outlook 
occurred in the adoption of modem science, from the nature of the thing to the 
manner in which it is related to its surroundings, to the very nature of these 
surroundings. As was shown in the case of Aristotelian science, the manner in which 
nature is conceived shapes scientific method. In that case, the intelligibility of the 
forms of nature and the subsidiary importance of matter allowed a method that did 
not rely heavily upon experimentation and observation. 
The reliance of modem science upon experimentation is also based upon its 
conception of nature and the manner in which we can come to know it. The 
relationship between a mathematized nature and the experimental character of 
modem science will be addressed below. Before taking up that issue, however, I will 
examine Heidegger's Sll;ggestion that there are several key aspects to the modem 
understanding of nature that render modem mathematical science possible. The first 
of these is the mathematization of nature, the second is the establis.hment of a 
peculiar understanding of subjectivity. Only the issue of mathematics and nature will 
be addressed in this chapter. 
10. 
In discussing Heidegger's account of the mathematical element of modem science it 
is important to keep his peculiar understanding of that term in mind. Apart from our 
familiar notion of mathematics, we should also see in the term 'the application of a 
determination of the thing which is not experientially derived from the thing and yet 
lies at the base of every determination of the things, making them possible and 
making room for them. ' 269 To state the problem again, here we are seeking the 
origin of the determination of thinghood that is peculiar to modem science and which 
allows the application of mathematics in the narrower sense to the study of nature. 
268 Newton, Principia, p405. 
269 Heidegger, What is a Thing?, p89. 
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Heidegger argues that the assumptions which underlie Newton's physics are 
essentially the understanding of 'thinghood' that underlie the modem conception of 
nature (at least in classical modem physics). Thus, elements that I outlined above in 
developing the contrast between Newton and Aristotle can be repeated as the modem 
conception of nature. Essentially, the natures and forms that ruled in Aristotle's 
science are replaced by bodies that have no 'hidden' motive power. Bodies are 
judged only by their behaviour, that is their movement in space and time. The forces 
that produce movement are taken to exist only in so far as they produce a measurable 
effect on bodies. From what has been said already with regard to Newtonian 
mechanics, it is possible to say that it concentrates on how things show themselves 
within this measurable framework of space and time. Thus, rather than attempting to 
understand why objects move by determining their essence, it is the movement itself 
that is important in modem science. 
Aside from the details of this modem projection of nature, the most striking aspect of 
Heidegger's argument in What is a Thing?, is his insistence that the mathematical 
projections that found the sciences under discussion are not derived from experience. 
He provides only very brief evidence for this proposition in the essay. He refers to 
Galileo's famous experiment in which he attempted to prove that bodies of different 
weight would reach the ground at the same time if they were dropped from the same 
height. Galileo wished to demonstrate that if all obstacles were removed, then the 
motion of a body would change uniformly if a uniform force was applied. As 
Heidegger tells it, the two bodies did not in fact arrive at exactly the same time, 
however, they were close enough for Galileo to conclude that, were it not for the 
resistance of the air, they would have done so. The point here is that Galileo's 
conclusion was in fact contrary to the performance of the bodies in his experiment. 
Indeed those who opposed his work were able to confirm for themselves that Galileo 
was mistaken in maintaining bodies of different weight fall at the same speed if not 
interrupted. 270 
Not only Galileo, but Newton as well, were reliant upon assumptions that could 
never be derived from experience. This is not a question of the limits of induction. 
270 Glazebrook notes that there is some doubt as to whether Galileo ever actually performed this iconic 
experiment himself. This issue does not, however, affect Heidegger's point which is a 
general point about the role of experience in modem science. See Glazebrook, Heidegger's 
Philosophy of Science, pp73-74. Interestingly, Heidegger employs an account of Galileo's 
experiment in order to contrast ancient and modem science in one of his very earliest 
writings. See Heidegger, 'The Concept of Time in the Science of History', pp52-56. 
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The difficulty here is not that of how we are to form general rules from specific 
instances, no matter how numerous they may be. Rather, the axioms which they 
established with regard to the motion of bodies can never be found in the natural 
system they define. Specifically, it is never possible to find a body that is entirely 
left to itself so that we may determine whether its motion remains uniform or not. In 
reality bodies are constantly under the influence of various forces and their motion is 
never entirely uniform. Newton's laws prescribe a framework for examining the 
motion of bodies. However, the movements described in these laws are never found 
in reality. Galileo's experiment was controversial because it is not possible to prove 
experimentally a law regarding a body that is entirely left to its own devices. Such a 
body can never be found and although it is certainly possible to explain the 
discrepancy between the motion of such an ideal body and the observed motion 
through an appeal to intervening forces, one must already assume that the law of 
motion is valid in order to do so. 
In pointing out that experience alone. cannot establish the axioms of science, 
Heidegger is not attempting to undermine the authority of modern science. That 
these axioms are not derived from experience does not mean that the findings that 
flow from them are not valid. What is undermined by this argument is the positivist 
appraisal of science in which the criterion of empirical knowledge is that it must be 
wholly derived from experience, which is itself understood as atoms of sense data. 
Such a notion is untenable, and I have mentioned its inadequacy in chapters 1 and 2. 
The difficulty that positivists and empiricists have in justifying the assumption that 
nature is regular, and that the use of induction is thereby valid, is but one example of 
the problems that arise from such an attempt to exclude all knowledge that cannot be 
drawn from experience. Heidegger's characterisation of positivism as a degenerate 
form of science and a mere collecting of facts, stems from the idea that positivism is 
divorced from the vital ground of its own research. Thus, he comments that 'The 
experimenting urge to the facts is a necessary consequence of the preceding 
mathematical skipping (Uberspringen) of all facts. But where this skipping ceases or 
becomes weak, mere facts as such are collected, and positivism arises. ' 271 The word 
Uberspringen can be more literally rendered as 'jumping over' and points to the 
manner in which understanding depends upon an interpretative leap beyond the 
objects of experience. Much the same idea is expressed in the term 'Project' 
(Entwurf) discussed earlier. Science depends upon the projection of nature and its 
271 Heidegger, What is a Thing?, p93. 
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various realms and the rejection of this framework reduces science to mere 
elaboration of an assumed structure, rather than an active questioning of both object 
and the ready understanding in which they appear. 
11. 
It is possible to see the modem preoccupation with the legitimacy of knowledge even 
in the earliest stages of the development of the modem world view. Ifwe glance 
briefly at the position of Francis Bacon, we will see that already in his thought, the 
legitimacy of scientific knowledge is bound up with its correct derivation from 
experience. Bacon sets out his vision for a new scientific method in his Novum 
Organum, or New Organon, of 1620. He self-consciously wishes to develop a 
scientific method that is distinct from that of Aristotle .. His most interesting 
comment, for this inquiry, is that he intends to develop his science upon the basis of 
an 'interpretation' of nature, rather than an 'anticipation' of nature. The charge of 
illegitimately anticipating nature is obviously directed at the methods of Aristotelian 
and scholastic science. He states that Aristotle ' ... made his natural philosophy a 
mere slave to his logic, and so rendered it virtually useless and disputatious. ' 272 
Bacon states that 'For the sake of instruction I have grown used to calling human 
reasoning which we currently apply to nature Anticipations of Nature (because it is 
an impetuous and premature proceeding), whereas that reasoning elicited from things 
by proper means.I call Interpretation ofNature.'273 This can serve as a preliminary 
guide to the issues that have dominated modem philosophy of science. The 
distinction between anticipations and interpretations of nature already points to the 
issue of how legitimate science can be distinguished from what is only _apparently 
science. This is referred to as the problem of demarcation. 
Bacon also provides us with one of the most prominent answers to the problem of 
demarcation. Science can be distinguished from mere opinions by the method it 
employs. Scientific method ensures us that our science is not mere fancy by 
correctly directing us towards the matters in question. In Bacon's case, this method 
consisted of a form of induction. He states: 
.. . Anticipations are far better at sustaining assent than Interpretations because as 
they are gathered from a few facts, and those of the most everyday kind, they at once 
impress the intellect and fill fantasy. Interpretations on the other hand, gathered 
272 Bacon, Novum Organum, p89. 
273 Bacon, Novum Organum, p75. 
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from facts extremely various, and widely dispersed, are incapable of striking the 
intellect suddenly, so that they cannot but sound harsh and discordant to current 
opinion and almost like the mysteries of faith.274 
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In Bacon's writings it is possible to see the major outlines of the subsequent 
development of much philosophy of science. On the one hand, legitimate knowledge 
is increasingly identified with the careful observation of nature. On the other hand, 
knowledge that cannot be gained from experience remains vital in order to legitimize 
this account of knowledge and nature. This amounts to one of the central tensions of 
modem philosophy. 
12. 
If we examine more recent accounts of the nature of science, we find that Heidegger 
is certainly not alone in his estimation that it could not be pure experience, or greater 
attention to it, that brought about the change from ancient to modem science. 
Through the course of the twentieth century, there emerged several interesting 
approaches to the philosophy of science that emphasise the extra empirical 
considerations that influence the progression of our understanding of nature and the 
structure of natural science. I will briefly examine some of these approaches in order 
to demonstrate that Heidegger's position is certainly not unique, although his focus 
may differ from that of other philosophers of science. 
From the second half of the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century, 
philosophy of science was·dominated by the idea of producing a 'logic' of science. 
Thus, philosophers focused on various aspects of the logical structure of scientific 
findings. I have already discussed the neo-Kantian strand of this philosophy of 
science. In response to the positivist attempt to found science on experience alone, 
Windelband and later Rickert attempted to demonstrate that scientific methods 
constituted their own objects from the raw material of experience. Thus, the 
difficulty of the positivist position was apparently overcome because in the natural 
sciences, the objects of study were constituted as instances of general laws. The 
difficulty of the neo-Kantian position is the matter of how we are to understand the 
'values' according to which the objects of the sciences are produced. 
The positivist conception of science remained current during this period alongside 
the neo-Kantian stream of thought. Insofar as the positivists remained of the view 
that all legitimate scientific knowledge must ultimately be drawn from experience 
274 Bacon, Novum Organum, p75. 
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alone, the issue of how we can justifiably generalize from particular instances of 
experience to universal rules remained a central problem. It is this issue above all 
others that appears to divide positivist philosophers of science. Thus, in the early 
part of the 20th Century Bertrand Russell maintained the view that we are justified in 
making inductive inferences through an appeal to the principle of induction. This 
principle asserts that the more we observe an instance of some sort to be associated 
with a different instance, the greater the probability thatthey will be associated in the 
future. 
However, Russell himself acknowledges that ' ... we must either accept the inductive 
principle on the ground of its intrinsic evidence, or forgo all justification of our 
expectations about the future. '275 This is so because the problem Russell addresses 
himself to is whether or not we are justified in believing that nature is regular, not 
whether it is in fact regular. He states: 'The problem we have to discuss is whether 
there is any reason for believing in what is called "the uniformity of nature."' 276 
Ultimately, the notion that nature is uniform, which Russell·assumes underpins both 
our daily life and our science, is an assumption that cannot be justified by 
experience. He is reduced to justifying our belief in this maxim by the claim that it 
becomes more probable, the more often we observe an instance of regularity. 
Unfortunately, even this claim to an increase in probability appears to assume that 
nature is uniform. 
Russell's positivist approach, which was strongly supported by the Vienna Circle, 
came under attack by Karl Popper in his work of 1934, The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery.277 Popper accepted the fact that.the uniformity of nature coµld not be 
established from experience and proceeded to reverse the accepted account of 
scientific method. He proposed that the general laws of science could only ever be 
falsified by experience, rather than verified. We are able to maintain·scientific 
theories until such time as they are contradicted by experience, at which point they 
must be rejected. This overcomes the objection that we cannot confirm the 
uniformity of nature through an appeal to experience. However, it leads to another 
objection, namely that it is impossible to test such an hypothesis. For in Popper's 
account the testability of hypotheses is vital to the functioning of science. The more 
a hypothesis rules out, he claims, the easier it is to test against our experience. In the 
275 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, (Williams and Norgate, London, no date), p 106. 
276 Russell, Problems of Philosophy, pp98-99. · 
277 Popper, The Logic Of Scientific Discovery. 
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case of the conjecture that nature is uniform, it is difficult to see any particular 
experience that this rules out. Presumably Popper must dismiss this statement as 
unscientific due to the fact that no experience would contradict it, and yet the very 
possibility of natural science seems to depend upon it. 
There exist other streams of thought regarding the justification of general scientific 
laws. Perhaps the most prominent that I have not so far discussed is that of 
"conventionalism'. The originators of this view appear to be Poincare and 
Duhem.278 In this view the basic laws of particular sciences are held to be 
conventions. This is held to be the case because these laws appear to be neither a 
priori true, nor the product of any experimental findings. The classical example of 
such a law based neither on experiment nor on a priori truths are Newton's laws of 
motion. We can take as an example the law that a body that is under the influence of 
no forces will uniformly move in a straight line. This does not appear to be correct a 
priori because it had remained unrecognised, and in fact implicitly contradicted by 
Aristotelian physics for thousands of years. Furthermore the law cannot be based 
wholly upon experiment and experience for we have no experience of a body which 
is under the influence of no forces. 
13. 
All these streams of positivist philosophy are modifications of the attempt to develop 
a justification for the non-empirical element of scientific knowledge. The 
conventionalist position appears to come closest to recognising the import of this 
issue regarding anticipations and interpretations of nature. We cannot opt for the 
Kantian escape into an a priori account due to the historical permutations .of these a 
priori findings. Nor is the positivist route acceptable due to the impossibility of 
deriving the founding conception of nature within nature itself. The increasing 
interest in the history of scientific discovery that developed in the twentieth century, 
including such researchers as Thomas S. Kuhn, Alexandre Koyre, M.B Foster, and E. 
A. Burtt, has further emphasised the fact that extra-scientific factors are vital in the 
development of science.279 In Kuhn's case, this focuses upon the non-rational 
278 See discussion in Donald Gillies, Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century, (Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1993), especially part 1. 
279 See Alexandre Koyre Galileo Studies, trans John Mepham, (The Harvester Press, Hassocks, 
Sussex, 1978, first published in French 1939), From the Closed World to the Infinite 
Universe, (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore and London, 1957), Metaphysics and 
Measurement, (Chapman & Hall, London, 1968). Thomas S. Kuhn The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, 2nd Edition (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970). Edwin 
Arthur Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, revised edition, (Routledge 
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structures that influence the work ofresearch communities, whilst Koyre, Foster, and 
Burtt, have illustrated the dependence of scientific development upon metaphysical 
considerations. 
The research undertaken by these thinkers has lead to the conclusion that, as Kuhn 
puts it, the more careful study historians devote to 'Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic 
chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, the more certain they feel that those once 
current views of nature were, as a whole, neither less scientific nor more the product 
of human idiosyncrasy than those current today.'280 The work of these researchers 
has rendered the view that scientific knowledge progresses through steady 
accumulation difficult to maintain. Only if we see all scientific enterprise as striving 
towards our present situation can such a view seem plausible. However, even the 
discussion of Aristotle's understanding of the cosmos demonstrates that such a view 
overlooks the true nature of previous scientific endeavour. 
Furthermore, these thinkers have pointed to the fact that progression towards the 
present state of science is not merely a matter of conducting more experiments or the 
introduction of more sensitive equipment and techniques. The truly revolutionary 
moments in science are simultaneously revolutions in our projection of nature. It is 
for this reason that Galileo's vision of nature as mathematical is of such moment. 
Burtt and Koyre in particular have emphasised the importance of this new (or at least 
revived) view of nature. M. B. Foster has traced the manner in which the Christian 
doctrine of creation played a decisive role in the establishment of modem science. 
As a matter of historical fact, such metaphysical considerations have shaped the 
nature of science. 
and Kegan Paul, London, 1932). M. B. Foster 'The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the 
Rise of Modem Natural Science' in Mind, New Series, vol.43, no. 172, (Oct., 1934) pp.446-
468 and 'Christian Theology and Modem Science of Nature' in Mind, New Series, Vol. 45, 
177 (Jan, 1936) ppl-27 
28° Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p2. I don't mean to suggest that these thinkers all 
agree with one another concerning the nature and significance of the scientific revolution that 
took place in the seventeenth century. I take Kuhn's comment to be representative of the 
thinkers listed in note 277 only in the following senses. First, they take Aristotelian and 
medieval physics to be a legitimate form of science. Second, they think that a fuller 
understanding of this Aristotelian physics will help us to understand the nature of modem 
science. Koyre repeatedly points out that although Aristotelian physics turned out to be 
wrong in crucial areas, for example in its account of thrown objects, it was nevertheless a 
form of physics. See his comments at p5 and p28 of Metaphysics and Measurement, and p4 
of Galileo Studies. This insistence on a broad understanding of what counts as 'science' is 
also implicit in the works of Burtt and Foster listed in note 277. 
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Heidegger's point is that this must necessarily be the case. We must anticipate 
experience in order that it may become a fact. The examination of the Aristotelian 
science serves not only to illustrate the alien understanding of nature that it is built 
upon, but also to undermine any straightforward appeal to the 'facts' that is 
encountered in modem science and philosophy. The facts can only come forward as 
facts, upon the background of an understanding of nature, and even more generally, 
an understanding of the being of beings. 
14. 
At this point it must be said that Heidegger is not clear enough in his demarcation of 
the various senses of mathematics and the mathematical. He outlines mathematics 
understood in the narrow everyday sense of science of numbers, the mathematical 
project as he has described it, and the objects that can be known in this mathematical 
learning, the mathemata. However, there is a further issue that he does not clarify, 
that of the actual 'mathematization' of nature. By this I mean the identification of 
the mathematical aspects of natural beings with their essential constitution. 
Although this is perhaps implied by his examination of the contrast between Newton 
and Aristotle, he does not address it in detail in the works under examination. It is, 
however, one of the central features of modem science. Heidegger's oversight is 
perhaps a function of his thought that this 'mathematization' of nature is dependent 
upon the central issue of subjectivity and certainty, and is thereby a secondary issue. 
I will attempt to redress this situation. 
Although Heidegger does not seem to have noticed the issue, there is another sense 
in which mathematics is informative about the nature of science. This is the manner 
in which mathematics came to be pervasive in modem science. The manner in which 
the order of nature came to be seen as mathematical in the works of Copernicus, 
Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton, is telling. Ifwe examine this story in some 
detail it appears that mathematics came to be important not through purely scientific 
reasons, but through philosophical and religious convictions. This further bolsters 
the contention of Heidegger, and other philosophers, that science rests upon a 
projection of its domain of objects. Mathematics became increasingly important in 
astronomy prior to Galileo. However, I will focus upon his work as he is himself 
aware of the radical step that is involved in the use of mathematics in a physics that 
is no longer bound up with the distinction between terrestrial and heavenly realms. 
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15. 
Galileo's achievements must be seen as both philosophical and scientific. The 
significance of his achievement lies in the fact that his scientific discoveries carried 
with them metaphysical determinations of the essence of nature. That his mode of 
thought amounted to a rejection of the Aristotelian tradition was not lost on Galileo 
himself. Heidegger argues that: 
The greatness and superiority of natural science during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries rests in the fact that all the scientists were philosophers. They understood 
that there are no mere facts, but that a fact is only what it is in the light of the 
fundamental conception, and always depends upon how far that conception 
reaches.281 
Metaphysical determinations and science are inextricably linked and this must not be 
overlooked. The incoherence of positivism stems from this attempt to deny any role 
to a founding conception. 
The boldest aspect of Galileo's thought is his belief that mathematics could be used 
in the study of physics. He famously stated in his work The Assayer that: 
Philosophy is written in this grandest of all books which forever lies open before our 
eyes ( I mean the universe), but which cannot be understood if one does not first 
learn to understand the language and interpret the characters in which it is written. It 
is written in mathematical language, and the characters are triangles, circles, and 
other geometrical figures, without which if is humanly impossible to understand a 
. 1 d 282 smg ewor ... 
Although this assertion seems uncontroversial to modem ears, it was not at all 
obvious at the time of writing. In fact the application of geometry in th.e study of 
nature was a highly controversial matter for it was not apparent, to an Aristotelian, 
how this could be achieved, or even why it should be attempted. 
For Aristotle, the application of mathematics, or more specifically geometry, to the 
study of nature was illegitimate for several fundamental reasons. Aristotle, with 
some legitimacy, held that the natural world is not amenable to the application of 
mathematics due to the fact that it is a world of change and qualities. The world as 
we discover it through the senses is constituted of colours, textures, sounds. Leaving 
aside the issue of the heavens, we can say it is in a constant process of generation and 
281 Heidegger, What is a Thing?, p67. 
282 Galileo Galilei, The Achievement of Galileo, ed James Brophy and Henry Paolucci, (Twayne 
Publishers, New York, 1962), p31. 
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decay. All these characteristics are utterly foreign to the timeless realm of numbers 
and geometrical figures. It is for precisely this reason that the triangles, squares, and 
circles that we encounter in the reality can only ever be approximations or hints of 
the nature of ideal geometrical figures. There is an obvious division between the 
qualitative and changing realm of sensuous reality and the ideal realm of number and 
geometrical form. 
Furthermore, the concept of movement, the very foundation of physics both ancient 
and modem, was a qualitative one for Aristotle. It seems obvious to us that we can 
examine a body purely in terms of the distance and speed with which it moves. 
However, it must be observed that for Aristotle, motion could not be achieved 
without an alteration in the quality of the body involved. Motion is analysed in terms 
of the part it plays in the actualisation of the essence of a body. Thus, a body is 
never indifferent to motion as this motion either helps or hinders the achievement of 
the body's essential nature. Motion is in fact only one of the many qualitative 
changes that a body can undergo. It is worth recalling that change in location is only 
one aspect of bodily change as it was conceived by Aristotle. As mentioned above, 
he conceived of metabole as including changes of quantity, quality, substance and 
place. Motion understood primarily as a change in quality was not something that 
could be accounted for by mathematics. 
Aristotle recognised that the objects of both mathematics and physics possess lines, 
points, surfaces and curves. However, the physicist investigates these matters in so 
far as they exist in physical objects whilst the mathematician has no regard to the 
actual existence of his objects. Thus, the objects of the mathematician are removed 
from motion, understood in Aristotle's broad conception of the term.283 
Mathematical objects are lines, points, curves, and so on, considered as they are in 
themselves. The distinction between the realm of motion, that is the physical realm, 
and that of mathematical objects was clear for Aristotle. To mix the two, and apply 
mathematics in the realm of physics, it would be necessary to overlook the very 
aspects of physical reality that, for Aristotle, rendered it real, its sensuous qualities. 
283 It is important to note that the separation of mathematical objects from motion is, for Aristotle, a 
separation 'in thought'. Insofar as natural objects possess such attributes as figure, line and 
number, these mathematical objects are subject to motion. However, as Aristotle states, 
'Now the mathematician, too, is concerned with these, but not insofar as each is a limit of a 
physical body; nor does he investigate attributes qua existing in such bodies. That is why he 
separates them, for in thought they are separable from motion; and it makes no difference, 
nor does any falsity occur in separating them [in thought].' See Aristotle, Physics, 193b30-
35. 
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The implications of Galileo's position are quite profound. In essence, he was forced 
to distinguish between primary and secondary qualities of bodies. That is to say, 
Aristotle was not wrong in his assertion that sensuous reality is not amenable to 
mathematical treatment. This determination was not abandoned by Galileo. Rather, 
he was forced to argue that real objects are not in fact the objects that appear to us 
through our senses. These original sensations must be analysed and dissolved into 
the real, mathematical objects that underlie them. Although the new science of the 
seventeenth century claimed to base itself in experience rather than the groundless 
speculation that characterised scholasticism, in this respect it turned completely 
against experience. As mathematical relationships do not immediately present 
themselves to us in sensation, we must resolve this data into its 'essential', 
mathematical elements. Galileo's solution to Aristotle's objection to the application 
of mathematics to nature, was to assume that the rational order of nature was not 
immediately apparent. In his study, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern 
Science, Edwin Arthur Burtt describes the consequences of Galileo's arguments: 
The Copernican astronomy and the achievements of the two new sciences must 
break us of the natural assumption that sensed objects are the real or mathematical 
objects. They betray certain qualities, which handled by mathematical rules, lead us 
to the knowledge of the true object, and these.are real or primary qualities, such as 
number, figure, magnitude, position, and motion, which cannot by any exertion of 
our powers be separated from bodies-qualities which also can be wholly expressed 
mathematically. The reality of the universe is geometrical ; the only ultimate 
characteristics of nature are those in terms of which certain mathematical knowledge 
becomes possible.284 
This is the manner in which nature, understood to be essentially mathematical, 
becomes divorced into primary and secondary qualities. It has been argued by both 
Burtt and Koyre, that Galileo's position amounts to a revival of Platonism. That 
Galileo understood himself as defending Plato's position against Aristotle is made 
quite apparent through the structure of his dialogue as well as specific comments he 
makes, such as his allusions to the Platonic doctrine of recollection.285 Koyre 
explains that, according to the philosophical opinion of the time: 'If you claim for 
mathematics a superior status, if more than that you attribute to it a real value and a 
commanding position in physics, you are a Platonist.' On the other hand, if you 
believe that 'physics needs no other basis than experience and must be built directly 
284 Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, pp74-75. 
285 Galileo Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, Ptolemaic & Copernican, 
trans. Stillman Drake, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1953). 
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on perception, that mathematics has to content itself with the secondary and 
subsidiary role of a mere auxiliary, you are an Aristotelian. ' 286 
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Given the metaphysical significance of his thought, the scant attention Heidegger 
pays to the substance of Galileo's position is unfortunate. Furthermore, close 
attention to Galileo's achievement reveals a further aspect of 'mathematics' that is of 
interest. Heidegger uses the term 'mathematical' to refer to the science of 
mathematics as well as to a founding conception of nature. However, he overlooks 
the metaphysical struggle that was undertaken to arrive at the modem view of nature 
as itself calculable, that is governed by numbers, lines, forms, and motion. Although 
he notes that mathematics comes to play an extremely important role in modem 
science, and that this can be so only upon the basis of a modem conception of nature, 
he does not explain the relationship between these two points. Modern science 
employs mathematics so extensively because reality appears as fundamentally 
calculable in our modem understanding. A division between sensations and reality 
was required in order to maintain that the reality of nature was 'mathematical', in the 
sense of being amenable to the application of mathematical science. The fully 
developed physics of Aristotle and Newton are fundamentally determined by their 
understanding of the relationship between mathematics and reality. Although it 
reinforces his position, as does much modem philosophy and history of science, 
Heidegger does not bring this relationship to the fore. 
16. 
This brief account of Heidegger's interpretation of modem science gives us a sketch 
of why he characterises the modem age as the age of technology .. The central point 
in his discussion of modem science is that it is based upon a configuration of man 
and nature in which man conceives of nature in advance as a 'mathematically 
calculable coherence of forces.' Heidegger writes in The Age of The World Picture: 
'To be sure it was Aristotle who first understood what empeiria (experientia) means: 
the observation of things themselves, their qualities and modifications under 
changing conditions, and consequently the knowledge of the way in which things as 
a rule behave. ' 287 The situation with modern science is quite different in that 
'Experiment begins with the laying down of a law as a basis. To set up an 
experiment means to conceive [ vorstellen] the conditions under which a specific 
286 Koyre, 'Galileo and Plato', pp36-37. 
287 Martin Heidegger 'The Age of the World Picture', in QCT, p121 
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series of motions can be made susceptible of being followed in its necessary 
progression, i.e., of being controlled in advance by calculation. ' 288 Within modem 
science, it is the conception of what nature must be, in advance, which guides the 
setting up of the experiment. 
Here we come to the point where it is possible to see why Heidegger calls the 
modem age the age of technology. As he argues in The Question Concerning 
Technology, the proliferation of technological items has its source in a fundamental 
reconception of nature and our relationship with it. This tum about is clearly to be 
seen in the difference between ancient and modern science. Whereas Aristotle 
looked at natural objects and attempted to describe their behaviour, Galileo, Newton, 
and modern physical science in general, first conceive of nature as a mathematically 
describable system and then set about, through the process of experimentation, 
determining how nature reports itself on this basis. Thus, as Heidegger argues, 'If 
physics takes shape explicitly, then, as something mathematical, this means that, in 
an especially pronounced way, through it and for it something is stipulated in 
advance as what is already-known. That stipulating has to do with nothing less than 
the plan or projection of that which must henceforth, for the knowing of nature that is 
sought after, be nature: the self contained system of motion of units of mass related 
spatiotemporally.'289 The form of knowledge that is found in modern science is 
equivalent to that form of knowledge that Aristotle termed techne, that is productive 
knowledge. The nature that concerns modern physics is not derived from simple 
observation but is conceived in advance and then produced through experimentation. 
This is the reason for Heidegger's label for the modern age. Yet, there is still much 
to be said about the significance Heidegger attaches to this modern metaphysical 
situation. Indeed, some of the most heated criticisms of Heidegger arise not so much 
from the technical details of his critique of modernity but from the significance 
which he attributes to this account. In the next chapter I will address the details of 
his interpretation of the modern philosophical tradition with particular emphasis 
upon Descartes and Kant. Following that, chapter six will be devoted to a more 
direct discussion of Heidegger's essay The Question Concerning Technology. 
288 Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture', p 121. 
289 Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture', p119. 
Chapters 
Heidegger on Descartes and Subjectivity 
In the previous chapter I explored Heidegger's argument that the form of knowledge 
that is characteristic of modem science is equivalent to what Aristotle identified as 
techne. I have argued that this analogy is apt insofar as modem science does not 
draw its understanding of nature from pure experience, instead it relies upon an 
initial projection of nature as a unified system of calculable forces. Just as the 
craftsman must conceive in advance the form of the object he wishes to create, 
modem man first conceives of nature as a law-governed system of interacting forces 
and then sets about determining through experimentation which of these laws nature 
actually follows. It is within this a priori framework that experience gains its 
significance. Thus, although we may go to great lengths to determine how natural 
objects behave under tightly controlled conditions, we do not decide which laws 
nature follows in its own self-production. Nevertheless, the initial determination of 
nature as a lawful system derives not from 'pure' experience; rather it first allows the 
objects of nature to appear as the product of a law governed system. 
As I have argued previously Heidegger's argument that modem science necessarily 
contains an a priori element is implied by his account of understanding and 
interpretation. Yet this consideration rules out the possibility that it is simply this a 
priori element that distinguishes ancient from modem science. For although the 
categories which modem science employs to describe nature are profoundly different 
from those of Aristotelian science, if we accept Heidegger's account of 
understanding, they are the same in the sense that they provide a framework of 
intelligibility within which nature can first appear as nature. The fact that Aristotle's 
understanding of physis differs from our modem concept of nature does not alter this 
similarity. Heidegger's discussion of the differences between ancient and modem 
science aims to demonstrate that science necessarily relies upon metaphysical 
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determinations of what is. However, this does not provide him with the grounds for 
the truly fundamental distinction between these two modes of science that he is 
seeking to establish. 
Heidegger's direct analysis of the categories of the sciences demonstrates that all 
science must have a metaphysical determination of its objects, and .that the 
determination of what constitutes a natural being was transformed at the beginning of 
the modem age. However, it is to his critique of modem subjectivity that we must 
tum to find the foundation of the claim that modem science approaches its objects in 
afundamentally new way. For Heidegger, the transformation of man into the 
'subject' is the very essence of modernity because it marks the beginning of a new 
relationship between man and being. The new sciences, in so far as they are founded 
on a metaphysical determination of a region of beings, are symptoms of this more 
fundamental upheaval in man's conception of being. Science, seen as the 
embodiment of our understanding of particular regions of being, implicitly depends 
on a metaphysical determination of being itself. Heidegger argues that the modem 
determination of being is novel because man takes it upon himself to establish what 
can count as a being based upon reason's examination of itself. In modernity, reason 
becomes divorced from being such that man, in so far as he is rational, must first 
provide a framework in which being can be understood. This is fundamentally 
different from the ancient Greek and Medieval situation. For Plato, the world is the 
result of the Demiurge bringing together form and matter, whilst the Christian 
understanding of God as the absolute creator meant that he produced both form and 
matter according to a plan of his own. Despite this significant difference regarding 
the creation of form and matter, both ancient Greek and medieval philosophers 
understood the natural world to be rationally ordered. In both these periods the 
intelligible forms were already 'in' natural things. In contrast to both these positions, 
in the modem age reason is restricted to humanity, and the being of nature is a matter 
to be determined through the self examination of this reason. 
As the philosophy of Descartes provides the focus of Heidegger's deliberations on 
the foundations of the modem age, I will spend some time establishing what his 
interpretation involves. Much of it contains a subtle reading of the significance of 
Descartes' principle 'Cogito, ergo sum'. The purpose of this initial exposition is, 
however, to demonstrate the ontological significance of Descartes' philosophy. 
Descartes is often seen as carrying through a shift from a fundamentally ontological 
mode of philosophy to a mode that must initially secure for itself the possibility of 
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knowledge, that is epistemology. Heidegger attempts to show that this can only take 
place within a prior understanding of being. As a means of demonstrating the 
strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger's account of Descartes, I will initially 
provide a somewhat unorthodox interpretation of the Cartesian project as 
fundamentally directed towards a new grounding of scientia.290 This interpretation 
of Descartes demonstrates that he retained an essentially medieval understanding of 
being and knowledge. He does not, as Heidegger would have it, understand the 
certainty of the subject as the ground of being. Rather, Descartes argues that through 
the establishment of necessary knowledge about his own nature and the nature of 
God, it is possible to demonstrate that our subjectively necessary knowledge 
coincides with the objective order ofbeing.291 Although this calls into question the 
accuracy of Heidegger's interpretation of the development of modem philosophy, I 
will argue that his account remains insightful as it manages to capture the situation 
that results from the failure of the Cartesian project. 
1. 
Although the popular image of Descartes portrays him as a sceptic, we must be 
careful with this term. The truly distinctive element in his thought was not his doubt 
regarding the foundations and legitimacy of what pretended to knowledge in his 
time; indeed he lived in a period of great unrest with regard to the fundamental 
conceptions of man, world, and God. I have attempted to show in previous chapters 
the extent to which Galileo's new conception of science challenged some of the most 
fundamental tenets of ancient and medieval physics. Other examples of discontent 
with traditional knowledge, both in its specific doctrines and in its claim to authority, 
can be found in the writings of Bacon and Montaigne.292 The truly distinctive aspect 
of Descartes philosophical work lies in the manner in which he turns this uneasiness 
with regard to the foundations of traditional knowledge into a method of securing 
290 This reading of Descartes has been developed in much greater detail than I can go into here by 
Richard Campbell in chapter 9 of his Truth and Historicity. Certain elements of this 
interpretation have also been supported by Robert Stoothoff, see his 'Descartes' Dilemma', 
in The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 39 (1989), pp294-307. 
291 It is crucial to note that this coincidence of subjective and objective orders does not come about 
· because the objective order of being is nothing but what the subject can know with necessity. 
As I will argue, this is the mistake that Heidegger makes in his interpretation of Descartes' 
ontology. For Descartes, the objective order of being stems from God. We can be assured 
that knowledge of our clear and distinct ideas is also knowledge of this objective order 
because God exists, he is our creator and he is not a deceiver. 
292 See Michel de Montaigne, The Essays of Michel de Montaigne, trans. M. A. Screech, (Allen Lane, 
London, 1991) and Francis Bacon The Advancement of Learning, ed. G. W. Kitchin, (Heron 
Books, London, 1977). 
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knowledge. Thus, as Alexandre Koyre has pointed out, it is important to distinguish 
between two modes of doubt when discussing Descartes' work. 293 Descartes begins 
from a position in which the truth of all that had previously been taken to be 
indubitable was being questioned. The scepticism of Montaigne provides a fine 
example of this as he emphasises the propensity of man to accept as true and right 
what is ultimately the product of incomplete deliberations, mere resemblances, 
contingent traditions, and prejudices. 294 
Thus, there is a preliminary sense of doubt which notes the diversity of opinions in 
the world and the frailty of our faculties and is unable to find a means of establishing 
certainty for itself. It is the genius of Descartes to have actively taken up this doubt 
and employed it as a means of establishing a ground for scientia. It is important, 
therefore, not to interpret Descartes as a sceptic, as one who doubts the possibility of 
attaining any truths. His doubt is rather a method of overcoming this original 
scepticism by determining what is true, evident, and necessary. Heidegger has a 
similar point in mind when he argues that 'Descartes does not doubt because he is a 
sceptic; rather, he must become a doubter because he posits the mathematical as the 
absolute ground and seeks for all knowledge a foundation that will be in accord with 
it.'295 That is to say, although he accepts that it is difficult to discern,. Descartes does 
not lack faith that necessary knowledge can be found. He only doubts in order to 
attain an unshakeable foundation for necessary knowledge. 
The relationship between knowledge and doubt becomes clearer if we take careful 
note of Descartes' use of the epistemological terms, scientia and cognitio. Both 
these terms are commonly translated as 'knowledge', however, this effaces the 
crucial difference between them. In fact, scientia is employed by Descartes to name 
a very restricted sort of cognitio. 'Knowledge' in this restricted sense is only used to 
characterise cognition of necessary truths. This understanding of 'scientific' 
knowledge as necessary knowledge stems from the Aristotelian and medieval 
293 See Koyre's introduction to Descartes: Philosophical Writings, trans. and ed. by E. Anscombe and 
P. T. Geach, (Nelson and Sons, New York, 1954). Caton and Judovitz also make this point 
and provide discussions of the relationship between ancient scepticism and Cartesian doubt. 
See chapter 1 and appendix B ofHiram Caton, The Origin of Subjectivity, (Yale University 
Press, New Haven and London, 1973), and chapter 4 .of Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and 
Representation in Descartes, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988). 
294 Although all of his essays are written with a sceptical tone regarding the abilities of man to attain 
the truth, see in particular Montaigne's first and twenty first essays, 'Of Custom, and that we 
should not Easily Change a Law Received', and 'Of Experience'. 
295 Heidegger, What is a Thing?, p103. 
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tradition of scientific explanation. Within that tradition, as I have shown in previous 
chapters, the behaviour of a natural entity is necessarily determined by its form. 
Scientific explanation was achieved by determining the necessary elements in any 
particular event. It is the purely intelligible forms which provide the ground upon 
which such necessary knowledge is built, as we are able to give a definition of them 
that is universally true. Although entities do not always act in accordance with their 
form, this is the result of the contingent fact that they exist alongside other entities 
which may impose a forced or unnatural action upon them. This tradition, of which 
Descartes remained a part, understands 'scientific' knowledge, in its strictest sense, 
as the recognition of the necessary and unchanging aspects of existents. 
If we take into account Descartes' interest in the new mathematical sciences, the 
widespread uncertainty about the scope of scientia, and his ambition to establish a 
new foundation for such necessary knowledge, then the import of his method of 
doubt becomes clear. He is working with the simple idea that what may possibly be 
false cannot be necessary and thereby cannot provide the foundation of scientia. 
Certainty plays only a negative role in this project because Descartes actually 
employs uncertainty as a criterion of contingent knowledge. It is true that he 
eventually comes to equate subjective certainty with truth, however, this is an 
assumption that he feels justified in making only after he has proved the existence of 
God. Thus, Descartes is not interested in truth as such but in providing a necessary 
ground for scientific knowledge by establishing the existence of God. Descartes' 
understanding of truth is difficult for modem readers to understand as it relies upon a 
distinctly pre-modem equation of truth and reality. Yet this was not considered to be 
a problem by Descartes himself and it is a mistake to interpret his method of doubt as 
an attempt to overcome scepticism as to whether nominal essences resemble real 
essences. His project is to establish, through the method of doubt, what is in fact 
necessary rather than what we commonly take to be necessary. Descartes retains the 
Aristotelian and medieval understanding of scientific knowledge as knowledge of the 
necessary. However, he departs from that tradition in terms of what he takes to be 
necessary. He seeks to establish a mathematical science rather than a science which 
is dependent on substantial forms. I will return to Descartes' understanding of truth 
shortly. 
That Descartes thought his method of doubt was a means of re-establishing a ground 
for scientia, is well illustrated by Hobbes' objection to Descartes' first meditation 
that 'this very matter of the uncertainty of sensible things has been discussed by 
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Plato and other ancient philosophers; and it is a common observation how hard it is 
to tell waking life from dreams. So I am sorry that so excellent an author of new 
speculations should publish this old stuff.' Descartes replies that in rehearsing these 
doubts he aimed 'partly to accustom the reader's mind to consider intelligible objects 
and distinguish them from corporeal things ... partly, to reply to them in the 
subsequent meditations; and partly, also, to show how solid are the truths I set forth 
later on, since they cannot be sapped by such metaphysical doubts.' 296 This passage 
demonstrates that Descartes understands necessary knowledge and doubt to be 
incompatible. On this basis he can identify knowledge which is dubitable with mere 
cognitio. Although scepticism was very common in the 1 ih century, and indeed has 
a philosophical history stretching back to the ancient Greeks, Descartes' employment 
of doubt as a tool for the securing of necessary knowledge remains original. 
Descartes begins his Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason 
and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences with an account of the confusion that he was 
left in after completing his studies. He writes that the diversity of opinions that he 
found in his studies led him to abandon 'the study ofletters all together' and resolve 
to 'study no other science than that which I could find within myself or else in the 
great book of the world' .297 However, he declares thatafter a period of travelling he 
found that there was no basis for science to be found in the behaviour of men for he 
noticed in this field 'almost as much diversity as I had done earlier among the 
opinions of philosophers. ' 298 Having thus gained experience of the great diversity of 
opinion in both the sciences and in the traditions and practices of various peoples, 
Descartes resolved to study only himself in order that he may correctly choose which 
paths he should follow. In this enterprise he states that he was much more successful 
than he would have been had he 'never left either my country or my books. ' 299 
As he cannot tum to the wisdom of philosophers or that of tradition, since there 
appears to be great diversity and disagreement in both these areas, Descartes 
proposes to subject all his ideas to a review. That is, he means to test them all as to 
whether they can be doubted or not. We can see from this approach that he is 
296 Emphasis added. See Hobbes' first objection to Meditation I, in Descartes: Philosophical 
Writings, p127. 
297 Rene Descartes, 'Discourse on the Method of Properly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking 
the Truth in the Sciences', in Discourse on Method and the Meditations, trans F. E Sutcliffe, 
(Penguin Books, London, 1968), p33. 
298 Descartes, 'Discourse on the Method', p33. 
299 Descartes, 'Discourse on the Method', p34. 
Chapter Five 167 
operating with a very limited idea of what can be called knowledge. If immunity to 
doubt is our criterion of knowledge then knowledge is restricted to what we can see 
is necessarily true. 300 If it is possible to gain a ground which cannot be doubted, then 
proceeding methodically from this ground our store of knowledge can be increased. 
Descartes' method for conducting this examination is expressed in four rules which 
are as follows. First, 'never to accept anything as true that I did not know to be 
evidently so'. Second, 'to divide each of the difficulties that I was examining into as 
many parts as might be possible and necessary in order to solve it.' Third, 'to 
conduct my thoughts in an orderly way, beginning with the simplest objects and the 
easiest to know, in order to climb gradually, as by degrees, as far as the knowledge of 
the most complex'. Fourth, 'everywhere to make such complete enumerations and 
such general reviews that I would be sure to have omitted nothing. ' 301 
This procedure is explicitly derived from that of mathematical and geometrical 
proofs, the great merit of which is that one can advance from the known to the 
unknown without sacrificing necessity at any stage. Thus, Descartes separates the 
essence of mathematical thinking from its specific application to numbers and 
figures, and conceives of this thinking as the strict determination of relationships and 
orders between objects regardless of their specific nature. He writes in his Rules for 
the Direction of the Mind that: 
... as I considered the matter carefully it gradually came to light that all those matters 
only were referred to Mathematics in which order and measurement are investigated, 
and that it makes no difference whether it be in numbers, figures, stars, sounds, or 
other objects, that the question of measurement arises. I saw consequently that there 
must be some general science to explain that element as a whole which gives rise to 
problems about order and measurement, restricted as these are to no special subject 
matter. This I perceived was called 'Universal Mathematics,' .... 302 
Each new step in his method must be founded upon what is already known. The 
trustworthiness of long chains of reasoning, in which we are otherwise likely to go 
astray either through relying upon an unexamined premise or by failing to assure the 
relationship between what is already known and a new conjecture, can be secured by 
this approach if it is first possible to find a necessary foundation from which to 
300 See chapter 9 of Campbell, Truth and Historicity, for a discussion of Descartes' careful use of 
scientia to name a very restricted form of cognitio, that is knowledge of necessary truths. 
301 Descartes, 'Discourse on Method', p41. 
302 Rene Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1931), trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross, 
vol. 1, p13. 
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begin. This indubitable beginning is required because Descartes aspires to a 
universal mathematics which would encompass all that can be known. As he can 
rely upon no knowledge that has not been arrived at by the method he is proposing, 
he must search for an absolute beginning that does not itself rest upon any other 
considerations. 
2. 
I turn now to Descartes' Meditations as it is here that he develops his classical 
argument that there is one principle that survives the most radical doubt and that if 
we reason carefully from this principle then we can develop a sound foundation for . 
scientia. The means by which this principle is determined is once again the method 
of doubt. In this instance, however, Descartes doubts not only the opinions he has 
obtained from tradition, the philosophers, and the scientists, but also all the evidence 
of his senses. He writes that 'Whatever I have up to now accepted as most true I 
have acquired either from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I 
have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those 
who have deceived us even once. ' 303 
Descartes now goes a crucial step further and employs his method of doubt in a more 
radical manner than is evident in his previous works. He extends his method to 
mathematics and geometry, to those regions of knowledge which are subjectively 
necessary. He contrives to doubt that which appears utterly necessary by posing a 
question with regard to God: 
How do I know that he has not brought it about that there is no earth, no sky, no 
extended thing, no shape, no size, no place, while at the same time ensuring that all 
these things appear to me to exist just as they do now? What is more, since I 
sometimes believe that others go astray in cases where they think they have the most 
perfect knowledge, may I not similarly go wrong every time I add two and three or 
count the sides of a square, or in some simpler matter, if that is imaginable?304 
Descartes goes on to argue that rather than God causing such deception, as this 
would be inconsistent with His perfection, we can imagine that a 'malicious demon' 
could systematically mislead us. Every time we add two and three we get five, and 
we always come to the same answer when we count the sides of a square, thus the 
303 Rene Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy', in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 
trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1984), vol. II, p12. 
304 Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy', p14. 
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truths of mathematics and geometry seem utterly necessary to us. Despite this 
subjective necessity, it is conceivable that my constitution is such that I am 
systematically wrong in my conclusions, even about those mathematical truths which 
seem to hold with complete necessity. Although these judgements are subjectively 
necessary, they may bear no relationship to reality andtherefore not hold objectively. 
Thus, for all Descartes knows at this stage of his meditations, he may have a nature 
such that he constantly goes wrong. He takes this conclusion to hold even if we 
suppose that we are not created by God but are merely the products of various chains 
of events. For in that case we are the products of chance and are even more likely to 
go astray. 305 
Having suspended his judgement regarding the reality of all things, Descartes makes 
the observation that whether or not our ideas correspond with reality beyond our 
minds, does not affect the fact that we do in fact have these ideas. We come now to 
his famous claim that every time I think, I must also exist. The basis of this claim 
lies in the fact that regardless of whether the contents of all my thoughts are 
fantasies, it is nevertheless the case that I must exist in order to be so deceived.306 
On this point I can never be wrong, for no matter how often I take other beings to 
exist when they do not, or as not being when they are, or as being other than they are, 
my own being is assured in this conceiving. 
Although it does not appear in this form in his Meditations, Descartes' earlier 
formulation of his findings in the phrase 'Cogito ergo sum', or 'I think, therefore I 
am', can give the impression that he is presenting an inference.307 That is, because of 
the presence of the term "ergo", or "therefore'', it may appear that Descartes is 
inferring existence from thought. Thus, it might be thought that he is presenting an 
argument along these lines, 'Insofar as I think, I am. I think, therefore I am.' This is 
not the case, however, as such an argument merely restates, in its major premise, the 
vital point of Descartes discussion. 308 Through his method of doubt, Descartes 
305 This is a somewhat controversial interpretation of Descartes' intentions in this passage. For a more 
detailed interpretation of this argument as a dilemma which depends on Descartes' assumed 
ignorance at that stage of the meditations, see Robert Stoothoff, 'Descartes' Dilemma', in 
The Philosophical Quarterly, vol.39 (1989), pp294-307. Also see Chapter 9 of Richard 
Campbell's Truth and Historicity. 
306 See Descartes 2nd meditation for this discussion. 
307 For this formulation see Descartes, 'Discourse on the Method', p53. 
308 Descartes explicitly makes this point in his second set of replies. There he writes 'And when we 
become aware that we are thinking things, this is a primary notion which is not derived by 
means of any syllogism. When someone says 'I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist', he 
does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as 
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eliminates everything in his idea of himself of which he cannot be certain. Thus, he 
argues that he cannot take himself to be a body, or a rational animal, for these 
definitions presuppose knowledge that was proven to be uncertain by the method of 
doubt. Yet even if we leave all of this out of consideration, Descartes sees that he 
cannot be nothing, he must be at least a thinking thing. He argues that 'this 
proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or 
conceived in my mind. ' 309 In coming to a clear and distinct idea of himself, 
Descartes also assures himself of his reality. As I will demonstrate later, this 
relationship between clear and distinct ideas and reality, lies at the heart of 
Descartes' concept of truth. 
3. 
Descartes' epistemological claims are bound up with his understanding of substance 
in a way that is potentially confusing. For this reason I will provide an account of his 
essentially medieval conception of substance before I return to his attempt to provide 
an unshakeable basis for scientia. Descartes provides two definitions of substance 
which may initially appear to be contradictory .310 In his Principles of Philosophy, he 
writes that 'We can mean by substance nothing other than a thing existing in such a 
manner that it has need of no other thing in order to exist. There can indeed be only 
one substance conceived as needing absolutely no other thing in order to exist; 
namely God.' 311 Ifwe employ this definition strictly then only God can be a true 
substance. However, Descartes also uses this definition to refer to the creatures of 
God, provided that they rely for their existence only upon God and not another 
creature. There are, for Descartes, two substances that have this characteristic. He 
argues that 'corporeal substance and mind ... can be brought under this common 
concept: things that need only the co-operation of God in order to exist. ' 312 
However, Descartes also speaks of substance as that which is the bearer of qualities 
and attributes. Therefore substance can also be considered as the subject of various 
predicates. The question now is whether these two accounts of substance can be 
reconciled with one another. In fact they are quite closely connected and, as 
something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind.' See 'Objections and Replies', in 
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. II. plOO. 
309 Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy', p 17. 
310 R. S. Woolhouse provides a good discussion of Descartes' position on substance which I have in 
part relied upon here. See chapter 2 of his Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The concept of 
Substance in Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics, (Routledge, London and New York, 1993). 
311 Descartes, 'Principles of Philosophy', in Philosophical Writings, p192. 
312 Descartes, 'Principles of Philosophy', p192. 
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Woolhouse has argued, we need only see that the common theme in the two accounts 
is one of degrees of dependence.313 Thus, in the first account we see that God is in 
the strictest sense a substance as he depends only upon himself in order to be. 
However, aside from God there are created substances which depend only upon the 
co-operation of God for their being. In the second account we see that it is possible 
to distinguish two orders of created beings, those which were already identified as 
needing only the co-operation of God, and those which need both the co-operation of 
God and another created substance. This final category refers to the attributes of 
created substances. 
Woolhouse points out that Descartes does not take the relationship of dependence to 
be the same between God and created substance, and created substance and its 
accidents. The accidents of created substance are not created by that substance, but 
rather logically rely upon such substance. This is different from the causal 
relationship that exists between God and both created substance and its accidents.314 
The accidents depend upon substance in the sense that they imply the substance on 
which they depend. An example of this would be that all the variations of colour are 
dependent upon shape for it is not possible to have something that is coloured that 
does not also have a shape. It is possible to understand the concept of a shape 
independently of any colour, however, the reverse is not true. The point here is that 
although substances always have accidents, there is an order of necessity to these 
accidents. If we follow this order, it should be possible to determine which attributes 
a substance must necessarily possess. Descartes contends that there are in fact two 
substances whose necessary characteristics are, respectively, to be extended and to be 
thinking. Here we come to the concepts of res extensa and res cogitans. All the 
attributes of the mind are dependent upon a thinking substance, and all the attributes 
of bodies are dependent upon an extended substance. 
That Descartes understands substance in this way is clear from his discussion of the 
piece of wax in his second Meditation. There he describes the many attributes of a 
piece of wax: ' .. .it has not yet quite lost the taste of the honey; it retains some of the 
scent of the flowers from which it was gathered; its colour, shape and size are plain 
to see; it is hard, cold and can be handled without difficulty; if you rap it with your 
knuckle it makes a sound.'315 All these matters seem to be required for our 
313 Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, pl6. 
314 See Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, pl 7. 
315 Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy', p20. 
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knowledge of a body, and yet if the wax were to be placed in front of a fire, all these 
attributes are transformed. Nonetheless, it is still the case that the wax itself persists 
throughout these alterations. Thus, we may distinguish between a substance and its 
accidents. He writes of the wax after it has been melted, 'But does the same wax 
remain? It must be admitted that it does; no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise. 
So what was it in the wax that I understood with such distinctness? Evidently none 
of the features which I arrived at by means of the senses; for whatever came under 
taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now altered - yet the wax remains. ' 316 
The fact that we are able to separate the infinitely variable accidents of an object 
from the substance which remains throughout all such variations, leads Descartes to 
dismiss the senses as a source of scientia about external bodies. Although objects 
always have some attributes, the nature of these attributes is variable. Given that 
Descartes is· seeking necessary knowledge, he cannot rely upon the accidental 
attributes of extended substance that we gain from·the senses. Attributes like colour, 
hardness, warmth, smell,· and sound can provide no basis for scientific knowledge as 
they may alter without a change in the substance which underlies them. 
Significantly, the two substances Descartes arrives at, res extensa and res cogitans, 
are bound together by the mathematical. As we have seen from the wax example, 
Descartes excludes all the qualitative attributes from extended substance itself and 
attributes them to the action of this substance upon the senses of man. In essence, 
Descartes' conception of the physical is a purely quantitative one. As Leclerc 
describes the matter, 'All of what Aristotle had designated as the qualitative, as 
distinct from the quantitative, attributes of the physical existent were, in the new 
doctrine, wholly extruded from the physical and were ascribed entirely to mind, as 
subjective appearances to mind of the exclusively quantitative physical.' 317 The 
difficulties that were encountered in the attempt to develop a mathematical physical 
science from within an Aristotelian framework, have already been discussed in the 
preceding chapter on Galileo and I will not repeat them here. However, it is 
important to note that Descartes' hope of developing a physical science based 
entirely on the ideas of extended substance and its motion contained some deep 
contradictions. 
316 Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy', p20. 
317 Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence, p194. 
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Not only is the physical, as res extensa, essentially the actually existing 
mathematical, but the mathematical is also present in the res cogitans. Although 
these two substances are distinct, they are related in an important way. Again, 
Leclerc clearly brings this out when he argues that' ... for Descartes the science of 
pure mathematics is the knowledge of the essence of the physical, knowledge as such 
consisting in the intellectual possession of the forms constituting the very essence or 
being of the physical.'318 However, for Descartes, we do not gain our mathematical 
ideas by sifting the quantitative from the qualitative elements of our experience; 
rather they are given to us directly by God and we possess them as innate ideas. 
Thus, our thinking, insofar as it is to give us scientia, involves methodically 
developing the implications of the clear and distinct ideas that we have received from 
God. Descartes introduces 'clarity' and 'distinctness' as criteria for determining 
which ideas can give us certainty, that is, can be the basis of necessary knowledge. 
He writes in his Discourse on Method: 
And having noticed that there is nothing at all in this, I think, therefore I am, which 
assures me that I am speaking the truth, exceptthat I see very clearly that in order to 
think one must exist, I judged that I could take it to be a general rule that the things 
we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true, but that there is nevertheless 
some difficulty in being able to recognize for certain which are the things we see 
distinctly.319 
Once we have come to a clear and distinct conception of a substance, that is we do 
not confuse it with other substances or accidents, then we can take it that we have 
grasped its essence. In the example above, Descartes argues that 'I am thinking, 
therefore I exist' must be true because once we clearly conceive of a thinking 
substance we must recognise its reality. Provided that we proceed methodically, we 
can then derive further knowledge from these clearly and distinctly conceived 
premises. Thus, not only is the physical essentially mathematical for Descartes, 
thought too must proceed according to mathematical methods if it is to attain truth. 
4. 
I return now to Descartes' attempt to establish scientia on the basis of the certain 
. principle that when I think, I exist. Descartes dismisses the evidence of his senses 
and introduces, through the discussion of the malicious demon, the doubt that he may 
have a nature such that he goes systematically wrong in matters that are obvious and 
318 Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence, p195. 
319 Descartes, 'Discourse on the Method', p54. 
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seemingly necessary. Yet he remains confident that knowledge of reality is possible. 
Such a position seems untenable; for how can Descartes be sure that his ideas can be 
relied upon to give him any knowledge of reality? I have shown that he takes 
certainty, clarity, and distinctness, to be criteria of ideas which give us scientia. 
Indeed, a passage from his first meditation demonstrates that Descartes understands 
clear and distinct ideas as providing us with knowledge of reality. He notes that 
Painters are able to produce images of mythical scenes, of 'Sirens and Satyrs' from 
elements which are themselves indubitably real. Thus, through combining elements 
from reality such as heads, hands, arms and so on, in ways that we do not find in 
reality they are able to build up an image that has no basis in reality. However, no 
matter how confused we are with regard to which creatures in a painting can be 
found in reality, it remains the case that a painting is made up of a mixture of real 
and distinct colours. Descartes claims this is also true of' ... corporeal nature in 
general, and its extension; the shape of extended things; the quantity, or size and 
number of these things; the place in which they may exist, the time through which 
they may endure, and so on.' 320 These aspects are the primary qualities of which we 
can be most certain. On this basis Descartes claims that the sciences of arithmetic 
and geometry are more certain than those of physics, astronomy, and medicine, 
because they concern themselves only with these underlying forms, not with the 
composite and secondary matters that arise from them. These sciences do not 
consider whether the forms exist beyond the mind, they merely study their natures. 
However, physics must concern itself with the real objects of nature and therefore the 
question of whether our ideas can be considered a reliable guide to reality. 
As I have already mentioned, Descartes considered knowledge of mathematics and 
geometry to be knowledge of the essence of the physical realm. The question now is 
with what right does he assert the objective validity of scientific knowledge given 
that his criteria for determining which of our ideas are true are merely criteria of 
subjective certainty. How is it that Descartes does not come to the conclusion that 
Locke put forward in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, namely that 
we can only have knowledge of nominal essences? It seems that Descartes himself 
was certainly aware of this problem, indeed his postulation of a malicious demon in 
the Meditations is designed to state this objection in its most extreme form. 
Descartes replies to this 'metaphysical doubt' by appealing to the existence of God in 
his third meditation. However, I will argue that this reply presupposes an 
320 Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy', p14. 
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understanding of truth as equivalent to the reality of an idea. This account of truth 
underpins Descartes' thinking and fundamentally differentiates him from Locke and 
his successors. 
It may seem from the structure of his metaphysical doubt that Descartes is operating 
with a conception of truth as the correspondence of an idea and the external reality it 
purports to represent. However, Descartes' resolution of this doubt demonstrates that 
his conception of truth is rather different. He argues that ' ... as soon as the 
opportunity arises I must examine whether there is a God, and if there is, whether he 
can be a deceiver. For ifl do not know this, it seems that I can never be quite certain 
about anything else. ' 321 In order to determine whether God exists, Descartes 
examines a particular class of his thoughts. He examines his 'ideas' which, strictly 
speaking,·are only those thoughts which are the 'images of things' and are therefore 
the bearers of truth and falsity. With this restriction, he rules out of consideration 
other elements that may accompany our ideas, such as volitions, emotions, and 
judgements. Furthermore, as he is intending to establish the existence of God he 
examines only those ideas which he takes to resemble things which exist outside of 
himself. Although he has long thought that many things do in fact exist outside 
himself, Descartes argues that he has not come to this conclusion through sound 
reasoning but merely through blind impulse. His lack of secure knowledge about his 
own nature makes it impossible for him to tell whether his convictions about external 
objects are not merely the result of a faculty, internal to himself, of which he is not 
aware.322 
Descartes' attempt to prove the existence of God rests upon two very controversial 
claims. His first point is that although there is no inequality between his ideas so 
long as we consider them merely as the accidents of a thinking substance, they do 
contain different levels of 'objective reality' according to the different objects they 
represent. Descartes is not using the term 'reality' in the modem sense, rather it 
refers to the 'essence' or 'whatness' ofa thing. The 'reality' of something, in this 
sense, remains the same whether it exists or is a mere possibility. Heidegger makes.a 
note of this in his discussion of Kant's claim that being is not a real predicate. There 
he writes that 'Descartes here, too, takes realitas in the sense mentioned above-the 
sense of realness or res-ness, German Sachheit-equivalent to the scholastic 
321 Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy', p25. 
322 Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy', p27. 
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quidditas [whatness, somethingnessj.323 I will return to Heidegger's reading of 
Kant's thesis about being as it is important for his account of subjectivity. 
Returning to Descartes' argument with this concept of reality in mind, we can 
understand his argument that 'Undoubtedly, the ideas which represent substances to 
me amount to something more and, so to speak, contain within themselves more 
objective reality than the ideas which merely represent modes or accidents. ' 324 By 
this he means that the essence of an attribute is logically dependent upon a substance. 
Descartes relied heavily upon the assumption that there is an evident hierarchy of 
beings leading from the most to the least perfect, a position that stems from the 
medieval equation of being with being created by God. We can trace this hierarchy 
in Descartes' concept of substance. As God is dependent only on himself for his 
being, he is the only true substance. His creatures are substances only if we discount 
their dependence on God, and the accidents of these created substances stand even 
further removed from true substantiality. 
In the passage quoted above, however, Descartes is speaking not of substances 
themselves, but of ideas and their 'objective reality'. This is a puzzling term, 
however, something of its meaning remains in the expression 'object of thought' 
which is used to refer not directly to a person, for example, but to that person insofar 
as we think about them. Thus, the very same person exists both in themselves and as 
an object of my thought. Descartes explains this in more detail in his reply to the 
first set of objections to the Meditations. Taking the sun as an example, he writes: 
By this I mean that the idea of the sun itself existing in the intellect - not of course 
formally existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existing, i.e. in the way 
in which objects normally are in the intellect. Now this mode of being is of course 
much less perfect than that possessed by things which exist outside the intellect; but, 
as I did explain, it is not therefore simply nothing.325 
Although our ideas do not have the same level of perfection as external objects do, 
presumably because they are merely the modes or accidents of thinking substance 
whereas external beings are parts of extended substance, they are nevertheless 
something. Furthermore, Descartes is arguing that it is the same thing that exists 
both as an idea and as an external reality. 
323 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter, (Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington, 1982), p38. 
324 Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy', p28. 
325 Descartes, 'Objections and Replies', p75. 
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The second controversial claim that Descartes makes in his proof of God's existence 
is as follows: 
Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much <reality> 
in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause. For where, I ask, could 
the effect get its reality from, if not from the cause? And how could the cause give it 
to the effect unless it possessed it? It follows from this that something cannot arise 
from nothing, and also that what is more perfect - that is, contains in itself more 
reality- cannot arise from what is less perfect.326 
This is a further determination of the hierarchical picture of beings that I outlined 
above. Now Descartes is claiming not only that there is a hierarchy of perfection or 
reality, but also that this hierarchy is causally structured. A higher state of perfection 
cannot arise from a lower state, rather all perfection, being, and truth, stern from 
God. There is not space here to explain the origins of this view, however, I note in 
passing that it is a form of neo-Platonisrn.327 
On the basis of these two claims, along with the presence within him of the idea of a 
perfect God, Descartes argues that we can conclude that God exists. He argues that 
although his many other ideas could be the products of his own nature, his idea of an 
infinite and perfect God must have been caused by such a God. The idea of such a 
God contains the highest possible 'objective reality', certainly far greater than that 
contained in my idea of myself as a finite creature. Therefore only God himself 
could have produced such an idea, neither Descartes himself nor any intermediate 
being between man and God could have caused an idea with such a degree of 
objective reality. 
With this result, Descartes is in a position to assert that his clear and distinct ideas 
give him knowledge of external objects. He summarises his argument at the end of 
the third meditation: 
I recognise that it would be impossible for me to exist with the kind of nature I have 
- that is, having within me the idea of God - were it not the case that God really 
existed. By 'God' I mean the very being the idea of whom is within me, that is, the 
possessor of all the perfections which I cannot grasp, but can somehow reach in my 
thought, who is subject to no defects whatsoever. It is clear enough from this that he 
326 Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy', p28. 
327 Ivor Leclerc provides a good discussion of this issue in his article 'The Ontology of Descartes', in 
Review of Metaphysics, vol. 34 (1980), pp297-323. 
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cannot be a deceiver, since it is manifest by the natural light that all fraud and 
deception depend upon some defect.328 
On the basis of his demonstrating that God exists and that man gains his nature from 
God, Descartes claims that the truth of his clear and distinct ideas is assured. Given 
the perfection of God, it is not possible that he should be the source of deception or 
falsehood. Therefore man's nature cannot be such that he systematically goes wrong 
when he perceives necessary truths, nor can his innate ideas, which he also receives 
from God, fail to be true. Thus, at the conclusion of the third meditation Descartes 
believes that he has demonstrated his clear and distinct ideas give him knowledge of 
reality, that is they are true. This is precisely what was required to support his 
understanding of mathematics and geometrical knowledge as knowledge of the 
essence of extended substance. The proof of God's existence differentiates 
Descartes from atheist mathematicians and geometers. Whilst he concedes that an 
atheist may be 'clearly aware that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
angles', this 'awareness (cognitio) of his is not true knowledge (scientia), since no 
act of awareness ( cognitio) that can be rendered doubtful seems fit to be called 
knowledge (scientia).' 329 
Significantly, Descartes does not lay claim to scientia at the conclusion of his third 
meditation. He only makes this claim after he has provided another proof of God's 
existence in the fifth meditation. The fact that Descartes provides two proofs of the 
existence of God, along with the fact that he does not claim to have established 
scientia until after the second proof, provides strong evidence that he employed these 
proofs for two distinct purposes. 330 Descartes' first proof of God's existence depends 
ultimately on his argument that the proposition 'I exist" is necessarily true whenever 
I entertain it. On this basis he ascends, through a discussion of the objective reality 
of his ideas, to the claim that God exists and that as He cannot be a deceiver, we can 
take as true those ideas which we clearly and distinctly perceive. Yet the conclusions 
of this proof can only be contingently true as they rest upon the contingent existence 
of Descartes and his idea of God. If Descartes is to establish that his clear and 
328 Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy', p35. 
329 I have inserted the terms scientia and cognitio in this passage to emphasise the point made by the 
translators in a footnote on the difference between awareness and knowledge. Descartes, 
'Objections and Replies', plOl. 
330 See the fmal paragraph of the fifth meditation for this claim to scientia in 'Meditations on First 
Philosophy', p49. 
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distinct ideas give him scientia, he must establish that these ideas are necessarily 
true. 
This appears to be the purpose of the second proof of God's existence. This proof 
turns on the claim that the essence of God includes His existence. Although we can 
distinguish between the essence and the existence of every other being, Descartes 
argues that 'it is just as much of a contradiction to think of God (that is, a supremely 
perfect being) lacking existence (that is, lacking a perfection), as it is to think of a 
mountain without a valley.'331 Working with this idea of God, and with the earlier 
claim that what he clearly and distinctly conceives is true, Descartes claims that God 
necessarily exists. Given that God necessarily exists, that everything depends upon 
Him, and that He is not a deceiver, Descartes is able to claim not only that his clear 
and distinct ideas are true, but that they are necessarily true. It is only after this 
second proof that Descartes lays claim to perfect knowledge, or scientia. 
5. 
As I mentioned above, this argument is easily misunderstood if we read Descartes as 
holding a correspondence theory of truth. His concern is not whether he can be 
certain that his ideas correspond with external objects, rather he aims to demonstrate 
the reality of our clear and distinct ideas. That Descartes equates reality and truth is 
clear from the manner in which he uses these terms interchangeably. In his second 
set of replies he writes: 
Now everything real which is in us must have been bestowed on us by God (this was 
proved when his existence was proved); moreover, we have a real faculty for 
recognizing the truth and distinguishing it from falsehood, as is clear merely from 
the fact that we have within us ideas of truth and falsehood. Hence this faculty must 
tend towards the truth, at least when we use it correctly (that is, by assenting only to 
what we clearly and distinctly perceive, for no other correct method of employing 
this faculty can be imagined).332 
We need only determine which of our ideas are real, that is contain objective reality, 
in order to be assured of their truth. Moreover, as God is not a deceiver, he must 
have made us such that we have a faculty for recognising the truth. This thought is 
the foundation of Descartes' claim that once he conceives of himself as a thinking 
substance he cannot but see that he exists. He says that the movement from his clear 
and distinct idea of himself as a thinking thing to the knowledge of his existence, is 
331 Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy', p46. 
332 Descartes, 'Objections and Replies', p103. 
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not a deduction but a 'simple intuition of the mind' .333 Indeed, as we have this real 
faculty for distinguishing the truth and our ideas are the real products of God, 
Descartes' problem is to explain how we so frequently fall into error. Given that we 
are created by God, there can be no inherent imperfection in our faculty of 
understanding, rather error arises when our will over reaches our understanding such 
that we assent to things that we do not clearly understand. In this way the will and 
the understanding, which are not faulty in themselves, give rise to error. Descartes' 
method of doubt essentially aims at the elimination of this source of error by refusing 
his assent to everything that he does not clearly and distinctly perceive. If this is 
achieved, then he will arrive at the truth in accordance with his God-given 
constitution. 
This interpretation of Descartes' understanding of truth completes my examination of 
his project in the Meditations. There are a great many issues that I do not have space 
to discuss adequately here. Of particular relevance to the interpretation that I have 
been putting forward are the alleged circularity of Descartes' proof of God's 
existence in the third meditation and his apparent return to this issue in the fifth 
meditation. However, I have explored enough of Descartes' project to establish that 
his concepts of truth, substance, and scientia, remain closer to medieval philosophy 
than they do to modern philosophy. Naturally this division of modern and medieval 
philosophy depends upon the criteria that one employs. Thus, if we consider 
Descartes' understanding of nature as a single unified system, of ideas as mental 
realities, and of subjectivity as the foundation of certainty, he seems distinctly 
modern. Despite the complexities of Descartes' philosophy, Heidegger argues that 
he marks the beginning of the modern age. I turn now to an examination of his 
interpretation. 
6. 
Heidegger's own interpretation of Descartes is so entangled in his understanding of 
the modern age as determined by the essence of technology that it is impossible to 
separate the two. The picture of Descartes that is developed in his Nietzsche lectures, 
and The Age of the World Picture, is entirely focused on demonstrating that a new 
understanding of subjectivity emerges in his thought. This is used in turn to place 
Descartes at the centre of a contrast between the conceptions of subjectivity that 
reign over the ancient Greek thinking of Protagoras, and the modern thinking of 
333 Descartes, 'Objections and Replies', p 100. 
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Nietzsche. Descartes, according to this schema, is the first to give voice to the 
essential element of the modem age because he thinks through the ontological 
implications of man's new self-assertiveness. This new position represents, for 
Heidegger, both a break with the ancient Greek understanding of man's relationship 
with beings, and the first elements in a movement that culminates in Nietzsche's 
metaphysics of the will to power. He gives a summary of this framework in his 
Nietzsche lecture series. He writes there: 
At the beginning of modem philosophy stands Descartes' statement: Ego cogito, 
ergo sum, "I think, therefore I am." All consciousness of things and of beings as a 
whole is referred back to the self-consciousness of the human subject as the 
unshakeable ground of all certainty. The reality of the real is representedness 
through and for the representing subject. Nietzsche's doctrine, which makes 
everything that is, and as it is, into the "property and product of man," merely carries 
out the final development of Descartes' doctrine, according to which truth is 
grounded on the self-certainty of the human subject.334 
This passage indicates that Heidegger misreads Descartes' position on truth as it is 
only certain truth, that is scientia, that is grounded on self-certainty. According to 
Heidegger, the ultimate significance of Descartes is that he gives voice to a new 
conception of truth in which the beingness of beings, that is the sense in which a 
being is a being, is a matter to be determined by man himself. This reading of 
Descartes is fraught with difficulties for it is clear that Descartes does not himself 
explicitly support anything like the view that Heidegger attributes to him. However, 
this apparent contradiction is not an oversight by Heidegger for he is fully aware that 
Descartes does not understand himself in this way. Heidegger's interpretation of the 
principle 'cogito, ergo sum' is not primarily aimed at clarifying Descartes' own 
understanding of it, but rather at showing that this principle expresses the essential 
elements of modem man's new position with regard to everything else that exists. 
Thus, although Descartes' principle does have an ontological element, it is not 
explicitly intended as a new formulation of the way beings as a whole are.335 
334 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol IV, Nihilism, trans. Frank Capuzzi, (Harper &Row, San Francisco, 
1982), p86. 
335 It is certainly true that Descartes provides a new account of what there is with his argument that 
there are only two sorts of things, namely thinking things and extended things. It is also 
undeniable that this distinction has had a profound influence on subsequent philosophy. 
However, Descartes does not think that these realities gain their character or existence by 
virtue of being represented. On these questions he remains firmly of the view that to be is to 
be a creature of God. The distinction between God and his creatures remains the most 
fundamental ontological determination in Descartes' philosophy, not the division of created 
beings into res cogitans and res extensa. 
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However, Heidegger thinks it does express such a new formulation and interprets it 
accordingly. Whilst this means that we must be careful in distinguishing 
Heidegger's account of Descartes from Descartes' own position, it also means that 
we can find in this interpretation a clear account of what Heidegger takes to be the 
essence of the modem age. 
Heidegger argues that when we translate 'cogitare' as 'thinking', we have not truly 
understood anything about the meaning of this term. It is certainly true that 
Descartes' term is not quite equivalent with our term 'thinking', as 'cogitare' is 
meant to denote a broader range of phenomena than we would normally include 
under 'thinking'. The res cogitans, or thinking substance, underlies all mental 
phenomena and therefore all mental phenomena are the attributes of res cogitans. 
Thus, Descartes' concept of cogitare is broad enough to include all mental acts, the 
essence of which he thinks is a certain presence to the self. Descartes writes in his 
Principles of Philosophy: 
By the term conscious experience (cogitationis) I understand everything that takes 
place within ourselves so that we are aware of it (nobis consciis), in so far as it is an 
object of our awareness (conscientia). And so not only acts of the understanding, 
will, and imagination, but even sensations, are here to be taken as experience 
(cogitare). Suppose I say I see (or I am walking) therefore I exist. Ifl take this to 
refer to vision (or walking) as a corporeal action, the conclusion is not absolutely 
certain; for, as often happens during sleep, I may think I am seeing though I do not 
open my eyes ... But ifl take it to refer to the actual sensation or awareness 
( conscientiae) of seeing (or walking), then it is quite certain; for in that case it has 
regard to the mind, and it is the mind alone that has a sense or experience ( cogitat) 
of itself seeing (or walking).336 
I quote this passage at length because it clearly shows Descartes' understanding of 
mental activity as defined by presence to the self. As it is an action of my body, I 
can doubt whether or not I am actually seeing, or merely dreaming I am seeing. I 
cannot however doubt that I have the experience of seeing, because what is in 
question here is not whether the experience corresponds with a physical reality, but 
simply the presentation of the experience to the self.337 
John Cottingham has argued, correctly I think, that the common interpretation (see 
the comments on this topic by Koyre and by Anscombe and Geach in Descartes' 
336 Descartes, 'Principles of Philosophy', pl 83. 
337 The notion that the experience of seeing and the thing that is seen are separate realties can be found 
in William of Ockham' s Tractatus de Successivis. 
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Philosophical Writings) of Descartes' use of 'cogitatio' can be misleading. It is 
certainly true that he uses the term to include will, sensation, and imagination. 
However, this should not be taken to mean that 'cogitatio' does not have an 
'intellectualistic' meaning. By this, Cottingham means that although Descartes 
includes elements which we would not class as 'thoughts' in his definition of 
cogitatio, he does so only in the sense that they can be the object of the mind's 
reflection on itself. Thus, willing, imagining, and sensing, are cogitationes, and can 
be employed in the formula 'cogito, ergo sum', only in so far as 'they include a 
reflective cognitive act-the mind's intellectual awareness of itself which Descartes 
terms conscientia.'338 Descartes does not extend res cogitans to include res volens, 
or res sentiens, rather it is only the mind in so far as it is present to itself that is 
secured by the method of doubt. Heidegger makes the same point through his 
warning that we must be careful when we translate 'cogitare' as 'thinking'. 
Heidegger employs the term 'representation' or 'Vorstellung' to name Descartes' 
concept of experience. This translation is certainly not without significance as it 
allows Heidegger to emphasise what he sees as the hidden reality of modern 
knowledge, namely the grasping of objects in such a way that they are placed before 
the subject and calculated. As David Carr notes, 'In using the language of 
Vorstellung Heidegger is already forging the link between modern metaphysics, 
science, and technology. The term Vorstellung is central to Kant's first Critique, but 
is used there in a way that makes it more or less equivalent to the Latin, French, and 
English term idea (idee) used by his modern predecessors. Perhaps on this basis, 
Heidegger permits himself to read the German term back into Descartes ... '. 339 
The connection Carr makes with Kant's language is interesting because Heidegger 
also spends a great deal of time determining precisely what Kant meant by his 
argument that 'being is not a real predicate'. This matter is closely related to the 
above discussion of Descartes because it addresses the fundamental element of 
Descartes ontological proof of God's existence in the fifth meditation. However, 
Kant's argument is difficult to understand as he appears to maintain both that 'exists' 
is not a real predicate and that existential judgements are synthetic, that is they add 
something to our concept of an object. The resolution of this problem is to be found 
338 John Cottingham, 'Descartes on 'Thought", in The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 28 (1978), 
pp208-214. Quote from p214. 
339 David Carr, The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition, (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999), p20. 
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in Kant's understanding of the term 'real'. As is the case with Descartes, Kant holds 
that the reality of a thing, a res, is its quidditas, or whatness. A real predicate is, 
therefore, a predicate which tells us something about the definition of a thing, not 
about its existence. This understanding of a reality underpins Kant's claim that 
' ... the actual contains nothing more than the merely possible. A hundred actual 
dollars do not contain the least bit more than a hundred possible ones. ' 340 This 
example is meant to illustrate that, provided I have an adequate concept of a thing, 
the existence of this thing will make no difference to this concept. Whether the 
dollars are actual or possible tells us nothing about the reality of 'one hundred 
dollars'. 
Yet it is obvious that an existing dollar is different from a possible dollar and that we 
know more about the dollars in question if we are told that they exist. The key to 
understanding Kant's position is to see that real predicates are not the only type of 
predicate. Rather there are also relational predicates of which 'exists' is an example. 
Thus, for Kant, when we say that something exists, we are not adding a 
determination to the concept of the thing, rather we are saying that the thing holds a 
position in our experience. Kant writes in his Critique of Pure Reason: 
Now if I think of a being as the highest reality (without defect), the question still 
remains whether it exists or not. For although nothing at all is missing in my 
concept of the possible real content of a thing in general, something is still missing 
in the relation to my entire state of thinking, namely that the cognition of this object 
should also be possible a posteriori. And here the cause of the predominant 
difficulty shows itself. If the issue were an object of sense, then I could not confuse 
the existence of the thing with the mere concept of the thing. For through its 
concept, the object would be thought only as in agreement with the universal 
conditions of a possible empirical cognition in general, but through its existence it 
would be thought as contained in the context of the entirety of experience; thus 
through connection with the content of the entire experience the concept of the 
object is not in the least increased, but our thinking receives more through it, namely 
a possible perception.341 
That something exists tells us nothing about the 'whatness' of that thing, rather it 
tells us something about its relationship to our experience. Existential predicates are 
thereby both synthetic and not real.342 Kant's argument, if we accept it, 
34° Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A599/B627. 
341 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A600-601/B628-9. 
342 Fora discussion of Kant's apparently contradictory claims in this argument see Richard Campbell 
'Real Predicates and 'Exists', in Mind, New Series, vol. 83 (1974), pp95-99. Also see 
Heidegger's extended discussion of this argument in BPP, pp27-43. 
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fundamentally undermines Descartes' ontological argument for the existence of God. 
For the very core of the ontological argument is that existence can be part of the 
concept of a thing, in this case God. This dispute between Descartes and Kant brings 
out very clearly the difference in their fundamental orientations toward being. 
Descartes maintains the view that all reality, and therefore being, flows from God 
and the most fundamental ontological distinction for him is therefore that between 
God, the absolute creator, and his creations; whereas Kant argues that existence is 
distinct from reality and is a matter of the object having a location in the field of 
experience. Thus, the fundamental ontological ground for Kant is the representing 
self. 
By undermining the ontological proof that Descartes' provides in his fifth 
meditation, Kant also removes the key stone of his claim to scientia. Prior to his 
introduction of the ontological argument, Descartes is only in a position to claim that 
his knowledge is true, not that it is necessarily so. It is only at the end of the fifth 
meditation, having provided an argument for God's necessary existence, that he is 
able to lay claim to scientia. Once he knows not just that God exists, but that He 
exists necessarily, Descartes can claim that his knowledge of reality is also 
necessary. Thus, in attacking the logic of the ontological argument, Kant 
undermined the means by which Descartes tried to establish that truth and being are 
anchored with absolute necessity by an eternal God. It is the failure of this strategy 
for founding scientia that throws us back upon mere certainty. Descartes saw very 
clearly the difficulties of establishing a firm foundation for scientia, yet he, unlike 
later philosophers, thought that it could be done. 
There are two aspects of representation that Heidegger emphasises. The first is that 
every representation involves 'placing' or 'presenting' the thing to be known before 
the subject. He argues that 'Cogitare is the presenting to oneself of what is 
representable. ' 343 It is this very fact that allows Descartes to argue from the 
existence of a representation to the being of the one to whom it is a representation. 
Thus, it is possible to say of Descartes, as Heidegger does, that 'every ego cogito is a 
cogito me cogitare; every "I represent something" simultaneously represents a 
"myself', me, the one representing ... ' 344 This does not mean that I somehow 
represent myself alongside whatever it is I am perceiving. Rather, the very structure 
343 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, p105. 
344 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, p106. 
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of experience, understood as representation, means that whatever is experienced is 
referred back to the one representing. The manner in which the self is 
simultaneously co-represented is not that it becomes a part of the object of 
experience, but rather it is always the subject of the representing. Therefore, he 
states that: 'the representing person is involved with and in every representation-not 
subsequently, but in advance, in that he, the one who is placing before, brings what is 
represented before himself.'345 
The second element in Heidegger's account of representation is his claim that 
representation is always deliberative in the sense that it is 'a representing that 
examines and checks: cogitare is dubitare.' 346 He recognised that Descartes' use of 
doubt was not sceptical in the usual sense, but rather oriented towards the securing of 
what is indubitable. He argues: 'thinking, which is essentially deliberating, accepts 
nothing as secured and certain-that is, as true-which is not proven before thinking 
itself to be the sort of thing that has the character of the doubtless ... '. 347 This 
argument correctly characterises Descartes' philosophical method and is legitimate 
insofar as we take cogitare to be restricted to the thinking that is involved in the 
pursuit of scientia. Yet Heidegger does not recognise this restriction. His claim that 
cogitare is essentially dubitare seems mistakenly to interpret as experience what 
remained for Descartes a philosophical method. As I argued above, Descartes' 
definition of cogitationis includes all that we are aware of as taking place within us, 
only in the sense that the mind encounters such activities when it reflects upon itself. 
Whilst Heidegger correctly picks out the form Descartes believes our thinking should 
take if it is to attain certain knowledge, this is a very restricted sense of cogitare. 
Descartes restricts his thinking by the introduction of a method because he sees the 
essential possibility of falling into error. It is this error that must be avoided if we 
are to attain scientia. Heidegger, wrongly I think, asserts that thinking, for Descartes 
is always deliberative. This mistake stems from Heidegger's attempt to find implicit 
in Descartes' writings the entire trajectory of modem philosophy. Whilst his 
influence on modem philosophy is certainly profound, the ontological foundation of 
modernity that Heidegger seeks in Descartes' writings, is not to be found there. 
Heidegger is aware of Descartes ontological position. However, he declares this to 
345 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, p107. 
346 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, p106. 
347 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, p106. 
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be inconsistent with the 'true' direction of his thought, a move that tells us more 
about Heidegger's view of modernity and history than it does about Descartes. 
7. 
187 
Heidegger's reading of the principle 'cogito, ergo sum' is tied to his claim that a new 
understanding of being can be found in Descartes philosophy. He writes: 'The 
principle speaks of a connection between cogito and sum. It says that I am as the one 
representing, that not only is my Being essentially determined through such 
representing, but that my representing, as definitive repraesentatio, decides about the 
being present of everything that is represented; that is to say, about the presence of 
what is meant in it; that is, about its Being as a being. ' 348 The basis for this claim 
rests on Heidegger's interpretation of the principle as implying that it is man's being 
that underlies and gives the measure to everything else that exists. 
Heidegger's use of the term "subject" requires some explanation. He is not using it 
to refer to the distinction that we commonly make between the "subjective" and 
"objective". This use of subjective, and subjectivity, refers us to what is peculiar to 
each individual, or what is valid only for a particular person. Thus, it is common to 
distinguish between judgements that we take to be objective, that is. true of the object 
itself, and opinions that are merely subjective, that is the products of each person's 
own idiosyncrasies and tastes. Heidegger writes that the 'I' that Descartes refers to 
in his formula 'Cogito, ergo sum', is 'in its meaning, nothing "subjective" at all, in 
the sense ofan incidental quality of just this particular human being. ' 349 
The sense of 'subject' that Heidegger wants to emphasise can be seen from the 
contrast that he draws between the modem and the medieval uses of the term. He 
argues that prior to Descartes (and still in Descartes' writings), 'subject' or 
'subiectum' could be used to denote anything that existedindependently. Heidegger 
writes, 'everything present-at-hand for itself was a "subject"; but now the "I" 
becomes the special·subject, that with regard to which all the remaining things first 
determine themselves as such. ' 350 The point Heidegger is trying to make here is that, 
from a medieval perspective, every being could be said to be a subject insofar as it 
possessed its own foundation. 'Subject' in this sense is equivalent to Descartes' use 
of 'substance'. In a corresponding change of meaning, the notion of an 'object', or 
348 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, pl 14. 
349 Heidegger, What is a Thing?, pl05. 
350 Heidegger, What is a Thing?, Pl05. 
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'objectum', prior to the modem age meant an object of thought, but now has come to 
mean what truly exists. Heidegger writes, 'I imagine a golden mountain. This thus 
represented-an objectum in the language of the Middle Ages-is, according to the 
usage oflanguage today, merely something "subjective"; for "a golden mountain" 
does not exist "objectively" in the meaning of the changed linguistic use.' 351 
Heidegger is here equating the older use of 'subject' with that of 'substance', that is 
of a being that exists independently. This is significant because Heidegger is trying 
to show that as 'subject' changes its meaning, so does 'substance'. He thinks that as 
the way of being of all beings changes, so does the grounding that determines the 
existence of these beings. It is for this reason that he thinks the true direction of 
Descartes' thinking was held back by his adherence to a medieval understanding of 
substance which complements his medieval understanding of science. He gives us a 
summary of Descartes' understanding of substance: 
Substantia is the conventional and predominant name for hypokeimenon, subiectum 
in a metaphysical sense. Substantia infinita is God, summum ens, creator. The 
realm of substantiafinita is ens creatum. Descartes divides the.latter into res 
cogitantes and res extensae. Thus all being is seen from the point of view of creator 
and creatum, and the new delineation ofman through the cogito sum is, as it were, 
simply sketched into the old framework.352 
The medieval understanding of what is derives from the identification of God as the 
highest being and the conception of this highest being as the creator. Everything that 
exists is thereby a creature. Indeed, Descartes remains entirely a part of the tradition 
in this respect. So much so that his proof of the existence of God depends upon this 
conception, which in turn allows him to claim certain knowledge ofthe_physical 
world. 
Thus, Heidegger interprets Descartes' principle 'cogito, ergo sum' as the foundation 
of a new ontological order, something which it is not, and cannot be, for Descartes 
himself. The centre of this new metaphysics is the fact that 'Beingness now means 
the representedness of the representing subject.'353 Heidegger is quick to point out 
that this does not mean that being has become simply enveloped in thought and is 
thereby something 'subjective'. The actuality of beings is not called into question 
351 Heidegger, What is a thing?, p105. Also see appendix 9 of 'The Age of the World Picture' for this 
observation. 
352 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, pl 15. 
353 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, pl 19. 
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here, rather the point is that whatever is a being, gains this being through its 
representation to the subject. A consequence of Heidegger's reading of cogitare as 
essentially dubitare, is that all representing is simultaneously a deliberating and 
reckoning in order to sort what is certain and secure from what is not. The being of a 
being is, therefore, not merely its representation, but a representation that has been 
made certain. The pre-eminence of man arises from the structure of this reckoning 
representation, for if we understand man as the representing being, then he is always 
already counted upon in every act of representation. If the being of beings consists 
in representation, then man is, as Heidegger puts it, 'the distinctive ground 
underlying every representing of beings and their truth, on which every representing 
and its represented is based and must be based if it is to have status and stability. ' 354 
On this basis, Heidegger thinks that truth also changes such that it is now simply 
certainty. Once again he attributes this position to Descartes. It is true that by the 
end of the Meditations Descartes comes to identify what is certain with what is true. 
However, this equation of the indubitable with the true is a consequence of his proof 
of God's necessary existence. Only on this basis can he treat his clear and distinct 
ideas, about which he was always subjectively certain, as necessarily real and true. 
Certainty is only a criterion of truth because it coincides with necessary being, not 
because it is identical with truth itself. Despite this fact, Heidegger maintains that, 
beginning with Descartes' thought, a being is what the subject can be certain of in its 
representation, and truth is this certitude itself. If truth is this certitude then 'method' 
becomes not merely an order in which we do things, as it is in a recipe book, but a 
procedure of assuring ourselves in advance of the certitude of our dealings with 
beings. For Heidegger "'Method" is now the name for the securing, conquering 
proceeding against beings, in order to capture them as objects for the subject.'355 
8. 
In opposition to my reading of Descartes ontology one might argue that although 
Descartes certainly goes on to say a great deal about beings that seems to place God 
at the foundation of his ontology, this only occurs after his discovery of his own self 
certainty. As the recognition that he is at least a thinking thing is the first truth 
Descartes arrives at in the Meditiations, it may seem that, despite his subsequent 
references to God, subjectivity really does lie at the foundation of his philosophy. 
354 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, pl 19. 
355 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, p120. 
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There is some merit in this observation as the cogito argument is undeniably the first 
point of Descartes' attempt to provide a foundation for scientia. However, to rest 
with this initial conclusion would be to seriously misunderstand Descartes' position 
in the Meditations. 
If we look more closely at Descartes' arguments we discover that there are in fact 
two orders that we can trace through the Meditations. The first of these orders is the 
order of discovery. Following this order, the Meditations moves from the self-
certainty of the subject to God, and from God to mathematical essences and finally to 
bodies themselves. If this were the only order to be found in the Meditations then we 
would be justified in taking the subject as the ultimate foundation of Descartes' 
ontology. However, this order of discovery is not the only order, there is also the 
order of beings themselves. In this second order, as I have shown, God is the highest 
point. 
The existence of these two orders would not create a problem if it was the case that 
one order could be reduced to the other. But this does not seem to be possible in the 
Meditations. As Paul Ricoeur has argued: 
The Cogito would be truly absolute in all respects if one could show that there is 
only a single order, that in which it is actually first and which the other order sends 
back to the second level, derived from the first. Now, it does seem that the third 
Meditation reverses the order by placing the certainty of the Cogito in a subordinate 
position in relation to divine veracity, which is first according to the "truth of the 
thing".356 
As I have demonstrated above, Descartes' proof of God's existence in the third 
meditation revolves around the notion of objective being. In switching from an 
investigation of the fact that he has ideas, to an investigation of his capacity to 
produce those ideas, Descartes identifies the idea of God as an idea that he could not 
produce himself. From this he believes he has gained a proof of God's existence 
along with the subsequent benefits this holds with regard to securing scientific 
knowledge. 
356 Paul Ricoeur, 'The Crisis of the Cogito', Synthese, vol. 106 (1996), p62. 
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However, Descartes' recognition of an idea within himself which he could not have 
produced of his own accord, also has the consequence of reshaping the concept of 
subjectivity with which he began. He now knows himself to be an imperfect and 
finite being that depends upon God for its existence. As he argues towards the end 
the third meditation: 
And certainly it is not surprising that God, when he created me, should have 
implanted this idea in me, to be as it were an artist's mark impressed on his work. 
This mark need not be anything distinct from the work itself. From the mere fact of 
my creation by God, it is highly worthy of belief that I am somehow made to his 
image and likeness, and that I perceive this likeness, which comprises the idea of 
God, by the same faculty that enables me to perceive myself. That is to say: when I 
tum my mind's eye on myself, I understand, not only that I am an incomplete being 
dependent upon another ... but also, at the same time, that he on whom I depend 
comprises all these greater things ... 357 
As a result of these reflections the subject is transformed from a thinking thing into a 
dependent and finite being that exists within an independent ontological order. In 
order to progress beyond the fleeting certainty of his own existence, Descartes is 
compelled to concede the fundamental ontological position to God. Thus, it seems 
that, as Descartes has formulated the matter, either the cogito is a foundation on 
which we cannot found anything more, or the subject's cognition of its own 
imperfection is the crucial point, in which case the self-certainty of the subject is not 
a first foundation. 
Whilst this dilemma may have led later thinkers to place the subject at the foundation 
of their ontological systems, Descartes tried to hold these two competing orders 
together. The tension in this position is well described by Ricoeur: 
The stark choice that subsequent history will uncover continues to be in Descartes a 
comfortable one: it is presented as the interweaving of two competitive orders, that 
of subjective reasons and that of the objective truth of the thing. Descartes thought 
he could pass smoothly from one to the other, by substituting in the examination of 
the ideas contained in thought the point of view of their representative value in place 
of their merely belonging to the Cogito, and by assigning to this representative value 
an equivocal existential status: 'objective being'. With objective being we are still 
in the Cogito and already outside the Cogito. We are still in the Cogito to the extent 
that the degrees of perfection of the objective reality of each idea possess evidence 
of the same nature as the Cogito itself, due to the fact that objective reality is that of 
357 Descartes, Meditations, pp90-91. 
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ideas and that ideas cannot be separated from my nature. We are, nonetheless, 
outside the Cogito to the extent that the hierarchy of the degrees of perfection is 
measured by the highest among these, the idea ofinfinity, which, to be sure, is in me 
as an idea but is not produced by me - as it has more perfection than I do, I who 
doubt.358 
Once we realise that the recognition of God's existence transforms the concept of 
subjectivity with which Descartes began his escape from universal doubt, it is no 
longer possible to argue that this original subjectivity is the absolute foundation of 
his ontology. In fact, the subject must recognise that it is not the ground of all beings 
if it is to attain scientia. Through the mechanism of 'objective being', Descartes 
holds together the two orders I have mentioned above, namely the order of discovery 
and the order of reality itself. Although subsequent philosophers, for the most part, 
found this position to be untenable, this should not lead us to overlook the 
complexity of Descartes' own position. 
9. 
This leads us to the final point of Heidegger's interpretation, or appropriation, of 
Descartes' principle. Heidegger puts the matter in this way: 
Because man essentially has become the subiectum, and beingness has become 
equivalent to representedness, and truth equivalent to certitude, man now has 
disposal over the whole of beings as such in an essential way, for he provides the 
measure of beingness of every individual being. The essential decision about what 
can be established as a being now rests with man as subiectum.359 
Modem man, whose being is defined by self-consciousness, stands beyond every 
other being, the existence of which depends entirely upon being brought before this 
self-consciousness in such a way that it can be known with certainty. Man is no 
longer one being among others, albeit a special being by virtue of his possession of 
language, or reason, or his relationship with God. Rather he is identified as that 
being which gives all measure to beings on the basis of what he can be certain of in 
his representing. Importantly, this picture of man denies the element that is crucial to 
Descartes' argument, his relationship with God. 
This reading of modem subjectivity provides the basis of Heidegger's claim that 
ancient and modem science differ in an essential way. If we understand physical 
358 Ricoeur, 'The Crisis of the Cogito', p64. 
359 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, p121. 
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science as the knowledge of natural beings, then the fundamental distinction 
Heidegger attempts to bring out, is that ancient science draws its categories from an 
understanding of being as self-emerging while modem science first determines what 
is in being on the basis of the projection of nature that the subject develops within 
itself. In the modem age, it is thought that dictates what a being is on the basis of 
what it determines to be indubitable. However, this seems to be a more apt 
description of Locke's position than of Descartes'. Without any recourse to innate 
ideas, Locke is unable to bridge the gap between subjective and objective certainty. 
Thus, he is left with nominal essences and must build scientific knowledge from this 
subjective foundation. Descartes, however, maintains that his ideas, provided they 
are clear and distinct, yield knowledge of real essences. His subjective certainty 
coincides with the real order of being. This order is founded not upon subjectivity, 
but by God's creative activity. 
Heidegger's essay The Age of the World Picture, or Die Zeit des Weltbildes, makes 
this very point. There he argues that we are mistaken if we think that each age had 
its own world view, if we take this to mean that as 'subjects' they took up the task of 
determining the nature of the world from the basis of their own subjectivity. This, 
claims Heidegger, is a modern phenomenon, indeed it is the very definition of 
modernity for him. He writes: 'The fundamental event of the modem age is the 
conquest of the world as picture. The world "picture" [Bild] now means the 
structured image [Gebild] that is the creature of man's producing which represents 
and sets before. ' 360 Heidegger elaborates this in another way in The Question 
Concerning Technology. There he coins the term 'Gestell' or 'Enframing' to name 
the peculiar manner in which beings are revealed in the modem age. Although the 
term is different the point remains the same, namely that the determination of what 
can count as a being rests with man and that the world is therefore a framework, or 
picture, that man determines for himself. 
Heidegger's controversial claim that the essence of modem technology preceded the 
development of modem science is based on this reading of modernity as the 
transformation of man into the ground of beings. Normally we consider the reverse 
to be the case as particular technological devices depend upon the application of 
scientific laws. Heidegger does not deny this obvious relationship between science 
and technology. His point is that modem science, along with the technologies that 
360 Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture', p134. 
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rest upon it, is already 'technological' in a deeper sense, namely in the sense that 
beings in general are dependent on a prior conception of their being by man. In this 
sense the entire world is a product, and man's knowledge of it equivalent to ancient 
techne.361 Thus, 'Because the essence of modem technology lies in Enframing, 
modem technology must employ exact physical science. Through its so doing, the 
deceptive illusion arises that modem technology is applied physical science. ' 362 
10. 
From this discussion of Heidegger's interpretation of Descartes, we see that his 
conception of the essence of 111-odemity is man's involvement in the division of 
subject and object that results from the equation of being with being represented. 
The new conception of nature that underpins modem science and technology is only 
one aspect of representation. The other aspect is the definition of man as the 
absolute subject. The vital element in Heidegger's account of modernity is his grasp 
of the fact that the great successes of modem science are founded as much in a new 
conception of man as they are in a new conception of nature. 
If, as I have argued above, Heidegger's account of technology is an elaboration of his 
reading of subjectivity in the modem age, then his 1954 essay The Question 
Concerning Technology must be read very carefully. It is true that we can gain some 
understanding of his critique from this essay. However if it is read in isolation, it can 
be fundamentally misleading in that its structure suggests that Heidegger's account 
of the essence of technology rests on a phenomenological description of modem and 
ancient technologies. Certainly Heidegger does use descriptions of ancient Greek 
production, and he contrasts them with modem technologies. Examples of this 
procedure include his juxtaposition of a primitive sawmill in the Black Forest with a 
hydroelectric plant on the Rhine, a weather vane with a radar station, and the work of 
a peasant in the fields with modem mechanized agriculture.363 It is my contention 
that the force of these illustrations is only apparent on the basis of Heidegger's 
reading of modem metaphysics, a reading which is not clearly spelt out in that essay. 
361 As I noted in the previous chapter, this determination of the world as a product is not restricted to 
the modem age. I argued there that the ancient Greeks saw the world as the product of a 
demiurge, whilst Christians saw it as the creation of God. In the modem period the world is 
conceived as a product of man himself. The act of creation is determined by different 
conditions in each of these cases and these conditions determine the nature of scientific 
knowledge in each period. 
362 Heidegger, QCT, p23. 
363 Heidegger, QCT, p5 and p15. 
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I raise this point because some commentators have taken Heidegger's illustrations in 
The Question Concerning Technology to be phenomenological descriptions. They 
have therefore attempted to illustrate with more precision how, from a 
phenomenological perspective, modem technology differs from earlier technologies. 
Typically this approach focuses on the scale and complexity of modem technological 
systems, and the extent to which they shape modem life. This is an interesting 
problem in itself and Heidegger's examples do seem to hint at such an approach to 
understanding technology. Nevertheless, I do not think that this is what Heidegger 
himself intended. The fact that his examples are so brief and partial indicates that far 
from attempting to rise from a thorough description of the phenomena to a 
metaphysical interpretation, as was his procedure in Being and Time; his method in 
this later essay is exactly the reverse. He is now simply providing quick sketches in 
order to illustrate a metaphysical point that he has already made elsewhere. 
However, if this reading of The Question Concerning Technology is correct and 
Heidegger is deriving the character of modem life from his metaphysical reflections, 
then the legitimacy of Heidegger's reading of the modem age becomes a serious 
problem. As I have shown with regard to Descartes, Heidegger's account of 
subjectivity does not correspond in any straightforward way with the actual 
expressions of past philosophers. Far from attempting to establish a new 
philosophical era in which subjectivity forms the ground of all ontological 
determinations, Descartes sought a ground for scientia and remained entirely within 
a medieval conception of both science and substance in order to carry out this 
project. It is true that Descartes marks the beginning of a new way of thinking about 
subjectivity, however this was not a fundamental ontological principle for him. 
Subjectivity only rises to such prominence if we can no longer maintain that what we 
know with subjective certainty is reality itself. It is Locke who gives expression to 
this sundering of reality into what we take to be real, and what is real in itself. 
Whereas Descartes maintained that his ideas were true because they were the real 
products of God, later philosophers could no longer maintain such a unity of ideas 
and reality. 
Heidegger openly attempts to interpret the history of philosophy with the history of 
being as his guideline. Thus, he seeks not what was actually thought, but what was 
not thought, namely the understanding of being that lies unexpressed in metaphysical 
thought. This approach seems ultimately untenable, for the guideline that it assumes 
for the determination of all reality, that is the history of being, must simply be 
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assumed. The problem is not that Heidegger attempts to understand historical reality 
in terms of the history of being, but that he does not let the reality that is exposed by 
this approach speak for itself. Rather, he forces the phenomena to conform to a pre-
existing schema in which the modem age is the exhaustion of the possibilities of 
metaphysics. This is clearly seen in his reading of subjectivity. It is certainly true 
that man's relationship with the world changes fundamentally at the beginning of 
modernity. Yet Heidegger reduces this incredibly complex event to the 'essential' 
fact that in modernity, being becomes identified with being represented. The 
objection that this is simply not true for most of the modem philosophical tradition is 
discounted because Heidegger seems to have abandoned the vital reciprocity 
between the guideline of interpretation and what is given for interpretation. He no 
longer allows the possibility that the historical phenomena do not fit his history of 
being. I will discuss this objection and the extent to which it undermines 
Heidegger's account of the essence of modem technology in my concluding chapter. 
Chapter6 
Interpreting The Question Concerning 
Technology 
In the preceding two chapters I have discussed the details of Heidegger's critique of 
technology insofar as this is taken as an account of the nature ofWestem 
metaphysics. I argued that, despite the fact that his interpretation of Descartes was 
mistaken, Heidegger managed to uncover an essential characteristic of metaphysical 
thinking. This characteristic is the tendency to take production as the most 
fundamental horizon for the understanding of being. In the ancient Greek, medieval 
and modem periods, beings have been thought of as products. The changing 
characteristics of this act of production determined the nature of scientific methods 
by which beings could be known. Heidegger saw that this conception of beings as 
products played a crucial role in the establishment of the two most fundamental 
ontological categories, namely 'essence' and 'existence'. Furthermore, he saw that 
these two categories, along with the concept of production, played a crucial role in 
the development of modem philosophy and science. 
The only essay that Heidegger entirely devoted to the topic of technology was The 
Question Concerning Technology (1954). For this reason much of the commentary 
on his critique of technology focuses upon this work. However, I have postponed a 
close discussion of this essay until now because I believe he develops this conception 
of the essence of technology much more clearly in other places. Thus, I have turned 
to his discussions of Descartes in his Nietszche lectures delivered in the 1940s, his 
essay The Age of the World Picture derived from a 1938 lecture, his 1935-36 lecture 
series on Kant published as What is a Thing? and his essay on Aristotle's conception 
of physis (1939). All these sources provide a far clearer account of the analysis of 
metaphysics that lies at the heart of Heidegger's account of technology. 
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However, I will examine The Question Concerning Technology in more detail in this 
chapter because it shows how Heidegger ties his critique of metaphysics to an 
assessment of modem life in general. By this I mean that he attempts to explain 
specific elements of modem social, political and economic conditions by referring to 
the 'essence' of the modem age. Moreover, he attempts to explain what is 'wrong' 
with the modem age by tracing these phenomena back to our neglect of the question 
of being. Heidegger himself saw his investigations of the history of metaphysics not 
simply as a matter of academic research, but as a matter of how we understand our 
own existence. This understanding of metaphysics stems from his insight into the 
historicity of human existence. Thus, despite the apparently abstract and theoretical 
nature of metaphysical reflection, it nevertheless provides the categories by which 
humans understand their actions and possibilities. 
However, Heidegger's position becomes difficult to maintain because he thinks that 
metaphysical determinations of the nature of beings entail certain types of social, 
political and economic structures. There are several problems with this position 
which I will outline during the course ofthis chapter. First, although the conception 
of beings as products has had a profound influence upon the structure of science, it is 
not clear how this metaphysical determination may have influenced other elements of 
human existence. Second, Heidegger's lack of clarity regarding the extent to which 
the understanding of being determines the rest of human life, leads him to posit a 
'history of being' (Seinsgeschichte) which founds the more mundane events of 
human history with which we are familiar. Once again, the problem with this 
position is the sense in which this 'founding' of history by a 'history of being' is 
understood. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how Heidegger can determine the 
nature of this history of being without relying upon an accurate historiography. 
These difficulties are by no means confined to The Question Concerning 
Technology. Indeed, they are to be found in many of the earlier works that I have 
previously relied upon in my exposition of Heidegger's critique of technology. I 
address these problems through a discussion of this essay in particular because it is 
their presence there that disguises the perceptive analysis of metaphysics that is part 
of Heidegger's critique of technology. I will demonstrate the difficulties of this 
essay by first following Heidegger's comments on the 'essence' of the modem age. 
Next, I will argue that this concept of 'essence' must be understood in the light of his 
account of truth. Having addressed these two issues I will return to a fuller 
discussion of the problems that I have outlined above, namely the reduction of the 
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richness of modem life to an understanding of being and the lack of interaction 
between the history of being and historiography. 
1. 
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The most obvious aspect of Heidegger's account in The Question Concerning 
Technology is that he does not address our ordinary understanding of technology. He 
calls our everyday understanding of technology the 'instrumental definition' of 
technology. On this account, 'the manufacture and utilization of equipment, tools 
and machines, the manufactured and used things themselves, and the needs and ends 
that they serve, all belong to what technology is. The whole complex of these 
contrivances is technology.'364 The essence of this definition, as Heidegger sees it, is 
that technology, in all of its various facets, remains an instrument of man and is put 
to the service of those ends that man decides upon. In this description, technology 
remains entirely at man's disposal. 
Heidegger's account of this instrumental definition is extremely broad. It includes 
artefacts, tools, their means of production, and the ends to which one puts all these 
elements. Stephen J. Kline has pointed out that our use of the term 'technology' is 
itself ambiguous. He suggests that there are four identifiable concepts that are 
named by 'technology'. These four concepts are man-made objects or artefacts, the 
elements of the system that produces these artefacts, the knowledge or technique that 
guides this system of production, and finally the system within which artefacts are 
used in order to achieve certain goals.365 It is clear from Heidegger's description that 
he intends to include all these concepts within the instrumental definition. 
Although all these senses of 'technology' are recognized in English, there remains an 
incongruence between this term and the German 'Technik'. This leads to some 
difficulty in the seemingly straightforward translation of' Technik' as 'technology', 
as occurs in William Lovitt' s translation of Die Frage nach der Technik as The 
Question Concerning Technology. As Samuel Weber has argued in his discussion of 
Heidegger's essay, the German term 'Technik' can mean technology, however, it can 
also mean technique, craft, or skill. 366 These connotations are not so apparent in the 
English term 'technology' which is often taken to mean applied science, or the 
364 Heidegger, QCT, pp4-5. 
365 Stephen J. Kline, 'What is Technology', in Philosophy of Technology, edited Robert C. Scharff and 
Val Dusek, (Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2003), pp210-212. 
366 Samuel Weber, 'Upsetting the Set Up: Remarks on Heidegger's Questing After Technics', MLN, 
vol. 104 (1989), pp977-91. 
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scientific study of the practical arts. Thus, 'technology' implies a theoretical element 
that 'Technik' does not necessarily also include. As will be apparent from the 
arguments of the last two chapters, this is problematic in a discussion of Heidegger's 
thought because he argues that modem science is in fact a symptom of Technik 
which thereby cannot itself be simply applied science. Thus, it is important to keep 
in mind that the relationship between science and technology is precisely what is in 
question in this discussion. 
This characterization of our everyday understanding of technology remains valid 
today. However, the repeated assertion of our mastery over technology is often 
provided as a response to the suspicion that technology is not in fact entirely within 
our control. Heidegger fails to bring out clearly the uncertainty that drives these 
repeated assertions of human mastery over technology in his discussion of the 
instrumental definition. The more that we assert that technology provides us with 
new potential and scope for action, the more apparent it is that this can be both 
beneficial and dangerous. This can be seen clearly in such areas as genetic 
engineering, nuclear energy, and modem information technologies. Potentially, 
these technologies can produce both great good and great harm. Indeed, our interest 
in technology is characterized by a concern that it be adequately monitored and 
regulated. This is an approach which itself could be characterized as a technique 
aimed at the most efficient development of technological advances. Heidegger does 
capture something of this issue when he points out that, having assumed this 
instrumental view, 'Everything depends on our manipulating technology in the 
proper manner as a means. We will, as we say, "get" technology "spiritually in 
hand." We will master it.'367 Although we are not normally troubled by technology 
for the 'essential' reasons that Heidegger puts forward, we are nevertheless not 
entirely confident of our mastery either. 
Heidegger often writes about technology in a manner that makes it appear that he is 
the first to recognise in it a philosophically interesting problem. His characterization 
of the 'everyday' understanding of technology furthers this impression. Although 
the instrumental definition that he describes is still quite common, many 
philosophers had come to see it as an inadequate account well before the publication 
of The Question Concerning Technology in 1954. As I mentioned in the 
introduction, the writings of Marxist philosophers such as Adorno and Horkheimer, 
367 Heidegger, QCT, p5. 
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along with those of Marcuse, show an acute awareness of the relationship between 
technology and reason. Indeed Marx himself had already attempted to understand 
the relationship between consciousness and the material and economic conditions of 
human life. Thus, although some of the current interest in technology as a 
philosophical problem has certainly developed from Heidegger's confrontation with 
the issue, it should be noted that technology was already of interest to many 
philosophers. WhilstHeidegger's account of technology is unique in its focus upon 
the metaphysical foundations of modernity, the impression he gives of Western 
culture as utterly blind to technology as a philosophical issue is certainly not true. 
Indeed, Heidegger's critique lacks the close examination ofthe social effects of 
modern technology which is so characteristic of the thinkers mentioned above. 
2. 
Heidegger argues that the definition of technology as an instrument is correct, but it 
does not get to the heart of the matter. Ifwe are to gain an adequate understanding of 
technology, then we must ask after its essence. Heidegger's use of essence, or 
Wesen, in this context is idiosyncratic as it refers not to that which determines the 
'whatness' of an object as opposed to its existence or 'thatness', but rather to the 
manner in which something comes to presence. This notion of 'essence' as an 
historical event in which something comes to presence, in this case technology, is 
closely bound up with Heidegger's account of the essence of truth as aletheia or 
unconcealment. 
The essence of technology must lie, according to Heidegger, in a modification to the 
structure of 'unconcealment' that holds between being and man, such that modern 
manipulations of nature become possible. This notion of 'unconcealment' is one of 
the central terms of Heidegger's philosophy. Its significance will become clearer 
through a discussion of Heidegger's critique of correspondence theories of truth. 
Heidegger's approach to the problem of technology remains within the broad 
approach he took towards determining the essence of modern science, a matter that 
was discussed in the previous chapter. I demonstrated there that he conceived of 
understanding as reliant upon an initial and enabling project (Entwurj) of the matter 
that is understood. This insight led Heidegger from technological objects back to the 
initial anticipation of the relationship between man and nature, that first make 
possible our modern technological existence. Thus, Heidegger seeks to determine 
the decisive, although hidden and extremely abstract, aspects of the manner in which 
man and nature are revealed to us. 
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Heidegger's answer to this question is that man's attitude towards nature in the 
modem age is increasingly one of 'challenging' (Herausfordern).368 He writes, 'The 
revealing that rules in modem technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the 
unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as 
such.' 369 This challenging of nature is further characterized by an 'expediting' 
(Fordern) of the energies of nature. Thus, man exposes the energies of nature and 
makes these energies available for use. This process forms one gigantic economy of 
ordering that has no end. Heidegger writes: 
Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of 
revealing. But the revealing never simply comes to an end. Neither does it run off 
into the indeterminate. The revealing reveals to itself its own manifoldly 
interlocking paths, through regulating their course. Regulating and securing even 
become the chief characteristics of the challenging revealing.370 
Our common response to technology is to meet the fact of technological expansion 
with redoubled efforts to regulate its development. If we follow Heidegger's 
characterization, this reaction is a deepening of the technological mode of revealing. 
The regulation of technology is simply a technology of regulation. It is for this 
reason that Heidegger thinks our response to technology has been inadequate. 
Heidegger takes this idea of technology as a mode of 'revealing' further in his claim 
that whatever becomes a part of this economy of revealing and regulating acquires its 
own peculiar mode of being. He gives the name 'standing-reserve' (Bestand), to the 
mode of being of those beings that are part of this economy. The standing-reserve is 
insofar as it has its place in this technological system. The example of an airliner is 
given in The Question Concerning Technology to illustrate this mode of being. 
Although we can view the airliner as a material object standing on the runway, its 
peculiar character is then lost. Thus, 'Seen in terms of the standing-reserve, the 
machine is completely unautonomous, for it has its standing only from the ordering 
of the orderable. ' 371 The airliner, revealed as part of this ordering of the orderable, is 
simply there as 'a possibility of transportation'. 
368 All of these translations of Heidegger's terms are taken from the William Lovitt translation of The 
Question Concerning Technology. 
369 Heidegger, QCT, p14. 
370 Heidegger, QCT, p16. 
371 Heidegger, QCT, p17. 
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3. 
As Don Ihde has noted, this description of 'standing-reserve' as the mode of being of 
beings in the modem age, is remarkably similar to the description of ready-to-hand 
objects in Being and Time.372 This is true insofar as Heidegger argues that the 
'standing-reserve' does not exist as an isolated object but as merely an element 
within a broader economy of 'regulating and securing' as Heidegger puts it. This 
appears similar to his claim in Being and Time that handy items must appear within a 
context of other useful things. However, I suggest that the similarities between these 
two categories do not extend any further than this superficial resemblance. This is 
because Heidegger is pursuing two different ends in his descriptions of beings in 
Being and Time and The Question Concerning Technology. In the former work, he is 
trying to characterize the form in which objects appear in our everyday commerce 
with them, whilst in the latter work he is attempting to characterize the meaning of 
being in the modem age. 
It is true that the intention of Heidegger's descriptions of the 'standing-reserve' is not 
entirely clear, and he does give the impression that he is conducting another 
phenomenological investigation of the appearance of beings, just as he had done in 
Being and Time. Yet these examples are so brief and enigmatic that they are best 
read as an attempt to quickly sketch the conclusions about metaphysics that 
Heidegger reached in his earlier works. The following passage serves as an 
illustration of this point: 
The revealing that rules in modem technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], 
which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be 
extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as 
well? No. Its sails do indeed tum in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's 
blowing. But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to 
store it. 
In contrast, a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The 
earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The 
field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears 
differently than it did when to set in order meant to take care of and to maintain. 
The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the 
grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its 
increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of 
another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [stellt] nature. It sets upon it in the 
sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is 
now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for 
372 Ihde, Technics and Praxis, ppl03-129. 
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example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released either 
for destruction or for peaceful use.373 
It is clear from this passage that Heidegger is trying to characterise the distinctive 
being of natural objects in the modem era. Yet his analysis lacks the careful 
distinctions that are to be found in his earlier works. He does not say whether he is 
describing natural objects as they appear in our everyday commerce with them, or as 
they appear to scientific and metaphysical reflection. The distinction between these 
two levels was central to the project of Being and Time, however, Heidegger does 
not make his intentions clear in this later essay and, in fact, he appears to confuse 
scientific and everyday interaction with beings.374 The above passages seem to 
suggest that, regardless of whether a modem farmer understands himself in this way, 
his activities betray a distinctly 'technological' approach to nature. Presumably this 
is because of the position of the modem farmer within a modem economic and 
scientific framework rather than due to his own understanding. Yet Heidegger never 
makes this explicit nor explains why this understanding of being is the appropriate 
one for the interpretation of all modem phenomena when he does not arrive at it 
through an examination of the beings themselves. 
This ambiguity in Heidegger's analysis poses a serious problem for interpreters who 
argue that his account is straight-forwardly phenomenological, just as the analysis of 
the ready-to-hand had been in Being and Time. I have in mind particularly Ihde's 
account of The Question Concerning Technology as well as the appropriation of this 
essay in the works of Borgmann and Dreyfus.375 I do not mean to suggest that there 
are not distinctive elements in our interaction with modem technology, as opposed to 
the technology of previous ages, that may be discovered through a phenomenological 
examination. Rather, I suggest that Heidegger's essay does not truly exhibit such an 
approach. In fact he proceeds from the understanding of the relationship between 
373 Heidegger, QCT, pp14-15. 
374 The distinction I refer to here is not that which was addressed in chapter three, namely between 
theory and practice. I argued there that Heidegger attempts to undermine this distinction in 
Being and Time. The point at issue here is whether Heidegger's determination of natural 
beings as standing-reserve can be legitimately applied to all beings, or indeed whether it can 
even be taken as the only manner in which natural beings are in the modern age. 
375 See Ihde, Technics and Praxis; Albert Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary 
Life, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984), especially pp197-200; Hubert L. 
Dreyfus, 'Heidegger on Gaining a Free Relation to Technology', in Technology and the 
Politics of Knowledge, ed. Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay, (Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1995), pp97-107. 
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metaphysics and production, which he developed elsewhere, and tries to characterize 
our experience of objects on this basis. 
This approach exemplifies the problems of Heidegger's account of the essence of 
technology and his history of being in general, in that he derives the character of 
modem life from his metaphysical reflections on the modem understanding of being, 
instead of through a concrete examination of it. Thus, he assumes that because 
nature is understood at a metaphysical level as the product of man himself, then in 
our actual interaction with objects we treat them as nothing more than resources to be 
manipulated at our convenience. Indeed, he even argues that we treat other humans 
in this manner. He writes: 
Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged to exploit the energies 
of nature can this ordering revealing happen. If man is.challenged, ordered, to do 
this, then does not man himself belong even more originally than nature within the 
standing-reserve? The current talk about human resources, about the supply of 
patients for a clinic, gives evidence of this. The forester who, in the wood, measures 
the felled timber and to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way 
as did his grandfather is today commanded by profit-making in the lumber industry, 
whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, 
which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which is then delivered 
to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in their turn, set public opinion 
to swallowing what is printed, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes 
available on demand. Yet precisely because man is challenged more originally than 
are the energies of nature, i.e.,· into the process of ordering,· he never is transformed 
into mere standing-reserve.376 
Heidegger brings up a series of very different issues in this passage and yet he tries 
to reduce them all, without any argument, to examples of 'standing-reserve'. Thus, 
he is not attempting to rise, through the careful description of individual elements of 
modern life, to the essence of technology. Rather, he proceeds in the reverse 
direction. 
4. 
The final points I will address in this outline of Heidegger's position in The Question 
Concerning Technology, are his contentions that man himself cannot simply choose 
to abandon this technological mode of revealing, and equally that it was not man that 
brought about this mode ofrevealing in the first place. Thus, 'Man can indeed 
conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another. But man 
does not have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the real 
376 Heidegger, QCT, p 18 
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shows itself or withdraws. ' 377 Put very simply, Heidegger is arguing that modem 
man is revealed in such a way that he is called upon to 'challenge' nature. That 
nature is revealed as capable of being put into order, and man revealed as the one 
who carries out this setting in order, is not itself the doing of man. 
The thought that the revelation of man and world within this economy of ordering 
cannot be ascribed to man himself is perhaps the most controversial aspect of 
Heidegger's account of technology. It implies that we cannot of our own accord 
escape this situation.· The difficulty of Heidegger's position can be illustrated by 
establishing a contrast with Jacques Ellul's technological determinism.378 Ellul's 
position is 'determinist' in the sense that he argues that the ends which man sets for 
himself cannot be separated from the technology that is required to realise those 
ends. The freedom of choosing whatever ends we desire is, according to Ellul, 
merely apparent because the large scale processes of politics and science are in fact 
put in the service of the technological imperative of efficiency. This view is based 
upon an empirical examination of the relationships between the various facets of 
society which are generally assumed to be independent of technology. Thus, the 
institutions of the state, the scientific community, the media, and the economy, 
appear to operate in a manner that is entirely determined by the dictates of the 
advancement of technology. Whether this view is convincing is not of consequence 
here, rather what I am seeking to point out is that this argument is founded in 
sociological observation. 
By contrast, Heidegger spends almost no time describing the reality of what he 
claims is an epoch determined entirely by technology. His case rests rather upon 
examinations of the thought of various major figures in the Western philosophical 
tradition. Although Heidegger's position is also 'determinist' in the sense that he 
thinks the esssence of technology is not under the control of man, he does not base 
his arguments upon observation of the concrete conditions of society. Rather, his 
case rests upon a determination of the peculiarity of our modem understanding of 
being. Thus, for Heidegger, the sociological examinations that Ellul undertakes are 
irrelevant to the question of determining the fundamental nature of technology. This 
seems to raise serious difficulties, as it appears that the actual nature of man's 
377 Heidegger, QCT, p18. 
378 See Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson, (Jonathon Cape, London, 
1965). 
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entanglement with technology is of no philosophical importance; rather it is the very 
possibility of modem technology that we should focus on. 
This feature of Heidegger's analysis is not confined to his account of technology. 
Rather, the difficulty of reconciling the actual existence of man with a philosophical 
account of this existence was one of the dominant themes of Heidegger's thought in 
the period surrounding the publication of Being and Time in 1927. I have already 
attempted to demonstrate that Being and Time must be read as a continuation of 
Heidegger's previous efforts at establishing a means of describing human existence 
without systematically overlooking its distinctive features in the process. Indeed this 
is one of the motives for the reformulation of theory and practice in terms of the 
vorhandenand the zuhanden. If our everyday practical involvement in the world 
possesses its own unthematic, conceptual content, and our explicitly theoretical 
activities are understood as a modification of our everyday practice, then we need no 
longer see theory and practice as opposing categories. As everyday life contains its 
own understanding and interpretation (which for Heidegger are inseparable), then 
philosophical reflection is only an explicit turning of this existence upon itself. 
However, this situation becomes complicated because the determinations that this 
philosophical reflection makes regarding human existence are also its own conditions 
of possibility. Thus, Heidegger can be seen as attempting to grapple with the 
problem of how to understand the fact that the analysis of Da-sein is constrained, and 
its possibilities given by its own object, that is itself. Its manner of knowing must be 
compatible with that knowing which it claims to observe. The historicity of Da-sein 
provides an additional complication in that it brings out the point. that Da-sein' s self 
understanding necessarily includes a foreign element, that is Da-sein' s past. This 
past is not of our choosing and cannot be altered by us, and yet it provides the ground 
from which we must take up our possibilities for living. The issue of how the 
essence of technology is related to the actual existence of man in an age which is 
determined by such an essence, is more complex than it first appears, In order to 
gain a fuller understanding of Heidegger's position I turn now to his conception of 
truth as aletheia. 
5. 
In Being and Time Heidegger argues that our ordinary understanding of truth as a 
property of statements or judgements is in fact a derivative phenomenon. The 
motivation for this manoeuvre is the same as that which drove Heidegger's attempt 
to collapse the distinction between the theoretical and the practical aspects of human 
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existence. Heidegger's guiding thought throughout Being and Time is that explicit 
philosophical reflection can be a possibility of human beings only if our everyday 
existence is itself constituted by understanding and interpretation. Thus, much of the 
book is spent establishing how it can be that everyday life carries on in an unthematic 
understanding of the world. The account of truth forms part of this project and is a 
natural extension of the analyses of the distinction between vorhandenheit and 
zuhandenheit, the unified structure of being-in-the-world, and the account of 
understanding and interpretation as constituted by the fore-structure. 
It is this last issue, the fore-structure of interpretation and understanding, that 
provides a basis from which to approach Heidegger's analysis of truth. Of particular 
interest here is his characterization of the difference between two different senses of 
'as' in section 33 of Being and Time entitled 'Statement as a derivative mode of 
interpretation'. Here he argues that we can distinguish between the existential-
hermeneutical 'as' and the apophantical 'as' of the statement.379 The distinction 
between these two forms of 'as' lies in the explicitness with which this interpretation 
is held. Thus, in our everyday commerce with beings they are understood but this 
understanding is not explicit, as is the case with 'theoretical' reflection on beings. 
This distinction returns us to the idea of the vorhanden and the zuhanden and the 
issue of their difference. As I argued in chapter three, the difference between these 
two categories is not the same as that between practice and theory. Rather the 
distinction is in the 'fore-having' of the matter in question. 
Heidegger illustrates this point with his familiar hammer example. He argues that 
whilst it is common in logic to consider the meaning of a statement to b_e what it 
asserts about an object, this is not primarily the case. Thus, Heidegger argues that if 
we presuppose the meaning of the statement 'The hammer is heavy' to be that 'this 
thing, the hammer, has the property of heaviness', then we have missed the meaning 
such statements have in our usual involvement in the world. We are not usually 
explicitly positing that an object has certain properties, rather our concern is caught 
up in practical matters. Therefore, 'The primordial act of interpretation lies not in a 
theoretical sentence, but in circumspectly and heedfully putting away or changing the 
inappropriate tool "without wasting words"' .380 When we speak about objects in our 
daily lives we are not usually making a 'statement' in the sense of attributing a 
379 Heidegger, BT, p148. For a discussion of this relationship and of Heidegger's account of truth in 
general see chapter six of Ruin, Enigmatic Origins. 
380 Heidegger, BT, p147. 
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property to an object. The transformation that must occur if we are to make such a 
statement lies in our fore-having in that 'Something at hand with which we have to 
do or perform something, turns into something "about which" the statement that 
points it out is made.'381 The manner in which we approach objects when we are 
making such judgements is a modification of our everyday involvement which 
carries its own understanding of the world. Heidegger is trying to establish that the 
stance we take when we merely 'look' at an object is a derivative mode ofbeing-in-
the-world, and following from this, we should be wary of letting this mode cover 
over our more primordial existence. 
What emerges in this discussion is that the apophantical 'as', or the manner in which 
we 'see' an object when we are making a statement about it, is grounded in the 'as' 
of circumspect interpretation. Put more simply, Heidegger claims that 'The 
statement is not an unattached kind of behaviour which could of itself primarily 
disclose beings in general, but always already maintains itself on the basis ofbeing-
in-the-world.'382 This finding is mirrored in Heidegger's examination of 
correspondence theories of truth. Here the issue is whether truth, when understood 
as a property of statements that correspond with reality, is not also founded on a 
more primordial disclosure. 
In both section 44 of Being and Time and his essay On the Essence of Truth (1931 ), 
Heidegger appropriates the ancient Greek term aletheia in order to show that 
propositional truth depends upon a prior disclosure of a world. He insists that 
aletheia, normally rendered as simply 'truth', should be translated as 
Unverborgenheit, a German term which has been rendered into English as 
'unconcealment' or even more awkwardly as 'unhiddeness'.383 The importance of 
insisting that aletheia be translated as Unverborgenheit rather than Wahrheit or truth, 
can be seen in Heidegger's critique of correspondence theories of truth. Such 
theories are, according to Heidegger, characterised by an adherence to three theses. 
These theses are: 
1. The "locus" of truth is the proposition Gudgement). 
381 Heidegger, BT, p147. 
382 Heidegger, BT, p 146. 
383 As Ruin points out in his discussion of truth, Heidegger's various attempts to express this idea of a 
primordial 'unconcealment' or 'opening' lead him to employ a variety of terms over the 
years. This list includes Aufgeschlossenheit, Erschlossenheit, Unverborgenheit, 
Unverhulltheit, Entdeckheit, and Unverstelltheit. See the note at Ruin, Enigmatic Origins, 
p223. 
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2. The essence of truth lies in the "agreement" of the judgement with its object. 
3. Aristotle, the founding father of logic, attributed truth to judgement as its 
primordial locus, he also started the definition of truth as "agreement".384 
Heidegger gives the impression that he takes the entire metaphysical tradition, at 
least from Aristotle on, to be advocates of this correspondence theory of truth. Such 
a position appears fraught with difficulties, for even if we concede that this has been 
the dominant conception of truth throughout the history of Western philosophy, there 
remains a wealth of positions within this tradition. The issues of what the judgement 
is supposed to agree with and how this agreement is to be achieved have been the 
subject of many philosophical controversies. Indeed one of the defining differences 
between the philosophy of the modem and the medieval ages can be seen in the 
different conceptions of correspondence that held sway in each. 
Ifwe understand 'correspondence' in a broad sense as some kind of agreement or 
correlation between a judgement and its object, then it is certainly the case that 
medieval philosophy held a correspondence theory of truth. However, this situation 
is complicated by the fact that for medieval thinkers there was no question that the 
real essences of objects could be known by man. In medieval philosophy, the object 
is itself a more or less adequate expression of a divine idea, and a true statement is an 
explicit stating of this expression. The point here is that, although they both involve 
correspondence, the medieval formulation of truth is not the same as that of the post-
Cartesian age. Medieval philosophy is not motivated by a need to rationally 
establish a relationship with the world. Furthermore, truth is not yet restricted to 
propositions as objects themselves can be more or less true instantiations of divine 
ideas. 
Although it is Descartes who first explicitly attempts to rationally establish our 
knowledge of reality, it is Locke that first restricts truth to propositions. 385 Indeed, 
although Heidegger does not state this, it is Locke that provides the model for the 
position that he objects to most vehemently, seeing it as based on a double error. 
Locke overlooks the original disclosure that Da-sein is dependent upon by restricting 
truth to propositions and by attempting to establish what must already be the case-
the possibility of a relationship between thought and reality. Locke argued that the 
ideas of the mind were the product either of sensation or reflection, and that the mind 
384 Heidegger, BT, p198. 
385 For a full discussion of this restriction see chapter 8 of Campbell, Truth and Historicity. 
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worked only with these two sources of ideas. Furthermore, Locke understood 
language to refer to the ideas of the mind. Thus, he states that 'Verbal propositions, 
which are Words the signs of our Ideas put together or separated in affirmative or 
negative Sentences' .386 Problems immediately arise from this understanding of the 
mind and language. The first problem is that the mind has no direct access to 
whatever it is that affects it in order to produce sensations. As the mind only 
operates upon the ideas given to it through reflection upon itself or through 
sensation, the very notion of an object outside of the mind is in fact an idea of the 
mind. Propositions do not refer us to objects external to the mind, rather they refer to 
the pictures that are produced in the mind through both sensation and reflection. 
Whether these pictures represent external objects accurately is an impossible 
question to answer, for 'How shall the Mind when it perceives nothing but its own 
Ideas, know that they agree with Things themselves?'387 Locke was only able to 
reply (to his own question) that we could assume that this was the case, even though 
such a correspondence could never be established. 
6. 
Heidegger grounds his own account of truth, insofar as it belongs to statements, on a 
phenomenological examination of how it is that we make judgements and understand 
them to be true or false. To illustrate this process he describes a case in which 
'someone make[ s] the true statement with his back to the wall: "The picture on the 
wall is hanging crookedly"; .388 We confirm the truth of such a statementthrough 
turning to face the wall and looking to see whether or not the picture is actually 
hanging crookedly as it was presented in the statement. The essential point here is 
that when we undertake this process of confirmation, the 'it' that we turn around in 
order to confirm is in fact the very same object that we are turning to look at. It is 
not the case that we are turning around in order to test the correspondence between 
the real object and some mental representation that was referred to when the 
statement was originally made. The fact that the statement directs us to the object 
itself, whatever we decide about the being of this object, is very important for 
Heidegger. Indeed, as mentioned above, he claims that the primordial meaning of 
logos is apophansis, which he takes to mean 'to let beings be seen from 
themselves. ' 389 The difficulties of claiming that statements refer to mental images or 
386 Locke, Essay, IV. v. 5. 
387 Locke, Essay, IV. iv. 3. 
388 Heidegger, BT, p200. 
389 Heidegger, BT, p 144. 
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representations of objects as they really are is demonstrated by Locke's 
abandonment of knowledge of real essences. 
Heidegger argues that the object we have in mind, or 'intend', when we originally 
make the statement is the very same object that we subsequently turn around to see. 
Thus, what is to be demonstrated in this turning around is that the painting 'shows 
itself as the very same thing' it was when it was first presented as hanging crookedly. 
What we seek in confirmation is the 'being's showing itself in its self-sameness' .390 
The statement was true because it presented the picture on the wall just as it was. 
Heidegger avoids the problem of making an ideal and a real object agree with one 
another, with all the attendant difficulties of demonstrating in what respect such 
differing species of being could agree. He does this by arguing that a statement is 
true not because its 'meaning' corresponds with the object, but because it shows the 
object as it is.391 We can confirm the truth of a statement by comparing the object as 
presented by the statement with the object itself. Thus, it is the two different 
appearances of the object that correspond. If an object shows itself to be the same 
being that was presented in the statement, then the statement can be said to have let 
'beings "be seen" (apophansis) in their discoveredness.'392 Furthermore, if such a 
statement turns out to be false, then the object is not as it was originally presented by 
the statement. The false statement nevertheless presents the object in question, it 
simply does so incorrectly. The object is intended by the false statement not as it is, 
but rather in a semblance or disguise. Thus, both disclosing and covering over are 
possibilities of statement making. 
The notion that 'the being true (truth) of the statement must be understood as 
discovering', leads Heidegger to a claim that holds far reaching implications for our 
understanding oftruth.393 This claim is that as truth has been shown to be based in 
discovering rather than correspondence, 'being-true as discovering is in tum 
ontologically possible only on the basis of being-in-the-world' .394 What is named by 
the term 'being-in-the-world' is the indissoluble unity that constitutes the human 
mode of being, ofDa-sein. If 'world' is understood as a totality of interrelated 
390 Heidegger, BT, p210. 
391 For a useful overview of some of the contrasting understandings of what precisely a truth bearer is 
and of correspondence theories of truth see Richard L. Kirkham Theories of Truth: a critical 
introduction, (MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1992), particularly chapters 2 and 4. 
392 Heidegger, BT, p201. 
393 Heidegger, BT, p201. 
394 Heidegger, BT, p201. 
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matters at hand, then there can be no human mode of being that is worldless. A 
human that has no world in the sense of a totality of interrelated matters at hand, is 
not in the human mode of being. Thus, it can be seen that as Da-sein is the mode of 
being in which beings are brought out of their concealment and presented to thought, 
it is Da-sein from which the possibility of truth arises. More precisely it is the 
primordial phenomenon of disclosedness through which Da-sein first finds itself in a 
world that grants the possibility of truth. It is this line of argument which leads 
Heidegger to the controversial statements that 'truth is only because and as long as 
Da-sein is' and that 'Understood in its most primordial sense, truth belongs to the 
fundamental constitution of Da-sein' .395 
7. 
It is important that Heidegger's identification of unconcealment as the most 
primordial sense of truth is not read as introducing unconcealment as an alternative 
version of propositional truth. The two quotations from Being and Time above 
demonstrate that truth is used by Heidegger to name both the propositional notion of 
truth, as well as that which grounds this propositional truth, unconcealment. This 
confusion remains in the later work On the Essence of Truth. Here Heidegger 
employs the term 'correctness' (Richtigkeit) to name the manner in which 
propositions may accord with their objects and appears to be reserving the term 'true' 
to name unconcealment as he states that 'Truth does not originally reside in the 
proposition' .396 Heidegger himself eventually comes to realise the untenability of 
using truth to refer both to aletheia and propositional truth. He comments in The 
End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking that: 
Insofar as truth is understood ... as the correspondence of knowledge with 
beings .. . aletheia, unconcealment may not be equated with truth. Rather, aletheia, 
unconcealment thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth.'397 
His early conflation of aletheia and propositional truth is unfortunate as it then 
appears that aletheia is the condition of the possibility of propositional truth, as well 
as propositional truth itself. This conclusion is incompatible with Heidegger's 
account of propositional truth as one possible mode amongst others of relating to 
entities in the world. If aletheia and propositional truth are the same thing then it 
appears that all ofDa-sein's relationships with entities in the world must take the 
395 Heidegger, BT, p21 l, and p208. 
396 Heidegger, 'On the Essence of Truth', in BW, p125. 
397 Heidegger, 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking', in BW, p389. 
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form of making statements about these entities. Such a position is in obvious 
contradiction to Heidegger's characterisation of statements as the fossilised products 
ofDa-sein's discovering mode of being-in-the-world. A statement arises from Da-
sein's discovering mode of being and becomes an entity in the world. Although the 
statement retains its ability to discover entities, it is a derivative or secondary mode 
of discovering. 398 
Thus, to understand propositional truth and aletheia to be the same is to run contrary 
to Heidegger's entire attempt in Being and Time to describe the everyday existence 
of human being as always already in a world. It is this everyday existence that 
renders ridiculous attempts to establish the relationship between man and world. 
This ambiguity should therefore not be interpreted as an insurmountable problem of 
Heidegger's account of truth, rather it should be seen as a confusing use of terms 
which was later clarified. In light of this examination I shall use the term aletheia to 
refer to unconcealment understood as the condition for the possibility of 
propositional truth, not propositional truth itself. 399 
The basic distinction between aletheia, or the many other terms Heidegger employs 
to name this original field of disclosure, and propositional truth remains a central part 
of Heidegger's thought throughout his life. However, his descriptions of the 
relationship between man and aletheia changes dramatically in the years following 
the publication of Being and Time. This can be demonstrated by examining 
398 Heidegger, BT, pp201-208. Mark Wrathall also argues that Heidegger himself is responsible for 
much of the confused reception of his theory of truth through his imprecise use of the terms 
'aletheia' and 'truth'. His further point that Heidegger's position is also a correspondence 
theory of truth is somewhat misleading. For Heidegger, the truth of a statement is confirmed 
when the object as it was presented by the statement agrees with the object as we see it in a 
confirming intuition. This remains substantially different from the usual understanding of 
correspondence theories of truth which attempt to fmd a correspondence between the 
structure of linguistic entity such as a statement, judgement, or sentence and reality. See 
Mark Wrathall, 'Heidegger and Truth as Correspondence', in International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, vol. 7 (1999), pp69-88. For another useful article on Heidegger's 
theory of truth see Mark Wrathall, 'Heidegger on Plato, Truth, and Unconcealment: The 
1931-32 Lecture on The Essence of Truth', in Inquiry, vol. 47 (2004), pp443-463. 
399 An example of the conflation of aletheia and propositional truth can be found in: Ernst Tugendhat, 
"Heidegger's Idea of Truth", trans. by Christopher Macann, in Hermeneutics and Truth, 
(Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1994), pp83-97. Tugendhat employs 
Heidegger's early use of the term "truth", to refer both to unconcealment and a property of 
certain statements, to argue that "Heidegger overlooks the problem of truth precisely because 
of the way in which he makes the truth into his foundational concept"(p95). Tugendhat does 
not look beyond this problem of terminology. Ifwe examine the instances in which "truth" 
is used by Heidegger, we can see that it is used to refer to two distinct concepts. 
Furthermore, Tugendhat does not take Heidegger's comments from The End of Philosophy 
and the Task of Thinking into account. 
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Heidegger's language in Being and Time (1927) and in the Letter On Humanism 
(1947). In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that 'truth (discoveredness) must 
always first be wrested from beings. Beings are tom from concealment. The factical 
discoveredness is, so to speak, always a kind of robbery' .400 The notion that the true 
nature of beings is always initially hidden and that they show themselves in disguise, 
is strongly expressed in this passage. The latter writing, Letter on Humanism, 
repudiates the violence of the earlier description of man's approach to beings. Man 
is now described as 'the shepherd of Being' whose existence, (or 'ek-sistence' as 
Heidegger calls it in this essay), 'is ecstatic dwelling in the nearness of being. It is 
the guardianship, that is, the care for Being' .401 
These comments initially.appear quite contradictory, however, the sense of 
Heidegger's earlier claim that 'truth must always first be wrested from beings' is not 
completely clear. This passage may be read as an allusion to the issues of history 
and authenticity, matters which are of central importance in Being and Time. Thus, 
Heidegger's reference to the wresting of beings from concealment may refer to the 
manner in which we must overcome or appropriate received opinion in order to 
disclose beings as they are. As I demonstrated in chapter three, Heidegger thought 
that the past could only be an historical past if it was appropriated in the present. He 
argued in Being and Time that the past does not possess a stable meaning of its own 
that we can discover by the examination of sources, rather, it gains its meaning by 
being understood in the light of the future possibilities of existing human beings. 
Human understanding always begins within a certain tradition of thought, yet we 
must appraise this inheritance according to. our own concerns and possibilities if it is 
to be authentically significant. It might be that Heidegger has in ·mind this process 
by which history is repeated or reclaimed for the present when he claims that truth 
must be wrested from beings. 
Alternatively, Heidegger may have in mind the fact that modem science essentially 
involves the use of experiments to determine the nature of beings. This process of 
experimentation involves the careful constraining of certain parameters in order to 
establish the precise effect of changes in others. Through a series of practical 
manipulations experimentation 'forces' beings to reveal what they truly are. For 
modem scientists, the true nature of beings is only found by manipulating and 
400 Heidegger, BT, p204. 
401 Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', pp245. 
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constraining them in certain ways. This second reading of Heidegger's comments on 
truth is more relevant to the issue of technology as it appears, if we adopt this 
reading, that he was already aware of the distinctive nature of modem science. As I 
have described in the preceding few chapters, Heidegger's understanding of the 
difference between ancient and modem science was not fully developed until the 
1930s and 40s. However, in this passage on truth he does appear to hint at an 
important element of that later account, namely that modem science is essentially 
experimental. The dramatic contrast between Heidegger's comments in Being and 
Time and the Letter on Humanism is an indication of his changing evaluation of 
modem science and metaphysics. The latter claim that 'man is the shepherd of 
being' stems from Heidegger's attempt to develop a new way of understanding 
human existence and the nature of being itself, free from the traditional structures of 
Western metaphysics. 
8. 
Thus, Heidegger argues that truth understood as 'correctness' is dependent upon an 
initial disclosure of beings. This can be understood as the most extreme consequence 
of Heidegger's account of the circularity and finitude of human understanding. As I 
argued in the discussion of Being and Time in chapter three, Heidegger. takes up 
Dilthey's insight that human understanding never has an absolute beginning upon 
which it can develop a completely certain scientific structure. It does not first stand 
off from the world in order to determine which categories it can validly apply to it 
Rather, hfimans find themselves in a world which they already understand by means 
of a language, a culture, and a society, which they did not create but simply find 
themselves within. In several important passages from Being and Time ·Heidegger 
writes that: 
Scientific proof must not already presuppose what its task is to found. But if 
interpretation always already has to operate within what is understood and nurture 
itself from this, how should it then produce scientific results without going in a 
circle, especially when the presupposed understanding still operates in the common 
knowledge of human being and world? But according to the most elementary rules 
of logic, the circle is a circulus vitiosus. But the business of historical interpretation 
is thus banned a priori from the realm of exact knowledge.402 
He continues in the following passage: 
402 Heidegger, BT, pp142-143. 
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But to see a vitiosum in this circle is to look for ways to avoid it, even to "feel" that 
is an inevitable imperfection, is to misunderstand understanding from the ground 
up ... What is decisive is not to get out of the circle, but to get in it in the right way. 
This circle of understanding is not a circle in which any random kind of knowledge 
operates, but it is rather the expression of the existential fore-structure of Da-sein 
itself. The circle must not be degraded to a vitiosum, not even a tolerated one. A 
positive possibility of the most primordial knowledge is hidden in it which, however, 
is only grasped in a genuine way when interpretation has understood that its first, 
constant, and last task is not to let fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception be 
given to it by chance ideas and popular conceptions, but to guarantee the scientific 
theme by developing these in terms of the things themselves. Because in accordance 
with its existential meaning, understanding is the potentiality for being of Da-sein 
itself, the ontological presuppositions of historiographical knowledge transcend in 
principle the idea of rigour of the most exact sciences.403 
Thus, all interpretation relies upon a prior understanding of what is to be interpreted, 
no matter how vague and imprecise this may be. This· is true of specific regions of 
beings which are subject to scientific investigation, however, it is also true of beings 
in general. The most fundamental determination upon which all other determinations 
are dependent is our understanding of being itself. Both in our everyday commerce 
with beings and in our scientific investigations, we already understand being itself in 
a certain way, we know what it means for a being to be. This projection of an 
understanding of being against which we can interpret particular beings is the most 
fundamental moment of human existence and it must precede and enable our pursuit 
of particular truths, understood as 'correct' judgements. Thus Heidegger's 
reflections on aletheia and the circular nature of human understanding lead him to 
argue that all particular truths about beings are relative to a initial understanding of 
beings itself. 
Heidegger's analysis of the difference between ancient and modem science provided 
a demonstration of this concept of truth. He argued there that modem science should 
not be understood as an improvement upon ancient science despite the fact that from 
our modem perspective ancient science appears utterly wrong and misguided. 
Rather, Aristotelian science was founded upon a different understanding of being 
from that of the modem era. He saw that the process of production had provided the 
dominant means by which being had been understood in the tradition of metaphysics, 
and that this had taken on a new form in the modem age. Heidegger argues that 
beings are now the products of man himself, rather than of God, the self directed 
movement of nature, or a demi urge. Thus, the determinations of modem and ancient 
403 Heidegger, BT, p143. 
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science are proper to a different 'revelation' or 'unconcealment' of being. Heidegger 
writes in Being and Time that: 
Constituted by disclosedness, Da-sein is essentially in the truth. Disclosedness is an 
essential kind of being ofDa-sein. "There is" ["gibt es"] truth only insofar as Da-
sein is and as long as it is. Beings are discovered only when Da-sein is, and only as 
long as Da-sein is are they disclosed. Newton's laws, the law of contradiction, and 
any truth whatsoever, are true only as long as Da-sein is. Before there was any Da-
sein, there was no truth; nor will there be any after Da-sein is no more. For in such a 
case truth as disclosedness, discovering, and discoveredness cannot be. Before 
Newton's laws were discovered, they were not "true." From this it does not follow 
that they were false or even that they would become false if ontically no 
discoveredness were possible any longer.404 
In this passage Heidegger is arguing that all 'truth', understood as unconcealment or 
aletheia in this case, is relative to the being of Da-sein. He does not mean by this 
that truth is subjective in the sense of being arbitrary or a matter of taste. Rather, he 
argues that' ... only because "truth," as discovering, is a kind of being of Da-sein, can 
it be removed from the arbitrariness ofDa-sein. The "universal validity" of truth, too 
is rooted solely in the fact that Da-sein can discover and free beings in 
themselves.'405 It is only through the projection of a certain understanding of being 
that beings themselves can be discovered. 
With this account of aletheia in mind it is possible to understand Heidegger's claims 
regarding the 'essence' of technology. In The Question Concerning Technology he 
writes that: 
Enframing is the gathering together that belongs to that setting-upon which sets upon 
man and puts him in position to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as 
standing-reserve. As the one who is challenged forth in this way, man stands within 
the essential realm of Enframing. He can never take up a relationship to it only 
subsequently. Thus the question as to how we are to arrive at a relationship to the 
essence of technology, asked in this way, always comes too late. But never too late 
comes the question as to whether we actually experience ourselves as the ones 
whose activities everywhere, public and private, are challenged forth by 
Enframing. 406 
Heidegger employs the term 'Enframing' (Gestell) to name the peculiar manner in 
which beings are revealed in the modem era, namely as 'standing-reserve'. Thus, 
Heidegger thinks that our modem entanglement with technology is not simply a 
404 Heidegger, BT, p208. 
405 Heidegger, BT, pp208-209. 
406 Heidegger, QCT, p24 
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matter of human choice, but of the understanding of being that prevails in the modem 
era. Moreover, he 'contends that we will never come to grips with this matter until 
we turn our attention from the particular effects that modem technology has 
produced in the social, econoniic, political and scientific realms of modem life, and 
focus upon this 'essential' problem. Thus, he continues on from the passage quoted 
above to argue that, above all, ' ... never too late comes the question as to whether and 
how we actually admit ourselves into that wherein Enframing itself comes to 
presence. '407 
Although an understanding of Heidegger's account of truth allows us to see more 
clearly what he means by such phrases as 'Enframing' and 'the essence of 
technology', it does not resolve the problems that I mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
In fact it only serves to heighten the difficulty of his position. For even if we grant 
the central point of Heidegger's discussion of truth, namely that all truth is relative to 
a fundamental disclosure of being, it remains unclear how the modem understanding 
of being determines the character of modem society arid.its relationship with nature. 
I have argued throughout this study that Heidegger is right in his claim that there is 
an essential relationship between modem science and technology. That relationship 
lies in the fact that modem science is, in contrast to ancient Greek and medieval 
science, essentially experimental and practical. The findings of modem science 
allow us to manipulate nature in a way that was not previously possible because 
modem scientific knowledge is itself practical, it is knowledge of how to produce 
certain effects in nature. Furthermore, this close relationship between science and 
technology is, as Heidegger contends, founded upon a new understanding of being. 
However, he is mistaken when he attempts to employ these insights as an 
explanation for the character of modem life in general which, he claims, is 
dominated by the boundless exploitation of both man and nature. Heidegger seems 
to think that because the determination of the nature of being is the most fundamental 
issue for metaphysics and science, it must also be central to understanding society, 
economics, and politics. Yet it is difficult to see how one can coherently explain the 
history of Western society since the time of Descartes by means of a very rough 
sketch of the ontological developments of the period. Insofar as Heidegger attempts 
such a explanation he manages only to obscure his insightful analysis of modem 
metaphysics. 
407 Heidegger, QCT, p24. 
220 Chapter Six 
9. 
I come now to the final issue of this chapter, namely the question of how Heidegger 
attempts to compel us to see that beings are revealed as standing-reserve. This is the 
second of the problems thatl outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the first 
problem being the validity of Heidegger's reduction of all beings to this category of 
'standing-reserve'. The difficulty with Heidegger's approach arises from two 
sources. First he separates the history of being from the science ofhistory, and 
second he comes to see this history of being as a single unified phenomenon which 
must be rejected in its entirety. The combination of these two claims leaves 
Heidegger's audience in a difficult position because he ultimately relies upon us 
simply accepting his account of the history of being, rather than relying upon 
accurate interpretations of the philosophical tradition. 
As I mentioned in chapter three, Heidegger distinguishes between 'historiography' 
and 'historicity'. He understood historiography as the scientific study of the past; 
whilst he used historicity to name an essential structure of human existence itself In 
addition to these two categories, Heidegger attempted to establish a history of being. 
He conceives of this 'history of being' as the most fundamental of all these ' 
determinatiorts of history as it makes possible historicity and historiography. 
Heidegger explains, somewhat cryptically, the relationship between this history of 
being and historiography in the following passage from The Question Concerning 
Technology: 
The essence of modem technology starts man upon the way of that revealing through 
which the real everywhere, more or less distinctly, becomes the standing-reserve. 
"To start upon a way" means "to send" in our ordinary language. We shall call th.at 
sending-that-gathers [versammelde Schicken] which first starts.man upon a way of 
revealing, destining [Geschick]. It is from out of this destining that the essence of all 
history [Geschichte] is determined. History is neither simply the object of written 
chronicle nor simply the fulfilment of human activity. That activity first becomes 
history as something destined. And it is only the destining into objectifying 
representation that makes the historical accessible as an object for historiography, 
i.e:, for a science, and on this basis makes possible the current equating of the 
historical with that which is chronicled.408 
Thus, the 'history' of the different modes in which being has been revealed is, for 
Heidegger, more fundamental than historiography. This relationship becomes a 
problem, however, because Heidegger identifies historiography and its findings with 
408 Heidegger, QCT, p24. 
Chapter Six 221 
an epoch of being that he is trying to overcome. This is the point at which 
Heidegger's reading of the history of Western philosophy as a single whole, unified 
by an understanding of being that was first developed by Plato and Aristotle, 
exacerbates this division of historiography and the history of being. I have not time 
here to provide an account of Heidegger's interpretations of the various stages of 
Western philosophy and several extensive accounts of his interpretation of this 
tradition are already available.409 However, Gillespie provides a useful summary in 
the following passages: 
For Heideggerhistmy begins with the early Greeks and ends with the explicit 
nihilism of late modernity. It is in his view the history of an error. The origin lies in 
the initial Greek mistake in grasping Being on the basis of the what-question as 
presence and the solidification of this misunderstanding in the thought of Plato and 
Aristotle. The history of the West is nothing other than the deepening of this error, a 
wandering ever further into the darkness of a blind alley that leads only to the ruin 
and desolation of the universal exploitation of the earth and the unlimited 
_degradation of man by world technology and ideological totalitarianism. 
The source of this error and the responsibility for its consequences, however, do not 
lie in man, according to Heidegger, but in Being itself as destiny.410 
This is the framework which Heidegger employs to interpret the history of the West. 
Yet as I mentioned at the end of the preceding chapter, he makes it quite clear that 
this interpretation is not drawn from what has been thought in the history of 
philosophy, but instead from what has been left unthought. I suggest that this strange 
conception of historical understanding stems from Heidegger's reflections on the 
nature of historicity in his earlier works. He argued in Being and Time that the past 
was only truly an historical past if it was 'taken up' or appropria~ed in the present. 
Heidegger thought that this argument undermined the understanding of historical 
methodology that had developed in Germany in the nineteenth century. He argued 
that the past does not possess its own 'objective' meaning which we can discover 
simply by observing it. Instead it is made meaningful in the light of future 
possibilities that are projected by existing people. The understanding of being is the 
most fundamental of these future possibilities and Heidegger is attempting to 
understand being in a new way. Thus it follows that his understanding of the 
tradition is also different. Gillespie writes of this situation: 
409 See Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, trans. Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene, 
(Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1971) and William Richardson, Heidegger: 
Through Phenomenology to Thought, (M. Nihjoff, The Hague, 1963). 
410 Michael Allen Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground of History, (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1984), pp164-165. 
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Heidegger's conception of interpretation is fundamentally bound up with his 
conception of Being and History. It is concerned not merely with the right or wrong 
reading of a text or historical situation but with the fundamental ontological 
transformation that occurs in or through this text or situation. It is in this sense that 
he wants to distinguish his method from mere interpretation as hermeneutics. His 
hermeneutical stance derives from the revelation of Being. This revelation, as we 
have seen, unfolds itself both forwards and backwards, establishing both a new goal 
and a new tradition appropriate to this goal. The means by which this new tradition 
comes to be is hermeneutics. Heidegger thus strives to think not what was thought, 
i.e. not the "Historical" truth, but what was left unthought, what indeed could not be 
thought because it was concealed by the prevailing goal and tradition. Heidegger's 
retrieval of past thought thus always is the establishment of a new tradition that is 
necessarily at odds with the old one and that always fails to "do justice" to it.411 
Thus, because Heidegger thinks that the entirety of Western philosophy, and indeed 
Western history in general, flows from an understanding of being which first 
developed in ancient Greece, we are left with no option but to accept or reject his 
new account of being and the tradition. Because our entire scientific apparatus has 
developed on the basis of an understanding of being as presence, its findings are of 
no use in determining the accuracy of Heidegger's claims. The problem is 
formulated in such a way that all that is left to us is to make a leap into this new 
understanding or to remain. with the. essence of technology. Yet, the premises upon 
which Heidegger sets up this crisis are all highly questionable. His understanding of 
the relationship between the revelation of being ~d the character of everyday life, 
his reduction of the philosophical tradition to a single ontological determination, his 
attempt to think what was unthought in the tradition without relying upon. an accurate 
determination of what was thought, are all points at which we could disagree with 
\ .. 
Heidegger. 
10. 
I will not go any further into Heidegger's reading of the philosophical tradition at 
this stage. My aim in this chapter was merely to acknowledge that Heidegger's 
account of the essence of technology is very much bound up with his reading of 
metaphysics. As I have shown, he thinks that the modem age is characterised by 
nihilism and endless technological expansion, and that this is the result of an original 
misunderstanding of the nature of being in ancient Greece. It is not necessary to 
discuss the weaknesses of this account in great detail in order to see how implausible 
it is on several grounds. As I have detailed above, the most obvious difficulty of 
Heidegger's position is his lack of any explanation of how the 'history of being', 
411 Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground of History, p167. 
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assuming that we adopt his version of it, interacts with concrete historical 
developments. Without such an explanation Heidegger's versio:ri of the 'history of 
being' appears simply as a crutch manufactured to support his deeply critical 
assessment of modem life. However; I do not think that the weakness of this element 
of Heidegger's reading of the essence of technology, undermines the insights that I 
have developed in the preceding two chapters. Despite the weakness of Heidegger's 
association of metaphysics and nihilism, the insight that our conception of being has 
been decisively shaped by an analogy between beings and artefacts remains valid. 
Thus, in the course of the last three chapters, I hope to have made clear, at least with 
respect to his critique of the essence of technology, that we may appropriate some of 
his insights without having to defend them all. Having rejected Heidegger's own 
estimation of the_ significance of the fact that beings have been understood via an 
analogy with artefacts, the question now arises as to the true import of this insight. 
This is a matter that I will take up in my concluding chapter. 
. i 
Conclusion 
Following the discussions contained in the preceding six chapters it is now possible 
to reach a conclusion concerning the two questions I posed at the outset of this study. 
These tWo questi~ns were 'What is the substance of Heidegger's account of modern 
technology?' and 'What are the limitations of this as an account of our relationship 
to technology?' I will address these questions in turn through abrief recounting of 
the findings that have emerged in this study. However, before I begin that task it is 
worth recalling the context within which I put these questions. 
In my introduction I argued that although it is important to address the ethical and 
practical consequences of each new technological development, this approach does 
not exhaust the philosophical significance of technology. Indeed, I stated that if we 
wanted to determine how modem technology differed from the technology of 
previous ages, aside from its greater complexity, then we must examine the 
metaphysical foundations of the modem age. This direction of investigation was 
suggested by the fact that modem science and modem technology are very closely 
related, in fact discoveries by and especially theoretical developments iii the former 
are often used to explain the great increase in efficiency and power of the latter. 
However, the simple recognition ofthis relationship is not sufficient to explain the 
distinctive nature of modem technology, as it only leads to more fundamental 
questions. In particular, it does not explain why science and technology have formed 
such a close alliance in modernity when this did not occur in either the medieval or 
. ancient periods of human history. In my introduction, I demonstrated the novelty of 
this alliance by outlining the different conceptions Aristotle and Bacon held 
regarding the relationship of scientific and practical knowledge. Whereas Aristotle 
defined techne and episteme in opposition to one another, Bacon asserted that 
scientific knowledge amounted precisely to power over nature. Thus, my 
investigation of modem technology was directed from the outset towards the 
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metaphysical determinations that lay behind both science and technology and which 
might explain their relationship. 
This .is the background within which I approached Heidegger's critique of 
technology. Although he is by no means the only philosopher to have investigated 
the nature of modem technology, he remains unique in his recognition of the fact that 
it presented not only ethical and practical problems, but metaphysical issues as well. 
The following passage from The Question Concerning Technology illustrates his 
approach: 
It is said that modem technology is something incomparably different from all 
earlier technologies because it is based on modem physics as an exact science. 
Meanwhile we have come to understand more clearly that the reverse holds true as 
well: Modem physics, as experimental, is dependerit upon technical apparatus and 
upon progress in the building of apparatus. The establishing of this mutual 
relationship between technology and physics is correct. But it remains a merely 
historiographical establishing of facts and says nothing about that in which this 
mutual relationship is grounded. The decisive question still remains: Of what 
essence is moderrttechnology that it happens to think of putting exact science to 
use?412 . 
I return to this initial phase of my investigation in order to clarify the sense of the 
two questions that I mentioned above. In asking, ' Wh(Jt is the substance of 
Heidegger's account of modern technology?', I am not asking simply for an account 
of what Heidegger wrote and said about technology. Rather, I am asking 'How does 
Heidegger's account of the essence of technology aid us in understanding the 
metaphysical foundations of modern technology?' Of course answering this question 
demands an accurate explication of Heidegger's position, yet thi~ is not the ultimate 
end of the investigation. Heidegger's work provides a means to think through the 
problems that I outlined above and although he also addresses this question, he does 
so within an investigative framework of his own. Therefore, my question regarding 
the 'substance' of Heidegger's account must be read as already implying my second 
question about the limitations of this account. In following B:eidegger' s thought, I 
have also attempted to determine where his thinking is no longer helpful. 
1. 
Heidegger's work ort the metaphysical folindations which underlie the union of 
modem science and technology yielded two crucial findings. Firstly, the form of 
412 Heidegger, QCT, p14. 
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knowledge manifest in modem science is indistinguishable from the practical 
knowledge that Aristotle called techne. Secondly, throughout the history of Western 
metaphysics, being itself has been understood through an analogy with artefacts. 
Heidegger reaches the first of these conclusions through a critique of the role of the 
subject in modem metaphysics. However, this critique consists in a demonstration of 
the fact that modem philosophy has produced a distorted account of human existence 
because it has unwittingly carried over an understanding of being and scientific 
knowledge from medieval philosophy. Contrary to the claims of early modem 
philosophers that they were beginning philosophy entirely anew based only upon 
what could be established by reason, modem philosophy assumes several decisive 
elements of the tradition it purports to reject. Thus, Heidegger's critique of modem 
metaphysics depends. upon an understanding of both medieval and ancient 
ontological doctrines. As such, his claim that modem science is an essentially 
technological form of knowledge, is dependent upon a reading of the history of 
metaphysics. This reading in turn suggests his further claim that since the beginning 
of Western philosophy in ancient Greece beings have been understood as .artefacts. 
In the following sections I will briefly recount the arguments that led to these two 
points regarding the relationship between metaphysics. an<;l technology. 
As is reflected in my division of this study into two sets of three chapters, 
Heidegger's critique of modem philosophy can be divided into two stages. The first 
stage consists of his attempt to develop a new account of human existence in 
opposition to his philosophical contemporaries. Although a critique of the modem 
tradition is implicit in Heidegger's work in the 1920s-as is clear from the fact that 
he undertakes an examination of human being in order to re-open the question of 
being itself-his main focus remains the development of a positive account of human 
.existence. This positive account became increasingly elaborate through the course of 
the 1920s and reached its peak in Being and Time. Although Heidegger continually 
reformulated the concepts of truth, understanding, language and authenticity that he 
developed in this early period, he never abandoned the critical standpoint which he 
had gained. Even though he never settled on a final 'doctrine', he always maintained 
a position from which these :fundamental concepts of philosophy appeared 
questionable. On this basis I suggest that although Heidegger himself did not deem 
Being and Time to be a success, it was instrumental in establishing a critical distance 
between himself and the metaphysical tradition as it then stood. 
i 
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The second phase' of Heidegger's critique of modem philosophy begins in the 1930s 
and continues until his death. He turns away from the attempt to provide a 
systematic account of human existence and towards interpretations of particular 
issues and figmes in the metaphysical tradition. It is in this phase that he develops . 
his explicit account of the essence of technology. Yet, as my choice of topics for the 
first three chapters suggest, if we take Heidegger's critique of technology as an 
attempt to understand the common foundation of modem science and technology in 
modem metaphysics, then his earlier work is just as important as his later, more 
explicit account. This is true in two different senses. Firstly, because we can gain a 
better understanding of Heidegger's later approach by examining the development of 
important themes and interpretations in his earlier work. Secondly, because this 
early·work represents a critique of modem metaphysics in its.own right. I return now 
to the details of this first critique of the modem tradition. 
2. 
In my first three chapters I argued that the key to understanding the significance of 
Being and Time is to be found in Heidegger's treatment of history. Heidegger 
distinguishes between the science of history or 'historiography' (Historie), and the 
more fundamental historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) of human existence itself. By 
recognising that history is not only the object of a science but is an essential 
characteristic of human existence itself, Heidegger makes a decisive break with the 
tradition of modem philosophy. The importance of this move lies in the fact that it 
undermines the various attempts made by modem philosophers to employ human 
subjectivity as a foundation for scientific knowledge. 
I have argued throughout this study that if, as Heidegger claims, modem philosophy 
is marked by a.decisive break with the ontological order of medieval philosophy, 
then John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding should be taken as the 
beginning of modem philosophy. Heidegger does not recognise the importance of 
Locke in the establishment of this modem tradition and he prefers instead to cast 
Descartes in this role. This is understandable given that Descartes portrays. himself 
as beginning philosophy anew on the basis of what he can establish for himself with 
certainty. However, Heidegger is mistaken because, despite the factthat the self-
certainty of the human subject plays a crucial role in Descartes philosophy, he 
remained firmly attached to a medieval ontology according to which beings were 
thought of as the creatmes of God. It was only in John Locke's Essay that a decisive 
break is made with the medieval ontological tradition. In that work Locke made two 
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extremely influential moves. First, he distinguished between real and nominal 
essences and argued that we only have direct access to the latter. Second, he adopted 
both a radically particularist ontology and an atomistic understanding of experience 
in direct opposition to the prevailing Aristotelian notion that what truly exists are 
general forms embodied in some matter. He still believed that objects possessed real 
essences; however, he identified these essences with the material constitution of 
beings rather than with their rational form. These two arguments combined to make 
the possibility of scientific knowledge highly problematic. Indeed, Locke himself 
adopted a sceptical outlook concerning the extent of human knowledge. This 
scepticism stems from the fact that scientific knowledge. had previously been 
conceived of as necessary and universal knowledge of real essences. This ideal of 
knowledge now seemed impossible to attain, for if we have access.only to atoms of 
sense experience, rather than to the rational order of nature as this had .been 
determined by God, then it seems that the best we may hope for is contingent 
knowledge of these sensory appearances. 
As I argued in my examination of J. S. Mill, Kant, Windelband.and Rickert, this 
dramatically new ontology forced subsequent philosophers into a pre'."occupation 
with the scope and legitimacy of scientific knowledge. This 'epistemological 
school', to borrow Dilthey' s phrase, developed two distinct responses to this 
problem, both of which failed to secure the ancient ideal .of universal and necessary 
scientific knowledge of the real essences of objects. Thus, British empiricists such as 
J. S. Mill relied upon the method of induction as a means of rising from our 
particular experiences to general laws of nature, whilst Kant and his followers 
appealed to the transcendental forms of experience as a foundation for necessary 
scientific knowledge. The empiricists could not justify the assumption that the 
regularities which we observe in our experience were necessary regularities; on the 
other hand the Kantians restricted the scope of scientific knowledge to appearances 
in order to salvage its necessity. 
Although these philosophers differed in the detail of their approaches, they are united 
by their attempt to provide a valid foundation for science within the human mind. 
However, the very possibility of finding such a foundation was undermined by 
Heidegger's claim that human existence is essentially historical. In Being and Time 
Heidegger argued that the being of human beings is not the same as that of 
substantial objects and that the unity of human existence is not constituted by the 
possession ofthe same characteristics through time. Rather, the unity of human 
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existence is to be found in the mode in which it acts and takes up its possibilities. 
Heidegger argues that humans do not have an essence which can be understood 
independently of their situation within time and history; instead temporality and 
historicity are our very 'essence'. As Heidegger put the matter: 
The "essence" of Da-sein lies in its existence. The characteristics to be found in this 
being are thus not objectively present "attributes" of an objectively present being 
which has such and such an "outward appearance," but rather possible ways for it to 
be, and only this.413 
Through this description of human existence as essentially worldly, historical and 
temporal, Heidegger undermined the notiqn that humanity can attain the divine 
outlook upon being, as was implied by the generally received ideals of theoretical 
knowledge. The foundation of human knowledge is not an absolutely detached 'I' 
which observes the world from without, but a self which only is through its 
involvement with the world, and a world which is revealed only in this concerned 
engagement. For Heidegger, the unity of human existence stems from an active 
unification of past, present, and future, rath.er than from an underlying substance 
which remains the same throughout the continuous transformation of our accidental 
characteristics. The direction of this argument was suggested, as Heidegger states in 
Being and Time, from Dilthey's attempts to develop a descriptive psychology upon 
which to found historical knowledge. 
Thus, Heidegger accomplishes two things in his attempts to provide a systematic 
account of the structure of human existence. First; he Un.dermined the modem 
project of using human existence as means of establishing that OUr' scientific 
knowledge was necessary, objective and universal. Second, he questioned whether 
the concept of 'substance' was adequate to describe the being of all beings. 
Heidegger recognised that this· concept of 'substance' persisted in the priority that 
was, and still is, accorded to 'thingliness' or 'objective presence' in our 
understanding of beings. However, as he demonstrated in Being and Time, the 
identification of 'substantiality' with. being in general obscured the true nature of 
human existence and its. involvement wiih the world. Thus, although technology was 
not yet an explicit theme for Heidegger, his early work ac~omplisheda break with 
the modem tradition of philosophy and provided the critical position within which 
his account of technology developed. This position includes a wealth of new 
413 Heidegger, BT, p40. 
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interpretations of fundamental philosophical concepts such as truth, interpretation 
and experience. Furthermore, the rudiments of his later reading of subjectivity as 
merely a continuation of medieval and ancient ontological doctrines were already 
apparent at this early stage. 
3. 
One of the important results of Heidegger's examination of human existence is his 
account of the 'fore-structure' or 'project' of understanding. He argued that 
understanding necessarily involves an anticipation of the objects that are in question. 
If our disclosing of objects is a process of understanding then there can be no 'pure' 
or un-interpreted object which can form the basis of subsequent investigations. The 
appearance of the object occurs only within a context and gains its character from 
this context. This argument is crucial for Heidegger's analysis of the difference 
between ancient and modem science, because it justifies the procedure of examining 
'nature' as a concept that underlies,the discovery of 'facts' by the sciences, rather 
than viewing it as a simple and unquestionable reality. To put this point another 
way, Heidegger argues that everything we encounter, both in our everyday lives and 
in explicit scientific research, is already understood in a certain way. In our 
everyday life this anticipatory understanding of objects is present but it is not 
explicit. However, in scientific research we explicitly conceive of objects within a 
highly complex and elaborated :framework and it is only within such a :framework 
that facts can be established. With regard to modem sciences such as physics,. 
chemistry, biology and so on, the most fundamental anticipation of their objects lies 
in their conception of nature. Even more basic than this conc,eption of nature, 
however, is the understanding of being itself. Thus, although these pre:-conceptions 
become increasingly abstract there is nothing that escapes this circle of 
understanding in which everything is understood as something. 
This is the methodological foundation for Heidegger's investigation of the difference 
between ancient and modem science which in tum is one of the foundations of his 
critique of technology. His examination of modem and ancient science is not 
focused on particular scientific discoveries or theories but upon the different 
understanding of 'nature' that is assumed in each period and the effect this has on the 
character of natural science. The central finding of this examination is that the form 
of knowledge that is characteristic of modem science is equivalent to that form of 
knowledge that Aristotle termed techne, that is productive knowledge. The 'nature' 
that concerns modem physics is not derived from simple observation but is 
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conceived in advance and then produced through experimentation. Thus, modem 
natural science is an essentially practical form of knowledge as it must constrain 
nature through experimentation in order to determine which lawsit follows. This 
situation is very different from the relationship between man and nature that 
underpinned Aristotelian science. Aristotle's method involved simple observation of 
how things ordinarily behave, rather than experimentation which involves 
constraining and manipulating natural objects in order to provide evidence for 
preconceived hypotheses. 
On the basis of this reading of modem science, Heidegger provides an answer to the 
question of why modem science and modem technology are so closely related. In 
fact he demonstrates that modem natural science depends essentially upon the 
practical manipulation of nature. Modem science is then itself a form of technology, 
if 'technology' is understood as knowledge of how to bring something into being. 
Yet this is not the most fundamental determination of Heidegger's investigation of 
technology. Rather, he also argues that this new configuration of science, nature and 
man is dependent upon a change in the conception of being itself atthe beginning of 
the modem age. This transformation consists in man~s assumption of the role of the 
absolute 'subject'. Heidegger argues that the modem determination o:f being is novel 
because man takes it upon himself to· establish what can count as a being based upon 
reason's examination of itself. In modernity, reason becomes divorced from being 
such that man, in so far as he is rational, must first provide a framework in which 
being can be understood. 
This is fundamentally different from the relationship between being and man in 
. . . 
ancient Greek and medieval philosophy. For Plato, theworldis the result of the 
Demiurge bringing together form and matter, whilst the Christian understanding of 
God as the absolute creator meant that he was considered to have produced both 
form and matter.414 Despite this significant difference regarding the. creation of form 
and matter, both ancient Greek and medieval philosophers understood the natural 
world to be rationally ordered. In both these periods the intelligible forms were 
already 'in' natural things. In the modem age, however, reason was restricted to 
414 It is true that Plato did not himself possess an explicit concept of 'matter'. It was not until 
Aristotle appropriated the term hyle to name 'that out of which' any particular thing is made 
that such a concept was developed. Nevertheless, Plato's account of world-making certainly 
implied such a concept. I have already mentioned the development of' hyle' as a 
philosophical term in section eight of chapter four. 
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humanity and the being of nature was a matter to be determined through the 
self-examination of this reason. As I mentioned earlier, Heidegger·mistakenly argues 
that Descartes marks the beginning of this new ontological order. This point should 
in fact be identified with Locke's decisive separation ofreal and nominal essences 
for it is only here that philosophers lost the convictionthat they could grasp the real 
essence of beings. . Despite this minor problem, Heidegger's interpretation of the 
modem understanding of being provides an insightful analysis of modem 
metaphysics. This analysis of subjectivity complements his earlier investigation of 
the different conceptions of nature that are found in ancient and modem science. The 
account of nature that arose from the investigation of science implied the account of 
subjectivity that he derived from his reading of Descartes. Thus, in his investigation 
of the essence of technology the most fundamental determination that Heidegger 
arrives at is that 'to be' in the modem age means 'to be represented'. This thesis 
implies both the accounts of subjectivity and nature that I described above. 
4. 
With these central findings in mind, we can now ask 'What are the limits of 
Heidegger's account of technology?' As a means of clarifying my answer to this 
question I will first lay outthe various senses of the term 'technology'. As I outlined 
at the beginning of chapter six, there are at least four senses in which 'technology' is 
employed. Thus it can be used to name man•made objects or artefacts, the 
knowledge that is employed in the production of these artefacts, the tools that are 
required in the production of artefacts, and the large scale systems within which 
artefacts are employed in order to achieve particular goals. Heidegger groups all of 
these senses together and refers to them as the 'instrumental definition' ·of 
technology. He argues that this instrumental definition does not get to heart of the 
matter because it does not address the structure of unconcealment that holds between 
being and man in the modem age. According to Heidegger, the instrumental 
definition of technology does not acknowledge that our new found mastery over 
nature is founded not only in a new approach to beings, but also in a new 
understanding of humanity. He writes in The Question Concerning Technology: 
So long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain held fast in the will 
to master it. We press on past the essence of technology. 
Conclusion 
When, however, we ask how the instrumental comes to presence as a kind of 
causality, then we experience this coming to presence as the destining of a 
revealing.415 
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Heidegger is correct insofar as he argues that technology presents us with 
metaphysical problems as well as more obvious questions concerning the ethical and 
practical effects of particular technological advances. Furthermore, his examination 
of the metaphysical ground of modem science and technology provides us with an 
understanding of the fundamental conceptual changes that took place at the 
beginning of the modem age. From this point of view it is possible to provide a 
metaphysical explanation of why modem science is essentially practical whereas 
medieval and ancient sciences were not. The fundamental elements of this 
explanation are that, in the face of the Lockean distinction of real and nominal 
essences, modem philosophers did not abandon the medieval concepts of substance 
and scientific knowledge. Rather, they employed humanity as the absolute subject 
and attempted to derive scientific knowledge from this basis. From the study of the 
metaphysical foundations of modem, medieval, and ancient Greek science, it is 
possible to see that beings had been conceived as artefacts in each period. 
Furthermore, the different conceptions of the maker and his materials in each case 
affected the structure of the natural sciences that were practiced in each era. 
It is true that most modem philosophers do explicitly reject the medieval concept of 
substance in the sense that they do not accept that 'to be' means 'to be a creature of 
God'. Nevertheless, as Heidegger correctly saw, they do unwittingly perpetuate the 
more fundamental understanding of being which underlay the medieval concept of 
substance. This more fundamental issue is the tendency to employ the being of 
objectively present things as the guideline for understanding being as such. This 
approach to understanding the being of all beings informed Aristotle's conception of 
ousia and was carried over into the medieval concept, substantia. From there it 
influenced the development of modem philosophy. 
Throughout these three periods of philosophy the real has, for the most part, been 
identified with what is eternally present and unchanging. Yet this approach 
precludes us from developing an adequate understanding of beings that are 
essentially processes of change and development. By interpreting everything that is 
through an analogy with artefacts the philosophical tradition also assumes that it is 
415 Heidegger, QCT, p32. 
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possible to separate the essence of a being from its existence. An artificer conceives 
of what he will produce in advance and the production of the object is only the 
instantiation of this pre-existing idea. Yet there are beings that cannot, without 
distortion, be interpreted in this way. As Heidegger rightly pointed out, the essence 
of a human being cannot be separated from its existence because it is a self-making 
process. Humans do not have their nature settled in advance, rather, it is determined 
through the process of existing itself. Thus, there is no 'human nature' that is 
separable from its particular temporal and historical development. That modern 
philosophers repeatedly tried to employ the 'subject' as a stable foundation for 
scientific knowledge demonstrates two points. First, the tendency to interpret being 
in terms of static objective presence remains strong in the modern tradition. Second, 
this tendency distorts the understanding of human existence. 
Thus, Heidegger's investigations of the metaphysical foundations of technology 
uncovered a surprisingly fundamental union between the Western understanding of 
being, the nature of products and the act of their production. These findings suggest 
further questions such as 'Why has being been interpreted via an analogy with 
artefacts?' and 'Is this means of understanding being appropriate?' and 'Can we find 
a more fundamental guideline by which to understand being?' 
Although Heidegger certainly grappled with these issues in his later work, his 
thinking becomes confused by his inflation of the explanatory power of these 
ontological findings. As I argued in my interpretation of The Question Concerning 
Technology in chapter six, Heidegger's later work lacks the careful distinctions that 
he made in the 1920s between the· scientific and everyday modes of human existence. 
As a result of this he tends to reduce the complexity of human life to the ontological 
determinations that supposedly underpin it. Thus he employs the finding that being 
means 'representedness' in modern philosophy to argue that, although we do not 
understand our actions in these terms, we treat everything as mere 'stock'. However, 
even if we accept Heidegger's assumption that these highly abstract ontological 
determinations somehow guide our everyday interaction with other people and 
objects in general, this seems to reduce all of our actions, whatever their concrete 
nature may be, to mere epiphenomena of this founding ontological position. 
Heidegger couples his assertion that all of our actions take place in the light of an 
understanding of beings as simply 'stock', with the claim that our actions cannot 
directly alter this situation. He writes that: 
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The coming to presence of technology threatens r~vealing, threatens it with the 
possibility that.all revealing will be consumed fu ordering and that everything will 
present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve.' Human activity can 
never directly counter thjs. danger. Human achievement alone can never banish it. 
But human reflectio11 9an ponder the fact that all saving power must be of a higher 
essence than what is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it.416 · 
Therefore, although Heidegger's critique of technology demonstrated that technology 
and Western metaphysics are far more closely related than is irrimediately apparent, 
his assessment of the 1sigfiificance of this fact is fundamentally mistaken. ·I suggest 
that the heart of this problem with Heidegger's view of the significance of ontology 
lies in all ambiguity iil his conception of the relationship between the scientific and 
everyday human existence. He argues in Being and Time that human existence is 
'ontological' in the sense that in all of its actions it already understands being in 
some 'Yay. It is this 'ontological~ constitution of human existence that makes 
possible 'ontology' understood in the more familiar sense as the explicit study of 
being. The difficulfy is that Heidegger loses sight of the fact that human life is 
articulated in many different ways. · Thus, although it is true tha:t humans must 
understand being in some way iii all their dealings, it is·also true that the explicit 
pursuit of truth and being which characterises science and philosophy is only one 
direction in which life can develop. This is not to say that an understanding of both 
truth and being is not important in other areas of life, or that it does not help shape 
the character of a society. However, it is a mistake to think that ontological 
determinations are alone sufficient for an understanding of an entire historical epoch. 
Furthermore, it is a mistake to think that these ontological determinations are not 
themselves influenced by the historical context in which they were developed. 
Heidegger makes both these mistakes in his attempt to develop a history of being 
which underlies the rest of human history. Thus, the shortcomings of Heidegger's 
account of the essence of technology lie in its extension beyond the realms of 
metaphysics and science, into an account of the history of Western civilisation. This 
extension produces a distorted account of that history and obfuscates the illuminating 
findings of his examination of modem metaphysics. 
However, these deficiencies in Heidegger's work should not lead us to dismiss his 
critique of the essence of technology. For, as I have tried to demonstrate, through 
this critique Heidegger managed to bring into the light some of the most fundamental 
characteristics of our metaphysical tradition. His vision of the significance of the 
416 Heidegger, QCT, pp33-34. 
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intertwining of technology and being was ultimately dogmatic and insupportable. 
Yet this should only encourage us to take up his legitimate insights and free them 
from this context. Thus,. the most fundamental achievement of Heidegger's 
investigation of the essence of technology was to render questionable once more 
such concepts as being, nature, truth, essence, knowledge and humanity. 
The exposure of the priority that was,·and still is, given to substantiality in Western 
metaphysics provides a new ()pportunity to examine the adequacy of our established 
philosophical and scientific structures. Heidegger himself was blinded to the new 
range of questions his account opened up due to his simplistic understanding of the 
'history of being'. However, we need not be limited by this same outlook. Instead 
of simply condemning the positive sciences as a product of a misguided 
understanding of being, we can examine them more closely to see how they have, 
through concrete research, developed new ways of understanding the being of their 
objects. The. achievements of the positive sciences should not be ignored if our aim 
is to develop a richer conception of bejng which will not distort our understanding of 
particular. beings. A new understanding of being will not simply 'befall' us, rather, it 
mustbe gained through the critical measurement of our understanc;ling of being 
against the. appearance of beings themselves. 
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